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Adult Mental Health Essay
Compare and contrast the effectiveness of cognitive behaviour 
therapy and systemic therapy in the treatment of eating disorders
URN: 3902129
PsychD Clinical Psychology 
Year I (Course 28)
December 1999
Compare and contrast the effectiveness of cognitive behaviour therapy and systemic 
therapy in the treatment of eating disorders
To investigate the effectiveness of cognitive behaviour therapy and systemic therapy in 
the treatment of eating disorders, a selection of empirical research evidence shall be 
reviewed. Comparing and contrasting this evidence will aim to establish effectiveness 
with different client sub-groups. This may be impacted upon by the principles of theory, 
therapy, and research methodology utilised by each model. Firstly, however it may be 
helpful to outline what is meant by CBT, systemic therapy, and the eating disorders.
Fundamentals
The development of cognitive behaviour therapy
The psychological therapies were not perceived as particularly ‘scientific’ until the 
movement towards more empirical methods. Through these means, behaviour therapy 
thrived on the “legitimacy of its foundations in academic-scientific psychology” 
(Rachman, 1996, pp.4 ). Throughout the various stages of development, behavioural 
approaches became increasingly influential as a result of the use of controlled trials (Paul 
1966; cited in Hawton, Salkovskis, Kirk, & Clark, 1989).
Although the effectiveness of behaviour therapy grew in acceptance, by the beginning of 
the 1970s there was some discontent for the model. The mechanistic notions that underlie 
the approach began to be criticised, for although the techniques were empirically 
validated, the treatment was often administered in a somewhat prescriptive way. This 
practice failed to assess the unique qualities and experiences which may make a particular 
choice of treatment inappropriate for a specific individual (Hawton et al, 1989).
The early successes of behaviour therapy in treating anxiety, were not evident when 
dealing with depression. The cognitive element in depression began to be considered by
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a number of pioneers in this field, including Beck (1967,1976; cited in Vitousek, 1996). 
He expressed that a patient’s negative thoughts have a central role in the maintenance of 
depression and that these thoughts needed to be identified and modified. With the 
success of Beck’s work, cognitive therapy gradually merged with behaviour therapy into 
the model o f‘cognitive behaviour therapy’ (CBT).
The merging of cognitive and behaviour therapy has led to important advances in 
treatment. Although there remains some fundamental difficulties in combining these two 
approaches (e.g. empirical measurement distinguishing between cognitive and 
behavioural processes), CBT has been applied to a wider range of client groups and used 
in addressing a variety of psychological disorders.
Indeed, the origins of CBT for the eating disorders can be traced back to Beck’s cognitive 
approach for depression. Clinical observations have often emphasised the relevance of a 
person’s over-valued ideas and beliefs, stressing the “paralysing sense of ineffectiveness, 
which pervades all thinking and activities of anorexic patients” (Bruch, 1973, pp.254). 
These methods are frequently combined with some more behavioural stimulus control 
techniques to help patients conform to the prescribed eating pattern (Mahoney & 
Mahoney, 1976; cited in Hawton et al., 1989).
The development of systemic therapy
As cognitive and behaviour therapies were beginning to merge, Bateson’s (1972) and 
Von Bertalanfly’s General Systems Theory (1968; cited in Partridge, in press) gained 
support. Contraiy to the aspirations of the behavioural psychologists around this time, 
who were aspiring to legitimise their theory on the foundations of academic-science, 
Bateson challenged the appropriateness of linear notions of causality which were 
principally derived from Newtonian physics. Instead, it was argued that there is no 
objective reality, and that causality is a circular process.
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This notion of causality can be clarified in terms of the family systems approach, in which 
the complete family system is conceptualised as the main target for treatment (Burbatti 
and Fonnenti, 1988). The individual within the system who is labelled as having the 
‘problem’, is perceived as having been ‘elected’ to present a symptom on behalf of the 
family. Hence, this ‘first order cybernetic view’ (as developed by the Palo Alto group) 
illustrates the way in which the system produces symptoms to solve a problem.
Towards the end of the 1970s, this approach further evolved to recognise the ‘observer’ 
as a part of the system, who could not be placed objectively outside of it. With this 
emergence of the ‘second order cybernetic approach’ professionals not only described 
themselves as family therapists but also as systemic therapists (Partridge, in press). To 
encompass this overlap, the terms ‘family’ and ‘systemic’ therapies shall be used 
interchangeably for the purpose of this essay.
What are the eating disorders?
There are four classifications of eating disorder in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV). Those are bulimia nervosa, anorexia nervosa, binge 
eating disorder, and eating disorder not otherwise specified. Despite the clinical 
importance of all of these disorders, this essay shall focus on anorexia and bulimia 
nervosa. Inclusion of the other eating disorders would be beyond the scope of this essay.
The DSM-IV sets out the diagnostic criteria for these two eating disorders as follows:
____________________________ Bulimia Nervosa___________________________
• The essential feature of this disorder is the recurrent episodes of binge eating, with a 
lack of control over eating behaviour during the eating binges._____________________
• Together with a preoccupation of body size, other associated features often include; 
self-induced vomiting, use of laxatives or diuretics, strict dieting and excessive exercise.
• A minimum of two binge-eating episodes a week over a period of three months are 
required to make this diagnosis._____________________________________________
• Persistent self-evaluation linked to ideas about body shape and weight._____________
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____________________________ Anorexia Nervosa_______ _____________________
• The primary feature of this disorder is a refusal to maintain a minimally “normal” body 
weight. This is defined as a body weight which is 15% lower than average for the 
individual’s age and height.__________________________________________ _
• There must also be an intense fear of becoming fat, even though underweight. This is 
accompanied by a severe restriction in food intake, and sometimes excessive exercising.
• Disturbance in the way in which one’s body shape, size, or weight is experienced, and 
an undue influence of body shape on self-evaluation._____________________________
• Amenorrhea in postmenarcheal women.________________________________
Bulimia Nervosa
Empirical findings for the effectiveness of CBT in the treatment of bulimia nervosa
Cognitive behaviour therapy has increasing support in the treatment of bulimia through 
controlled treatment trials. This treatment method typically reduces the frequency of 
bingeing and purging by up to 80%, with approximately half of the clients reporting a 
complete cessation of bulimic episodes (Vitousek, 1996).
One of the seminal studies into the effectiveness of CBT, was conducted by Fairbum, 
Jones, Peveler, Carr, Solomon, O’Connor, et al. (1991). This study investigated the 
effectiveness of three psychological treatments for bulimia. Using a pool of 75 
participants who were diagnosed with bulimia, the participants were randomly assigned to 
three groups to receive 19 sessions of either behavioural therapy, cognitive behaviour 
therapy, or interpersonal therapy. Comparisons of effectiveness were made between all 
three groups.
The results indicate that there was no reported differences in the effectiveness of these 
three treatments in the reduction of binge episodes and the alleviation of distressing 
symptoms. However, the CBT approach is reported to have had a superior effect on 
concern about weight and shape than either of the other two approaches. The frill
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treatment package also produced greater reductions in the frequency of vomiting than the 
interpersonal approach (Fairbum, et al., 1991).
Limitations of the findings
Despite these findings by Fairbum, et al. (1991), several factors may be used to dispute 
the reported effectiveness of CBT in the treatment of bulimia. A closer look at the 
randomisation and attrition used for this study reveals that at the outset of the study the 
patients who were assigned to the CBT group purged more frequently than those who 
received IPT. The consequence of this mismatch in groups suggests that CBT can not 
strictly be compared to IPT in its management of vomit reduction. Indeed, the fact that 
those in the CBT group were self-inducing vomit more frequently at the outset of the 
study, may be significant. The initial frequency of this symptom may have provided the 
patient a more tangible measure of their ‘improvement’ after a number of therapy 
sessions, which may have contributed to increased motivation and hence further 
facilitated positive outcomes.
The characteristics of the selected patients may also question the conclusion by Fairbum, 
et al. (1991), that CBT is superior to both of the other approaches. The reported 
effectiveness of CBT in the treatment of bulimia nervosa appears to be less convincing 
after the realisation that only 88% of the participants met the DSM-IH-R criteria for 
bulimia nervosa. Furthermore, 34% of the participants had met DSM-IH-R diagnostic 
criteria for anorexia nervosa in the past, and 76% had previously received treatment for 
an eating disorder. Many others had received treatment for other psychiatric problems, 
had misused alcohol, or took illegal drugs. Considering all of these other variables, it 
becomes apparent that personal history and characteristics may have been more indicative 
of ‘treatment outcomes’ than the style of therapy used.
A follow up study one year on (Fairbum, Jones, Peveler, Hope, and O’Connor, 1993) 
revealed some interesting results. Participants treated with IPT continued to make 
improvements over the 12 months following the original study and had similar scores to
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those in the CBT group on all outcome measures. This finding may have important 
implications for the effective treatment of bulimia, as, unlike CBT, the method of IPT 
enhanced treatment gains without addressing food or weight issues directly. Furthermore, 
the reported differences in the temporal pattern of improvement between CBT and IPT, 
suggests that each treatment may operate through different mediating mechanisms to 
achieve its goals.
Empirical findings for the effectiveness of systemic therapy in the treatment of bulimia 
nervosa
Similarities between the interpersonal therapy used by Fairbum et al. (1991) and the 
systemic model may have interesting implications. Jenkins and Asen (1992) state that 
systemic therapy is not reliant upon the amount of people being seen, but refers to the 
theoretical framework adopted in therapy. As in the case of IPT, the systems concept of 
“family therapy without the family” (Jenkins & Asen, 1992, pp.l) focuses on creating 
new connections between different patterns of relationships for the patient. Therefore, in 
IPT, although the patient is being seen individually, as with the CBT approach, the focus 
of treatment is more context related, rather than specifically focusing on food or weight 
issues. The results of the Fairbum et al. (1991) study, indicate the significance of 
contextual factors, as thoroughly addressed in the models of IPT and systems theory. 
This finding implies that these models are effective in the treatment of bulimia, albeit 
over a longer time-span than with CBT.
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Effectiveness of the approaches within different sub-groups
Other factors which appear to be indicative of treatment effectiveness have become 
apparent following a study by Russell, Szmukler, Dare, and Eisler (1987). The trial 
compared family therapy with individual supportive therapy in bulimia and anorexia 
nervosa. In a controlled trial, 87 patients (57 with anorexia; 23 with bulimia) were 
randomly allocated to one of the aforementioned treatment groups. The results of this 
therapeutic trial were that there were no significant differences between the two 
subgroups of patients (i.e. the anorexic patients and the bulimic patients). Moreover, 
family therapy was found to be the superior treatment in the younger patients who have 
experienced a relatively short-term illness. Subsequently, individual therapy led to a 
more successful outcome with older patients. Unfortunately, a one-year follow up on this 
trial showed that “a relatively small portion of patients had recovered from their anorexia 
nervosa or bulimia nervosa” (Russell et al., 1987. pp.1055).
Russell, et al. attribute the effectiveness of the family therapy approach with the younger 
patients to the family becoming re-empowered. They purport that the family therapy 
approach stresses the responsibility of the parents in helping the patient regain his/her 
health. Clinical impressions were that communications between the parents improved, 
and difficult issues, such as the gradual separation of the ‘child’ from the family became 
more comfortable to discuss.
However, it is evident from Russell et al. (1987) that using a family systems approach is 
not as effective as an individual approach for the older clients. The authors explain that 
this may be because the patient has “relative inaccessibility” to their parents’ efforts, 
hence minimising the therapeutic effect.
The outcome of this study serves as a warning when attempting to compare different 
treatment modalities for the eating disorders. It is crucial to delineate different subgroups 
of bulimia nervosa and anorexia nervosa in all studies. These sentiments are reiterated by
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Wilson, Fairbum and Agras (1997), in cautioning against attempting to apply the 
treatment programme which they developed to all bulimic patients. It is also stated that 
the CBT approach is clearly not “sufficient for the substantial minority who experience 
unresolved bulimic symptomatology” (Fairbum & Hay, 1992; cited in Salkovskis, 1996, 
pp.405).
Anorexia Nervosa
Empirical findings for the effectiveness of CBT in the treatment of anorexia nervosa
There is a noticeable contrast between the extent of evidence of treatment efficacy 
available concerning the eating disorders. CBT has a number of studies which support its 
clinical effectiveness in bulimia nervosa, whilst the systems theories have very few. 
However, this trend is reversed somewhat when applied to anorexia nervosa. Indeed, “the 
persistent lack of data [from a CBT perspective] is increasingly embarrassing for a 
modality with a stated commitment to empiricism” (Vitousek, 1996, pp.399).
One piece of research by Channon, Silva, Hemsley, and Perkins (1989) has provided 
some evidence for the effectiveness of the cognitive behavioural approach in anorexia 
nervosa. In this study, behavioural and cognitive behavioural conditions were compared 
to an unspecified treatment group. At the completion of treatment, all groups had 
significantly improved, although few differences were found between the three treatment 
conditions.
Limitations of the findings
Although these results are encouraging (Channon, et al., 1989), there were a number of 
methodological flaws which may have had a bearing on the conclusions of the study. 
Due to poor participant availability and the use of two alternative treatment groups, each
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group only had eight members. Vitousek (1996) also questions the method of CBT used 
in the trials, identifying a discrepancy away from the model of CBT recommended by 
Gamer and Bemis (1982,1985; cited in Vitousek, 1996).
The scarcity of empirical research on the effectiveness of CBT in the treatment of 
anorexia.
Some reasons given for the deficiency of research evidence offered by Vitousek (1996) 
are for reasons o f‘practicality’. The longer recommended course of therapy for anorexics 
is reported to increase the likelihood of attrition, resulting in publication problems. 
Vitousek also expresses some concerns regarding the difficulties in formulating the 
therapeutic task for the later phases of the intervention.
Concern is appropriate if the model of CBT can only develop its knowledge and 
understanding through relying on ‘easy and compliant’ clinical groups. Indeed, these 
sentiments could well contribute to the fragile nature of the alliance between patients and 
psychologists. This observation is encapsulated by a recovered anorexic who was very 
familiar with current research practices: “It is difficult not to gain the impression form the 
literature on anorexia nervosa that individual therapy has been devalued because 
psychotherapists do not like anorexics and anorexics do not like psychotherapists” 
(MacLeod, 1982; cited in Salkovskis, 1996, pp.400).
Improving the understanding of such relational issues is of central importance to the 
systemic therapies. For this reason comparisons with the CBT approach can be made 
through an evaluation of treatment effectiveness.
Empirical findings for the effectiveness of systemic therapy for anorexia nervosa
Minuchin and his colleagues developed the first conjectures as to the usefulness of family 
therapy in the treatment of anorexia. Using ‘structural interventions’, Minuchin and his
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co-workers aimed to alter the ‘dysfunctional’ state of the family. This process involved 
identifying the patterns of family organisations and limiting or encouraging these 
processes accordingly. For example, if the family accepts alliances between the child and 
parent which are judged to be harmful by the therapists, then directive interventions are 
made to reduce this tendency (Minuchin, Rosman, & Baker, 1978). The aim of this 
intervention is to increase in the bond between the parents as well as placing the children 
in a more appropriate and stronger sibling subsystem.
Minuchin et al. (1978) used family mealtimes to explore these interactions in an attempt 
to identify the ‘dysfunction’ which caused the eating problems. Initially the parents are 
encouraged to collaborate on what they want their child to eat. The next important step 
is to ensure that conflicts are not avoided at meal times, thus breaking the habitual pattern 
of interaction. Having taken responsibility for the symptom, the parents are then believed 
to be able to form a stronger coalition, and allow the child more room to develop.
This approach to anorexia has produced some very effective treatment outcomes. In a 
follow up study of 52 adolescents with anorexia, Minuchin et al. (1978) reported a good 
outcome in 80% of cases. The efficacy of a structural approach in the treatment of 
anorexia has been supported by a number of other controlled treatment studies (Martin. 
1985; cited in Vitousek, 1996; Russell, et al. 1987).
Limitations of some of the fundamental assumptions of systemic therapy
Family therapy, as initiated by Minuchin and his colleagues, can be compared to CBT. 
Common to both models is the concept o f‘dysfonction’. Minuchin et al. (1978) describe 
the family which comes into therapy as the ‘dysfunctional family’. In CBT, Beck (1967, 
1976) identified the concept of the formation o f ‘dysfunctional assumptions’ within the 
cognitive model of depression. Since then Teasdale (1997; cited in Fairbum, Shafron and
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Cooper, 1999) has stressed that treatment should aim to replace the dysfunctional mind­
sets (such as the anorexic identity) with more adaptive ones. Such dysfunctional 
assumptions are described as a rigid, extreme set of beliefs drawn from an individual’s 
experiences, which are counterproductive (Fennell; cited in Hawton et al., 1989).
The notion that a family (or indeed, an individual) has something ‘wrong’ with it has been 
widely criticised as unconstructive. The assumption that there is ‘something wrong’ in a 
family solicits the question as to what style of family organisation is ‘right’ and how 
‘rightness’ can be defined (Jones, 1990) . This line of enquiry from the feminist 
perspective, questions the role of the therapist in the therapeutic process. Feminists have 
been particularly critical of the approaches which emphasise issues of hierarchy and 
control within families, and the practices which place the therapist in the role of the 
‘powerful expert’. This exercise of power in intimate relationships is described as 
ineffective and unethical, as it conceals the abuse of power by men over women, and by 
parents over children (Jones, 1990).
Other authors have also expressed strong criticisms of the structural model and the 
potential abuse of power. Erickson (1988, pp.229) states that “if both the family as a set 
of persons, and external reality, are excluded as points of departure for analysis, then 
what ground is there for interpretation of meaning within the system and for 
intervention?” Erickson’s answer to this question is that the structure of relations, their 
meaning, and decisions about change, are produced by the therapist alone. Considering 
that there is no objective knowledge of the family’s interactive processes, any analysis 
made by the therapist is an interpretation and “no interpretation is value free” (Steiner, 
1986; cited in Erickson, 1988, pp.229). By this rationale, Erickson questions whether 
therapists “can have a sufficiently God-like perspective to perform the task (pp.229).”
Through these observations, it is apparent that the limitations of a collaborative 
therapeutic approach are therefore not exclusive to the cognitive behaviour therapist. In
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addition to this, perceptions of ‘dysfunction’ and ‘rightness’, would inevitably have 
implications on how the practitioner perceives outcome effectiveness.
However, the systemic therapies have evolved, absorbing a combination of post modem 
and feminist ideas. This evolution has seen shifts from structural models through to 
developments by the Milan associates, and the Maudsley model. These developments 
have increased the amount of evidence for the effectiveness of a systemic approach in the 
treatment of anorexia.
Effectiveness of the approaches within different sub-groups
The study by Russell et al. (1987) indicates the effectiveness of family therapy in the 
treatment of both anorexia and bulimia in adolescent patients who had the condition for 
less than three years. This group of patients had achieved a mean body weight which 
amounted to 93% of the mean matched population level. The effectiveness of this 
approach was still evident during a long-term follow up (Eisler, Dare, Russell, Szmukler, 
Le Grange, and Dodge, 1996).
The model of family therapy used with adolescent anorexic patients closely resembles the 
structural model (Dare and Eisler, 1997). However, modifications to the approach have 
eliminated some of the controversial aspects of the model which have been discussed. 
Although parental control of the child’s eating is still encouraged, no assumptions are 
made concerning the ‘dysfunctional patterns’ of family functioning and no attempt is 
made to reverse such a dysfunction.
Effectiveness of a family versus an individual approach
Therapeutic approaches which have been applied to both the individual, and as the family 
unit, have advanced our understanding of treatment effectiveness.
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Strategies such as the prevention of conflict avoidance within the family, have been 
criticised by some as harmful. A study (Le Grange, Eisler, Dare, and Hodes, 1992) which 
has compared the use of a more challenging and confrontational model of family therapy, 
with a family intervention where the parents and child were seen separately, found that 
there was no difference in effectiveness. Furthermore, the researchers reported that in 
families where there were already high levels of expressed emotion (Leff & Vaughn, 
1985), for example criticism and hostility, the latter model was more effective. Possible 
reasons for this outcome are provided by Squire-Dehouk (1993; cited in Dare and Eisler, 
1997), whose study identified that there is a counter-productive quality associated with 
increased conflict, as such conflicts are usually based around feelings of guilt or blame.
In light of these studies, it may be of use to make the comparison between a family 
therapy approach which utilises the technique of ‘confrontation’ and a cognitive 
behaviour approach which usually operates on an individual basis. If higher levels of 
criticism have a detrimental impact on the effectiveness of family therapy for anorexia 
nervosa (Szmukler, Eisler, Russell, and Dare, 1985; Le Grange et al. 1992), then why 
does the research evidence fail to establish an individual approach (e.g. CBT), as the 
favoured intervention for this disorder?
As already discussed (Channon, et al., 1989), CBT may potentially have some very useful 
strategies for the treatment of anorexia. However, until these are investigated through 
empirical means there is very little evidence to support the approach. A hypothesised 
advantage of CBT over the ‘confrontational’ technique used in some areas of family 
therapy, may be that there would be a reduction in expressed emotion. This treatment 
comparison has yet to be carried out.
Nonetheless, Robin, Siegel,.Koepkes Moye, and Tice (1994) conducted a controlled trial 
which did compare the effectiveness of family therapy, with an individual therapy (‘ego 
oriented’). Both treatment approaches were reported to be equally effective. However, 
the therapist also saw the parents of those in the individual therapy group for sessions
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intermittently throughout the treatment programme. Dare and Eisler (1997) report that 
this study contributes to the compelling evidence supporting the importance of involving 
the parents in the treatment of anorexia nervosa in adolescents. Whether the parents and 
child are seen together or on separate occasions, the empirical evidence (Robin, et al. 
1994) appears to support the effectiveness of adopting a systemic approach to understand 
and address the experiences and interactions within the family.
Despite the contrast between the approaches of family therapy and CBT, concerning the 
volume of evidence for the treatment of anorexia nervosa, it appears to be a little 
presumptuous to make comparisons between the necessity of parental input to enable an 
effective intervention. The piece of research carried out by Robin et al. (1994) may have 
contributed to the understanding of anorexia. The problem is, however, that through using 
a control group of ‘individual therapy’, which also included sessions with the patients’ 
parents, it is impossible to make the distinction between the effectiveness of an individual 
approach, and one that involves the whole family.
Using outcome measure to assess effectiveness
Some concern has been expressed with regards to the methodological issues surrounding 
outcome measurement. Research in both CBT and systems approaches have often relied 
upon self-report measures. These measures are believed to be vulnerable to bias and 
distortion with the anorexic population for a number of reasons (Vitousek, 1996). In an 
attempt to preserve ego-syntonic (protected) symptomatology , information on the 
measures may be falsified as part of a defence stance. Conversely, a tendency towards 
over-compliance may also bias the outcomes. Another factor which may affect the 
.accuracy of the .anorexics’ responses is .the dimini shed capacity of cognitive processes as 
a result of long term under nourishment (Gamer, Rockert, Olmsted, Johnson, and 
Coscina, 1985; cited in Gamer and Garfinkel, 1997).
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Also, measuring effectiveness solely on the alleviation of symptoms is not acceptable in 
respect to family therapy (Wynne, 1988; Orbach, 1985; cited in Dodge, Hodes, Eisler, 
and Dare, 1999). Although symptom changes in the eating disorders are often associated 
with psychological well being and social adjustment (Dodge, et al., 1995), it is important 
to investigate changes in family relationships. Scales such as the Morgan Russell Scale 
are often used to assess these factors. However, self-report bias may not be eliminated.
Is the evaluation of treatment effectiveness congruous with the principles of theory and 
practice?
One final, fundamental question needs to be considered to evaluate treatment 
effectiveness. That is; does the evidence do the therapy justice, and does the therapy do 
the evidence justice? This question can now be addressed by withdrawing from the 
security of these evidence-based findings and taking a more objective, macrocosmic 
perspective of the treatment modalities.
“The field of ‘family’ or systemic therapy has made a paradigm shift from a modernist to 
a post-modern perspective” (Partridge, in press, pp. 179). Postmodernism rejects the 
modernist perspective, which is based upon the foundation assumptions of the 
Enlightenment perspective (Grenz, 1996). That is, aspects of reality are placed under the 
scrutiny of reason and assessed on the basis of that criterion. The perspective puts its 
frith into human rational capabilities, as scientific principles are adopted to allow the 
neutral observer to gain expertise in a specific field of endeavour.
Contrary to the systemic approach, the cognitive behaviour therapist places greater 
emphasis on the ‘scientist-practitioner approach’, a supposition which is more consistent 
with the Enlightenment perspective. Through CBT’s orientation in positivist 
epistemology, an academic-scientific approach (Rachman, 1996) is utilised in the 
integration of theory, research, and clinical practice.
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Conversely, the systemic approach claims to have developed post-modern principles 
(Partridge, in press), in that ‘truths’ are not perceived as theoretical and objective (Grenz, 
1996). Foucault (cited in Grenz, 1996) expresses that ‘truths’ are arbitrarily generated by 
the practices which make it possible. In turn, these truths which form our knowledge­
base then produce our reality (Foucault, cited in Grenz, 1996). He goes on to state that 
science is an ‘ideology’ and when used to generate knowledge, is an act of violence. As a 
result of these considerations, Foucault collapses practice and theory into each other.
With this in mind, it becomes apparent that there are some anomalies in the systemic 
methods used to conduct therapy, and the methods used in accumulating evidence of 
treatment effectiveness. These can be exemplified through the work of Dare, Eisler, 
Colahan, Crowther, Senior, and Ansen (1995) which makes comparisons between clinical 
and empirical methods used with anorexia. The authors have concluded that clinical 
insights could not be proven to be ‘true’, and are less generalisable than the empirical 
equivalent. These principles appear to directly contrast with the post-modern perspective 
as outlined by Foucault, in that the conclusions of Dare et al. (1995) have used scientific 
means to generate ‘truths’ and knowledge. This is the exact process, which has been 
described as being an act o f‘violence’(Foucault; cited in Grenz, 1996).
As well as the reliance on empirical means, there are several other factors, which exclude 
the systemic approach from post-modern principles. Although the systemic approach 
considers relations between different parts of the system, ‘personal’ diagnoses usually 
seem to be preferred to ‘relational’ diagnoses. Anderson (1992) argues that this 
modernist approach is harmful because the DSM-IV (and its emphasis on personal 
diagnosis) assumes that “psychotherapy is a relationship between an expert who has
knowledge and a non-expert who needs help this process reduces uncertainty by telling
the therapist what he or she ought to do and suggesting how the client ought to change in 
order to get well (pp. 105).”
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The incongruity of postmodernism and systemic treatment is reinforced by Erickson’s 
(1988) assertion that therapists replace the family’s intentions and understandings with 
his/her own values. This process of ‘systems analysis’ is described to be an act of 
“mystification and sophistry wearing a mask of science (pp.226)”.
Having considered these points, it is possible to answer the question posed at the 
beginning of this section. CBT clearly attempts to use scientific principles in its theory, 
research and practice. Although there are some hazards identified with this approach, the 
consistency of the model contributes to the conclusion that the evidence does the therapy 
justice and the therapy does the evidence justice.
However, the incongruity between the systemic approach and post-modern principles, 
raises some serious concerns about it’s methods of treatment and subsequent 
effectiveness. Contrary to Foucault’s ideas that the theory and practice are collapsed into 
each other, the systemic approach appears to have various divisions between philosophy, 
theory, practice and research methodology. Therefore, the answer to that same question, 
would be, that the principles of systemic therapy, and the techniques used to accumulate 
the evidence, are somewhat incongruous. Subsequently, any reported treatment 
effectiveness would need to be evaluated with these considerations in mind.
Conclusion
In comparison to other clinical populations, there is relatively little evidence for the 
effectiveness of cognitive behaviour therapy in the treatment of either anorexia or bulimia 
nervosa (Fairbum; cited in Hawton et al. 1989). Nonetheless, the shift from descriptive to 
experimental measures has indicated that CBT is as effective, or superior, to any other 
forms of therapy in the treatment of bulimia.
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In spite of these developments, many fundamental issues are still not understood. For 
example, it is still unclear which cognitions need to be changed for treatment to be 
successful (Cooper, 1997). A recognition of the differences in cognitive disturbance 
between bulimics and anorexics, and across the different sub-groups would not only 
contribute to the theory, but may also provide a means of developing more effective 
treatment strategies.
Similarly, a number of empirical studies have begun to research the effectiveness of 
systemic therapy in the treatment of anorexia, and to a lesser extent bulimia nervosa. 
When applied to anorexia, the model has been shown to be effective with younger people, 
and those who have suffered for a short duration of time. Despite the conclusions drawn 
from the research, “the effectiveness of family therapy is no indication that family 
psychopathology was contributory to the development of the disorder” (Crisp, Norton, 
Gowers, Halek, Bowyer, Yeldham, et al., 1991, pp.326). Therefore, as with CBT, there is 
still a limited understanding of the core issues.
As the effectiveness of treatment strategies are increasingly being investigated, some 
methodological hazards have also become identified. The interpretation of data through 
the use of self-report measures, has sometimes been viewed as ‘contaminated’ by 
respondent bias. Likewise, any more qualitative interpretations made by the therapist 
may be subject to differing levels of distortion.
Research methodology appears to be a somewhat contentious area, especially for the 
systemic therapist. As the approach continues to develop around post-modern principles, 
the incongruous nature of the treatment paradigm, and aspirations of empiricism, may 
have some fundamental implications on evaluating exactly what constitutes an effective 
intervention.
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What is the impact of others’ expectations on the communicative abilities of people 
with learning disabilities and how might a clinical psychologist work with these
issues?
To begin to appreciate the importance of die communicative abilities of people with a 
learning disability, it is necessary to value die significance of their interactions with 
others within their social networks. The very nature of communicadon, especially in this 
population, is largely determined by die expectations and reactions of these significant 
others. TO place these issues in context, this essay will attempt to address the theoretical 
understandings, in die field of communication in learning disabilities, using a number of 
applied examples. This process may provide the means to illustrate the diversity of the; 
methods and quality of communication, significant people which comprise the social 
networks, levels of expectation, impact of these expectations and ways in which a clinical 
psychologist may begin to address them.
Fundamentals
What is communication?
Standard practice implies that an author should define aS of the significant terms in a 
question before attempting to investigate and debate the meaning of die question. 
However, one may argue that a standard definition to any question including die word 
^communication” would fail to address the very meaning of the term.
Communication cannot be simply differentiated between those who are, and those who 
are not judged to have a learning disability. Indeed, it has been argued that no two 
people, ^disabled” or otherwise can ever share their insulated experiences into a single 
self-transcendence. Sensations, feelings, insights, fancies -  all these are private and, 
except through symbols and at second hand, incommunicable ...communication between 
universes is incomplete or even non-existent... words are uttered but fait to enlighten... the 
things and events to which symbols refer belong to mutually exclusive islands" (Aldous 
Huxley, 1954, pp.3).
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These “mutually exclusive islands” may take the form of the “communicator” and the 
“addressee”. Two (or more) persons in a particular context may attempt to express, 
interpret and negotiate meaning through verbal or non-verbal means. Van Der Gaag and 
Dormandy (1994) suggest that non-verbal forms of communication can be said to be 
“weak communication”. They argue that such methods constrain the communication to 
the “here and now” and are greatly inferior to their linguistic equivalent. Considering the 
many modes of communication used within both the learning disability and the non- 
learning disability populations (signs, symbols, music, art, drama, etc), including this very 
essay, one can challenge any suggestion of such an uni-dimensional approach to 
communication.
Indeed, the potential chasm between modes of communication, as well as between 
communicator and interpreter may be illustrated through the use of visual art. If the 
reader could be encouraged to study the painting below, it may be interesting to consider 
what the artist was trying to communicate and subsequently what the audience expects 
the artist was attempting to convey.
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MATERIAL REDACTED AT REQUEST OF UNIVERSITY
An interpretation o f Hopper’s message
“Hopper portrays the couple as loving but not necessarily in love. Another interpretation 
might suggest that she dressed up for the man as a surprise when he came home from  
work. The playing o f the piano gives the painting a sense o f motion, but by having the 
looks as if  she has just turned away from the man for a moment to play a note or two to 
break the uncomfortable silence that was the end result o f the man’s focussed reading. It 
seems that no matter what she does, the man still refuses to acknowledge that she is even 
in the room. The door may represent new opportunities for the man’s business or the 
relationship o f the couple. The darkness in the side with the man may represent the 
coldness o f men in society, while the brightness on the side o f the woman may represent 
the warmth and compassion o f women ” (Ungles, 2000, p. 1).
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Above, an interpreter attempts to decipher Hopper’s message. This translation may well 
differ significantly from Hopper’s and even the reader’s. Hence, one can begin to 
appreciate the impact of an interpreter’s expectations of the communicator and the 
subjectivity of such an interpretation. A comparison of the emotions engendered when 
looking at the painting, in contrast to reading the written “interpretation”, may also 
encapsulate the qualitative differences between modes of communication.
Communication and learning disability
Having outlined the impact of different modes of communication as well as raising some 
issues concerning the subjectivity of interpretation, it is possible to relate the significance 
of such communications to people with a learning disability. Definitions of a learning 
disability usually refer to sub-average intellectual functioning, and limitations in adaptive 
skill areas, which are manifested before the age of sixteen (for details see Dodd and 
Webb, 1998).
Whilst valuing the need not to use de-humanising labels, there is a defensive act 
associated with changing a term eveiy few years in the “irrational hope that the 
irrevocable handicap could go away if its name were changed” (Stokes and Sinason, 
1992). With this in mind, the terms “learning disability”, “mental handicap”, and “mental 
retardation” shall be used inter-changeably throughout this essay.
Adults with a learning disability experience a range of communication problems (Bartlett, 
1997). A survey by Law and Lester (1991) found that in a social education centre, 81% 
of the learning disabled population required support with their communication skills with 
9.5% being non-verbal and 5.9% presenting with low comprehension and expression.
So, what is the correlation between mental handicap and communication difficulties? 
Leudar (1989) asserts that a mental handicap is a tangible mental phenomenon, which is 
distributed through the process of communication. This standpoint has been developed as 
some individuals with learning disabilities are said to restrict their levels of
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communication or even withdraw altogether in response to difficult communicative 
interactions and in an attempt to assert personal autonomy in restrictive environments 
(Leudar, Fraser and Jeeves, 1984, 1987; cited in Leudar; 1989). Hence, the importance 
for “others” working and interacting with this population to be aware of the complexities 
of communicative ability and to adjust their expectations accordingly to facilitate 
maximum development.
The location of communicative disorders 
There has been a major shift in the expectations of the communicative abilities of people 
with learning disabilities since researchers have begun to challenge the individualist 
perspective, that communication disorders are located within the person (Leudar, 1981; 
cited in Leudar, 1989). Following the work of Chomsky (1957; cited in Beveridge, 
1989), for many decades the acquisition of language was seen as being genetically 
predetermined and accessible only to those “organically intact people”. Not surprisingly, 
these assumptions led to poor expectations of improvement and few interventions were 
devised for this population.
These early beliefs, locating the deficit within the individual, led researchers to search for 
“what is wrong with retarded children”, which is said to have blocked our understanding 
of their behaviour and communication in environmental and social terms (Ryan, 1975; 
Leudar, 1981; cited in Leudar, 1989). This process also lacked ecological validity as the 
performance of retarded and non-retarded people was compared on a variety of 
experimental tasks.
History has seen the “developmental-difference” debate, which is associated with 
cognitive and language development in mentally retarded children, have a profound 
impact on what is expected of these individuals and subsequent service provision. Initial 
stimulus for research in this area was provided by Lenneberg (1967; cited in Kamhi and 
Masterson, 1989), who stated that there was a quantitative difference between the 
language of retarded and non-retarded children. This “developmental perspective”
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claims that handicapped and non-handicapped children pass through identical 
developmental stages (e.g. the stages described by Piaget, 1970; cited in Kamhi and 
Masterson, 1989), but at a different rate and reach a different upper level. Conversely, 
the “difference perspective” would argue that even when equated for level of 
development, there are qualitative differences in language between the retarded and non- 
retarded children.
Support for the qualitative view has emerged from a number of studies, including one by 
Semmel, Barritt and Bennet (1970; cited in Kamhi and Masterson, 1989). In a task where 
children were asked to suggest words deleted from a sentence context, the retarded 
children performed at a significantly poorer level then their mental age matched non- 
retarded counterparts. This finding led the authors to conclude that there are fundamental 
differences between the two groups, as the grammatical re-coding ability of the mentally 
retarded group is less efficient.
Conclusions drawn from such studies have been often been stated as over-simplifications 
which may detract from the quantitative, “difference” hypothesis. A seminal study by 
Lackner (1968; cited in Kamhi and Masterson, 1989 ) developed a “grammar” for each of 
the five retarded children, with a mental age ranging from 2.8 -  5.9 years. The single 
grammar which Lackner constructed for each child was compared to investigate the 
development of grammar from child to child as the mental age increased. Lackner 
observed how increases in syntactic complexity were related to increases in mental age. 
This led him to conclude that mentally retarded children are not qualitatively different 
from non-retarded children as they progress through similar developmental trends.
Limitations of these studies addressing the difference -  development issues have led to 
questioning as to the validity of the results. Factors such as the heterogeneity of the 
retarded subjects, measures used, and the way in which language and cognitive level were 
compared, have raised serious methodological concerns. Moreover, this insistence on 
locating the “problem” of language and communication deficit within the individual, may
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suggest that others should not expect the learning disabled person to progress “beyond 
their means”. This notion is contested within many disciplines, including clinical 
psychology, as an appreciation of the effect of social and environmental factors are 
continuing to develop.
From the individual to the social 
There has been some recommendations for psychology to reflect upon it’s own practice to 
recognise and progress from the dichotomy of the universal and the individual familiar to 
the themes of modernity (for details see Kvale, 1992 ) whereby “the rootedness of human 
activity and language in a given social historical context is overlooked” (pp.33). This 
movement from the individual to the social is evident in the more contemporary 
developments concerning how communication in learning disability is perceived. The 
focus has shifted from, why those with learning disability cannot communicate, to how 
they can. Indeed, the expectations of their potential ability, has been renegotiated with 
the recognition that the route to overcoming intellectual impairment is through the quality 
of communicative exchanges (Beveridge, 1989).
One factor reflecting such exchanges is that regardless of a child’s linguistic ability, there 
is evidence that children will frequently blame themselves for any communication 
failures (Robinson, 1986; cited in Beveridge, 1989). Indeed, Beveridge, Spencer, and 
Mitler (1978; cited in Beveridge, 1989) observed how a group of learning disabled 
adolescents with relatively high linguistic ability would initiate few social interactions, 
blaming themselves for communication failures. The professional would need to detect 
this attribution of blame to encourage and facilitate further communicative interactions.
However, a serious concern arises when the professional does not detect how they are 
“disabling” that individual. This can be exemplified through the study by Newton (1981; 
cited in Beveridge, 1989), which shows how an interactive process in the classroom 
appears to devalue the communicative competence of the child with a mental handicap. 
Newton designed several situations which were problematic for the severely learning
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disabled child. Each task relied upon the child communicating to the teacher or another 
pupil to solve the problem (e.g. asking for a toothbrush to clean their teeth). Newton 
found that in some respects the handicapped population were more reluctant to make 
social contact to solve the problems than were their non-handicapped counterparts.
With this evidence, alongside findings by Beveridge and Hurrell (1980; cited in 
Beveridge, 1989) that over 50% of initiations made by learning disabled pupils were not 
acknowledged by teachers, it becomes easier to understand why these pupils are reluctant 
to seek assistance. Furthermore, the teachers were not only fairly ineffective at predicting 
whether a child would be able to solve one of the problems, but were also less able to say 
whether a child would communicate his/her difficulty. Perhaps through the limits of 
communication in this environment, the teachers hold false expectations that those pupils 
with a learning disability who were able to solve one problem would be able to solve 
them all. This assumption could have an immense impact on the child accessing the 
relevant support to augment further development.
The impact of parental expectations on the child with a learning disability is also 
important in overcoming communicative obstacles. For example, parents of children with 
Down’s Syndrome are now advised to allow sufficient time for their child to respond to 
them without overwhelming them with questions, and directives (Wootton, 1989). 
Buckley, Emslie, Haslegrave, and Provost (1986; cited in Wootton, 1989) suggest that 
parents let the child lead the communication, encouraging their initiations where possible. 
This is deemed as important as studies have shown that children with Down’s syndrome 
initiate vocal communication with their parents half as much as non-handicapped children 
(Fisher, 1983; cited in Wootton, 1989).
Experiencing the richness of diversity
Previously, the point was made that it is necessary to reflect on the practice of psychology 
to attempt to evaluate effectiveness. A brief oscillation from the research and academic 
details associated with this subject may ameliorate the understanding of these issues at a
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meta-level. For example, whilst considering the disabling effect of expecting children 
with Down’s syndrome to only be able to manage directive instruction, once again, art 
can be used to illustrate a point.
Art is employed as a mode of communication. Whereas rational thought has rejected the 
non-linear, the imprecise and the unpredictable, art in a postmodern world (for details see 
Kvale, 1992) rejects the idea of a unitary frame of reference. As stated previously, when 
interpreting a painting (e.g. Hopper’s Room in New York) the audience uses a multitude 
of perspectives and experiences to attribute meaning or feeling to the piece. Hence, the 
unitary frame of reference is replaced by a plurality of perspectives leading to a 
fragmentation of experiences (Kvale, 1992). One fears that substituting a diversity of 
experiences for the restraints of a uni-modal, directional and functional approach may 
well have the impact of further disabling people with Down’s syndrome and condemning 
them to a merely “functional” existence. An awareness of this disabling effect is essential 
for the clinical psychologist to recognise in order to communicate with all significant 
others the importance of developing appropriate expectations, which may in turn become 
integrated into the individual’s education programme.
The individual displaced from the social 
The success of integrating a learning disabled person into an environment where 
communication is effectively reciprocated and the individual is given the opportunity to 
develop from a plurality of perspectives, can not be generalised to the whole population. 
The statement posited at the outset of this essay that; “Sensations, feelings, insights, 
fancies -  all these are private and, except through symbols and at second hand, 
incommunicable...communication between universes is incomplete or even non­
existent...words are uttered butfail to enlighten...the things and events to which symbols 
refer belong to mutually exclusive islands” (Aldous Huxley, 1954, pp.3), may be more 
literally applied to those people with an autistic spectrum disorder.
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The inability to communicate at even the most basic levels are often beyond the scope of 
the person with autism as they have a profound deficit in their linguistic skills. Autism is 
believed to involve a primary deficit in pragmatics which is also linked to deficits in 
nonverbal communication (Fay and Schuler, 1980; cited in Schopler and Mesibov, 1985). 
These communication problems are described as being one of the main features at the 
intersection of language and social dysfunction (Schopler and Mesibov, 1985).
Indeed, from early childhood parents may expect their child to attend to them, imitate, or 
reproduce similar actions. The failure to even catch their child’s gaze may have massive 
implications on the quality of interactions and the subsequent development of 
communicative methods (Lord, cited in Schopler and Mesibov, 1985).
To address the issue of a non-communicative child and anxious parents the clinical 
psychologist needs to detect whether the child is employing any communicative strategies 
which can be utilised. For example, echolalia (repetitive speech) is now seen by some as 
a strategy to communicate (Prizant and Duchan, 1981). It has also been stated that 
although expressive communication may be infrequent in these individuals, as they may 
not initiate conversation, there is often a fairly high degree of appropriate responding 
(Hurtig, Ensrud, and Tomblin, 1980; cited in Schopler and Mesibov, 1985).
Furthermore, a technique called “facilitated communication” (Crossley and McDonald, 
1980; cited in Bartlett, 1997) has recently been developed for physically assisting people 
with an autistic spectrum disorder to communicate. This technique involves a non­
disabled person holding the finger of the individual with autism whilst they jointly select 
letters on a keyboard to spell words. Proponents of facilitated communication believe 
that this method has allowed individuals who were previously thought to be severely 
autistic, to communicate in a highly effective manner (Bidden, 1990; cited in Warren and 
Yoder, 1997). Bidden concludes that the findings from using this method help to 
challenge prior assumptions that autism is a social-cognitive disability and suggests that 
the main problem is expression.
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However, there have been some concerns over who is actually doing the communicating. 
Indeed, there is recent evidence to show that this technique may not folly represent the 
client, as the facilitator may have a profound influence over the messages which are 
communicated (Datlow Smith, Haas, and Belcher, 1994). The debate over the use of 
facilitated communication has highlighted the importance of communication in reducing 
the impact of a “disability”. Furthermore, it has helped to clarify the danger of such high 
expectations, as the individual with the communication disorder is further disabled as 
facilitators (despite good intentions) often manipulate the communications for those who 
cannot speak for themselves.
From the institution to the community 
There has also been an interest in the opportunities for, and quality o£ communication in 
the community when compared to that experienced in institutions. As with the previous 
observations in schools, the literature does not suggest that it is the physical settings 
themselves that are psychological variables (Zigler, 1966; cited in Van Der Gaag, 1989), 
but rather the organisational characteristics. In the case of the institution, residents’ 
behaviour and skill attainment is largely dependant on the size of wards, the stafFresident 
ratios, the quality of staff training and the motivation of the residents (Van Der Gaag, 
1989).
Leudar (1988) states that the “communicative environment” (Guyette, cited in Van Der 
Gaag, 1989) of adults with a learning disability often provide inferior opportunities for 
communicating than those for non-handicapped people. StafFresident interactions have 
been found to be less frequent and of a poorer quality with “poor communicators” than 
with those who were deemed to be more able (McGany and West; cited in Van Der 
Gaag, 1989).
There appears to be a direct relationship between how others’ “expectations of non­
handicapped individuals can have an important influence on the communication skills
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that the handicapped person actually uses” (Van Der Gaag, 1989, pp.222). Indeed, Van 
Der Gaag’s (1989) study into the social environment and communicative competence, 
illustrated how increased demand in the community encouraged people with learning 
disabilities to further develop their communication skills. These gains were attributed to 
the increase in opportunity to use such skills on a day to day basis.
The impact of community discourse 
In a return to the position of modernity, which accepts the concepts of a universally 
accepted norm and the individual as the centre of the world, (the universal and the 
individual) one can attempt to reassess the impact of the reintegration of those with 
learning disabilities back into the community. The modern polarity of the universal and 
the individual has become replaced by “contextual relativism where legitimation of action 
occurs through linguistic practice and communicative action” (Kvale, 1992). The 
collapse of meta-narratives in favour of local narratives ameliorates in the contribution to 
uphold the values of that particular community. Indeed, reality is constructed through 
social and linguistic means, and on interpretation and meaning of the lived world (Kvale, 
1992). This premise is consistent with Vygotsky’s (1978) theory of development which 
asserts that thought occurs primarily as a social discourse and is then internalised.
Therefore, one can only assume that all the time those with learning disabilities are 
excluded from the community, they can only ever operate outside of the “reality” in 
which those without a learning disability exist. If this assumption is accepted, the clinical 
psychologist must be aware when working with the individual who may have only 
experienced life within a long-stay hospital, that expectations of the individual to share 
“reality” with the their carers and their peers may be unreasonable. This said, there is a 
necessity for any approach adopted to facilitate the communication and development of 
the person with a learning disability, to be realistic about, and sensitive to this remarkable 
transition.
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Sensitivity to alternative modes of communication 
Those who work with learning disabled people need also to be aware of the impact of 
how others perceive “inadequacies of speech” of those with communication difficulties 
and the subsequent impact on self-image (Keman, Sabsay and Shin; cited in Leudar 
1989). A common reaction of carers is to increase the frequency of “other initiated-other 
repair” (i.e. correctly rephrasing what the other has said), which is believed to negatively 
affect the learning disabled person’s self-image (Sabsay and Keman; cited in Leudar, 
1989). Despite the positive intentions of those working with this population, displaying 
individuals’ different levels of competence only serves to reproduce the existence of the 
handicap (Leudar, 1989).
Processes such as this are believed (Stoke and Sinason, 1992) to contribute to the 
individual’s “secondary mental handicap”. This concept describes the learning disabled 
person as exaggerating their disabilities as a defence against the pain and contusion which 
is experienced as a result of difficult interactions in society. Sinason (1992) gives 
examples whereby handicapped individuals are believed to have found the difference 
between their voices and a “normal” voice so unbearable that they have exaggerated the 
level of defect. Another example of secondaiy mental handicap is given, where the 
“victim of the handicap” reduces the quality of his/her speech to render others incapable 
of understanding him/her and thus transferring the experience of being “handicapped” to 
the other party.
Communication through actions 
Progressing from the complexities of understanding verbal communications, 
professionals including the clinical psychologist also need to be aware of the 
communicative intent of actions. These actions may take the form of “challenging 
behaviours” which have been defined as; “ jBehaviour o f such an intensity, frequency or 
duration that the physical safety o f the person or others is likely to be placed in serious 
jeopardy or behaviour which is likely to seriously limit or delay access to and the use o f  
ordinary community facilities” (Department of Health, 1995).
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Challenging behaviours have recently been interpreted by many professionals as an 
effective form of communication where more socially acceptable, appropriate means of 
communicating are outside the realms of ability for an individual (Durrand and Carr, 
1991). A study by Chamberlain, Chung and Jenner (1993) claimed that the less able the 
client was to communicate verbally, the more likely they were to present with challenging 
behaviours. Furthermore, the authors state that those demonstrating the most aggressive 
behaviours received the highest proportion of the staffs time.
Staff would need to have an awareness of the reinforcing effect of their reactions to these 
more severe challenging behaviours. Through training, one may begin to improve the 
staff s recognition of the early signs of any challenging behaviour and to augment means 
of more effective communication. An improved quality of interaction may well give the 
person with communication difficulties an experience of more meaningful 
communicative exchanges (Bradshaw, 1998). As staff adjust their expectations of why 
this challenging behaviour occurs, and begin to assist the individual with more 
appropriate ways of communicating, the person with the “disability” may become more 
“able” as their own expectations of the effectiveness of alternative means of 
communication are realised (Bradshaw, 1998).
Likewise, those people who withdraw from communication may also be transferring a 
message to others. Their quietness may be misinterpreted as contentment but may also 
signify resentment or ftuy (Leudar and Fraser, 1985). Failure to identify the purpose of 
such withdrawal may well exacerbate the individual’s anger which if not addressed may 
result in more challenging behaviours.
Communication and the interview process 
Communication issues are also a serious matter once an individual becomes involved in 
the legal system. People with learning disabilities are over-represented in the population 
of those people who are held by the police on suspicion of committing a crime
42
(Gudjonsson, Clare, Rutter and Pearce, 1993; cited in Bull and Carson, 1995). 
Furthermore, many people with learning disabilities are at a higher risk of receiving abuse 
(Turk and Brown, 1992), and may find themselves being interviewed in order to 
prosecute the perpetrator.
Considering the seriousness of such matters, professionals involved need to be aware of 
the dangers associated with expecting the learning disabled person to interview with the 
same degree of competence that others might. Although there is very little research 
examining the accuracy of responses given by the learning disabled individual in this 
context, it has been stated that there appears to be a significant “acquiescence effect” 
(Sigelman, Budd, Spanhel and Sehoenrock, 1981; cited in Bull and Carson, 1995). Not 
only were acquiescence rates reported as being exceptionally high, but question answers 
were found to be especially biased by question structure and wording.
Suggestions which a clinical psychologist can work with in an attempt to avoid false 
confessions in this population (Bull and Carson, 1995) include; (i) a reduction in the 
power differential between the interviewer and interviewee, (ii) avoiding the appearance 
of knowing what happened, (iii) use of open-ended questions and free recall. Currently, 
psychology has little research to support the effectiveness of these interview techniques. 
Therefore, one of the major issues in clinical psychology would be to collaborate with 
other professionals working in the field of communication (e.g. speech and language 
therapists, those in legal professions) to enhance our ability to acquire accurate 
information through the use of interviews.
Communication of physical illness 
Acquiring accurate information about physical discomforts experienced by people with 
restricted communication has also presented serious concerns. Indeed, Minihan (1991; 
cited in Dodd and Bruker, 1999) has identified communication problems as the primary 
reason why people with learning disabilities often fail to access effective health care. 
Furthermore, misinterpretation by health care workers about the person’s physical
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symptoms may even result in behaviours being interpreted as challenging or self-injurious 
rather than due to a physical cause (Lawrie, 1995).
Therefore, reliance upon carers to interpret symptoms and communicate on behalf of 
people with learning disabilities may well reduce the accuracy of information which 
would directly impact upon diagnosis and treatment (Dodd and Brunker, 1999). This 
observation, alongside the shift towards community care has led to new expectations that 
learning disabled people take responsibility for monitoring and improving their own 
health.
To begin to equip this population with the skills to take this responsibility, clinical 
psychologists have begun to develop and implement training programmes and 
communication aids (Dodd and Brunker, 1999). These innovative new ideas appear to 
have had a positive effect on communicating health concerns, however there remains a 
paucity of research concerning these issues. Furthermore, expectations to improve skills 
can not reside with the learning disabled population alone, as GPs will also need to 
improve their training to be more compatible with this client group (Meehan, Moore, and 
Barr, 1995; cited in Dodd and Brunker, 1999).
The misinterpretation of sex abuse 
Misinterpretation of a person’s experiences of sex abuse may also have serious effects 
upon health and intervention. With the rates of abuse in the learning disabled population 
so much higher than that in the non-disabled population (Tahringer, Horton and Milia; 
cited in Sinason,1994) the clinical psychologist needs to be sensitive to what the 
individual is attempting to communicate.
Body language is often used by those with a severe communication disorder to try to 
relay their plight. The professional may confuse excessive masturbating or eroticised 
inappropriate behaviour as a part of the handicap, rather than a way of communicating 
disturbing experiences (Sinason, 1994). The psychologists’ failure to recognise this will
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subtly maintain the pattern of abuse as the individual’s message is either ignored or 
interpreted as a psychotic fantasy (Sinason, 1994). Instead, the psychologist always 
needs to consider the possible impact of abuse on individuals with a learning disability 
and increase the awareness of these issues to fellow professionals.
Conclusion
This investigation has illustrated that although people with learning disabilities are not a 
homogenous group, there does appear to be some common issues in the development and 
maintenance of their communication skills.
Possibly the most significant finding is the importance of others’ responses. The way in 
which staff, teachers, family and peers understand and support those with a learning 
disability appears to be crucial to the progression of their communicative abilities.
To offer effective support the accuracy of the carers understanding of the many different 
means of communication is essential. Only through such an understanding can 
expectations of the individuals’ abilities be realistic. These expectations will impact 
directly on the quality of interactions, thus placing an emphasis on realistic goal setting. 
Similarly, carers need to be sensitive to the potential disparity between expressive and 
receptive communication in order to achieve appropriate goals.
Despite the paucity of good clinical research in this field, there appears to be 
accumulating evidence for the professional to take a systemic perspective when 
addressing a communication difficulty. Instead of locating the “problem” in the 
individual, there is more of an emphasis on considering the whole of the social network 
within which that person habituates. The importance in adopting such a perspective has 
become more apparent since the move towards de-institutionalisation and caring in the 
community.
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Alongside this transition, the emergence of community teams for people with learning 
disabilities also appears to have made some improvements in the appreciation of the 
importance of communication. Clinical psychologists and other professionals can share 
clinical, educational and practical skills to recognise and advise on effective procedures. 
Hopefully, through developing appropriate and realistic expectations, those working with 
learning disabled people can continue to provide a plurality of perspectives and skills 
which will impact positively on issues of communicative ability.
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Psychiatric classification is irrelevant to the understanding and treatment of mental 
health problems in childhood and adolescence. Discuss.
It would be veiy difficult to evaluate the relevance of psychiatric classification without a 
consideration of psychiatry’s complex historical development. Providing a brief outline 
of this development may clarify why psychiatric classification and the medical model is 
so central to the field of mental health problems.
Following this, the use of psychiatric classification in the understanding and treatment of 
mental health problems shall be investigated by considering its impact on the clinical 
population of children with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder. This exploration 
will consider issues of comorbidity, cross cultural diversity, and objectivity. A more 
systemic perspective will then offer some insight into the influence of organisations on 
the relevance of classification systems before looking at the impact of the social context 
on clinical decisions. Having examined these issues it may then be useful to consider 
some of the current ideologies that underlie the system of psychiatric classification before 
suggesting a potential improvement to this position.
The establishment of psychiatry as a branch of medicine
Psychiatry became recognised as an established branch of medicine during the time when 
Cartesian-Newtonian principles were at their most prominent. These principles claimed 
that there are two radically different kinds of substance: the human body, comprising of 
the human brain and entire nervous system, and the thinking substance which includes the 
mind, thoughts, desires and volitions (Gregory, 1987).
In the nineteenth century, with the newfound interest in organic causes for mental health 
problems, a number of revolutionary discoveries contributed to the conceptualisation of 
psychiatry as a specialised branch of medicine. An example of the apparent “success” in 
the field of psychiatry was the recognition that general paresis, a condition associated 
with delusions of grandeur and a defect in cognitive capabilities, was caused by tertiary
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syphilis of the brain and was treated effectively using chemicals. Furthermore, medicine 
claimed triumphs in the symptomatic control of some emotional and behavioural 
disorders (Grof, 1985). Interventions included psychosurgeiy, electric-shock therapy, and 
a range of psycho pharmaceuticals.
The successes of this medical approach were clearly limited as an organic aetiology to a 
number of conditions including depression, psychoneuroses, and psychosomatic disorders 
were not discovered (Grof, 1985). The failure of the medical approach in understanding 
and treating the emotional disorders gave rise to an alternative movement -  the 
psychological approach to psychiatiy.
Although psychological research began to provide more suitable explanatory models for a 
variety of emotional disorders (Salkovskis, 1996), and in doing so brought psychiatry 
closer to the social sciences and philosophy, this had little impact on the status of 
psychiatry as a medical discipline (Grof, 1985). Grof goes on to describe how the 
hegemony of the medical model was reinforced by the “symbiotic liaison between 
medicine and the rich pharmaceutical industry, vitally interested in selling its products” 
(pp.l). The result was that many medical concepts have been applied to the 
“understanding” of emotional disorders, which has been widely criticised as counter­
productive (Szasz, 1973). A more detailed appraisal of some of these criticisms shall be 
discussed later in this essay to assess whether psychiatric classification is helpful or not in 
the understanding and treatment of mental health problems in children and adolescence. 
However, an important issue which has already been raised, is that despite the apparent 
“misfit” of the medical model of psychiatry to a range of mental disorders, the 
psychologist has assumed a subordinate role to the psychiatrist regardless of which 
profession’s approach is better suited to the client (Gro£ 1985).
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Psychiatric classification
Having outlined the relationship between psychiatry and the medical model, one can 
begin to appreciate why there is such an emphasis on correctly diagnosing a person using 
an accurate diagnostic or classificatoiy system. This is usually done by dividing up the 
heterogeneous population according to the different relationships between its different 
members. This is often achieved using classification, in which people are grouped into a 
number of sub-populations, or by adopting a dimensional approach and assigning them to 
a position on one or more axes or dimensions (Kendell, 1975).
The diagnostic process has been described (Carr, 1999) as having three main functions: 
Firstly, to facilitate the growth of a body of expert knowledge about particular problems. 
This knowledge is said to provide a detailed clinical description of the aetiology, 
maintenance, course and the most effective interventions for the disorder. Secondly, the 
classification system is believed to contribute to the epidemiological information about 
the disorder which may be useful in planning services and allocating resources. Finally, 
through a classification system professionals are provided with a common language with 
which to communicate with each other.
These functions of the classification system are widely served through the use of the 
Diagnostic Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV, American Psychiatric Association,
1994) and the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10, World Health 
Organisation, 1992). There is also a multiaxial version of the ICD-10 for the classification 
of children and adolescents. These multiaxial systems allow for complex details about an 
individual to be coded without the loss of important information, which was characteristic 
of single-axis classification systems (Carr, 1999).
Reliability and validity
To achieve the aims of the classification systems, adequate reliability and validity are 
essential. Good reliability would result from clinicians interviewing the same cases and 
reaching similar conclusions about the most appropriate diagnosis. This remains a
53
problem, and Carr (1999) states that for both the DSMIV and the ICD 10 demonstrations 
of satisfactory reliability are unacceptably low. In an attempt to improve reliability there 
has been a gradual narrowing of the definitions of disorders. However, this process has 
resulted in poor coverage, resulting in difficulties in classifying many cases into the 
clearly defined categories (Carr, 1999).
Even if it was achievable, high reliability alone may not be sufficient to make an accurate 
diagnosis. This can be illustrated by considering the infamous study of Rosenhahn’s 
(1973) in which eight volunteers without a mental illness spent several weeks in a mental 
hospital without anybody detecting their sanity. All of the hospitals medical staff agreed 
that the volunteers were insane, indicating high reliability, however they were all wrong, 
indicating very low validity.
The current classification systems validity is compromised, as psychological difficulties 
are not experienced in the same way as disease-like categorical entities (Carr, 1999). 
Problems need to be viewed as interactional, with consideration to the child’s social 
networks, as dimensional psychological phenomena, or as a combination of both 
(Volkmar and Schwab-Stone, 1996; cited in Carr, 1999).
Even if the clinician is sensitive to these complex issues, the categorisation of a child may 
still be not valid as the DSM IV and the ICD 10 are, in many instances, based on 
insubstantial evidence (Carr, 1999). One reason for the possible invalidity of the 
classification systems is that they have been subject to committee biases throughout their 
development (Clark, Watson, and Reynolds, 1995).
The psychiatric classification of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)
Perhaps the most relevant way to investigate the ir/relevance of psychiatric classification 
in understanding and treating mental health problems would be to consider how it is 
applied to a clinical population. Furthermore, an investigation into the psychiatric 
classification of ADHD may satisfy the essay question’s focus on children and
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adolescents. This could be achieved as the disorder is usually considered as a condition 
that is particularly relevant to this client group (Report of a Working Party of The British 
Psychological Society, 1996).
What is ADHD?
The category of ADHD originated in the United States. This term refers to children and 
young persons whose “behaviour appears to be impulsive, overactive and/or inattentive to 
an extent that is unwarranted for their developmental age and is a significant hindrance to 
their social and educational success” (Report of a Working Party of The British 
Psychological Society, 1996, pp.8).
How is ADHD classified?
In contrast to the approach of the Americans, who mainly use the DSM IV for the 
purpose of diagnosis, the tradition in Europe has been to use the ICD 10. The two 
diagnostic systems may be consulted for a detailed examination of the differences in how 
ADHD (or Hyperkinetic Disorder in Europe) is conceptualised. However, for the purpose 
of this essay it may be useful to outline the variances between the two systems in the 
classification of the disorder.
Perhaps the main difference is that unlike the DSM IV, the ICD 10 adopts a strict 
requirement for pervasiveness and persistence. In effect, this means that to fulfil the ICD 
10 criteria for ADHD, the individual’s behaviours must be present across a range of 
different situations. Furthermore, the ICD 10 is more inclusive than its American 
equivalent as it requires that both significant inattention and hyperactivity are observed. 
With regards to these symptoms, the DSM IV utilises an either/or clause. As a 
consequence, children fulfilling the criteria of ADHD in Europe are for less common than 
those reaching the DSM criteria (Reason, 1999).
This difference between diagnostic systems illustrates how there are variations in 
psychiatric classifications and the impact that this may have on a particular population.
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Consequently, the idiosyncratic nature of the classification systems will influence how a 
“disorder” is perceived, understood and treated.
Why is ADHD classified?
Those with severe, persistent, and pervasive problems may find that the conceptualisation 
of their experiences as a “disorder” (compliant with the disease model) may have 
advantages that contribute positively towards therapy (Reason, 1999). In ADHD, the 
child’s behaviour may be viewed by their family and surrounding networks as the 
symptom of a legitimate disorder which may influence the attribution of “blame” and 
have an impact on the way in which others react to the individual. Furthermore, a 
diagnostic classification is an essential pre-requisite to medical intervention, especially if 
it includes a prescription (Reason, 1999).
Considerations when using the classification o f ADHD 
Cultural variability
Comparisons of the DSM IV and the ICD 10 highlight the difficulties in the utilisation of 
classification systems in the understanding and treatment of mental health problems for a 
disorder as heterogeneous as ADHD. This point is exemplified by a study by Taylor 
(1987) that looked at ADHD cross-culturally and found that core symptoms were 
remarkably consistent across countries. However, there was considerable cross-national 
variability and ADHD was 20 times more likely to be diagnosed in the United States than 
in England. Also, cross national prevalence is believed to be effected by the variations 
amongst diagnostic criteria as the impact of externalising disorders may have different 
effects depending on cultural norms regarding acceptable behaviour (Sergeant and 
Steinhauser, 1992).
Comorbiditv
In addition to cross cultural factors, the use of classification in approaching ADHD has 
proved to be questionable as it is not a “pure” disorder and often appears along with other 
mental disorders (Searight and McLaren, 1998). Indeed, these authors go on to state how
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investigators have found both convergence and divergence of symptoms of ADHD, 
Conduct Disorder (CD) and Oppositional Defiant Disorder (ODD). These issues have 
been recognised through the developments of the DSM and hence specific criteria have 
been written into the interviews to delineate between the diagnoses of these disorders.
However, in practice, when employing teacher and parent behavioural ratings to establish 
a diagnosis of one of these externalising syndromes, complications have been 
encountered. Patemite, Loney, and Roberts (1995; cited in Searight and McLaren, 1998) 
could not empirically separate ODD from comorbid ODD and ADHD. This finding is 
particularly significant to the question of whether psychiatric classification contributes to 
the understanding of the disorder, as ADHD has been conceptualised as a 
neurophysiological deficit (McCracken, 1991) and ODD is believed to arise from family 
interactions (Searight and McLaren, 1998).
As no significant differences were found between the ODD and the ADHD children on 
cognitive or family environment factors, the validity of DSM IV appears to be less 
credible. Indeed, if there is not one single biological or psychological determinate that 
accounts for all behaviours subsumed under the heading of ADHD then the use of this 
cluster of symptoms as a distinct and unitary condition may suggest that a psychiatric 
classification exists for a “non-entity”. If so, the use of the term ADHD would be 
misleading with clear implications that the range of presenting symptoms are not 
understood. The impact of such a “bogus classification” and the subsequent prescription 
of treatment would raise a host of ethical, practical, ideological and financial dilemmas.
The application of classification
Having outlined some of the important features associated with the classification of 
ADHD, it may be useful to consider the influence ofpeople on this diagnosis. Indeed, it 
could be said that psychiatric classification is a tool. How this tool is used to understand 
and treat childhood mental health problems is central to assessing its effectiveness.
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The classification system for ADHD uses a dimension of “inattention” which is left open 
to interpretation. The dimension includes statements such as, “is often forgetful” and 
“does not seem to listen”. Although the DSM IV states that children with oppositional 
disorders or language difficulties may also present with these behaviours, “the proximate 
cause is left to the parent or teacher to interpret” (Searight and McLaren, 1998, pp.474). 
A potential problem with this is that due to the extensive media attention of ADHD, the 
clinician may experience an attribution bias towards this diagnosis and fail to consider 
alternate causes. Furthermore, although psychiatric classification is not necessary to 
provide for children with special educational needs in Britain, it is necessary for medical 
intervention (Report of a Working Party of The British Psychological Society, 1996). 
This may explain why so many paediatricians and family physicians experience pressure 
to diagnose ADHD and prescribe methylphenidate (medication) treatment (Searight and 
McLaren, 1998).
This point illustrates how a diagnosis can be made without the clinician having a 
complete and unbiased understanding of the child’s mental health problem. Instead, 
psychiatric classification is influenced by the “media success” of the diagnosis. A 
process such as this could be described as completely discrediting the use of psychiatric 
classification in both understanding and treating mental health problems. In fact, in this 
case the popularity of the classification may well have contributed towards its detriment.
From these observations one can begin to appreciate that classifications do not operate in 
a void but the associated agents are of ultimate importance. Earlier, it was stated that 
psychologists who may be more appropriately qualified to understand certain mental 
disorders have to assume a somewhat subordinate role to the psychiatrists as a result of 
the socio-historical factors surrounding mental illness and the medical model. This 
appears to be the case in the diagnosis of ADHD, as 75% of children with this diagnosis 
are seen solely by primaiy care physicians (Zarin, Tanielian, Suarez, and Marcus, 1998). 
Such a diagnosis is usually made without any psychological evaluation (Wolraich, 
Lindgren, Stromquist, Milich, Davis, and Watson, 1990).
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Organisational impact on classification
The impact of the government on how professionals should operate in order to better 
understand and treat ADHD also appears to have contributed to a unimodal approach. 
Following questions in the House of Commons from the Department of Health on 
December 12th, 1994, the Minister of State for Health recognised the diagnosis of ADHD 
(or Hyperkinetic Disorder) and advised that children with ADHD are seen in Child 
Mental Health Services. In addition to this the Minister of State for Education 
communicated that special educational needs procedures were outlined for those with 
ADHD in the Code of Practice (1993 Education Act) and the Further and Higher 
Education Act 1992 (Fogel, 1995). Nonetheless, neither minister discussed the 
importance of meeting the child’s needs through the co-ordinated efforts of health, 
education and social services. Such a multimodal approach is considered as particularly 
pertinent in the context of ADHD and encouraged in the recommendations from Services 
for the Mental Health o f Children and Young People in England -  A National Review 
(Kurtz, Thornes and Wolkind, 1995).
In an attempt to address some of these issues (November 5th, 2000) The National Institute 
for Clinical Excellence (NICE) issued its guidance to the National Health Service (NHS) 
in England and Wales on the use of methylphenidate for ADHD. In summary the 
guidance recommends that:
1 “Methylphenidate should be used as part o f  a comprehensive treatment 
programme for children with a diagnosis o f severe ADHD.
2 Diagnosis o f ADHD should be made by a child/adolescent psychiatrist or a 
paediatrician with expertise in ADHD and should involve children, parents & 
carers and the child’s school.
3 A comprehensive treatment programme should involve advice and support to 
parents and teachers, and could, but does not need to, include specific 
psychological treatment (such as behavioural therapy).
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4 Children on methylphenidate should receive regular monitoring. When 
improvement has occurred and the child’s condition is stable, treatment can be 
discontinued at intervals, under careful specialist supervision, in order to assess 
both the child’s progress and the needfor continuation o f therapy. ’’
(NICE, 2000, pp.l)
Despite the organisation’s apparent intentions to use psychiatric classification positively 
in the treatment of ADHD, these recommendations may not he based on an adequate 
understanding of the disorder and its clinical implications. Point 1 assumes that 
medication is a necessary component of treatment for all of this population. This 
assumption could be questioned on the evidence already discussed, that comorbidity 
obscures the syndromes defining features. Considering the data that methylphenidate 
often benefits non-ADHD individuals (Searight and McLaren, 1998), the prescription of 
stimulants for a number of related problems in the paediatric population is likely to result 
in some “improvements”. With the growing emphasis on the medicalisation of 
nonclinical symptoms in order to streamline education and health care (Barsky and Borus,
1995), one needs to be aware of the confirmatory process of pharmacological verification 
in contributing to the increased use of stimulants.
Point 2 recognises the importance of a multi agency approach to ADHD, but this also 
increases the chances of the psychiatrist or paediatrician being subject to external forces 
and biases in the diagnosing of an individual. Indeed, the NICE guidelines with their 
emphasis clearly on the effectiveness of treating ADHD with methylphenidate may well 
contribute to these external pressures. The prescribing professional may be further 
pressurised, as the NICE document states that “this guidance does not, however, override 
the individual responsibility of the health professionals to make appropriate decisions...” 
(NICE, 2000, pp.2). This statement further questions the relevance of psychiatric 
classification when applied to a concept as heterogeneous as ADHD.
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The next point, number 3, minimises the contribution of psychological approaches in the 
treatment programme for ADHD. This suggestion appears to have failed to consider the 
conclusion made by the Working Party of The British Psychological Society (1996, 
pp.62) that “it is probably not useful to think of ADHD as a mental disorder given current 
understandings of the psychological basis of the concept”. Such an approach is also 
likely to continue to see ADHD treated without adjunctive benefit of behavioural 
intervention despite the feet that most practitioners advocate the use of a multimodal 
treatment approach (Goldman, Genel, Bezman, and Slantez, 1998).
Finally, point 4 alludes to the feet that the child has a “condition”. This indicates that 
ADHD is conceptualised as a pathological disorder. In this light, it is advised by NICE 
that the diseased child is monitored until their condition stabilises, at which point 
treatment (medication) can begin to be discontinued. With the assurance of psychiatric 
classification, this guideline clearly places the apparent “disorder” within the child. This 
approach fails to recognise that the aetiology or any maintaining features may be the 
result of socio-environmental factors that are likely to remain unchanged regardless of the 
treatment imposed upon the child.
The medicalisation of the child assures that the political interests of the governing body, 
with its emphasis on “clinical and cost effectiveness”, are upheld whilst the unrepresented 
child is pathologised. Indeed, Ingleby (1981) states how the diagnosis of “hyperkinesis” 
invalidates the child’s rebellious expressions of boredom and frustration. He goes on to 
say that the use of diagnosis should be redirected from talking about the “maladjusted 
child” to think instead about the maladjustment of their schools and families.
Clinical practice and the social context
Along with the recognition that the child with ADHD does not operate within a social 
vacuum, but is influenced by social networks, is the acknowledgement that psychiatric 
classification also exists in and adapts to the social and economic climate. Neglecting the 
impact of these broader systemic forces may obstruct the health care professional in
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recognising the ir/relevance ofpsychiatric classification and making informed judgements 
in their everyday practice.
Indeed, the way in which ADHD has captured the public imagination may reflect current 
cultural anxieties. This “illness” could be viewed as a projection of collective societal 
fears about the impact of rapid social and technological change on children (Searight and 
McLaren, 1998). Concerns over “family values”, the computer age, television, and the 
quality of education may well contribute to and become embodied in the ADHD 
metaphor. Problems of inattention, distractibility and poor concentration may provide 
comfort when attributed to “scientifically known aetiologies”. Furthermore, reassurances 
offered through the medicalisation of these “symptoms”, as promoted by the NICE 
guidelines, may serve to reattribute the causes of the problems away from the child’s 
social networks thus alleviating family anxieties. Having relocated the “problem” within 
the child, pharmacotherapeutic intervention is prescribed.
From this observation, it could be suggested that psychiatric classification and the social 
and economic climate can mutually verify the relevance of a particular diagnosis. 
Reflecting on this process is essential to the understanding of the “disorder” and issues 
associated with the preferred choice of treatment.
Labelling and the use of psychiatric classification
So far, this essay has explored some of the strengths and limitations concerning the soci- 
historical development of classification systems, the relevance of classification when 
applied to an ADHD clinical population, and the relationship between clinical practice 
and social/economic forces. The following section will aim to provide a more 
macroscopic perspective on the labelling process and how this may or may not contribute 
to the understanding and treatment of peoples’ experiences.
Szasz (1974) describes classification as a social act that entails the participation of three 
different agents: classifier, classified, and public called upon to accept or reject a
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particular classification. Psychiatrists are said to be the agents of classification as well as 
objects of classification by others. However, “mental patients” are characterised by their 
powerlessness to classify themselves or others and are treated solely as the objects o f 
classification by health care professionals (Szasz, 1974).
Historically, those patients who were classified as suffering from bodily diseases (which 
could be diagnosed and cured) received good medical attention, whereas those suffering 
from “mental illness” (malingerers) were stigmatised and received little help from society 
(Szasz, 1974). Despite the historical process of labelling and relabelling of mental illness 
(e.g. from “lunacy” to “psychological illness”) over the past three hundred years, 
psychiatric classifications have done little to affect the degradation of the persons to 
whom these labels are attached (Szasz, 1974).
Szasz goes on to assert that psychiatrists have become the scientifically accredited experts 
not in the field of mental illness, but in the practice of personal conduct and social 
control. Szasz declared, “the covert aim of psychiatric classification is social 
stigmatisation and the creation of a class of justifiably persecuted scapegoats” (1974, pp. 
234). This opinion could well be considered as congruent to many of the issues already 
outlined with regards to the possible reasons for the diagnosis of ADHD.
With such stigmatisation associated with psychiatric classification, there is a danger that 
the diagnosed child will be relatively powerless to resist the process of pathologisation 
(being solely an object o f classification — Szasz, 1974). This in turn could have a 
negative effect on the parent/child and professional/child dynamics (Johnson, Rasbiuy, 
and Siegel, 1986). Furthermore, the way in which diagnoses focus on negative attributes 
and are couched in a pejorative discourse may lead the child to believe that they are 
“defective” and the diagnosis may become a self-fulfilling prophecy (Carr, 1999). That 
is, the child who is labelled as “mentally ill” is type cast in a role which gradually 
becomes indistinguishable from his/her “real” self(Schefif, 1966).
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Ideologies of the health care profession and the impact on psychiatric classification.
So why do the categories and classifications used in psychiatry and psychology fail so 
often in assisting in the understanding and treatment of mental health problems? Many 
writers throughout the history of psychiatry have attempted to answer this question.
One approach was that of the “anti-psychiatry” movement, which emerged during the 
1960s and 1970s to question the very basis of psychiatry itself. Some of the issues that 
were contested included the purpose of psychiatry, its conception of mental illness and 
the distinction between madness and sanity. Furthermore, the anti-psychiatrists 
questioned whether the concept of mental illness, constructed by professionals, was more 
harmful to human potentialities and more “false” than the “disorders” which the medical 
profession claimed to find within their patients (Crossley, 1998).
Although the anti-psychiatry movement is a fascinating analysis of the development and 
contribution of psychiatry, a detailed investigation into this movement is beyond the 
scope of this essay. Nonetheless, a consideration of some of the emerging ideologies of 
the human sciences and their impact on mental health may further clarify the ir/relevance 
of psychiatric classification.
For instance, in the same way as GofiBnan (1959) ascribes social power to those who 
control the “definition of the situation”, one can also consider psychiatrists as controlling 
the “definition of madness”. Equipped with “formalised” classification systems (DSM, 
ICD) those in control are thus invested with the extraordinary role of “managers of 
reality”.
Defenders of the classification system may argue that it is constructed on scientific 
principles relying on objectivity to avoid bias (Wing, Cooper, and Sartorious, 1974). 
However, criticism comes in terms of the biases of the scientific framework itself, which 
reinforces rather than undermines its own principles. Indeed, Ingleby (2000) asserts that 
those in the human sciences need to be aware that ideology dominates all scientific
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practice and that “good” scientific practices maybe more prey to ideological influences 
than a “non-conformist” approach. Such considerations are rarely entertained in 
institutions where science is carried out because the existing culture is saturated with its 
own ideologies. Hence the research conducted is ritualised, as is the teaching, 
communications, tutorials, and conferences which all serve to become a tacit celebration 
of the “ethic of normality” (Ingleby, 2000).
The use of strict diagnostic criteria could be perceived as imprisoning the psychiatrist 
inside a cage of ideologically determined pre-conceptions. Using a quotation by 
Goldman (1969, pp.41) [authors words in brackets], and by replacing the notion of the 
“researcher” with the “psychiatrist”, one can appreciate the disparity between categories 
and objective understanding:
“In the human sciences...it does not suffice as Durkheim believed, to apply the artesian 
method, to call into question acquired truths and to open ones mind entirely to the facts, 
because the researcher [psychiatrist] generally approaches the facts with categories and 
implicit and unconscious preconceptions which close off to him in advance the way to an 
objective understanding.”
However, it is not just the psychiatrist who is blinded by the lenses of “scientifically 
determined” criteria in an attempt to understand mental health problems. Psychologists 
have also been accused as too keen to “sell out” to a paradigm of science that reduces 
human realities to some other, non-human reality (Ingleby, 2000). This has been 
described as the process of “reification”, in which human realities are reduced to “the 
order of things” (Ingleby, 2000). This is evident in the way that classification systems 
deconstruct a persons behaviours and symptoms to create a pathologised label or 
diagnosis.
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Knowing how to use psychiatric classification and “expert” knowledge
An analysis of these observations may lead the reader to wonder whether an 
understanding of mental illness and its subsequent treatment is accessible from within our 
present conceptual universe.
This question has been considered by academics approaching such issues from the 
perspective of “postmodernism”. In short, postmodernism adopts an anti-worldview and 
denies the existence of universal truths or standards (Kvale, 1992). “Postmodern society 
consists less of totalities to be ruled by preconceived models than by decentralisation to 
heterogeneous local contexts characterised by flexibility and change” (Kvale, 1992, pp.2).
With this in mind, it is essential to deconstruct the theoretical dogmas that construct our 
conceptual universes and form our foundational ideologies, in order to be able to begin to 
accommodate a conceptual multiverse. Throughout this essay, some of the ideologies 
behind psychiatric classification have been explored. Now, with an emphasis on the 
avoidance of developing polarised epistemological positions, some consideration maybe 
given to a preferred approach.
To do this, it may be helpful to draw parallels between the recent movement to find 
common ground between psychoanalysis and family therapy. Both disciplines recognise 
the complex relationship between knowing and not-knowing (Lamer, 2000). That is, the 
recognition that the therapist is knowing in terms of imparting professional advice, 
expertise, certainty, power and authority to their clients, while simultaneously assuming a 
not-knowing stance of curiosity, reflection, and collaboration (Lamer, 2000).
This approach appears to have fundamental differences to that of the therapist or 
psychiatrist who is positioned outside of the patient’s subjectivity. Such a posture would 
be reliant upon positivist ideals of neutrality and objectivity, in which the professional 
presumes to know the client in a scientific sense. This has been attempted using 
psychiatric classification. Instead, the postmodern professional would relinquish an
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objectifying stance and work collaboratively with the client to investigate the 
psychological manifestations and interpretations that are socially constructed in the 
present (Lamer, 2000). Using this approach, what the psychiatrist or psychologist knows 
in terms of “psychological facts” (e.g., psychopathology, diagnostic categories, etc) is less 
relevant than how the professional knows. This method of engaging with, and exploring a 
client’s experiences may be more effective in facilitating an understanding of any mental 
health problems than the use of psychiatric classification systems.
However, the not-knowing social constructionist must be aware of the power ambiguities 
of the therapeutic context (Lamer, 2000). Therefore, it is important that the not-knowing 
professional continues to recognise the power differentials between themselves and the 
client. In addition, the professional must be sure not to impose their knowledge on the 
client to preserve the collaborative therapeutic relationship.
Conclusion
In view of the evidence discussed, it has become apparent that adopting a polemic 
epistemological position on the relevance or irrelevance of psychiatric classification may 
be unhelpful. Having examined a range of issues through the use of a socio-historical 
perspective, the reader may well appreciate the need for the health care professional to be 
reflective and attempt to keep biases at a minimum in an attempt to work effectively. 
Furthermore, through an investigation into emerging ideologies and their effect on 
practice, one must be aware of how adopting one particular ideology can become a self­
verifying process. The danger of this being that any forms of understanding, and the 
subsequent treatment of mental illness, may be reliant upon an evidence base that is not 
necessarily comprehensive.
In summary, it is apparent that working from within one conceptual universe may deny 
the professional a chance to sufficiently understand a client. Therefore, too much of a 
reliance on a formalised classification system, which has been developed through a 
particular set of ideologies may well be considered as an “abuse” of the professional’s
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power over an individual. However, if the psychiatric classification system is used within 
a collaborative, multimodal approach, with an emphasis on a multiverse of perspectives 
then there is more chance of its potential being utilised.
In practice, this may be more easily achieved through the use of multi-disciplinary teams, 
however it is the responsibility of all those members in the team not to be consumed by 
one over-powering ideology. This is incredibly important for the clinical psychologist to 
realise, as psychology was initially developed to improve the understanding and treatment 
of people with emotional disorders. Therefore, a reversion back to a reliance on the 
medical model and psychiatric classification alone would do little to progress our 
understanding of mental health problems in both adults and children.
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Depression is an inevitable part of the ageing process and requires understanding,
but not treatment Discuss.
To facilitate an understanding of depression in the context of the ageing process, it may 
be useful to outline some of the prominent factors that contribute to these 
conceptualisations. Following the introduction of these terms it will then be possible to 
begin to investigate how “inevitable” the association between depression and ageing are. 
This will be done through a review of the evidence base with special attention paid to 
issues of prevalence, life span, diagnosis, and biopsychosocial factors. Evidence for the 
effectiveness of treatment intervention will then be discussed as well as the accessibility 
to the health care services for the older adult population. Finally, a consideration of 
recent Government guidelines and recommendations will be explored in order to 
synthesise issues of depression, understanding, treatment and service provision in relation 
to older people in the mental health services.
The “understanding” of depression in older people
Depression
As a result of the high prevalence of depression it has been termed the common cold of 
psychiatry (Seligman, 1975). Clinical depression is a diagnostic category that has been 
classified in a number of ways (for details see DSM-IV, American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994) and is qualitatively different from the transient low mood experienced 
by many people as a natural reaction to loss (Fennell, 1988). People suffering from 
clinical depression may feel sad, guilty, tearful, irritable, and anxious. Following an 
exacerbation of their symptoms they may lose the ability to enjoy certain activities, may 
have low energy, and withdraw from the people and activities that they would normally 
enjoy. Furthermore, bodily functions may be disturbed as sleeping becomes difficult, 
appetite declines and there is a loss in libido. Over time a sense of hopelessness 
(Abramson, Metalsky, and Alloy, 1989) about themselves, the world and the future may 
develop, which can in some cases lead to suicidal ideation or completed suicide.
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Relationship between depression and the ageing process 
Prevalence
Depression is described by Fernandez, Levy, Lachar and Small (1995) as the most 
common psychiatric disturbance among the elderly population. However, such a broad 
conceptualisation of “depression” has been attributed to there being little consensus about 
its prevalence. In an attempt to clarify this, Beekman, Copeland, and Prince (1999) 
carried out a systematic review of studies of prevalence of depression in later life. Within 
this review, using “rigorous research diagnostic criteria” (pp. 3) they were able to 
distinguish between those people with “major” and those with “minor” (sub clinical) 
depression. Beekman et al. (1999) report that these previous studies suggest that major 
depression in older adults is a rare phenomenon (1.8%) and minor depression was more 
frequent at around 10%, which is lower than some reported rates of depression in the 
adult population (15-20%, Fennell, 1989).
Whereas the above review included a host of data including studies from other countries 
(i.e. Japan, Hong Kong), surveys in England have suggested that up to 15 % of over 65 
year olds suffer from depression (Livingston and Hinchcliffe, 1993; Montano, 1999), a 
figure comparable with the reported prevalence of “minor” depression by Beekman, et al. 
(1999).
Age difference in the prevalence o f depression
These figures suggests that depression in later life is far from “inevitable”, in fact the 
review of literature by Beekman et al. (1999) suggests that the risk of major depression 
may actually decrease with age. This invokes the question of what are the developmental 
effects on vulnerability and stress across adulthood? This question is particularly relevant 
as major depression and subclinical levels of depression across adults of all ages are 
extremely costly to the medical services as well as to the individual sufferer (Callahan, 
Hui, Nienaber, Musick, and Tierney, 1994). Furthermore, for clinicians to diagnose, 
prevent and treat individuals across adulthood, they need to understand similarities and 
differences in the presentation of and risk for depression.
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Comprehensive data to this effect has been produced by The National Institute of Mental 
Health Epidemiological Catchment Area (ECA) study (Reiger, Myers, Kramer, Robins, 
Blazer, et al., 1984; cited in Karel, 1997) on a study conducted in the United States. 
Having divided community residents of five cities into age bands (18-24, 25-44, 45-64, 
and 65+ years) the highest prevalence of depression was among the 25 to 44 year olds and 
the lowest prevalence was in the group of over 65 year olds. These age trends were 
predominantly consistent across the sexes and across ethnic groups, with the older adult 
group showing lower rates of mood disorder. In an extension of this study to adults at the 
older end of the adult spectrum (55-64, 65-74, 75-84, and 85+ years) there were no 
significant differences in mood state between the groups (George, Blazer, Winfield-Laird, 
Leaf, and Fishbach, 1988).
At one level these findings could offer evidence that is contradictory to the assertion that 
depression is an “inevitable” part of the ageing process. However, age related biases in 
the conceptualisation and measurement of depression has compromised the validity of 
such epidemiological studies. It has been suggested that this low prevalence of major 
depression among older adults may be an underestimation. Karel (1997) believes that 
these results reflect invalid measurement of depression as diagnostic criteria may be 
different in later life, symptoms may be misdiagnosed as having a medical cause, and 
older people may not be assessed as being functionally impaired by depressive symptoms. 
In addition, sampling biases may be present as depressed older adults are more likely to 
be excluded through death and being too ill to take part. There is another bias in that 
these results used older adults living in the community. Indeed, in a direct comparison, 
Ames (1991) reported that older people living in institutions had a significantly higher 
incidence of major depression and depressive symptoms than their community based 
counterparts.
One further difficulty in understanding the prevalence of depression throughout the 
ageing process is that epidemiological research provides a cross sectional snapshot of
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people suffering from depression at one time. For these reasons the statistics of late onset 
and early onset of cases of depression among the older adult population is unknown 
(Karel, 1997).
An understanding of the onset of depression is further complicated by biochemical and 
neurological factors. It has been acknowledged that risk factors do change across the life 
span as genetic predispositions may trigger neurological disease (e.g. vascular diseases, 
Parkinson’s) often associated with depression (Karel,1997). Subsequently, the onset of 
neurological disease and the risk of comorbid depression may be more likely in later 
years. These observations further question the validity of current research findings and 
their ability to account for the complex relationship between the onset and prevalence of 
depression across the lifespan.
Diagnosing depression in the elderly
As stated previously, the mis/diagnosis of depression in the older adult population has 
been recognised as seriously compromising a comprehensive understanding of the 
disorder and will have implications on the provision of intervention.
One frequently voiced concern given for the under diagnosis of depression is that the 
older person is more likely to express somatic complaints or insomnia than the more overt 
feelings of depression (Butler, Collins, Katona, and Orrell, 1997). Knauper and Wittchen 
(1994) believe that one explanation for this is that older adults who have insufficient 
memoiy capacity to cope with the complex answering processes required to complete 
complex diagnostic instruments, simplify the process by attributing depressive 
experiences to physical illness. Conversely, there are also concerns that the use of 
diagnostic instruments, which include somatic items, are resulting in false 
overestimations of the presence of depressive symptoms in older people (Karel, 1997).
Accurate diagnosis is further complicated due to the shared symptomotology of 
depression and dementia in some older adults. Both disorders may have features of loss
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of motivation and energy, changes in sleep pattern and appetite, and poor concentration 
(Warrington, 1997). This relationship between biological and psychological factors has 
made the use of existing measures contentious as they “can identify the presence of 
specific symptomotology, but they cannot clarify its cause” (Terri and Wagner, 1992, 
pp.31). Considering as many as 30% of people with Alzheimer’s disease also meet the 
DSM-m criteria for major depression (Teri and Reifler, 1987), this highlights the 
complexities of diagnosis and the potential for misunderstanding the presenting 
symptoms in this client group.
In addition to this, the cohort effect is used to explain how older people grew up in an era 
when stigma was attached to “mental illness”. This may leave them reluctant to report 
symptoms of depression to their physician (Sims, 1993). To fully test the appropriateness 
of this hypothesis, Jorm (2000) has stated the need for longitudinal studies.
A further reason given for the under-diagnosis of depression in later fife is that the 
physician may have to deal with a certain amount of hostility on the part of the depressed 
“patient” (Montano, 1994). Therefore not surprisingly, in a study by Butler, Collins, 
Kantona, and Orrell (1997) 50% of General Practitioners stated that they required more 
training to be able to recognise depression more effectively in the older adult population.
Overall, there appears to be a number of factors that limit the accuracy of diagnosis as 
neither the “patient” nor the physician perceives the symptoms as those of depression. 
Through this misidentification of symptoms, a therapeutic nihilism exists between the 
physicians and the “patient” as the symptoms of depression are overlooked and may be 
conceptualised as “inevitable” or appropriate to the person’s chronological age (Montano, 
1999).
Depression as a psycho-social factor
Roberts, Kaplan, Shema, and Strawbridge (1997) question whether ageing alone, 
independent from declining health and functioning increase the risk of depression. An
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answer has been provided by Lewinsohn, Rhode, Seeket, and Fischer, (1991) who 
reported that the negative changes in ageing are primarily psychophysiological and 
neuropsychological functioning, which were not associated with depression. This leads 
Roberts et al. (1997. pp.1384) to assert that “healthy, normally functioning older adults 
are not at greater risk for depression than younger adults”, however “this is not to argue 
that depression does not increase with age”(pp. 1389). In feet, Rovner, Broadhead, 
Spencer, Carson, and Folstein (1989) complete the biopsychosocial perspective through 
their observations that dementia patients with depression are more cognitively impaired 
and disabled, in terms of self-care than dementing patients without depression. The 
consequence of this may well be a reduction of independence, placing greater pressure on 
a partner, family or carers to meet the individual’s needs.
A further psychosocial factor that has been identified as contributing to the prevalence 
rates of depression in late life is “loss”. Osgood (1992) asserts that the process of 
retirement brings with it a loss of money, prestige, status, and power which were 
previously associated with the work role. This is then said to have the potential of 
manifesting into an identity crisis for some older people who were consumed in their 
working lives. For those older adults who were raised with a strong sense of a work 
ethic, leisure is no replacement for their jobs and may not be fulfilling and satisfying. For 
these individuals, Osgood (1992, pp.57) states that retirement represents a loss of dignity 
and status, and signifies that they are “old, useless, and no longer vital, contributing 
members of their community and society at large”. This is one hypothesis as to why 
suicide rates are the highest in older white males than in any other demographic group 
(Woods, 1999).
Alongside the loss of role and status, there is the cost of the loss of human relationships. 
Although bereavement is consistently associated with depression at all ages, the “older 
old” are exposed to it more so than other age groups (Beekman, et al., 1999).
In considering the impact of psychosocial factors it is also necessary to consider the 
impact of societal perceptions on the older adult population. Bodily (1994, pp.178) has
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conceptualised the recurrent negative deployments of age as “the unelaborated attribution 
of the characteristics, limitations, or abilities of others to their chronological age”, as if 
time itself has a negative causal force. The suggestion that depression is “inevitable” in 
this population and could not be treated would fit into this conceptualisation. A 
legitimate danger is that some adults deeply internalise this concept of “age” as an 
explanatory resource that obstructs them from reflecting upon their attributes. As they 
begin to accept and rationalise judgement from others, these older people are further 
disenfranchised which may actually contribute to the “inevitability” of the onset of 
depression
Summary
Although there is extensive literature on depressive disorders, there is a limited 
understanding when applied to older adults. It is apparent that depression is the most 
prevalent functional psychiatric disorder in this population. Nonetheless, meta-analyses 
have indicated that the presence of major depression is lower in older adults than in 
younger groups across the lifespan. These findings are complicated through the 
complexities of the biopsychosocial factors in determining and maintaining the disorder. 
Indeed, many professionals and patients are reluctant or unable to identify the symptoms, 
there are fiirther complexities regarding comorbidity, and time of onset. In addition to 
this the suggestion that the most ill and institutionalised are excluded from research trials 
seriously questions accuracy of the current evidence base.
Consequently, controversies over the under diagnosis of depression in older people would 
discount any conclusion as to its “inevitability”, or not, as purely speculative. The 
question of whether it is enough to “understand” depression as a part of the ageing 
process is also a moot point as efforts to achieve an understanding of these issues through 
the “reassuring lens” of an “effective” evidence base is currently unsatisfactory.
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Is there any evidence to suggest that depression in older people can benefit from 
treatment?
Access to treatment
If an understanding is a necessary precursor to treatment then it is not surprising that 
psychological interventions with older adults reflects a field that is still so early in its 
conceptual and research development that the evidence base is at best suggestive, but not 
conclusive (Smyer, Zarit, Qualls, 1990). Limitations of this resource are compounded by 
the feet that older people do not receive equitable access to psychological treatment. An 
audit by the Department of Health (1994) discovered that although 16% of the total 
population in Britain are older adults, less than 10% of initial contacts with clinical 
psychologists were from this client group. Service provision for this population is 
similarly unsatisfectory in the United States. As a consequence of “bias” in the detection 
and diagnosis as previously discussed, less than 20% of depressed older adults in the 
community and primary care populations are receiving adequate treatment (Cole and 
Yaffe, 1996).
When considering the reasons why older people are not offered the treatment that they are 
entitled to, and may benefit from, some psychologists have stressed the importance of 
reflecting on some more subtle process issues. Biggs (1993) explains that 
countertransference (feelings invoked in the therapist by the patient) has contributed to 
the professional’s lack of understanding of older adults with mental health difficulties and 
their subsequent exclusion from treatment programmes. Biggs (1993) points out that 
clinicians have their own fears about ageing and that their reactions to older clients may 
be influenced by unresolved conflicts with parental figures. It is suggested that effects of 
this countertransference will often result in the older adults being seen to be “untreatable” 
and thus not really deserving attention. In such cases, where the clinician has not 
reflected on and recognised these intrapsychic processes, then responses are said to be 
avoidance by the professional or the suggestion of medical rather than interpersonal forms 
of intervention.
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Pharmacological and psychological Intervention
Although intervention can take many forms, those prognostic studies reported usually 
reflect medical intervention. Livingstone and Hinchcliffe (1993) reported that a third of 
patients remained depressed after medical treatment after a three-year follow up. 
Research by Heeren, Derksen, Heycop, and Van Gent (1997) claims that the 
ineffectiveness of pharmacological treatment is often the result of the prescription of sub- 
therapeutic doses. They assert that due to professional concerns over the detrimental side 
effects of the medication and of levels of tolerance, inadequate doses are being 
prescribed. Laidlaw (2001) argues that even when this is the case referral to 
psychotherapy is still exceptionally low.
Outcome research on the effectiveness of psychological intervention for older people with 
depression is extremely limited. In a review of seventeen comparative trials of 
psychosocial treatment, Scogin and McElreath (1994) found a good effect size in both 
major depressive disorder and sub-clinical varieties of depression in comparison to the no 
treatment or placebo groups. However, the sample size limitation precluded examination 
of the comparison of different treatments (cognitive, psychodynamic, and eclectic). The 
clinical use of these findings is further limited considering that only four (23%) of these 
seventeen trials included a population with a formal diagnosis of major depressive 
disorder, reaffirming the significance of the presence of sub-clinical depression in this 
population. Another study conducted by Thompson, Gallagher, and Breckenridge (1987) 
found similar results when comparing the effectiveness of cognitive, behavioural and 
eclectic/psychodynamic approaches to depression. A significant effect was evident when 
the therapies were compared with the waiting list group, however there were no 
significant differences in efficacy between treatment modalities. In a follow up study two 
years on, (Gallagher-Thompson, Hanley-Peterson, and Thompson, 1990; cited in Woods 
and Roth, 1996), as many as 70% of participants were no longer in the depressed range. 
As important as it is to extend clinical trials on this population, caution needs to be 
exercised when interpreting the above results due to the high drop out rate, mortality, 
measurement problems, and assisted medication effects.
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Comparable results were found using group therapies for depressed older people, as 
psychodynamic and CBT were found to be equally effective in reducing depressive 
symptoms (Steuer, Mintz, Hammen, Hill, Jarvik, McCarley, Motoike, and Rosen, 1984). 
A further study comparing group therapy with pharmacological treatment (Beutler, 
Scogni, Kirkish, Schretlen, Corbishley, Hamblin, Meredith, Potter, Bamford, and 
Levenson, 1987; cited in Woods and Roth, 1996) found that the attrition rate over the 
five-month duration of therapy was lower in the cognitive therapy group. However, once 
again these results are only partially indicative of the effectiveness of treatment 
modalities, as the antidepressant used was alprazolam, which is not particularly good for 
making therapeutic comparisons as it is rarely used as a drug of choice for depression in 
this population (Beutler, Scogni, et al., 1987; cited in Woods and Roth, 1996)
Despite the limited studies on this client group, there appears to be some evidence that 
individual therapy may be more effective in the treatment of depression in older people 
(Woods and Roth, 1996). Nonetheless, the long-term support of the groups appears to 
provide a greater resource for longer-term support thus assisting in relapse prevention 
(Culhane and Dobson, 1991; cited in Woods and Roth, 1996).
Treatment effectiveness across the lifespan
So for those in which depression has become a part of the ageing process, what are the 
chances of experiencing change with respect to their difficulties when compared to their 
younger contemporaries? Again the evidence is somewhat conflicting. A meta analysis 
of cognitive therapy (Dobson, 1989) indicated that there is a significant negative 
correlation between patient age and the amount of change to symptoms. Conversely, 
having evaluated a number of outpatient therapies, Knight (1988) reported that the over 
60 group improved more than younger adults. One further interesting finding was that 
those at the oldest end of the older adult spectrum required a longer period of therapy but 
were then able to achieve the same gains as their younger counterparts. Nonetheless, 
there are still too few studies on the treatment for adults at the older end of the spectrum,
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those not in a community setting, and those with comorbid illnesses to make an informed 
evidence base for the efficacy of the range of therapeutic interventions (Blazer, 1999).
Other benefits
Another reported advantage to treating older people is that recovery from depression may 
have a significant influence on improvements to comorbid physical illness (Woods,
1999). Studies have indicated that those with depressive symptoms have functioning that 
is comparable or worse than that of adults with chronic medical conditions (Gurland, 
Wilkder, Berkman, 1988). The impact of this level of functioning is correlated with a risk 
of increased functional impairment, and even mortality (Beekman, et al., 1999). 
Furthermore, the experience of depression can increase the perception of poor physical 
health (Jaffe, Froom, Galambos, 1994) as well as health care costs (Simon, Von Korff, 
and Barlow, 1995).
Summary
There are relatively few studies that have successfully investigated the effectiveness of 
the range of treatments for older adults with depression. Those that have been conducted 
have been subject to a range of biases including; inconsistent methods of intervention, 
problems with appropriate measurement tools, high drop out rate, rates of mortality, and 
the exclusion of non-community based older adults. Considering these limitations, the 
evidence base is clearly insufficient to make a conclusive decision as to the effectiveness 
of psychological (or other) treatments for this client group with depression.
However, the research to date does allude to the fact that older people have as much 
potential as other client groups in benefiting from psychological intervention, especially 
over an extended period of time. Indeed, considering the effects of depression on older 
people and the serious implications that it can have when comorbid with other physical, 
biochemical and neurological illnesses, there is an argument that this client group should 
at the very least be given equitable access to psychological treatment. Furthermore, the 
reciprocity between evidence based practice and practice based evidence should
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encourage clinicians to further create the opportunities to explore the interrelationship 
between “understanding” and “treating” older people for depression.
What is being done to promote both the understanding and treatment opportunities for 
older adults?
Directive action has recently been taken to address some of the difficulties which older 
people experience in the National Health Service (NHS). It has been acknowledged that 
more and more people are living on to old age and that this client group requires an 
equitable quality of care with other client groups. Those over sixty five year olds who 
develop depression and other mental health difficulties are to be given priority by the 
Government, as commissioning groups are being established to develop specific 
integrated investment plans (Audit Commission, 2000). Guidelines for an improved 
understanding and treatment options for older people have recently been published in the 
National Service Framework for Older People (Department of Health, 2001).
National Service Framework for Older People
Depression, as well as other mental health difficulties, has not been conceptualised in this 
Government document as an “inevitable part of the ageing process”. Indeed, input into 
the document by two prominent clinical psychologists (Twining and Rowan) has ensured 
that the emphasis and importance has been placed on the accessibility of psychological 
interventions for this population.
One of the key aims is to promote good mental health and to treat and support those older 
people with dementia and depression. Through integrated mental health services, the 
NHS and social services are setting out to ensure effective diagnosis, treatment (with an 
emphasis on psychological intervention) and support for the clients and their carers. The 
strategy also aims to recognise difficulties early, provide specialist services where 
necessary, and to offer community oriented services with seamless care packages.
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The guidelines also state explicitly that age discrimination is to be “rooted out”. NHS 
services are to be provided regardless of age and ethnicity but on the basis of clinical need 
alone. Furthermore, in a drive for person-centred care individuals will be enabled to 
make choices over their own treatment rather than be dictated to by professionals and 
policy. To address the problems of detection of client difficulties in the primary care 
services (as discussed previously), it has been suggested that professionals are trained in 
the assessment and diagnosis of depression, dementia and suicide.
These Government guidelines appear to be far more person centred than the tone of the 
essay title. Depression has been given priority in these guidelines and the suggestions for 
the preferred action by professionals appears to address some of the limitations of the 
service to date. Through the use of training, education and a sharing of skills amongst the 
professionals, the aim is to detect depression early and provide appropriate interventions 
swiftly.
Conclusion
Although it has been stated that depression is the most prevalent functional mental health 
difficulty in the older adult population it is far from “inevitable”. In fact, some evidence 
has suggested that older adults suffer less from major depression than their younger 
counterparts, and that older adults actually become less prone to depression as they age. 
However, it is clear that caution should be exercised when reviewing the evidence base 
due to a host of methodological difficulties. Despite the relative wealth of information on 
depression across the lifespan, and the impact of biological and psychosocial factors, few 
studies have claimed to reach any conclusive evidence. Furthermore, Beekman et al. 
(1999) have stated that large-scale epidemiological studies on depression in older adults 
illustrate the divergence of findings reflecting either real differences in the samples 
studied, or methodological differences between studies.
A similar observation is made by Biggs (1993) who argues that much literature and 
evidence on older adults is somewhat skewed towards an unrepresentative sample of the
85
ageing population as it is primarily based on the most distressed, disadvantaged and 
unwell. A danger is that these results fail to consider the variability in the physical and 
mental ability of older adults as well as important differences between people in their 
mid-sixties and those who are in their nineties (Papouchis and Passman, 1993).
These observations appear to challenge the assumption that depression is an inevitable 
part of the ageing process. Instead it is apparent that people in the older adult “age band” 
experience less major depression then their younger counterparts. Furthermore, it appears 
that with the most appropriate treatments tailored to their individual needs, older people 
with depression are as responsive to treatment as younger people. Therefore, having 
concluded that this population who may experience depression, can also benefit from 
treatment, the question is whether the healthcare services can provide equitable access to 
services, accurate diagnosis, effective treatment, and support. Encouragingly, it appears 
that such shortcomings in practice have of late been recognised and are beginning to be 
addressed in alliance with recent Government initiatives.
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Discuss the current findings on the cognitive functioning of adults with 
schizophrenia and the implications for treatment
The understanding of schizophrenia in adults has experienced several major changes over 
the last twenty years. There has been a shift from the view that it is a progressively 
deteriorating disorder, which has placed greater reliance on neurodevelopmental 
explanations of schizophrenia. Secondly, the phenomenology of the disorder has 
expanded from an emphasis on positive symptoms to include negative symptoms as well. 
And thirdly, in the 1990s the focus on these symptoms has modified as notions of 
phenomenology have increasingly moved beyond symptoms to an emphasis on the 
cognitive aspects of schizophrenia. This essay will present the current findings that 
attempt to elucidate the role of cognitive deficits in schizophrenia in relation to treatment 
and outcome. This discussion will include a consideration of the cognitive effects of 
antipsychotic medication, the implications of the selection of particular cognitive 
constructs for intervention, and the relationship between cognitive and social functioning. 
These issues may be best understood following a brief introduction of the concept of 
‘schizophrenia’, some of the issues surrounding diagnosis and symptomatology, and the 
relevance of cognitive functioning.
An introduction to schizophrenia 
Classification
Many epidemiological studies have used classification schemes (see Hare, 1982) to show 
that schizophrenia is a relatively common illness with a risk of affecting approximately 1 
in 100 people (Torrey, 1987). This risk appears to be largely independent of culture and 
socio-economic status and is as likely to affect as many men as it is women (Hare, 1992). 
However, onset in men is usually in the mid-20s whereas women are more likely to be 
first affected in their early 30s (Frith, 1992).
Perhaps the most widely used classification scheme used is the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual (DSM-IV, American Psychiatric Association, 1994). This gives a comprehensive 
guide to diagnosing schizophrenia in all of its recognised forms and should be consulted
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for an in depth understanding of the disorder. However, a brief precis may be beneficial 
at this point:
Schizophrenia is a general term encompassing a number of psychotic disorders with 
various cognitive, behavioural and emotional manifestations. Although schizophrenia is 
divided up into various subtypes, there are certain features which are believed to be 
common to all: (i) deterioration from previous levels of cognitive, social and vocational 
functioning; (ii) onset before midlife (est. 50 years of age); (iii) a duration of at least 6 
months, (iv) a pattern of psychotic features including delusions, hallucinations, thought 
disturbances, disturbed sense of self and reality testing.
This final feature is often called ‘positive symptoms’ as they are abnormal by their 
presence, and are outlined by Frith (1992) as follows: Firstly, there are ‘auditory 
hallucinations’, in which the individual experiences hearing voices discussing them or 
commenting on their actions. There may also be the presence of ‘delusions’, which is 
when a person holds some beliefs that are maintained despite data and refutation that 
should be sufficient to seriously challenge them. Other positive symptoms are the 
experience of thoughts coming into that person’s head from someone else (‘thought 
insertion’), thoughts leaving their mind and entering mind’s of others (‘thought 
broadcast’), or the feeling that thoughts are being removed from their head (‘thought 
withdrawal’). Whereas the previous positive symptoms are often identified through the 
patient’s self reports, there maybe abnormal absences in behaviour that can be observed. 
For example, the individual may show a reduction in spontaneous behaviour (‘affective 
blunting’), resulting in poverty of speech (alogia), ideas and action as well as social 
withdrawal (‘anhedonia’); these are termed ‘negative symptoms’ (Andreasen, 1985).
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Difficulties with diagnosis
Prior to addressing the cognitive factors that may be central to the rehabilitation of a 
person with a particular disorder, it is important to determine that the disorder ‘exists’. 
Indeed this is particularly important in schizophrenia as there is some debate over the 
aetiology of the disorder, which has direct implications on making an accurate diagnosis.
Historically, schizophrenia was termed ‘dementia praecox’ (Kraepelin, 1896) and as no 
specific neuropathology had been found for the disorder it was labelled as ‘functional’, as 
opposed to ‘organic’ psychosis. At that time dementia praecox was considered to be a 
deteriorating disorder from which there was no recovery. Kraepelin (1896) hoped that a 
better understanding of the cause could be found so that sufferers could begin to share 
phases of remission that were common to the other ‘functional’ psychosis such as ‘manic 
depressive psychosis’. Later Bleuler (1913; cited in Frith, 1992) made changes to this 
classification scheme and termed the disorder ‘schizophrenia’ to capture the characteristic 
in which different mental faculties (i.e. emotion and understanding) appear to ‘split 
apart’.
Nearly one hundred years on there has not been much change in the accuracy of the 
classification of schizophrenia. To date no independent marker of schizophrenia has been 
identified in order to validate what some consider to be an ‘arbitrary definition’. Indeed, 
theories that have attempted to account for the disorder are as diverse as childhood 
trauma, early psychosocial factors, life stresses, neuropsychological, neuroanatomical and 
neurophysiological abnormalities, diet, genetic predisposition, and exposure to viruses 
(Neale and Oltmans, 1980).
This kind of diversity in the field has led some to question the label and encourage 
abandonment of the term ‘schizophrenia’. The deconstruction of schizophrenia is a 
fascinating and potentially valid ‘progression’ in understanding certain facets of human 
distress, but is beyond the scope of this essay (see Bentall, 1993). However, suggestions 
that have arisen from such an approach have contributed to the perspective that the study
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of cognitive deficits is central to the identification of neuropsychological impairment in a 
psychiatric disorder (Bentall, 1993). Further emphasis is put on the individual’s 
experiences and less on generic labels with Bentall’s assertion that “neuropsychological 
data can best be understood in relation to symptoms rather than broad classifications” 
(1992, pp. 233).
Schizophrenia as a cognitive disorder 
An overview o f cognitive function
“The term ‘cognitive function’ is used synonymously with ‘information processing’ and 
‘neurocognitive functioning’” (Sharma, 1999, pp. 44), and refers to the ability to 
recognise and process complex tasks adequately. These broad terms encompass working 
memory and visuo-motor skills, as well as sequencing and planning processes. It has 
been argued that these cognitive deficits in people with schizophrenia are related to 
impairment in temporal and frontal regions of the brain (Sharma, 1999). As tasks become 
increasingly complex, functional structures compete for a limited attentional capacity and 
optimal functioning is determined by efficient switching between parallel and sequential 
processing (Sharma, 1999). If the switching mechanism is operating effectively then 
there will be a sufficient allocation of available attention resources (Nuechterlein and 
Dawson, 1984).
A shift in emphasis -  understanding cognitions in schizophrenia 
A substantial change has already begun to occur in research, as investigations of the 
relationship between cognitions and schizophrenia has increased significantly. Indeed, at 
the International Congress for Schizophrenia Research the content of paper sessions on 
cognitions has shifted from a minimal representation of one single session in 1993 (7% of 
all paper sessions) to one quarter of all paper sessions in 1997 (Green, 1999).
This change in the trend of schizophrenia research is believed to be as much to do with 
the rapid development of neuroimaging techniques, as it is to do with the centrality of 
cognitions to the disorder (Green, 1999). The neuroimaging techniques are used to
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provide demonstrations of dysfunctional neural processes in schizophrenic patients but 
these results cannot be fully interpreted without knowledge of the cognitive functions 
associated with the activation task (Buchsbaum, 1995).
The relationship between symptoms and cognitive deficits
Despite the recent belief that psychological studies are more informative when the 
emphasis is put on a patients particular symptoms rather than schizophrenia in general, it 
is necessaiy to understand the relationship of these symptoms to cognitive deficits. In an 
overview of this relationship, Green (1999) states that until recently cognitive deficits 
were assumed to be derivative of the more noticeable symptoms of the disorder. 
However, he explains that attempts to identify cognitive deficits as a secondary response 
to the presence of symptoms (or as medication side effects, or institutionalisation) have 
not been successful. On the contrary, it has been reported that many (but not all) 
cognitive deficits are present before the illness becomes apparent in an individual and that 
they endure long after the symptoms of the disorder have remitted (Comblatt and 
Erlenmeyer-Kimling, 1985, Nuechterlein, Dawson, Gitlin, Ventua, et al. 1992). The 
cognitive deficits have also been found in many first-degree relatives of the patients, and 
those relatives have never had, and may never have a schizophrenic illness (Keefe, 
Silverman, Mohs, Siever, et al. 1997). These findings suggest that cognitive deficits 
indicate a vulnerability to, rather than a presence of the illness, and could be described as 
intermediate phenotypic markers for schizophrenia.
Focussing in on cognitive deficits
As research has developed throughout the 1990s it has become apparent that cognitive 
deficits are associated with functional outcomes, such as social problem solving, social 
competence, community outcome, and psychosocial skill acquisition (Green, 1996). 
Another reason for growing interest in this area is that cognitive deficits may become 
targets of treatments themselves.
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The aim therefore has been to identify a single cognitive dysfunction, or pattern of 
dysfunction, from which the various abnormalities associated with schizophrenia can be 
derived (Hemsley, 1994). This endeavour has been difficult to achieve as a result of 
methodological difficulties (Hemsley, 1988) and because there is no definitivelarge-scale 
model of normal cognitive functioning. Even if there were, there would be problems in 
mapping cognitive constructs onto specific task performance if there were a presence of 
alterations in cognitive experience that is often associated with schizophrenia (Hemsley, 
1994). For these reasons, rather than adopt a reductionistic approach (attempting to 
match individual cognitions with functions), it may be more valuable to attend to the 
development of some of the current models that attempt to elucidate the role of cognitive 
deficits of schizophrenia in the context of treatment and outcome.
Conventional antipsychotic medications in relation to symptoms and functional outcome 
Figure 1 was developed by Green and Nuechterlein (1999) and reflects three conclusions 
found in the literature.
psychotic
symptom
conventiona
cognition
functional
outcome
Figure 1. Pathways from conventional antipsychotic treatment to functional outcome
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Firstly, this model recognises that although conventional antipsychotic medications are 
believed to have an effect on psychotic symptoms, their effects on cognitions are 
considered to be minimal (Strauss, 1993). Despite this limited therapeutic effect, it is as 
important to note that conventional antipsychotics can have a direct deleterious effect on 
cognition (Keefe, Silva, Perkins, and Lieberman, 1999).
Secondly, the model reflects the literature’s identification of a weak relationship between 
cognitions and psychotic symptoms, especially hallucinations and delusions (Strauss, 
1993). However the relationship between cognitions and particular positive symptoms is 
not mutually exclusive. For example, Spitzer (1997) claims to have isolated formal 
thought disorder to performance on a laboratory test of semantic priming. Nonetheless, 
Green and Nuechterlein (1999) continue to advocate keeping the psychotic symptoms and 
cognitive processes sufficiently separate as it is believed that some cognitive deficits 
remain unchanged following the improvement or full remittance of psychotic symptoms 
(Nuechterlein, Dawson, Gitlin, Ventua, et al. 1992).
Finally, studies have indicated that certain cognitive deficits are good predictors of 
functional outcome. Indeed, Green’s (1996) literature review showed that certain 
cognitive processes, such as verbal memory and vigilance were correlated with the 
outcome areas of community functioning, social problem solving and psychosocial skill 
acquisition in people with chronic schizophrenia. Similar results have been found by 
Mueser, Bellack, Douglas and Wade (1991), who identified relationships between verbal 
memory and social skills training, and social problem solving. Further significant 
relationships have also been found between measures of verbal memory and visual 
information processing and measures of social skill by Corrigan, Wallace, Schade, and 
Green (1994). However, as encouraging as these findings are, it remains tenuous to 
correlate cognitive measures and analogue measures of social functioning in order to 
prove a direct relationship between psychological deficits and functional behaviour in the 
community.
9 9
Nonetheless, these findings go some way to explaining the previous paradoxes of treating 
with conventional neuroleptics. Eliminating psychotic symptoms with this medication is 
unlikely to improve the schizophrenic patient’s social functioning. This factor may well 
contribute to understanding the high rate of hospital readmissions, as the individual may 
not have developed the skills to reduce the risk of intense relationships (i.e., Expressed 
Emotion; Brown, Carstairs, and Topping, 1958; cited in Kavanagh, 1992). Conversely, 
these findings have also begun to shed light on the way in which some people with 
schizophrenia can function in the community (and work effectively) despite experiencing 
positive symptoms (Green and Nuechterlein, 1999).
Novel antipsychotic medications, cognitions and functional outcome 
The initial model (figure 1) is incomplete as it excludes new antipsychotic agents, 
anticholinergic agents, and negative symptoms. By comparison, the impact of 
conventional antipsychotic agents has been minima!, whereas the newer ‘atypical’ 
antipsychotic medications appear to be more effective (Keefe, Silva, Perkins, and 
Lieberman, 1999). Subsequently, these authors have expressed that atypical 
antipsychotic medications are more effective at targeting cognitions in adults with 
schizophrenia than the older medications. If this is the case, then it is essential to 
consider whether the beneficial effects of medication involve a direct action on a 
particular cognitive construct.
Direct versus indirect effects o f medication
A “direct effect” is described as one in which a particular medication has an effect on a 
cognitive function. If an additional medication is required (e.g. to counteract the side 
effects of the first medication) and this too affects cognition , these effects are called 
“indirect effects”. This is an important point as most conventional medications require 
the addition of anticholinergic medication (Stalheim-Smith and Fitch, 1993). This 
adjunctive medication is often used alongside antipsychotics to impede or block impulses 
in the cholinergic nerves. Anticholinergic medication has been found to impair memory 
in many cases (Strauss, Reynolds, Jayaram, and Tune, 1990; Silver and Geraisy, 1995),
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and in doing so makes it impossible to attribute any memory improvements to the 
conventional anti-psychotics, which are used in conjunction (Keefe, Silva, Perkins, and 
Lieberman, 1999). Green and Nuechterlein (1999, pp.312) find such results less 
conclusive, stating that it remains unclear whether “a differential treatment effect is the 
result of something good (from the new medication) or the absence of something bad 
(from the anticholinergic agent)”.
Effects o f atypical antipsychotic medication on cognitive impairment in schizophrenia 
In a review and meta-analysis of 15 studies on the effects of atypical antipsychotics on 
cognitions several important methodological limitations and treatment effects were 
identified (Keefe, Silva, Perkins and Lieberman, 1999). Perhaps one of the primary 
factors limiting the knowledge of cognitive functioning in adults with schizophrenia is 
that there is rarely the opportunity to use medication-free baseline assessments. Although 
some first-episode populations may be drug free, in more chronic populations 
conventional antipsychotics will usually already have been provided before any cognitive 
testing can take place (Keefe, Silva, Perkins and Lieberman, 1999). Another limitation 
identified by these authors is the lack of double blind study conditions (only 3 of the 15). 
That is, assessments often require subjective evaluations that can be contaminated by the 
knowledge of a patient’s medication (Rosenheck, Cramer, Xu, Thomas, et al., 1997). 
Furthermore, even cognitive measures are believed to be vulnerable to these biases and 
need to be safeguarded using a double-blind methodology.
In the 15 study meta-analysis the authors (Keefe, Silva, Perkins and Lieberman, 1999, pp. 
209) recognised that there was a broad range of test measures used, which they grouped 
into the following categories: (1) attention subprocesses, (2) executive function, (3) 
working-memoiy, (4) learning and memory, (5) visuospatial analysis, (6) verbal fluency, 
(7) digit symbol substitution, and (8) fine motor function. They determined that in the 
double blind studies atypical antipsychotics produced a significant improvement in 
attention, executive functioning, and visuospatial analysis. In the open label-studies, 
where the researchers were aware of each treatment group on cognitive testing, the use of
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atypical antipsychotic medication was found to improve executive functioning, working 
memory, visuospatial analysis, verbal fluency, digit symbol substitution, and fine motor 
functions.
The authors of the meta-analyses conclude that this study suggests that atypical 
antipsychotics, when compared to conventional drugs improve cognitive functions in 
adults with schizophrenia. The strongest effects were on verbal fluency, digit-symbol 
substitution, fine motor functions and executive functions. However, enthusiasm should 
be tempered, as cognitive functions of patients with schizophrenia did not reach ‘normal’ 
levels in any of the analysed studies. In addition, methodological limitations cast doubt 
over the validity of the findings due to the strong impact of various rater-biases inherent 
in the open label studies (Rosenheck, Cramer, Xu, Thomas, et al., 1997).
Cognitions, negative symptoms and functional outcome
While tracing the in/direct effects of pharmacological treatment may be strewn with 
methodological difficulties, nonetheless they are often easier to determine than causal 
relationships between cognitions and negative symptoms (Green and Nuechterlein, 1999). 
Recent findings on the cognitive functioning of adults with schizophrenia have led to 
suggestions that negative symptoms have a direct causal impact on functional outcome. 
Indeed, studies based on statistical models claim that cognition mediates between 
negative symptoms and functional outcome (Velligan, Mahurin, Diamond, Hazelton, 
Eckert, and Miller, 1997). Unlike medical treatment, cognitions cannot be prescribed or 
proscribed to determine an effect. For this reason, the relationship between cognitions 
and negative symptoms are described as having a shared variance to avoid making 
assumptions about causality (Green and Nuechterlein, 1999). This approach is adopted 
despite longitudinal data that has concluded that the deficits in certain cognitive functions 
(i.e. vigilance and perceptual span) appear to be vulnerability factors for the development 
of negative symptoms rather than the result of negative symptoms (Nuechterlein , Edell, 
Norris, and Dawson, 1986).
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The cognitive/social functioning relationship
With the belief that understanding cognitions is central to the social functioning in 
schizophrenia, much research has recently attempted to identify the function of relevant 
cognitive subsystems. In a recent review of related studies, Green (1996) divided the 
literature into three areas of social functioning: community outcome, social problem 
solving, and skill acquisition.
Green’s (1996) areas of community outcome included: social engagement, 
communication, daily living skills, recreation, level of independent living, employment 
and quality of life (Q.O.L; Heinrichs, Hanlon, and Carpenter, 1984). Results indicated 
that secondaiy verbal memory and card sorting were good predictors of community 
functioning (Buchanan, Holstein, and Breier, 1994). It is believed that secondaiy verbal 
memory is reliant upon memory for stories and lists, utilising both immediate and delayed 
recall, factors which may well contribute to improved social engagement. In addition, 
card sorting is often used as a measure of executive functioning, suggesting that ability on 
this task will increase the likelihood of cognitive flexibility. This is described as a 
valuable facet in the integration and accommodation of new information, thereby 
reducing perseveration and increasing the chances of independent living (Addington and 
Addington, 1999).
In the second group of studies, reliable predictors of social problem solving included 
verbal memory (Bellack, Sayers, Mueser, and Bennet, 1994); vigilance (Nuechterlein, 
1991); and early visual processing (Asamow, and Nuechterlein, 1992; cited in Addington 
and Addington, 1999). An interesting finding was that executive functioning was not 
correlated with social problem solving (Corrigan, Green, and Toomey, 1994). This 
finding may be unexpected, as cognitive flexibility would appear to be of great use in 
problem solving. However, the applicability to social problem solving is questionable as 
questions are cast over this particular result considering only inpatients with 
schizophrenia were used.
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Finally, the third group of studies used both inpatients and outpatients with schizophrenia 
to identify the relationship between cognitive functioning and the ability to acquire 
psychosocial skills. Skill acquisition was consistently associated with verbal memory and 
vigilance (Corrigan, Wallace, Schade, and Green, 1994).
Overall, Green’s (1996) review highlighted the consistency between studies on cognitive 
functioning and social functioning. In summary, verbal memory predicted community 
functioning, skill acquisition, and problem solving skills. The two areas of social 
problem solving and skill acquisition were reliably predicted by vigilance, and card 
sorting was associated with performance in community functioning but inconsistently 
with skill acquisition.
The social cognition/functioning relationship
Between cognition and social functioning (reviewed above) are a number of mediating 
variables which are labelled as social cognitions (see figure 2; based on Green and 
Nuechterlein, 1999. Note that the author’s modifications are in red ink.). In this model 
the components of social cognition include emotion perception, social schema, coping 
strategies, and insight into illness. Such complex cognitive processes are necessary for 
the accurate perception of emotion in others, which is believed to be essential in 
schizophrenia to avoid misinterpretation and thus compromising social interactions 
(Addington and Addington, 1999).
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Drawing a distinction between basic cognitions and social cognitions, as this model does, 
may serve to clarify the specific or general nature of cognitive deficits in social cognition. 
That is, whether the deficits in the schizophrenic person’s ability to read emotions is
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specific to emotional stimuli or more of a general perception deficit. However, research 
has yet to make such distinctions in social cognitive functioning. Currently, claims are 
made that neurocognition is a prerequisite for social cognition, and social cognition, in 
turn, is a prerequisite for social functioning” (Green and Nuechterlein, 1999). 
Unfortunately this explanation is somewhat linear and does not account for the effect of 
the feedback of functional outcome back into the areas of negative symptoms, and both 
basic and social cognitions (red arrows added by the author), a process which one would 
expect to be central to the understanding of the role of cognitive processes.
Cognitive remediation for people with schizophrenia
Having discussed the role of cognitive deficits in schizophrenia and the impact of these 
deficits on social functioning, it may be useful to further consider implications for 
treatment. The evidence for the use of atypical antipsychotic medication has already been 
addressed and the limitations of this approach to ‘correct’ cognitive functioning has been 
recognised (Keefe, Silva, Perkins and Lieberman, 1999).
This observation may raise the question of what a successful intervention is. The answer 
to this question depends on both implicit and explicit goals (Wykes, Reeder, Comer, 
Williams, and Everitt, 1999). This can be thought about in these terms; the goal of 
pharmacological interventions is to improve cognition whilst it is administered (‘treat’), 
whereas psychosocial interventions aim to improve cognitive performance after it has 
stopped (‘retrain’). Although this is a somewhat dichotomous explanation, “the 
complementarity of these two related but separate goals provides a rationale for 
combining the approaches” (Green and Nuechterlein, 1999, pp.315).
Targeting impaired cognitive functioning with psychosocial interventions 
To date, little is known about the effectiveness of using psychosocial interventions for 
cognitive improvement in schizophrenia. However, research over the past few years has 
begun to explore this relationship. A comparison between two studies on severely 
disabled but stabilised patients with schizophrenia assisted in the identification of the
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impact of psychosocial factors in cognitive rehabilitation. In the initial study, 
Spaulding(1993) identified no cognitive change in 110 patients, in a State hospital long­
term unit, over a 6 month period. A more recent study (Spaulding, Reed, Storzbach, 
Sullivan, Weiler, and Richardson, 1998) assessed cognitive change in equally disabled 
and stabilised patients over the same time period but in a rich psychosocial treatment 
environment. In this study improvements were shown on 9 of the 12 measures of 
cognitive functioning, with improvements on measures of memory and executive 
functioning, and no change on measures of reaction time and attention. The authors 
surmise that in a rich psychosocial environment some aspects of impaired cognition in 
schizophrenia are subject to improvement.
The initial result from this study raises the question, what factors of the rich psychosocial 
environment impacted upon cognitive impairment? The design of the Spaulding, Reed, 
Storzbach, Sullivan, et al, (1999) study included a randomised controlled comparison of 
psychosocial rehabilitation with and without a group modality designed to exercise 
cognitive abilities. The modality was developed using some cognitive components of 
Interpersonal Psychological Therapy (IPT; Brenner, Roder, Hodel, Kienzle, Reed and 
Liberman, 1994), combining social skills training with other psychosocial techniques. 
Over the 6-month duration of the study there was evidence of improvement in cognition 
of only those who received the cognitive component. The most significant finding was 
the differential improvement in the span of apprehension, a domain of cognition that is 
thought to be sensitive to ‘top down’ information processing (Silverstein, Knight, 
Schwartzkopf, West, Osborne, and Kamim, 1996). Therefore, “it is possible that the 
differential improvement reflects better executive level modulation of preattentional 
processing routines, as opposed to improvement in the rate or efficiency of the routines 
themselves” (Spaulding, Fleming, Reed, Sullivan, Storzbach, Lam, 1999, pp. 279). This 
finding is particularly interesting as it challenges an alternative view (Posner, 1982; cited 
in Hemsley, 1994), that prolonged practice on a task, thus changing it from a controlled to 
an automatic process, serves to inhibit redundant information, reduce the load on a
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limited capacity system and subsequently improve information processing. The potential 
benefits of over-learning will be discussed further on.
In summaiy, this research indicates that cognitive improvement can occur in stabilised 
patients and that changes are more apparent in higher-level cognitions. Improvement is 
evident in the integration of elemental cognitive processes, rather than improved 
operation of the elemental processes themselves (Spaulding, Fleming, Reed, Sullivan, et 
al.1999). Next, some consideration needs to be given to whether cognitive change, 
improved through psychosocial interventions, has ecological benefits for the individual 
with schizophrenia.
The relationship between improved cognitive functioning and rehabilitation 
Systematic studies of the subjective value of cognitive recovery have yet to be performed. 
One of the difficulties associated with demonstrating this empirically is that self-reports 
can be influenced by factors unrelated to cognitive change, including symptom reduction 
and better behavioural functioning (Spaulding, Fleming, Reed, Sullivan, et al. 1999). 
These authors state that is more likely that cognitive changes are links which are directly 
related to anything from the stabilisation of psychotic symptoms to social behaviour. The 
effects of the cognitive improvements on other areas of functioning can also be viewed as 
being direct or indirect. For example, an indirect effect may see the recovery of memory 
capabilities having no direct effect on behavioural functioning, but may facilitate a 
patient’s response to social skills training or other rehabilitation interventions (Spaulding, 
Fleming, Reed, Sullivan, et al. 1999). Indeed, a return to the model set out previously 
(figure 2) illustrates the role of social cognitions as a mediator between basic cognition 
and functional outcome.
To increase or reduce the load on cognitive processes?
The optimism surrounding the benefits of targeting impaired cognition to improve the 
social functioning of adults with schizophrenia are not shared universally. Bellack, Gold 
and Buchanan (1999) state that despite the inevitable limitations to cognitive studies,
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there is convergent support for the argument that ameliorating cognitive deficits can be 
helpfiil. However, they assert that there is no support for the assertion that cognitive 
remediation is essential. They go on to make the point that the assumption that 
remediation is essential is consistent with the restorative model that has dominated the 
treatment of mental illness (including schizophrenia) for many years. This model 
assumes that impairments need to be corrected to achieve an effective rehabilitative 
outcome, an approach that has proved to be more applicable to orthopaedics (e.g. to fix 
broken bones) than it has to mental health (Bellack, Gold, and Buchanan, 1999).
An alternative approach to improving cognitive functions in the person with 
schizophrenia would be to reduce the demands on these processes. One such strategy that 
has been tried and has produced extensive evidence is the over learning of key skills until 
they become automatic, thereby reducing the load on working memory (Ericsson and 
Hastie, 1994). Equally, the role of attention and working memory in learning could be 
minimised by adapting the format and content of training (Bellack, Gold, and Buchanan, 
1999).
Bellack, Mueser, Morrison, Tierney, and Podell (1990) initially used an alternative 
training protocol (with cognitive behavioural components) to train adults with 
schizophrenia to overcome cognitive deficits on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test 
(WCST; a putative neuropsychological marker of prefrontal function). These cognitive 
improvements were maintained for at least a day. The authors concede that such an 
experiment has limited direct ecological validity as learning how to do the WCST has, in 
itself little value. However, they claim that the participants’ ability to improve their 
performance questions the assumption that they are suffering from a frontal lobe 
impairment but places an emphasis on the necessity to clarify vague and confusing 
instructions. Some support for this possibility comes from Stratta, Mancini, Mattei, 
Casacchia and Rossi (1994) who in a similar study found that people with schizophrenia 
produced significant improvements in the WCST without training, but with more 
appropriate instructions.
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Other research findings have further supported the strategy of shifting the emphasis from 
focussing on cognitive deficits as artefacts to practice based improvements following 
enhanced effort and motivation. One such study (Kern, Green and Goldstein, 1995) 
found that simple instructions and monetaiy reinforcements were effective in increasing 
performance on a measure of span of apprehension (a putative trait marker of 
schizophrenia), which is usually considered to be highly stable.
A number of accumulated similar findings have provided evidence that a range of 
cognitive tasks can be enhanced through practice, instruction, and provision of rewards 
(Bellack, Gold, and Buchanan, 1999). For these reasons, rehabilitation is believed by 
some to be more effective with intervention focussing on improving functional capacities 
and lessening the load on cognitive processes (Bellack, Gold, and Buchanan, 1999).
Conclusion
Since 1992 there has been a shift towards the subject of cognitive functioning in 
understanding schizophrenia, the role of these impairments in functioning, the impact of 
new pharmacological agents on cognition, and the role of psychosocial interventions to 
enhance impairment. Although much has been learned following this new direction, 
progress has been modest and many new avenues of necessary future investigation have 
been recognised. Nonetheless, there are clear developments in the current findings on the 
cognitive functioning of schizophrenia that have implications for intervention.
Cognitive deficits are now widely believed to be precursors to the symptoms of 
schizophrenia rather than derived from them. This new direction has followed on from 
treating positive symptoms with conventional medication, which had little effect on 
cognitive functioning. The development of the atypical antipsychotic medication has 
demonstrated how targeting areas other than the positive symptoms assist in social 
functioning. However, the inability to delineate specific cognitive functions and attribute 
them directly to areas of functioning has impeded progress. Furthermore, rarely is one
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medication alone used which has served to complicate the process of attributing positive 
or negative effects in a simplistic linear fashion.
Alongside the difficulties inherent in researching functions as complex as cognitions, a 
host of methodological limitations have also restricted progress. Adopting a standardised 
approach with such a heterogenous population is a significant challenge, and the range of 
research designs has limited the scope for comparison across studies. However, some 
studies have used creative statistical procedures to cany out meta-analyses in order to 
make comparisons across trials. One such study reached the conclusion that atypical 
antipsychotics had a significant impact on verbal fluency, digit-symbol substitution, fine 
motor functions and executive functions (Keefe, Silva, Perkins and Lieberman, 1999). 
Promising though this is, the authors note that cognitive functioning still failed to reach 
‘normal’ levels.
The relationship between basic cognitions and functional outcome has become clearer 
following the introduction of the mediator, social cognition. This accounts for the social 
skills that the individual might employ in order to apply cognitive process to achieve a 
desired outcome. Unfortunately, this relationship (figure 2; Green and Nuchterlein, 1999) 
fails to consider the reciprocal qualities that a particular functional outcome would have 
on at least three of the principal sub-components; basic cognition, social cognition and 
negative symptoms.
The use of atypical antipsychotic medication has been used alongside psychosocial 
interventions in order to improve cognitive functioning. At least one study has indicated 
that through using IPT there was a marked improvement in the span of apprehension, a 
domain of cognition that is thought to be sensitive to ‘top down’ information processing. 
This is particularly interesting as it suggests that there is an integration of elemental 
cognitive processes, which may have important implications in the development of future 
interventions with respect to the cognitive deficits that they are designed to target.
I l l
This in itself is a somewhat contentious point as there are differences of opinion about 
what should be the treatment target for psychosocial interventions designed to improve 
cognitive processes. Whereas some believe that specifically targeting cognitive abilities 
are the most appropriate way to correct the cognitive functioning of adults with 
schizophrenia, others have reservations about this approach. It has been suggested that 
until more is known about relevant cognitive targets for intervention, repeated practice of 
cognitive tasks is unlikely to have much improvement in underlying cognitive operations. 
In turn this is not likely to produce much benefit for community functioning. Instead, it 
may be more beneficial to place greater focus upon improving functional skills through 
skills training programmes. Although it has not been stated explicitly, this alternative 
approach advocates focussing on effort and motivation, which could be conceptualised as 
targeting the negative symptoms. Whilst this is not contradictory to current theoretical 
understandings, as cognitions and negative symptoms are said to have a reciprocal 
relationship, this form of intervention could be conceptualised as comparatively 
regressive. That is, cognitive functions are perceived to be somewhat incidental as 
intervention is directed exclusively at the negative symptoms.
To fully realise the potential of these current findings, further research is needed on the 
cognitive psychopathology and neuropsychology of schizophrenia. This research needs 
to surmount a host of methodological limitations in order to address the longitudinal 
course of the disorder across its acute, post acute and chronic residual stages. In addition, 
these investigations need to be done in the context of the latest biopsychosocial treatment 
and rehabilitation.
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Clinical Section
This section summarises the clinical experience gained in the four core placements and 
two specialist placements. A summaiy of each of the five case reports written for each 
core placement, and one specialist placement are also included in this section. The five 
clinical case reports are submitted in full in Volume Two of this portfolio, with the 
placement contracts, clinical evaluation forms and logbooks of clinical activity.
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Summary of Clinical Experience
Adult Mental Health Placement
Placement details
Dates: October 1999 to March 2000
Supervisor: Mrs Nicky Boella, Chartered Clinical Psychologist
NHS Trust: Sussex Weald and Downs NHS Trust
Base: Horsham CMHT
Client demographics
Individual work with 10 clients (6 male, 4 female) ranging in age from 17 to 58 
years.
Group work -  critical incident stress debriefing work with 30 men from 
Afghanistan following an armed aeroplane hijack. Co-worked with a clinical 
psychologist and an interpreter.
Presenting difficulties 
Depression 
Social phobia 
OCD 
Anxiety
Physical and verbal aggression 
Health issues (chronic fatigue) 
Alcohol dependency 
Cognitive impairment (memory) 
Sexual abuse 
PTSD
Somatoform disorder 
Relationship difficulties 
Eating disorder
119
Assessment procedures
Assessment interviews
Assessment tools: Critical Outcome Routine evaluation, Beck Depression 
Inventory n, Beck Anxiety Inventory, Maudsley Obsessional Compulsive 
Inventory, Risk Assessment, WAIS-III, NART, AMIPB,
Interventions
Cognitive behaviour therapy
Systemic
Narrative
Other experience
Attended and presented in the systemic/narrative therapy supervision group. 
Trust away day.
Completed and presented a service related research project.
Regular CMHT meetings to discuss organisational issues and review clients. 
Training in assessing eating disorders, PTSD, Mental Health Act, WAIS-III.. 
Critical incident stress debriefing (CISD) training.
Visits to the surrounding services (Inpatient wards, specialist services).
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People with Learning Disabilities Placement
Placement details
Dates: April 2000 to September 2000
Supervisor: Mrs Ewa Rula, Chartered Clinical Psychologist
NHS Trust: Kingston and District Community NHS Trust
Base: Richmond CTPLD
Client demographics
Individual work with 6 clients (3 male, 3 female) ranging in age from 21 to 57 
years
Group work -  A dog phobia group co-worked with 2 other trainees. The group 
comprised of 3 males and 2 females, aged between 25 and 50 years.
Presenting difficulties/issues 
Eligibility for services 
Depression
Challenging behaviour 
PTSD
Emotional insight 
Obsessions 
Bereavement 
Family relationships 
Anxiety
Assessment procedures
Assessment interviews with stafFclients/families.
Functional analyses: charts, diaries, observation.
Neuropsychological assessment using: Leiter, Vineland, Raven’s Progressive 
Matrices, WAIS-III.
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Interventions
Psychodynamic
Cognitive behaviour therapy
Systemic
Other experience
Psychology department presentation: “The division of clinical psychology - A 
critical self-reflection”.
Presented cases in a group supervision group.
Transmission of skills to a range of staff caring for clients.
Contributed to the development of services to offer an improved transition from 
child to adult.
Training day on men with learning disabilities and sexuality.
Conference about the development of the Institute of Psychotherapy in Learning 
Disabilities.
A government/professional debate on the new proposals for people with 
psychopathic personality disorder.
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Child, Adolescent and Family Placement
Placement details
Dates: October 2000 to March 2001
Supervisor: Dr Johanna Flack, Chartered Clinical Psychologist
NHS Trust: South west London and St. George’s NHS Trust
Base: Sutton Older Adult Community Mental Health Tearn
Client demographics
Individual work with 11 clients (7 male, 4 female) ranging in age from 8 to 17 
years
Presenting difficulties 
Depression 
Anxiety 
School refusal 
Relationship difficulties 
Toileting 
Psychosis
Cognitive impairment (learning needs)
Pervasive developmental disorder 
Challenging behaviour 
Alcohol dependence/care proceeding 
Learning disability
Assessment procedures
Assessment through interview, play, genograms, observations, monitoring. 
Assessment using: Child Depression Scale, WICS-HI, WORD, TEA-ch, Birleson 
Depression Scale, Connor’s, Strengths and Difficulties, British Ability Scales n.
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Interventions
Systemic/Narrative 
Cognitive behaviour therapy 
Psychodynamic
Other experience
Contributed to a teaching session for medical students doing a B Sc in 
Developmental Psychology.
Presented cases in peer supervision and CAMHS meetings.
Contributed to teaching for carers with children with autism.
Regularly worked in the family therapy team and joined the journal clubs. 
Attended several conferences and debates on the interventions for ADHD. Also a 
2 day workshop on Transforming Personality Disorder (Christine Padesky). 
Attended a narrative therapy conference, and a training day on intergenerational 
patterns of abuse.
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Older Adult Placement
Placement details
Dates: April 2001 to September 2001
Supervisor: Mrs Lynn Beech, Chartered Clinical Psychologist
NHS Trust: Sussex Weald and Downs NHS Trust
Base: Horsham CMHT
Client demographics
Individual work with 10 clients (4 male, 6 female) ranging in age from 65 to 91 
years
Presenting difficulties 
Depression 
Anxiety
Bereavement/loss 
Vomit phobia 
Relationship difficulties 
Guilt
Rehabilitation 
Claustrophobia 
Learning disability 
Challenging behaviour 
OCD
Cognitive impairment (dementia)
Separation anxiety
Assessment procedures
Assessment through interview, observations, monitoring.
Assessment using: WAIS-ffl, AMIPB, NART, WCST, HADS, B AL
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Interventions
Systemic/Narrative
Psychodynamic
Cognitive behaviour therapy
Other experience
Presented cases in the Tearn meetings.
Transmission of skills to relatives and carers.
Worked on inpatient/outpatient dementia wards.
Liased across 2 different Tearns to meet a clients needs.
Attended the older adult directorate meetings.
Meet and observe a range of professionals (ECT, psychiatrist, OT, nurse) 
Attended seminars on Bowlby’s Attachment Theory, staff‘bum out’. Also 
attended a conference on systemic reflections on working with child abuse.
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Specialist Placement I
Severe and Enduring Mental Health
Placement details
Dates: October 2001 to March 2002
Supervisor: Dr Brian Solts, Chartered Clinical Psychologist
NHS Trust: Sussex Weald and Downs NHS Trust
Base: Centurion Centre -  Acute psychiatric mental health wards
Client demographics
Individual work with 10 clients (5 male, 5 female) ranging in age from 20 to 54 
years
Group work -  An ongoing, weekly, open group, offering the inpatients a forum to 
discuss any issues. The group work was interpreted using a psychodynamic 
approach. This was joint run with a clinical psychologist (supervisor). The group 
was run over 20 weeks and between 3 and 15 patients attended.
Presenting difficulties 
Depression 
Social phobia 
Guilt/Self-esteem 
Psychosis
Attachment difficulties 
Sexual abuse 
“Personality Disorders”
Self harm/suicide attempts
Anxiety
OCD
Eating disorder
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Assessment procedures
Assessment interviews, observations, monitoring.
Interventions
Psychodynamic 
Systemic/Narrative 
Cognitive behaviour therapy
Other experience
Worked with the Home Treatment Team (HTT) in a consultative capacity. 
Carried out 2 teaching sessions for the HTT on working with relationship 
problems.
Assisted my supervisor in some teaching of ward staff.
Gave a psychological perspective at multi disciplinary meetings in relation to the 
needs of come challenging clients.
Supervised some work on the locked wards.
Contributed to a new risk assessment procedure.
Met and observed a range of professionals.
Attended ward handovers to give a psychological perspective on clients needs. 
Systemic/Narrative supervision group.
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Specialist Placement II
Systemic and Family Therapy
Placement details
Dates: April 2002 to September 2002
Supervisor: Mrs Jayne Beal, Chartered Clinical Psychologist, and Mr Graham Lee,
Family Therapist.
NHS Trust: West Sussex Health and Social Care NHS Trust
Base: Worthing CAMHS
Client demographics
Worked with 9 families. A total of 3 of the index patients were male and 6 female. 
Their ages ranged from 6 to 15 years
Family Therapy Clinic -  Worked with a total of 8 families. The index patients 
ages ranged from 8 to 16, and 2 were male and 6 female.
Presenting difficulties 
Depression
Social communication disorder 
Toileting
Auditory hallucinations 
Attachment difficulties 
Sexual abuse 
Self-harm 
Panic attacks 
Anxiety 
Eating issues 
Bereavement 
Somatoform disorder 
Relationship difficulties
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Assessment procedures
Assessment interviews, observations, monitoring.
Interventions
Systemic/Narrative -  Family Therapy
Psychodynamic
Cognitive behaviour therapy
Other experience
A two hour presentation on discourse analysis and ADHD.
Meetings about organisational issues/change.
Presented and reviewed cases in meetings.
Met with the Drugs and Alcohol Team and the Youth Offending Service. 
Received live supervision for a majority of the family work.
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Clinical Case Report Summaries
Adult Mental Health Case Report Summary
The assessment and intervention of a 59-vear-old male client with obsessive-compulsive 
disorder and depression: A cognitive behavioural approach.
March 2000
Year 1
132
The assessment and intervention of a 59-year-old male client with obsessive- 
compulsive disorder and depression: A cognitive behavioural approach.
N.B.: Some o f the details have been changed, including all names, to preserve the 
anonymity o f the people involved as well as the health care setting.
Name: M r L.
DOB: 01:01:41
Reason for referral
Mr L. was identified as having obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) and was referred to 
psychology from the CMHT psychiatrist.
History of Presenting Problem
Mr L. reported that he first experienced obsessions and compulsions in 1971. These 
symptoms coincided with the onset of depression, which was diagnosed by the 
psychiatrist. These difficulties coincided with a difficult time for Mr L., when he was 
caring for his elderly mother shortly before she died. Since this time his mood fluctuated 
and his obsessions and compulsions gradually became more generalised and increased in 
frequency. There was a history of serious mental health difficulties throughout Mr L.’s 
family and his brother committed suicide in 1999. Mr L. had a heart attack in 1991. He 
had no previous contact with psychology.
Assessment
The assessment included interviews with Mr L. to begin to understand the nature and 
course of his OCD and depression. Mr L. experienced compulsions to check that his 
house was safe, he believed that failure to do so would result in catastrophic 
consequences. Mr L. reported that his depression had recently reduced in severity. The 
assessment also included the use of the Maudsley Obsessional Compulsive Inventory 
(MOCI) and the Beck Depression Inventory II (BDI-IT). The MOCI indicated high scores 
on ‘checking’ followed by ‘slowness’. The BDI II indicated ‘moderate’ levels of
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depression. Other areas of the assessment included a history of his childhood, family 
members, employment and a risk assessment. He had a history of physical abuse from 
his father, had misused alcohol, and attempted suicide in 1978. At the time of assessment 
he reported no suicidal ideation.
Formulation
His OCD may have been the result of a genetic predisposition, as well as the result of his 
‘unsafe’ childhood. He may also have believed that his mental activity was responsible 
for his mother’s death, which happened at a time when his siblings became mentally ill. 
The assessment indicated that at this traumatic time Mr L. experienced unwanted 
intrusive thoughts about dangers and risks. To reduce distress, he attempted to neutralise 
these through checking. This response to the intrusive thoughts appeared to be central to 
their persistence causing marked anxiety. Seeking reassurance was another behaviour 
that appeared to maintain his obsessional thoughts.
Intervention
CBT was selected as the most appropriate intervention. The intervention was designed to 
offer education about OCD and match this to the client’s experiences, to use exposure and 
response prevention, whilst investigating and challenging the client’s intrusive thoughts. 
A number of tasks and monitoring strategies were designed to facilitate this process and 
to encourage Mr L. to take responsibility for his progress. Some narrative therapy 
techniques were also deployed to assist Mr L. in developing an alternative, less 
pathologised story of his experiences, thoughts and feelings.
Outcome and critique
The MOCI measure indicated a reduction in Mr L.’s ‘checking’ and ‘slowness’, although 
his score for ‘doubting’ rose a little. His BDIII score reduced to the normal/mild range. 
He reported having control over the OCD symptoms for the first time in his life. The 
frequency of checks reduced significantly and he also reported losing the “nagging 
feelings”. Mr L. also managed to adjust his perception of the amount of responsibility
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that he had over unwanted events. He learned to challenge and reappraise many of his 
negative thoughts. Mr L. developed a range of activities that he planned to pursue so that 
he did not have too much time at his disposal now that the compulsions had stopped. Mr 
L. and his wife planned to monitor his progress along with his psychiatrist. The critique 
included getting the timing right for exposure and response prevention. The need to use 
supervision promptly to work through frustrations with the client also became clear.
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Learning Disabilities Case Report Summary
The Assessment and Facilitation of Emotional Insight with a 44 Year Old. Male Client 
with a Moderate Learning Disability: A Psvchodvnamic Approach.
September 2000
Year 2
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The Assessment and Facilitation of Emotional Insight with a 44 Year Old, Male 
Client with a Moderate Learning disability: A Psychodynamic Approach.
N.B.: Some of the details have been changed, including all names, to preserve the 
anonymity of the people involved as well as the health care setting.
Name: M.S.
DOB: 03.03.56
Reason for referral
M.S. was referred to psychology by the occupational therapist as he was said to “obsess” 
over women, be “sexually inappropriate”, “lie”, and show aggression to others.
History of presenting problem
M.S. was a 44-year-old man with Down’s syndrome and a moderate learning disability. 
He spoke English and had good communication skills. In the past when he moved 
residential homes, his behaviour became more challenging and he was described as 
threatening people and destroying their photographs or belongings. More recently his 
manageress at work was concerned that he was being inappropriate with a female 
member of staff. When disappointed he presented with a low mood and misused alcohol.
Assessment
The assessment involved interviews with M.S., his carers, and work colleagues. It 
became clear that M.S. was close to his family but his mother had died when he was 
young. His two older brothers and his sister were alive but did not see him regularly. 
When M.S. was told that his mother was dead he threw a table through the window. His 
carers and work colleagues gave mixed reports about M.S.’s conduct, saying that he was 
a “lovely” man yet there was anger and frustration directed at him. When the manageress 
refused his photograph M.S. deliberately made “mistakes” at work and raised his fist to 
her. He often bought his colleagues gifts, but destroyed things when they left. He was 
threatened with the “sack” should there be any further incidents. He stated that he would
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never use physical aggression against a woman, as “it’s wrong”. M.S. was also believed 
to live the fantasy of being in an Australian soap family. M.S. spoke favourably about his 
colleagues. He appeared to be very pleased to be able to talk these issues through with 
the trainee clinical psychologist, who he occasionally called “perfect”.
Formulation
M.S.’s experienced unstable childhood attachments. The bond between the mother and 
‘handicapped’ child is often incomplete (Bicknell, 983). In addition, his mother was 
dependant on alcohol so she may not have been so emotionally available for him. The 
quality of his attachment was also impaired as his dad died when M.S. was aged 2 and his 
mother when he was 24. M.S. had no male attachment figures, something that is 
considered to be crucial to the development of sexual boundaries and identification 
(Neven, 1997). In the female dominated health and social care settings, M.S. could be 
seen to idealise, flatter and seduce, in an attempt to secure stronger bonds. These bonds 
were often disrupted, as he was required to change residential setting so frequently. 
Having invested in these bonds, disruption would often result in M.S. becoming 
distressed, which manifested in verbal insults and the tearing up of photographs. M.S. 
also wanted a relationship with a “normal” (non PLD) person. His gifts and compliments 
were often well received and any subsequent advances resulted in embarrassment and 
then anger was directed at him. His “lies” and fantasies could be understood as M.S. 
attempting to create the ‘perfect’ family that he never had, but longed for. Unfortunately, 
these actions often left him alienated by others.
Intervention
At M.S.’s request the focus of the intervention was “losing people and cruelty”. Much of 
the work involved focussing on the therapist/patient relationship, and issues of 
idealisation. This forum provided a unique arena to re-experience the vicissitudes of the 
parent/child relationship (Bauer and Kobos, 1987). Preparing M.S. to give up the 
therapeutic attachment, and acknowledging his disappointment could help him confront 
and modify his reaction to loss, separation an autonomy. This process was facilitated 
through an awareness of the counter/transference in the session. Following this
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intervention his work manager and home manager were informed of the pattern of 
relationships that can leave M.S. feeling abandoned, resulting in inappropriate behaviour. 
They did some work with the staff on maintaining clear and firm boundaries in the work 
place.
Outcome and critique
M.S. developed a different relationship with ‘sadness’ and ‘excitement’ when he began to 
recognise what was triggering these feelings and how to act on them. He had developed 
appropriate ways to understand and express a range of powerful emotions. He no longer 
became “over attached” to staff and there were no further incidents of aggression or 
withdrawal. His managers reported that he was doing well and M.S. was pleased with 
this feedback. M.S. expressed his sadness at the termination of therapy and requested a 
photograph to maintain the memory of our work together. There was also a reduction in 
the ‘stories’ about his Australian soap family as he pursued his interests through a range 
of clubs and activities that he found rewarding. Unfortunately, it was only after the 
completion of therapy that the trainee discovered that M.S.’s mother committed suicide.
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Child, Adolescent and Family Case Report Summary
Assessment and intervention of an 8-year-old boy presenting with nocturnal enuresis. An 
integrative approach was used to understand the issues associated with living with a 
mother with psychosis, and the reciprocal relationship that this had on the professionals 
working within a multi-diseiplinarv setting.
March 2001 
Year 2
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Assessment and intervention of an 8-year-old boy presenting with nocturnal 
enuresis. An integrative approach was used to understand the issues associated with 
living with a mother with psychosis, and the reciprocal relationship that this had on 
the professionals working within a multi-disciplinary setting.
N.B.: Some o f the details have been changed, including all names, to preserve the 
anonymity o f the people involved as well as the health care setting.
Name: Alfonso Bala DOB: 07.07.92 (Child)
Name: CarmeenaBala DOB: 02.02.59 (Mother)
Reason for referral
The 8-year-old Alfonso was referred to the CAMHS to assess his toileting difficulties, 
especially encopresis.
History of presenting problem
Carmeena reported that Alfonso had been wetting and soiling his clothes recently. 
However, the details did not become clear as she became visibly agitated, swearing and 
shouting. It was extremely difficult to understand the content of what she was saying.
Assessment
The assessment involved interviews with Carmeena and Alfonso. It became apparent that 
Carmeena was experiencing her own psychotic mental health difficulties. She used 
sexualised talk in front of her child, spoke about people reading her mind, believed she 
was constantly being watched, and said that the president of the United States was after 
her. She spoke about these issues in an aggressive tone whilst Alfonso would keep 
himself busy playing with the toys. She also reported a history of depression. Initially, 
the assessment interviews were conducted by the trainee clinical psychologist and a 
specialist psychiatric registrar (SPR). However, the line of medical questions used by the 
SPR appeared to aggravate Carmeena as they referred to ‘schizophrenia’ and medication.
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The SPR withdrew to protect the therapeutic relationship. The assessment indicated that 
Alfonso was anxious at home. His toileting difficulties were said to happen most nights, 
for as long as they could recall.
Formulation
Carmeena’s mental health difficulties were associated with Alfonso’s developmental 
delays. It appeared to be difficult for him to make sense of his world and learn about 
issues such as self-hygiene when his mother’s world was so unpredictable and non­
containing. His toilet difficulties could also be seen as a method of communication as he 
was anxious about his mother’s behaviour but felt unable to express this verbally. This 
toilet problem had in effect brought his mother’s needs to the attention of the mental 
health services.
Intervention
Some play therapy was used to get a better insight into Alfonso’s internal world. With 
Carmeena’s consent the community psychiatric nurse from the adult services joined one 
session to assist with the assessment. As her trust developed, Carmeena agreed to a home 
visit from the adult mental health services. When the appropriate services were holding 
Carmeena’s needs, it was possible to do some work on Alfonso’s toilet difficulties. This 
took the form of psycho-education, monitoring of his toileting, forming an alliance 
between mother and son, and introducing some behavioural interventions.
Outcome and critique
The monitoring of Alfonso’s toileting showed that he went from wetting every night to 
only very occasionally. He took responsibility for using the toilet appropriately with his 
mother’s encouragement. She reported that it “is like a miracle every day”. Mother and 
son had an improved relationship, which reduced family conflicts as they united their 
efforts. Communication between them improved, as well as between Carmeena and the 
professionals. However, she remained cautious over receiving treatment for her own 
mental health needs.
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Older Adult Case Report Summaiy
The neuropsychological assessment of a 65-vear-old man presenting with “memory 
difficulties”: Assessment profile, interpretation and recommendations.
September 2001
Year 2
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The neuropsychological assessment of a 65-year-old man presenting with “memory 
difficulties” : Assessment profile, interpretation and recommendations.
N.B.: Some o f the details have been changed, including all names, to preserve the 
anonymity o f the people involved as well as the health care setting.
Name: M r Reginald David Day
DOB: 04.04.36
Reason for referral
Mr Day was referred to the Older Adult Community Mental Health team to investigate 
his reported progressive memory impairment. The referring agent suspected that Mr Day 
was suffering from the early stages of a dementing illness.
History of presenting problem
Mr Day and his wife reported that his memory has been deteriorating over the past 7 
years. Previously he had experienced no such problems. The difficulties began after he 
was believed to have had a heart attack. Following investigation it was concluded that he 
did not have a heart attack but a syncopal attack (unconsciousness with a slow pulse and 
general flaccidity). He experienced further syncopal attacks, monthly, over the following 
7 years. Mr Day was otherwise in good physical and mental health. Mr Day’s father died 
age 84 from Parkinson’s disease and his mother died age 72 from a heart problem. She 
was not believed to have had a dementing illness.
Assessment
The assessment involved a series of interviews with Mr Day and his wife about the nature 
and course of his memory difficulties. The interviews also provided information about 
Mr day’s family, his interests and his employment history. Neuropsychological testing 
was also selected to accumulate more information on the possibility of a dementia and the 
potential effects of any sustained neurological damage. The following tests and measures
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were used: Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS-HI), Adult Memory and 
Information Processing Battery (AMIPB), Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST), 
National Adult reading Test (NART), Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI), and The Hospital 
Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS). He also had an MRI scan.
Formulation
The hypothesis to be tested was that Mr Day had diminished cognitive fimctioning that 
manifested itself in deterioration in his ‘immediate’ and ‘recent’ memory. In addition, it 
was hypothesised that his deficits were not globalised, but most acute in his verbal 
processing skills.
Intervention
Not applicable -  assessment only.
Outcome and critique
The hypothesis that Mr Day had diminished cognitive fimctioning, which manifested in 
deterioration in his “immediate” and “recent” memory, was reflected in testing. Also, the 
hypothesis that the deficits in cognitive fimctioning were not globalised but more acute in 
verbal processing tasks was also apparent, especially through his verbal/performance 
discrepancies. The neuropsychological testing information also identified the possibility 
of more marked deterioration in the left hemisphere, however the MRI scan did not 
support this. Finally, personal reports, neuropsychological testing and the MRI scan have 
indicated that the nature of Mr Day’s experiences and cognitive fimctioning are not 
inconsistent with those expected in the early stages of a multi-infarct dementia. The 
amount of clinical time taken was considerable for both client and clinician. However, 
with more time it might have been appropriate to use the Wechsler Memory Scale HI to 
give a more informed analysis of Mr Day’s abilities.
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Specialist Case Report Summary
Psychological engagement and extended assessment with a 37-vear-old man presenting
with psychosis in an adult acute inpatient mental health setting: A psvchodvnamic 
approach to formulation and work with staff to inform care planning.
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Psychological engagement and extended assessment with a 37-year-old man 
presenting with psychosis in an adult acute inpatient mental health setting: A 
psychodynamic approach to formulation and work with staff to inform care
planning.
N.B.: Some o f the details have been changed, including all names, to preserve the 
anonymity o f the people involved as well as the health care setting.
Name: Mr Peter Shaw
Age: 37 years
Reason for referral
The police detained Peter under section 136 of the Mental Health Act in the police station 
following a female acquaintance’s accusation that he had “stalked” her. The police 
described Peter as being “extremely deluded and grandiose in manner”.
History of presenting problem
In the States, Peter first experienced “alternative experiences”, he described experiencing 
birds joining and separating in mid air, walking on air, and people realising that he was 
someone other than Peter Shaw, someone very “special”. However when he returned to 
England and tried to re-establish relationships things became difficult as he was 
“misunderstood”.
Peter spoke about being able to read others’ thoughts, broadcasting his own thoughts, 
having the ability to control and predict what others might do, being able to control world 
events and the weather, and about being a “veiy special” person. On occasion he had 
referred to himself as the “messiah” to hospital staff.
Assessment
Considering Peter’s lack of trust and reluctance to be in hospital, formal assessment tools 
(e.g. The WAIS-DI) were not used as it was thought that they might obstruct engagement. 
Instead clinical interviews and observations were used in an attempt to get a clearer
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psychological formulation of his presentation. This was deemed as especially important 
as Peter had not engaged folly with the medical assessments and prior to the trainee’s 
involvement, there had been significant gaps in Peter’s life history and the information he 
was giving about his symptoms. The assessment focussed on his traumatic early life and 
developmental experiences.
Formulation
Peter’s reports of infancy and childhood illustrated that he had never felt loved, wanted, 
cared for and respected. He reported that his mother considered him to be an outsider, 
punished him frequently and blamed him for keeping the family apart. Klein stated that 
in a healthy relationship the mother acts as a receptacle for painful and complex feelings, 
which can later be integrated by the infant (depressive position) in order to develop a 
picture of one mother who can be both “good” and satisfying as well as “bad” and 
frustrating. As was the case with Peter, people with psychosis often had their complex 
feelings poorly contained contributing to excessive splitting, the lack of a secure identity 
and an inability to own both loving and aggressive feelings. Peter developed primitive 
mental defences in infancy to deal with recurring mental pain. He began to experience 
messianic delusions, which psychoanalytic theory has described as a process that is 
contrived unconsciously to avoid pain, loss, or helplessness or the feelings aroused by 
separation (Jackson, 2001). Using Klienian concepts, Peter could be understood as being 
incapable of containing the feelings aroused by his rejection and “failure”, and thus 
projected his anger, frustration and grief onto the outside world. This just left him with 
all of the “good parts”, that his father had previously represented, personified in the 
messiah figure (“unconditional and infinite paternal love”), which needed to be protected 
in a “military establishment” (hospital).
Intervention
Considering Peter’s lack of supportive relationships and his misunderstandings of where 
he was and for what reason, the action plan was to continue the process of an extended 
psychological assessment alongside his medical treatment. The aims of this plan were to
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offer him support in order to minimise further misunderstandings between Peter and staff, 
to encourage his adherence to interventions, to contain some of his anxieties and offer 
him an understanding of his current situation, and to offer him a consistent therapeutic 
relationship throughout his hospital admission. The therapist’s continued stable presence 
and professional attitude are powerful therapeutic factors (Jackson, 1991). It is also 
necessary to use several sessions to allow the patient to begin to understand his delusional 
beliefs and anxieties in a direct way (Jackson, 1991). Finally, sharing psychological 
formulations with the other professionals in the team could also contribute to his care plan 
and ensure that psychological factors were considered alongside predominant medical and 
forensic issues.
Outcome and critique
As Peter engaged with the trainee, he was more able to invest his trust in the team. The 
team began to challenge their catastrophic ideas which enabled them to develop a clearer 
understanding of Peter’s experiences and to inform his care plan. This provided a more 
containing environment in which Peter could began to take a meta position and do more 
reality testing which resulted in him perceiving the delusions as less concrete. As he did 
this he moved from a position of narcissistic identification (Caper, 1998) where he could 
not empathise with others to a position where he was particularly empathic and 
considerate. This enabled Peter to re-explore the “harassment” incident and to think 
about more appropriate ways to handle frustrating and irritating situations, which could 
reduce risk.
The nurses in the rehabilitation home assessed Peter’s daily living skills as “veiy good”, 
and he responded well to a “returning to work scheme”. In the final session Peter stated 
that “this is the best I have felt for two years” and that he was “looking forward to starting 
a new life”. Objective measures of risk, in addition to the Forensic and Police reports, 
may have helped contain the anxiety of the team.
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Research Section
This section contains four pieces of work. The service related research project was 
carried out in year 1, during the adult mental health placement. The qualitative research 
was done in year 2. The literature review was also completed in year 2 and was intended 
as an introduction to the major research project. The major research project was carried 
out across years 2 and 3.
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Service Related Research Project
Nurses’ beliefs and attitudes towards challenging patients on an
Acute Mental Health Ward: how this influences practice.
URN: 3902129
PsychD Clinical Psychology 
Year 1 (course 28)
July 2000
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Abstract
Objectives: To investigate nurses’ beliefs and attitudes towards the diagnostic categories 
and labelling, demands, and management of the challenging patient. The nurses’ 
perceptions of the effectiveness of their intervention as well as issues of support and 
possible continuing professional development were also explored.
Design: Each nurse was given the questionnaire and asked to apply the questions to their 
previous and current experience on the ward.
Setting: One acute mental health ward.
Participants: All nurses currently working on the ward.
Main outcome measures: Questionnaire on managing mental health patients. This was 
interpreted using content analysis.
Results: 54% (7 responses) of the nurses indicated that the most difficult diagnosis was 
that of personality disorder. The most challenging patients were described as “attention 
seeking” and “manipulative”, and were said to polarise staff. Several of the nurses’ 
(42%; 5 responses) believed that consistency and clear boundaries were important in 
managing the more challenging patients, however despite their efforts there was little 
belief in intervention effectiveness. This had a negative impact on how the nurses (67%; 
8 responses) felt about their professional role. Many of the nurses felt under-trained for 
this role and 92% indicated that they would like to further develop their professional 
skills should the opportunity be made available by the service.
Conclusions: The nurses identified patients with personality disorders as the most 
challenging. They reported that these patients were manipulative and non-cooperative 
and were highly critical of nurse care. The nurses reported few effective strategies in 
managing these patients and experienced powerlessness and the perception of 
intervention ineffectiveness. However, they did value their psychological skills and 
communicated that they would welcome greater levels of support and the opportunity to 
continue their professional development in this area. This was a preliminary study that 
shall be repeated in the future to evaluate the implementation of nurse training workshops 
and support networks.
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Introduction
Nursing of the challenging patient 
The label of the “unpopular”, “problem” or “difficult” mental health patient is familiar to 
the profession of nursing (Breeze and Repper, 1998). “Difficult” patient characteristics 
have been identified as; excessive demands for time, misuse of medication, hard to 
empathise with, dangerous to self or others, manipulative, attention seeking, or able to 
polarise staff (Neill, 1979; cited in Gallop and Wynn, 1987).
Early literature on this client group (Stockwell, 1972; Conrad 1979; Armitage, 1980; all 
cited in Breeze and Repper, 1998) has been criticised for taking a reductionist and 
determinist perspective on the phenomenon of the “difficult” patient. To redress this 
imbalance, more recent studies have switched from focussing on patient personality and 
traits (e.g. aggression, manipulation, demands), to investigating the social construction of 
the “difficult” patient (Gallop, Lancee, and Shugar, 1993; Gallop and Wynn, 1987; 
Johnson and Webb, 1995).
This new perspective has described “difficult” patients as those who deny the authority 
and the therapeutic value of the nursing staff (Breeze and Repper, 1998). The 
consequence of these challenges is that the “difficult” patients are labelled negatively and 
their care is affected. This may range from “belittling” and avoidance on the ward 
(Gallop, Lancee, and Garfinkle, 1989), reinforcing maladaptive behaviour, to the denial 
of care through rejection from the service (Repper and Perkins, 1995).
This lack of respect for challenging patients (Gallop, et al., 1989) can be described as a 
reaction to the nurses’ feelings of powerlessness (Carey, Jones, and O’Tool, 1990). This 
may be as a result of the patient not fulfilling the obligations of the sick role resulting in 
power struggles (Parsons, 1951; cited in Breeze and Repper, 1998). Subsequently, the 
nurses frequently attribute a patient’s refusal of treatment to their own therapeutic failures 
(May and Kelly, 1982).
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Furthermore, the nurses’ feelings of powerlessness may be exacerbated as they have to 
make difficult choices about who “deserves” help given limited time and resources 
(Breeze and Repper, 1998). Sharrock, Day, Qazi, and Brewin (1990) purport that greater 
staff time and optimism would be directed toward those patients who are more likely to 
make a therapeutic change, rather than those more “difficult” patients with a stable 
disorder.
Pringle (1998) stresses the importance of patients verbalising feelings to avoid acting out 
with self-destructive acts such as self-harming or overdosing. To respond to this there is 
a need for nurses to be trained in self-awareness, attitudes, and strategies to help them 
deal with any difficult emotional issues that arise (Stockbridge, 1993). Therefore, it is not 
surprising that inadequate training manifests itself in negative attitudes towards certain 
client groups (Perego, 1999), and that nurses with little experience report a greater degree 
of prejudice against an individual, depending on his/her diagnosis.
Another salient finding reported in the literature is that nurse/patient relationships can 
become more challenging around the time of patient discharge (Pringle, 1998). To 
respond appropriately at this time, the nurses would benefit from understanding how past 
experiences of relationships may be acted out between the nurse and the patient 
increasing levels of conflict (Pringle, 1998).
Rationale Behind the Research 
Members of the Community Mental Health Team (CMHT), nursing staff and patients, on 
one specific acute mental health ward had expressed some concern over practice, 
relationships and interactions on the ward. The purpose of this study was to identify 
some of these issues from the nursing staff’s perspective and to make appropriate 
recommendations.
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The Current Status on the Ward
This particular acute adult mental health ward has not been subject to any similar research 
projects. Therefore, the ward manager, clinical psychologist and trainee clinical 
psychologist (researcher) collaborated to investigate this area
The Kev Objectives of the Research 
A questionnaire was designed following a series of short interviews in which members of 
the CMHT as well as the nursing staff expressed their concerns. The questionnaire was 
designed to be exploratory and was constructed to investigate whether the problematic 
themes, which are prominent in the literature, were applicable to this specific ward. There 
were no specific hypotheses, but the main aims of the research were to investigate the 
nurses’ beliefs and attitudes towards:
I) the diagnostic categories and subsequent labelling o f the challenging patient
II) the demands o f the challenging patient
III) how the challenging patient is managed.
IV) the effectiveness o f intervention.
V) issues o f support and continuing professional development.
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Method
Participants
All 24 nurses on the ward formed the target sample. They were all given the 
questionnaire of which 13 were returned (54%). The grades of the nurses in the intended 
sample and the achieved sample are shown in Table 1. Ten of the nurses who responded 
were female and three were male.
Table 1. Categorisation of Participants bv Grade.
Grade Number in Intended 
Sample
Number in Achieved 
Sample
Percentage response 
rate per grade
A 8 4 50%
B 0 0 N/A
C 0 0 N/A
D 6 6 100%
E 7 2 29%
F 3 1 33%
The table shows that the achieved sample was made up predominantly from D-grades, 
followed by A-grades, E-grades and an F-grade. There were no participants from the B 
or C-grades.
Measures
The Questionnaire on Managing Mental Health Patients was used (appendix 1), having 
received approval from the Trust Research Steering Group (appendix 2). The author 
devised this questionnaire as no existing measure addressed the areas of interest outlined 
in the “key objectives” section (page 157). Following two questions determining the 
grade and sex of the nurse, there were a further twenty questions of which one was 
closed. The predominant use of open questions was selected to allow the nurses to give 
unrestricted responses. This was considered necessary, considering the exploratory stage 
of the investigation.
The questionnaire was devised through interviews with a clinical psychologist, a 
counselling psychologist, and two ward managers. In these interviews, the professionals 
were asked about patients that were most challenging to the nurses, how they are
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managed, the nurses’ attitudes towards these patients, and how working with these 
patients made the nurses feel about their own professional role. The questions were based 
on the information elicited from these interviews as well as on the literature.
A small pilot study was completed on a similar ward in another hospital in the Trust. 
Problems identified with the pilot draft of the questionnaire were amended. These 
included; shortening the questionnaire, simplifying complex questions and grammar, and 
adjusting questions to make them more relevant to those across the range of nursing 
experience. The amended questionnaire was administered to the target population.
Validity
Through the use of a pilot study and feedback, the measure appears to have adequate face 
validity. However, no further claims of the validity of the measure can be made.
Procedure
A questionnaire was given to each of the twenty-four nurses on the ward. Page one of the 
questionnaire was a cover sheet that explained the purpose of the research. That is, to 
further understand the demands placed on the nurses by the more challenging patients. 
The respondents were asked to apply the questions to their previous and current 
experience on the ward, and not just the current clients, to improve the generalisability of 
ward experience. The importance of client anonymity and respondent confidentiality was 
clearly stated. The nurses were also informed that in no way would their responses be 
used to judge their clinical work. All respondents were given the researchers contact 
number in case they required any assistance. When completed, the nurses returned their 
questionnaires to a “returns box”, in a blank envelope to ensure confidentiality. The 
researcher frequently visited the ward at hand-over times in an attempt to increase the 
response rate.
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Method of analysis
Content analysis (Breakwell, Hammond and Fife-Shaw, 1995) was used to classify the 
open ended, qualitative information. Going through each individual’s responses to each 
question and observing which themes of meaningful information were generated 
developed classification schemes. At the primary coding stage the researcher condensed 
the responses down into a few key words. The secondary coding stage involved using 
these key words to identify recurrent themes. Once the data had been coded in this way 
the rater then calculated the frequency of responses within each category.
Inter-rater reliability
Considering that this measure had not previously been used, an independent rater who 
was familiar with the issues raised in the questions classified the material in addition to 
the researcher. This process was undertaken to minimise the risk of interpreter bias.
Results
The data
The predominantly open question format of the questionnaire yielded a considerable 
amount of qualitative information. There was also some quantitative information 
generated from the closed questions.
Response Rate
Thirteen of the twenty-four questionnaires were completed and returned. The small 
sample does not allow for any inferential statistics. Therefore the data is best represented 
through descriptive statistics.
Inter-rater reliability
Content analysis (Breakwell, Hammond and Fife-Shaw, 1995) was used to interpret the 
data. Four of the completed questionnaires were categorised by a second rater to ensure 
inter-rater reliability. The second rater’s time constraints allowed for primary coding
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only. At the primary coding stage there was a good agreement rate of 89% between the 
two raters (appendix 3).
Data Presentation
The raw data is presented in appendix 4. Due to the wealth of information gathered and 
the brevity of this report, only the results that generated the most recurrent themes are 
detailed in this section. To view the complete set of categorised data see appendix 5. 
Consistent with the key objectives o f the research (outlined on Page 157), the data is 
divided into five main sections.
The following tables show the number of respondents to each question. The responses 
have been grouped into categories. N.B. Some participants made more than one answer 
to a question and may therefore appear in more than one category.
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I. Diagnoses and labels
Table 2. The Categories of Responses and Number of Respondents Regarding Issues of 
Diagnoses and Labels.
QUESTION CATEGORIES NUMBER OF
GENERATED RESPONDENTS
Patients with which diagnosis do you find the (N=13)
most difficult to manage? Personality Disorder 7
Aggression 2
Self-harmers 1
Schizophrenia 1
Substance misuse 1
Bi-polar affective disorder 1
Which labels do you and your colleagues use (N = ll)
to describe these more challenging patients? Attention seeking 3
Manipulative 3
Diagnostic term 2
“Cutters” 1
“Alchies” 1
Unwell 1
Don’t know 1
Table 2 shows that the nurses found it most difficult to manage patients with personality 
disorder” (7 responses), followed by aggression (2 responses). The most challenging 
patients were most frequently described as “attention seeking” (3 responses) and 
“manipulative” (3 responses).
162
II. Demands of the challenging patient.
Table 3. The Categories of Responses and Number of Respondents Regarding the 
Demands of the Challenging Client.
QUESTION CATEGORIES GENERATED NUMBER OF
RESPONDENTS
What is it about these patients, behaviours (N=13)
that makes caring for diem more demanding? Non co-operative/staff manipulation 7
Self harm/suicidal ideation 4
Time consuming 4
What is it about these patients’ attitudes that (N=13)
makes caring for them more demanding? Self-critical/destructive 5
Critical o f others 4
Manipulative 4
Unchangeable 2
Emotionally attractive 1
What other aspects are there which make (N = ll)
caring for the more challenging patients more Nurse helplessness 4
demanding? Inadequacies o f the system/mismatch
of patient to service 4
Self-harm 2
Need for authoritarian approach 2
Table 3 shows that the most challenging behaviours experienced by the nurses were 
patient “non-co-operation” and “manipulation of staff” (7 responses). This was followed 
by self-harming (4 responses) and time-consuming behaviours (4 responses). Patient 
attitudes that were deemed as problematic were; critical and manipulative (total 13 
responses) followed by unchangeable (2 responses). Other problems identified in 
managing the challenging patients were; nurse helplessness (4 responses) and 
service/system inadequacies (4 responses).
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III. Managing the Challenging Patient.
Table 4. The Categories of Responses and Number of Respondents Regarding Issues of 
Patient Management.
QUESTION CATEGORIES GENERATED NUMBER OF 
RESPONDENTS
What strategies do you use to manage these (N=12)
patients? Consistency and boundaries 5
Listen and talk 2
Increase psychiatric power 2
Improved planning 2
“I do not manage” 1
What other strategies or ideas are you aware (N=9)
of from the literature you have read or from Adopt a multi-agency approach 3
your colleagues which might be useful? Increase regulations/observation 3
Listen to patient 2
Play down self-injury 1
Consistency of care 1
What makes it difficult to implement these (N=9)
useful strategies which you currently do not Poor resources 4
use? Poor training 4
Severity o f patients’ problems 2
How do you balance die care needs o f (N = ll)
challenging patients with those who are less More challenging patients allotted
challenging? more time 7
Try to maintain a fair balance 6
How do you find balancing the time demands (N = ll)
of the challenging patients with the less Difficult 8
challenging patients? Attempt to prioritise and balance it out 5
Easy 1
Table 4 shows that the most favoured strategies used to manage these patients were a 
consistent approach with clear boundaries (5 responses). There was also a preference 
expressed for adopting a multi agency approach (3 responses) and increasing regulations 
and observations (3 responses). A total of 8 responses indicated that it was difficult to 
implement these strategies due to poor resources and training. There was a split in how 
care needs are balanced out as 7 responses indicated the need to allow the challenging 
patients more time, whereas 6 responses included the need to try to maintain “fair 
balance”. Balancing the time demands of the patient was described as “difficult” in 8 of 
the 14 responses.
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IV. Effectiveness of Intervention
Table 5. The Categories of Responses and Number of Respondents Regarding the 
Effectiveness ofNurse Intervention.
QUESTION CATEGORIES GENERATED NUMBER OF 
RESPONDENTS
Which patients appear to make the Least: (N=12)
least/most improvements? Personality disorder 8
Substance misuse 4
Psychosis 3
Other 3
Most: (N=12)
Psychosis 7
Depression 5
Motivated patients 1
Other 1
What is your understanding for why (N = ll)
these patterns occur? Improvements dependant on patient
responsibility 7
Improvements dependant on service
delivery 5
Other 1
What effect do these more (N=12)
challenging patients have on how Negative effect 8
you feel about your own Can folly utilise my skills 1
professional role? Other 3
Please list any details of post­ (N=8)
registration training. HIV 1
Nursing in secure environments 1
Counselling course 2
Others 2
None 3
Table 5 shows that the least improvements were expected in patients with a diagnosis of 
personality disorder (8 responses), followed by substance misuse (4 responses), and then 
those with psychosis (3 responses). Patients reported to make the most improvements 
were those with psychosis (7 responses) followed by depression (5 responses). Of the 12 
responses, 8 indicated that working with the challenging patients has a negative effect on 
how the nurses feel about their own professional role. The nurses had completed a total 
of 6 post registration courses.
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V. Support and Continuing Professional Development
Table 6. The Categories of Responses and Number of Respondents Regarding Modes of 
Support and Continuing Professional Development.
QUESTION CATEGORIES NUMBER OF
GENERATED RESPONDENTS
Can you identify any methods o f support that (N=10)
may help in the management of challenging Therapists 6
patients? Improvements in policy
and management 3
Peer group 1
Improved environment 1
Would you be interested in attending a (N=13)
workshop in the future to look at ways of Yes 12
working with the more challenging patients? No 1
What particular topics would you find (N=10)
beneficial? Psychological/structured
interventions 4
Personality disorders 3
Substance misuse 2
Other diagnoses 2
Public awareness 1
Table 6 shows how the nurses valued support from “therapists” (6 responses), and peers 
(1 response) and desired improvements in policy and management (3 responses). 92% 
(12 responses) of the participants were interested in attending a workshop to address 
issues around working with the challenging patient, but 1 person was not. Topics of 
interest that would be most beneficial were; psychological interventions (4 responses), 
personality disorders (3 responses), substance misuse (2 responses) as well as “other” 
diagnoses (2 responses).
Discussion
Main Findings
I. Diagnostic categories and the labelling of the challenging patient.
Seven (54%) of the nurses’ responses indicated that patients with the diagnosis of 
“personality disorder” were the most difficult to manage. Several other diagnostic 
categories were generated many of which are also associated with symptomatology of a 
personality disorder (e.g. aggression, self-harm, substance misuse). These most 
challenging patients were described as attention seeking and manipulative (50%: 6 
responses). This use of these particular labels has been described in the literature as 
“negative”, contributing to the reductionist and deterministic perspective of the
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“challenging patient” (Gallop, Lancee, and Shugar, 1993), which in turn, has a negative 
affect on patient care.
II. The demands of the challenging patient.
The patients’ behaviours which caused the nurses the most concern were “staff 
manipulation” and non-co-operation (47%: 7 responses). This denial of staff authority 
appears to have had a profound impact on the nurses’ experiences of the patients. Indeed, 
the nurses who reported that the patients’ attitudes are highly critical and “manipulative” 
(81%: 13 responses) may even experience some confusion over nurse/patient roles. The 
critical patient has been described (Parsons, 1951; cited in Breeze, 1998) as altering the 
archetypal “sick role” shifting the dynamics of the therapeutic relationship, which often 
results in power struggles. Indeed, this point can be illustrated by one nurse’s response 
that the patients “only seem to think of themselves”. This observation raises the issue as 
to whether the nurse feels uncared for and “unsafe”, sentiments that are more commonly 
associated with the role of the patient.
Furthermore, coping with the demands of the challenging patient appeared to be affected 
by some organisational inadequacies as some of the nurses (33%: 4 responses) expressed 
that the “system” was not conducive to a positive therapeutic experience. The impact of 
some of these identified issues may have contributed to a number of the nurses (4 
responses) expressing feelings of helplessness in coping with the demands of the 
challenging patient.
HI. Managing the challenging patient.
A common theme to emerge concerned the need for an approach of consistency with an 
emphasis on clear boundaries (42%: 5 responses). Very few of the respondents (2 
responses) communicated the importance of allowing the patient an opportunity to 
verbalise their feelings, which has been shown to prevent them acting out with self­
destructive behaviours (Pringle, 1998). Other responses consisted of a desire to increase 
the “power” of the nurses to enforce treatment (2 responses). Breeze and Repper (1998)
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assert that this is inevitable as the nurses attempt to secure more control over their 
environment. One nurse clearly indicated how difficult it was to secure control in this 
particular setting by stating that challenging patients are “impossible to manage on an 
open ward”.
Although some of the nurses were aware of the benefits of adopting a multi-agency 
approach (3 responses), there was overwhelming dissatisfaction (80%; 8 responses) with 
the level of resources provided to utilise this approach as well as relevant training 
opportunities. This expression is consistent with the point made by Breeze and Repper 
(1998) that there is currently little evidence in the literature of these services being guided 
to help meet the needs of the more challenging patients.
Balancing the demands of different patient needs was considered to be a very difficult 
procedure (73%; 8 responses). There was a split in nurse responses as to whether the 
more challenging patients would receive more of their time (7 responses) or whether they 
could maintain a fair balance between all patients (6 responses). This finding does not 
support the observations of Sharrock et al. (1990) who state that greater staff time is 
directed towards patients who are expected to make a therapeutic change. Nonetheless, 
the difficulty choosing who “deserves” more time and assistance is believed to further 
exacerbate the nurses’ feelings of helplessness as well as exemplifying the necessity of 
increased resources (Breeze and Repper, 1998).
IV. Effectiveness of Nurse Intervention.
Not only did a majority of the nurses find the diagnosis of “personality disorder” the most 
difficult to manage, but people with this diagnosis were also considered to make the least 
improvements on the ward (45%; 8 responses). One facet which may have contributed to 
the difficulties of working with this client group were the use of such labels, as it has been 
suggested that there is a relationship between negative labelling and diminished care and 
the exacerbation of mental health (Breeze and Repper, 1998).
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An interesting discovery was that the nurses divided the reasons for the challenging 
patients’ poor improvements between patient responsibility (54%; 7 responses) and 
service delivery (39%; 5 responses). Furthermore, May and Kelly (1982) have suggested 
that nurses attribute patient refusal of treatment to their own therapeutic failures. One 
nurse who stated that “the ward is not suitable for people with personality disorders and 
the staff do not have the skills to cope” encapsulated this. Additionally, 67% (8 
responses) of the nurses stated that the effect of working with these challenging patients 
has a negative impact on how they feel about their own professional role. Such low 
levels of job satisfaction and motivation may well have been a contributory factor to the 
low questionnaire response rate.
Furthermore, intervention effectiveness may have been restricted as a result of the nurses 
limited training experiences. Of the 13 responding nurses (9 of which were registered), 
only 6 post-registration courses were identified as having been completed. None of these 
courses were specifically relevant to the concerns raised throughout the questionnaire 
responses. Stockbridge (1994) has stated that without such training in self-awareness, 
attitudes and values the nurses cannot be expected to deal with difficult emotional issues.
V. Support and Continuing Professional Development.
The nurses responses indicated that they valued the opportunity to further develop their 
support networks and 54% (6 responses) reported that they would like to work more 
closely with therapists. There was also some indication that organisational issues may 
need reviewing as 3 responses suggested that some of the ward policies and management 
strategies could be improved. Also, the nurses appeared to recognise the importance of 
training when working with challenging patients and 92% (12 of the 13 respondents) 
expressed an interest in attending a workshop to address these issues. The main topics of 
interest identified were, developing their psychological skills (33%; 4 responses), 
managing personality disorder (25%; 3 responses), and dealing with substance abuse 
(17%; 2 responses).
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Limitations
Whilst interpreting the main findings of the study it is necessary to consider some of the 
limitations. The lowest percentages of respondents were those with the highest “E” and 
“F” grades. Although there is no information as to why this may have occurred one must 
consider that those nurses with the most experience are clearly under-represented. This 
obstructs the investigation into whether those more experienced nurses may have 
different coping strategies.
Furthermore, although there was a response rate of 54% there was only 13 respondents. 
Hence, following categorisation of the responses, the number of nurses with collective 
opinions was low. Therefore, caution is required as such low numbers are not conducive 
to generalising the “findings” to the entire ward. Moreover, apart firm one pilot study 
the questionnaire is also previously untested so the validity of the results may be 
undependable. However, the reliability of the questionnaire is to some extent less 
contentious as the use of an inter-rater provided consistent findings.
The content of the questions were somewhat complex which may have contributed to 
incomplete questions and the low response rate. Also, a more general term than 
“diagnosis” could have been used in question 1, as many of the responses were not 
expressed in clinical diagnostic terms.
The question which was used to determine current levels of nurse training (question 14) 
may have excluded those Grade A nurses as it refers specifically to post-registration 
training.
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Recommendations
These research findings shall be presented to the ward staff and CMHT members 
(appendix 6). The following recommendations have been suggested in an attempt to 
address some of the experiences that the nurses have outlined:
1. Provision of workshops combining the skills of the clinical psychology department and 
the experiences of the nursing staff. From the evidence of this research the workshops 
could focus upon:
The development of an awareness of the use of value judgements and labelling in the 
management of patient care and how this may affect the patient.
Guidance in the nurses monitoring and challenging of their own beliefs to develop a non- 
judgemental approach.
An awareness of how control and authoritarian approaches may exacerbate non- 
compliance from the more challenging patients.
Achieving collaboration with the client in developing their goals and treatment plan to 
help them realise autonomy. Importantly, the nurse can learn to give ongoing feedback to 
the client to ameliorate conflict resolution and development of an identity. Furthermore, 
giving the patient a chance to verbalise their feelings may reduce their propensity to act 
them out with self-destructive acts.
2. Acknowledge the nurses’ desires to have support from the therapies and to realise this 
in the form of regular supervision. This time can be used to interpret the nurse-patient 
relationship and how past conflicts may be played out on the ward.
3. In supervision, the nurses can discuss strong emotional reactions in themselves that 
may contribute towards a reduction in feelings of powerlessness. This space can also be 
used to discuss the times when patients appear to be manipulative and non-compliant, 
making interventions appear as non-effective.
4. Introduction of triumvirate nursing (Melia, Moran, Mason, 1999). This method utilises 
three nurses working together to plan and engage the individual in a therapeutic 
enterprise. The model is purported to offer the nurses support and to minimise the risk of 
boundary violations. It also claims to make time management more effective.
5. A follow up study, 6 months after the implementation of the above recommendations 
would be useful in monitoring service development and the nurses’ beliefs and attitudes 
towards challenging patients.
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Conclusions
Although caution must be exercised in the interpretation of this study, due to the modest 
response rate and the non-standardised status of the questionnaire, the results indicate 
several salient factors. Firstly, respondents indicated that certain patient sub-groups (i.e. 
personality disorder) made increased demands upon the nurses. The nurses expressed 
how these patients became highly critical and presented with various challenging 
behaviours to meet their needs. This would often result in an exacerbation of levels of 
tension on the ward, ultimately resulting in the nurses feeling powerless and experiencing 
the perception of intervention ineffectiveness. Consequently, those who responded 
communicated the harmful effect that these interactions have on how they perceive their 
own professional role. Encouragingly, these concerns may be approachable as the nurses 
were able to identify the need for improved support and opportunities for professional 
development to help to understand and care for the more challenging patients more 
effectively
Hopefully, the implementation of workshops and further opportunities for supervision 
shall begin to reverse the negative effect that many nurses experienced about their own 
professional role, ultimately benefiting both the professional and the patient.
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Appendices
Appendix 1
Number:
Questionnaire on Managing Mental Health 
Patients
As a part of my training I am conducting a research study looking at the 
demands placed on the nurses by the more challenging patients. I am also 
interested in the nurses’ opinions of these more challenging patients and 
hope to identify some of the strategies you use to manage them.
To folly utilise your knowledge, I would like you to apply the questions 
to your entire experience on the ward, and not just die current patients. 
Also, to protect the anonymity of the patients, I would ask you not to state 
any names.
The information that you provide is confidential. Your responses will not 
be used individually but gathered as group data. Finally, I would like to 
emphasise that your responses will NOT be used in any way to judge your 
clinical work.
This questionnaire should take approximately 30 minutes to complete. 
Your opinions are important in helping to identify what it is like working 
with challenging patients and die results of the questionnaires will help to 
identify and prioritise any training needs.
In the nurses office there is a box with “Questionnaire Responses” 
written on it. When you have completed the questionnaire please 
seal it inside one of the unmarked envelopes in the box and leave it 
there. I will come to collect it in 7 days.
Thank you for your time, co-operation and information.
Clinical Psychologist in Training Clinical Psychologist
Ward Manager
Please tick the appropriate box and write in your Grade.
Sex: MaleD FemaleD Grade:
1. Patients with which diagnosis do you find the most challenging to manage?
2. Which labels do you and your colleagues use to describe these more 
challenging patients?
' 3. What is it about these patients’ behaviours that makes caring for them more 
demanding?
4. What is it about these patients attitudes that makes caring for them more 
demanding?
5. What other aspects are there which make caring for the more challenging 
patients more demanding?
6. What strategies do you use to manage these patients?
7. What other strategies or ideas are you aware of from the literature you have 
read or from your colleagues which might be useful? Please state.
8. W hat makes it difficult to implement these useful strategies which you 
currently do not use?
9. Have you noticed any stages in a challenging patient’s hospitalisation when 
they may become more demanding? Please state when these stages are.
10. How do you balance the care needs of challenging patients with those who are 
less challenging? This may include both administration as well as practical 
management.
11. How do you find balancing the time demands of the challenging patients with 
the less challenging patients?
12. Which patients appear to make the least/most improvements? 
Least Most
13. What is your understanding for why these patterns occur?
14. Please list details of any Post Registration training:
15. Which aspects of your training and clinical experience do you value most in 
working with these challenging patients?
16. What effect do these more challenging patients have on how you feel about 
your own professional role?
17. Above you have identified some of your responses to challenging patients. In 
what ways are your responses to the less challenging clients the same or 
different?
Same Different
18. Can you identify any methods of support that may help in the management of 
challenging patients?
19. Would you be interested in attending a workshop in the future to look at 
ways of working with the more challenging patients?
YesD NoQ
20. What particular topics would you find beneficial?
Thank you for taking the time to fill out the questionnaire.
Appendix 2
Title of Project:
SERVICE MANAGER iW M *
I have read the enclosed proposal and have had an opportunity to 
discuss it if necessary with the researcher(s) involved
I agree that the service can manage to support this research
signed ‘ _______ ________________________________
date
HEAD OF DEPARTMENT (student projects only)
j have read the enclosed proposal and have had an opportunity to 
discuss it if necessary with the researcher(s) involved
I agree that the department can manage to support this research
signed PEAc>dV\Et^T £UP€RVf*£oS.
d a te  ^ . \ * 6 0
Project Title: Nurses beliefs and attitudes about challenging 
clients
The Topic (relevance to Trust annual plan/objectives)
All 3 reviewers feel this is a relevant topic. It is felt that perhaps “clients with 
challenging behaviour” would be better in the title
Service Issues (capacity to run the prefect, fit with other projects going on)
Capacity is not felt to be a problem, but the researcher should be aware that 
this a sensitive subject area and should take steps to ensure that there is 
adequate and close supervision of the project.
The people involved in the Project (sufficient experience to carry out the 
project)
As above, close supervision needed
Quality of the research proposal (design issues, sufficient sample size)
No problems noted
The project has approval, with reference to the points noted above. 
1 . / \  rxo: .. R& D co-ordinator
Appendix 3
Inter-rater reliability
The second rater was given respondents 11,12,25 and 30’s questionnaires to complete 
the primary coding. The inter-rater reliability was calculated as follows:
(Number of agreement/number of opportunities for agreement) 100 
(79/88) x 100 =89%
Inter-rater reliability was 89% agreement
Appendix 4
1. PATIENTS WITH WHICH DIAGNOSIS DO YOU FIND THE MOST 
CHALLENGING TO MANAGE?
Respondent Answer
1
2 Personality disorders + dual diagnosis
3
4
5
6 Substance misuse + depression
7
8 Persona^# disorders + substance misuse
9 Personal^disorders + substance misuse
10 Bipolar affective disorder
11 Personal;# disorders V"
12 Personality disorders
13 Personality/Qisorders
14
15
16
17
18 Aggression
19
20 Self-harmers
21
22
23
24
25 Aggression \ /
26
27
28
29
30 Personality disorders
31 Schizophrenia
n » o
SUflf * i 
x *2.
1 \
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2. WHICH LABELS DO YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES USE TO DESCRIBE 
THESE MORE CHALLENGING PATIENTS?
Respondent Answer
l
lv 2 Behavioural problems, attention seeking, acting out behaviour
3
4
5
'■4 6 Alchys
7
8 Revolving door syndrome, manipulative, denial, social problems
50 9 Difficult, manipulative, challenging, unsuitable for acute MH services
I 10 Attention seeking
J< < S ' 11 * No idea? \ /
I 12 PD '
? ( 13 Difficult, attention seeking, self-centered,
14
15
16
17
18 —
19
< ^ 20 Cutters
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
i
z 30 p d  s
*U- 31 He is veiy unwell
&>•» -  •
7_
!. What is it about these patients’ behaviours that makes caring for them more
Respondent Answer
1
2. Pushing boundaries, substances exacerbate mental state. Disruptive.
3
4
5
6 Lie about drinking/drug taking on ward. Assume staff stupid. I feel abused 
by their attitude.
7
8 Denial means no change. Influence others on ward. Finding best 
intervention is a balancing act.
1 9 Acting out and manipulation.
10 Overactive. Suicidal ideation. \
* 11 Attention seekers. x *
> 12 Disrupt and make self/others unhappy. Likeable but gloomy and sad. 
Attention seeking, demanding, manipulative.
r 13 * =As above f  Avtf“ ££*4^^
14 J
15
16
17
I 18 Not co-operating with treatment.
19
£ 20 Time consuming.
21
22
23
24
25 At night inadequate support to deal with aggressive patients.
26
27
28
29
t 30 Law unto selves. Hostile, over critical, disruptive, time-consuming, cutting. -■
'  31 Lack of insight.
O ^ u V V ^
4. WHAT IS IT ABOUT THESE PATIENTS ATITUDES THAT MAKES 
CARING FOR THEM MORE DEMANDING?
Respondent Answer
1
. J. 2 Rude and verbal abuse/ Reluctance to change. Lack insight.
3
4
5
ii 6 Drink on and expect to be bailed out each time.
7
.1 8 Intolerant to other patients.
z 9 Fixed and unchangeable.
10 Self-harm
3 11 Set patients and staff against each other.
/ _
' _5 12 Friendly and emotional attraction to nurse. Demanding and manipulative. 
Incautious nurse may find herself dropping guard of objectivity and spending 
more time with these patients.
3 13 Selfish.
1*4
15
16
h
17
18 Not coping
19
k 20 You spend hours talking with them then they come back to show you cuts.
21
22
23
'i
24
25 Demanding
26
27
28
29
k 30 Self-derogatory, hopelessness, changing at a whim. Want protection from selves, and understood. We can do that but for how long, for life?
0 31 Critical and uncooperative.
\) fuA - /ohuA . xG= -^ o/Lr i 
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5. WHAT OTHER ASPECTS ARE THERE WHICH INTAKE CARING FOR THE 
MORE CHALLENGING PATIENTS MORE DEMANDING?
Respondent 1 Answer
1 1
3 2 i Increase in personal stress levels.
3 1
4 I •
5
i £l Their abuse of the service and abusive language and behaviour.
1
■> 8 Not rewarding as they do not move and get better.
i 9 Those with PD in and out of the system. Know it better than the staff.
4 10 Close observations.
11 Attempt suicide often.
*i 12 Self-harm, suicide, attention seeking. They appear charming and the 
inexperienced nurse may be persuaded that the patient is a likeable and 
innocent victim of a bigoted and unfair system.
13 —
14
15
16
17
3 18 Depressing.
19
20 —
21
22
23
24~> 25 Cannot hold them physically if they decide to leave ward.
26
27
28
29
i 30 Unit not right for this type of client. They do not benefit. Would like to see a 
specialised place for these maladjusted clients. I do not see them as ill, but 
in need of listening to, confronting, and a safe environment.
\ 31 Legal aspects -  force fed/force medication.
**■//
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6. WHAT OTOER STRATEGIES DO YOU USE TO MANAGE THESE 
^  PATIENTS?
Respondent Answer
1
1 2 Consistent and firm. Setting of boundaries.
3
4
5
s 6 Drug and alcohol analysis. Impossible to manage on an open ward!
7
I 8 Develop clear boundaries through Care Plan. Staff consistency.
» 9 Be consistent.
3 10 If section 2 put on section 3 to enforce treatment. 1:1 observation.
i 11 Firm and fair.
12 Plan nursing activities.
1 13 Firm but fair. Not respond to attention seeking behaviour.
14
15
16
17
Z- 18 Counselling and advice.
19
20 —
21
22
23
24
3- 25 Persuade them not to leave ward or call Police to return them.
26
27
28
29
Z 30 I listen to them and show respect for their feelings. When they blame staff 
for their ills I find where their own responsibility lies and hand it back to 
them.
*c. 31 1:1 therapy.
\j C&w*
I) _  I
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7. what other strategies or ideas are you awrare of from the literature you have 
____________ read or from your colleagues which might be useful?________
Respondent Answer
1
2 —
3
4
5
6 Work in alliance with psychiatry.
7
8 Behaviour modification. Self help groups (AA). Psychotherapy. Inpatient 
care specialist unit for sustained length of time. Relapse prevention.
9 Consistency of care. Evidence based practice.
10 Increase staff and security. Low secure unit.
11 Understand behaviour and be sympathetic.
12 Assess in clear behavioural terms. Self identification of problems by patient. 
Psychology may administer psychometric testing.
13 —
14
15
16
17
18 —
19
20 —
21
22
23
24
25 Have a locked door policy at night.
26
27
28
29
30 Not make a big issue of cutting. I am not specialised and feel I don’t 
understand them and feel annoyance.
31 C.C. T.V. on wards.
\) -YjtftfcA.. •J
I) L . , i /, - t . 2
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8. WHAT MAKES IT DIFFICULT TO IMPLEMENT THESE USEFUL 
STRATEGIES WHICH YOU CURRENTLY DO NOT USE?
Respondent ! Answer
1
2
3
4
5
6 No power to control environment and admission criteria. Lack of training.
7
8 Staff not trained.
9 Large numbers of clients. Few staff.
10 The Mental Health Act. Lack of adequate staff.
11 They demand more attention and become dependant.
12 Patients feel animosity and resentment to nursing staff as we are symbols of 
authority and social order that they despise.
13 —
14
1*5
16
17
18 —
19
20 —
21
22
23
24
25 Open ward. Funding and planning problems.
26
27
28
29
30 No time or space to do group therapy.
31 Lack of knowledge and resources.
m
9. Have you noticed any stages in a challenging patient’s hospitalisation when 
 ________________ they may become more demanding?_______________
Respondent
*‘,v/  *“ *V MVVV...V -..V- W
Answer
h
2 Discussion of possible discharge. Restriction of boundaries. Lack of nursing 
input.
3
4
5
£ 6 When they’re pissed/high.
7
r 8 When they become institutionalised. When they repeatedly come back to 
ward.
/ 9 Coming up to discharge.
*»
10 w
11 Cutting and overdose.
12 Self harming to attract thie attention of nurses and doctors.
o 13 When ward disturbed and they get less attention.
1-4
15
16
17
A 18 When high.
19
20 —
21
22
23
24
\0 25 After physical restraining. Also psychiatric episodes.
26
27
28
29 '
r 30 Relationship break-ups. When confronted about their attitude or behaviour.
r 31 When they become hyper-manic.
/ u  i(
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10. HOW DO YOU BALANCE THE CARE NEEDS OF CHALLENGING 
PATIENTS WITH THOSE WHO ARE LESS CHALLENGING? Admin, or 
_______________________ practical management. ________________
Respondent Answer
I
2 Prioritising deliveiy of care. Allocate time to each patient each day. Delegate 
others to provide for missing needs.
3
4
5
6 Difficult but try to balance it out.
7
8 More manageable patients receive less attention. Offer specific periods of 
time for challenging patients.
9 On large ward less challenging patients lose out -inappropriate care.
10 No.
11 Spend time equally on patients -depending on their needs.
12 Be more fair upon treatment.
13 Allocate a period of time to spend with each patient.
14
15
16
17
18 —
19
20 —
21
22
23
24
25 Staff feel they lack skills with challenging patients so they give in to their 
demands for sake of safety.
26
27
28
29
- 30 Periods of time allotted to each patient.
31 Prioritising.
r u  >i
j) r ^ON-O * ~J
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11. HOW DO YOU FIND BALANCING THE TIME DEMANDS OF THE 
CHALLENGING PATIENTS WITH THE LESS CHALLENG ING
PATIENTS?
Respondent Answer
1
2 Difficult.
3
4
5
6 Not challenge drunk patient but try to get them to sleep it off.
7
8 Difficult.
9 Frustrating and non-rewarding.
10 Easy.
11 Spend specific time with PD person.
12 More time to patients who need it.
13 Difficult as they demand more time.
14
1*5
16
17
18 —
19
20 —
21
22
23
24
25 A challenging patient’s care needs equivalent to 5 other patients needs.
26
27
28
29
30 If too much time id spent with PD patient then try to even it out with others -  
delegate.
31 Difficult.
12. WHICH PATIENTS APPEAR TO MAKE THE LEAST/MOST
IMPROVEMENTS?
Respo
ndent
LEAST MOST
1
2 PD -  behavioural problems -lack of 
insight
Motivated patients -Those compliant 
with medication- those with insight
3
4
5
6 Substance misuse Psychosis
7
8 PD -  Substance misuse -  self-harm Psychosis-reactive depression
9 PD -  substance misuse Psychotic -depression
10 Don’t know
11 PD -  sciz.-chronic dementia Drug induced psychosis- neurotics.
12 PP -  Schiz. - Alcohol Dementia- Drug induced psychosis- 
reactive depn.
13 PD Psychotic illness
14
15
16
17
18 PD
19
20 —
21
22
23
24 . s \
25 Less challenging patients Ys Aggressive patients
26
27
28
29
30 PD -  Schiz. -  Huntingdon’s-dementia- 
manic depn.
Endogenous depn. -  reactive depn. -  
psychdsis.
31 Schizophrenia -A^ism Mood disorders- Depression.
f Z 
I ^
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13. WHAT IS YOUR UNDERSTANDING FOR WHY THESE PATTERNS
OCCUR?
Respondent Answer
1
2 Motivation and insight.
3
4
5
6 Alcoholics need to want to address their problem. Psychotic patients can be 
helped with caring, understanding, management and medication.
7
8 Deep rooted problems.
9 Psychiatric wards are not suitable for PD/substance misuses. Staff not have 
the skills.
10 4 Don’t know
11 Fragmentation of the personality.
12 Deterioration, relapse, non-compliance of medication, relationship problems.
13 Psychotics respond well to medication.
14
15
16
17
18 —
19
20 —
21
22
23
24
25 Improvements when staff give time to patients.
26
27
28
29
30 Medication effective with some disorders. Others are ongoing and rely on 
clients own motivation.
31 Harmful degenerative processes.
c u t  *
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14. PLEASE LIST DETAILS OF ANY POST REGISTRATION TRAINING:
Respondent Answer i
1
2 ENB :care of HIV -  + counselling certificates.
3
4
5
6 ENB-Psychiatric nursing in secure environments. Risk 
assessment/management. C+R
7
8 —
9 None.
10 N/A •
11 SRN/RMH
12 Enrolled nurse-psychiatry. 27 years experience.
13 —
14
15
16
17
18 —
19
20 —
21
22
23
24
25 —
26
27
28
29
30 Counselling course.
31 None
V^ > fk * 0
15. WHICH ASPECTS OF YOUR TRAINING AND CLINICAL EXPERIENCE 
DO YOU VALUE MOST IN WORKING WITH THESE CHALLENGING
PATIENTS?
Respondent Answer
1
1 2 Support for team and training. Past experience.
3
4
5
2 6 De-escalation and management of aggression.
7
■>*J 8 Helping skills, training, listening, empathising. Consistency and boundaries 
emphasised.
1 9 Patience, tolerance, team-wok.
10 All.
11 Study of psychology. Observation, listening and understanding.
4 12 Working in acute adult psychiatry.
4 13 Experience.
•14
15
16
17
18 Communication.
19
20 —
21
22
23
24
L 25 Management of aggression course.
26
27
28
?
29
30 Counselling course. Unable to attend PD course as yet.
3 31 Would value psychological interventions.
2- ^  C o -'T t- 1
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16. WHAT EFFECT DO THESE MORE CHALLENGING PATIENTS HAVE 
ON HOW YOU FEEL ABOUT YOUR OWN PROFESSIONAL ROLE?
Respondent Answer
1
2 Demands'being made.
3
4
5
6 Feel abused and treated like shit putting up with all their lies and abusive 
behaviour.
7
8 Feel frustrated as I do not have professional ability to deal with these 
patients.
9 Low self-esteem, confidence. They can also be most rewarding when 
discharged.
10 Exciting.
11 Dissatisfied with their care plans. Stressed.
12 Stressful, dissatisfied.
1-3 The more input you put in may not help. 1 step forward 2 back.
14
15
16
17
18 To understand.
19
20 —
21
22
23
24
25 I feel like a policewoman. Feel inadequate.
26
27
28
29
30 I feel useless. I question how they are benefiting from being on the ward. 
They take up too much time. Bad habits reinforced on the ward. What have 
they leamt?
31 Demand me to fully utilise my skills.
I- ■>•'.(/<. ?
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17. IN WHAT WAYS ARE YOUR RESPONSES TO THE LESS 
CHALLENGING CLIENTS THE SAME OR DIFFERENT?
Respo SAME DIFFERENT
ndent
1
2 Developing therapeutic relationships. Able to establish better nurse/client 
relationship.
3
4
5
6 De-escalation and management of 
aggression.
Tolerance understanding and patience.
7
8 Maintain consistency. Medication. Listen 
and support.
Caring for them can be more rewarding. 
Feel less unprepared to deal with them.
9 Patience and tolerance. Requires less structure and tight goals.
10 * Same
11 Different A
•12 Different A
13
14
15
16
17
18 —
19
20 —
21
22
23
24
25 Demanding. Cannot stop them. They are manageable in an open ward. 
Aggressive patients need a locked ward.
26
27
28
29
30 Substance misuse. Suffering is not their fault as they are 
unable to help selves. Those with ^  
psychosis need protection to feel safe 
until mind is right.
31 Time taken to respond. Level of care. Observation and firmness.
r u  2 ni ^
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18. CAN YOU IDENTIFY ANY METHODS OF SUPPORT THAT MAY HELP 
IN THE MANAGEMENT OF CHALLENGING PATIENTS?
Respondent Answer
1
2 Peer group support with facilitator. Team building exercise. Clinical 
supervision.
3
4
5
6 Education and support from specialists. Policy and management strategies.
7
8 Support from other professional agencies.
9 Supervision for the team working with that client.
10 Improved therapeutic environment, social support. Therapies.
11 Counselling, group therapy, individual therapy.
12 Refer to psychologist, behavioural therapy, group therapy.
13 —
~4
•15
16
17
18 Helping them by the way they feel.
19
S o —
21
22
'.3
4
■j--------------------------
Group therapy. Appoint a security officer or train staff to deal with 
aggressive patients.t, Seclusion. ECT.
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19. WOULD YOU BE INTERESTED LN ATTENDING A W ORKSHOP IN 
THE FUTURE TO LOOK AT WAYS OF WORKING W'lTH THE MORE
CHALLENGING PATIENTS?_________________
Respondent Answer
lj__— -------
9 Yes
3
4
5
6 Yes
7
8 Yes
\ 9 Yes
I 10 YesI n Yes
V2 No
\13 Yes
r
L
I .
V Yes
u
Yes
M-
Yes
Yes
Yes
IS
l l
20. What particular topics would you find beneficial?
Respondent | Answer
1
2 —
3
4
5
6 Understand substance misuse. Treatment. Management. Dual diagnosis.
7
8 PD/substance and treatment interventions.
9 Goals, specific care-plans, structured interventions.
10 All.
11 PD. Current treatment;
12 More lectures from the psychology department.
13 & Anything that may help.
14
15
16
17
18 —
19
20 —
21
22
23
24
25 Emotional abuse of aggressive outbursts from patients to nurses and doctors.
26
27
28
29
30 Origins of PD. What does the client obtain from self-harm. Handling the 
psychotic patient. Origins of psychosis.
31 Public awareness and tolerance of MX in the community.
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Appendix 5
Categorised data
I. Diagnoses and labels
Table 2. The Categories of Responses and Number of Respondents Regarding Issues of 
Diagnoses and Labels.
QUESTION CATEGORIES GENERATED AND NUMBER 
OF RESPONDENTS
Patients with which diagnosis do you find the most (N=13)
difficult to manage? Personality Disorder: 7
Aggression: 2
Self-harmers: 1
Schizophrenia: 1
Substance misuse: 1
Bi-polar affective disorder: 1
Which labels do you and your colleagues use to (N = ll)
describe these more challenging patients? Attention seeking: 3
Manipulative: 3
Diagnostic term: 2
“Cutters”: 1
“Alchies”: 1
Other: 2
II. Demands of the challenging patient.
Table 3. The Categories of Responses and Number of Respondents Regarding the 
Demands of the Challenging Client.
QUESTION CATEGORIES GENERATED AND NUMBER 
OF RESPONDENTS
What is it about these patients, behaviours that 
makes caring for them more demanding?
(N=13)
Non co-operative/staff manipulation: 7 
Self harm/suicidal ideation: 4 
Time consuming: 4
What is it about these patients’ attitudes that makes 
caring for them more demanding?
(N=13)
Self-critical/destructive: 5 
Critical of others: 4 
Manipulative: 4 
Unchangeable: 2 
Emotionally attractive: 1
Have you noticed any stages in a challenging 
patient’s hospitalisation when they become more 
demanding?
(N = ll)
Around discharge: 2
When using substances: 2
With limited nurse attention: 3
With nurse interventions: 3
When they are repeatedly readmitted: 1
What other aspects are there which make caring for (N=ll)
the more challenging patients more demanding? Nurse helplessness: 4
Inadequacies of the service/mismatch of patient to
service: 4
Self-harm: 2
Need for authoritarian approach: 2
HI. Managing the Challenging Patient.
Table 4. The Categories of Responses and Number of Respondents Regarding Issues of 
Patient Management.
QUESTION CATEGORIES GENERATED AND NUMBER 
OF RESPONDENTS
What strategies do you use to manage these 
patients?
(N=12)
Consistency and boundaries: 5 
Listen and talk: 2 
Increase psychiatric power 2 
Improved planning: 2 
“I do not manage”: 1
What other strategies or ideas are you aware o f from 
the literature you have read or from your colleagues 
which might be useful?
(N=9)
Adopt a multi-agency approach: 3 
Listen to patient: 2 
Increase regulations/observation: 2 
Other 2
What makes it difficult to implement these useful 
strategies which you currently do not use?
(N=9)
Poor resources: 4 
Poor training: 4
Severity o f patients’ problems: 2
How do you balance the care needs o f challenging 
patients with those who are less challenging?
(N = ll)
More challenging patients allotted more time: 7 
Try to maintain a fair balance: 6
How do you find balancing ihe time demands of the 
challenging patients with the less challenging 
patients?
(N = ll)
Difficult: 8
Attempt to prioritise and balance it out: 5 
Easy: 1
Y ou have identified some o f your responses to 
challenging patients. In what ways are your 
responses to the less challenging patients the same 
or different?
Same: (N=8)
Offer patience, support and tolerance: 4 
Others: 4 
Different: (N=9)
Offer patience, support and tolerance: 2 
Challenges more rewarding: 1 
Boundaries and objectives: 2 
Need a locked ward: 1
IV. Effectiveness of Intervention
Table 5. The Categories of Responses and Number of Respondents Regarding the 
Effectiveness of Nurse Intervention.
QUESTION CATEGORIES GENERATED AND NUMBER 
OF RESPONDENTS
Which patients appear to make the least/most 
improvements?
Least: (N=12) 
Personality disorder: 8 
Substance misuse: 4 
Schizophrenia: 3 
Other: 3 
Most: (N=12) 
Psychosis: 7 
Depression: 5 
Motivated patients: 1 
Other 1
What is your understanding for why these patterns 
occur?
(N = ll)
Improvements dependant on patient responsibility: 7 
Improvements dependant on service delivery: 5 
Other 1
Please list any details of Post Registration training. (N=8)
HTV: 1
Nursing in secure environments: 1 
Counselling course: 2 
Others: 2 
None: 3
Which aspects o f your training and clinical 
experience do you value most in working with these 
challenging patients?
(N=12)
Psychology skills: 5 
Team work: 2
Management of aggression course: 2 
General experience: 3 
Others: 1
What effect do these more challenging patients have 
on how you feel about your own professional role?
(N=12)
Negative effect: 8
Can fully utilise my skills: 1
Other 3
V. Support and Continuing Professional Development
Table 6. The Categories of Responses and Number of Respondents Regarding Modes of 
Support and Continuing Professional Development.
QUESTION CATEGORIES GENERATED AND NUMBER 
OF RESPONDENTS
Can you identify any methods of support that may 
help in the management o f challenging patients?
(N=10)
Therapists: 6
Improvements in policy and managements 
Peer group: 1 
Improved environment: 1
Would you be interested in attending a workshop in 
the future to look at ways o f working with the more 
challenging patients?
(N=13) 
Yes: 12 
No: 1
What particular topics would you find beneficial? (N=10)
Psychological/Structured interventions: 4 
Personality disorders: 3 
Substance misuse: 2 
Other diagnoses: 2 
Public awareness: 1
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Abstract
Research on experiences of labour, childbirth and early parenthood has identified the 
value of support systems in meeting the mother’s medical, social, and emotional needs. 
The effectiveness of these networks has been explained as central to averting considerable 
intrapsychic and interpersonal anxiety and distress. This research focuses on how both 
“new parents” experience these support networks and the value that they attach to them. 
Their experiences are tracked from the final stages of labour to six weeks postpartum to 
locate their support networks within a temporal and developmental framework. This 
paper reports findings from a qualitative study of six couples in Britain. Participants were 
interviewed about which supports they valued the most/least, who provided these 
supports, the most difficult aspects of this time for each individual, and how these 
supports may have adapted over time. The results indicated that satisfactory support in 
the hospital depended upon an integration of valued medical and psychosocial support. 
The hospital experiences were rarely reported to meet this level of satisfaction as the 
interviewees reported feeling out of control, a sense of unpredictability, under informed, 
with poor quality of attachment to the staff. Over the following six weeks, they expressed 
that they regained control and confidence from an improved attachment with the support 
networks of family and friends.
Keywords: support, professional, social, emotional, parents, qualitative, attachment 
theory.
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Introduction
Over the past decade there has been greater focus on theories of social support as a guide 
to understanding the mechanisms by which support affects health and adjustment.
In this field of enquiry, researchers have experienced conceptual difficulties in providing 
an operational definition of “social support” which has been reported as having important 
implications on the interpretation of research findings (Callaghan and Morrissey, 1993). 
For the purpose of this research it was deemed as important to operate within an 
epistemology which permits the idea that there can be a multitude of realities (see 
McFadyen, 1997), therefore emphasis was placed on understanding the meanings of 
individuals’ accounts of support rather than the need to contain individuals’ stories within 
the restrictions of a singular definition.
However to familiarise the reader with the term, one conceptualisation of social support is 
“an exchange of resources between at least two individuals perceived by the provider or 
recipient to be intended to enhance the well being of the recipient” (Shumaker and 
Brownell, 1984; cited in Callaghan and Morrissey, 1993, pp.203).
The provisions of support during labour and childbirth have been gaining more interest 
due to the impact of support on the results of obstetric treatment and parent satisfection 
(Campero, Garcia, Diaz, Ortiz, Reynoso and Langer, 1998). Studies have reported a 
relationship between psychosocial support and a reduction in various types of medical 
interventions including, anaesthesia, analgesics, caesarean sections and forceps (Sosa and 
Kennell, 1980; Keirse and Enkin, 1989; Kennell and Klaus, 1991). Furthermore, 
psychosocial support has been found to accelerate recovery, improve parent /child 
bonding, and decrease anxiety and depression during the first six postpartum weeks 
(Klaus and Kennell, 1992; Hofineyr and Nikodem, 1991; both cited in Campero et al.,
1998).
The experience of psychosocial support during childbirth has been described as central to 
the quality of the mothers’ experience of childbirth due to the increased medicalisation of
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professional support (Campero et al., 1998). Chalmers and Wolman (1993; cited in 
Campero, et al. 1998) have expressed that in certain cultures the hospital professionals 
generally consider labour and childbirth as potentially pathological conditions in which 
specialised and technological care is most appropriate.
The medicalised care model has been associated with an unfavourable relationship 
between the medical staff and the expecting couple, which increases anxiety. In turn, 
higher levels of anxiety have been linked to adverse consequences in labour that have 
increased the probability of medical interventions (Lederman, 1978; cited in Campero et 
al., 1998).
Considering these research findings there appears to be some questions over the 
relationship between social and professional “supports” experienced by expecting and 
new parents. This area of investigation has been explored by many writers (e.g. Hofineyr, 
and Nikodem, 1991; Klaus and Kennell, 1992; Sosa and Kennell, 1980; Chalmers and 
Wolman, 1993). However, one fundamental difference is that this piece of research 
adopts the narrative approach in which each person’s construction of experience and 
events is seen as reflecting their own belief system that may be in/distinguishable from 
their families or the professional’s who contributed to their support system. Through an 
interpretation of both parents’ stories this research aims to access a deeper, intricate 
network of stories which may reflect in some depth the parents’ narrative in relation to 
the context of time, place and person. The quality of these narratives can then be used to 
establish the supports that each of the parents in each couple found the most/least helpful 
from labour to six weeks postpartum.
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Method
Participants
A total of 12 participants (6 hetero-sexual couples) were recruited. Selection criteria 
included that the two partners in each couple were co-habiting at the time of conception, 
childbirth, 6 weeks postpartum and at the time of the interview. It was recognised that 
there are different levels of stories that both influence and are influenced by current 
experience and the story about that experience (McFadyen, 1997). If these stories define 
the context of the person and the context defines the story then it was deemed as 
important to recruit couples that were experiencing parenthood for the first time. This 
measure was taken to encapsulate the powerful emotions related to the first, “unknown” 
experience of childbirth as well as to facilitate comparability amongst the couple’s 
reports.
The couples recruited all had their first child less than 5 years ago. This limit was 
determined at selection as the “narrative incorporates the temporal dimension” and 
“requires the location of events in cross-time patterns” (White and Epston, 1990, pp.3). 
Therefore a failure to limit the time-span between the interview and the birth of the first 
child could have had a retrospective effect on the stories told.
Interview Guide
Each of the 6 couples were interviewed in their homes by a different researcher. Both 
members of the couple were interviewed separately about their experiences of support 
around childbirth and up to six weeks postpartum. The use of separate interviews was 
deemed as important to encapsulate the stories directly from each individual’s belief 
system and to avoid any obstructive collusion. The interview guide (appendix 1) began 
with demographic questions that were followed by questions around who was present at 
the birth, on the return from the hospital, and during the first six weeks of the child’s life. 
This was followed with questions around the quality of these supports, how helpful they 
were, the hardest aspect of this period of time for them and the person/people supporting 
them.
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Analytic Strategy
Interpretive phenomenological analysis (DPA) (Smith, 1996a; Smith, Flowers, and 
Osborn, 1997) was used to analyse the data. IPA provides a qualitative method to explore 
participants’ experiences, cognitions and meaning making. At the same time IPA also 
takes into account the understanding that research is a dynamic exercise that will be 
influenced by the researcher’s own conceptions and belief systems. Hence the 
participant’s phenomenological accounts are analysed through the researcher’s 
interpretive framework with the assumption that this process will result in meaningful 
interpretations about the individual’s thinking (Smith et al., 1997).
Smith (1996b) states that qualitative research should be transparent about its process of 
analysis. Therefore the details of this process as well as the two initial transcripts are 
included in appendix 2.
Adopting this methodology to analyse data involves a high degree of subjectivity as 
interpretations are influenced by the researcher’s own belief systems. Having a mixed 
sex group of researchers, of three males and three females, was considered as helpful to 
achieve a more informed awareness of the participants’ stories from a different gender 
perspective. Furthermore, two of the researchers had experienced childbirth themselves 
and several of the others had attended the birth of significant others. One important factor 
that also needs to be considered throughout the interpretation of the data is that all of the 
research group were trainee clinical/counselling psychologists and may have interpreted 
the priority of support differently from other groups.
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Analysis
Demographic Information
There were 6 male and 6 female participants (6 couples). Mean age was 24 years (range 
27-37). In terms of their highest educational qualifications, 5 had a postgraduate degree 
or diploma, 5 had a degree, and 2 had qualifications equivalent to an O-level/GCSE, 7 of 
the participants were in professional occupations, 1 was a senior manager, 1 was a charity 
worker and 3 were house-workers.
When the study was conducted, all of the participants lived within Great Britain and 
within a 30-mile radius of the London area. In terms of their ethnicity. 9 described 
themselves as white and British, 1 as half British and half Afro-Caribbean, and 2 were 
Greek.
Ten of the participants were married to their partners and two were not married, All 12 
lived with their partners, 3 of the six couples’ oldest child were 4 years old, 2 were 1 year 
old and 1 was 2 years old. All of the couples’ first-bom children were bom in a hospital 
in England.
All participants read and signed a research consent form (appendix 3) which outlined the 
aims of the research. Signing of the form gave consent to audio-tape the interview and 
write up the results with respect to participant confidentiality.
Table of Themes
Having produced clusters of themes for the initial interview, the coding process was then 
applied to the other interviews until main themes were identified. Using this method of 
analysis meant that the researchers were already oriented or primed to certain aspects 
within the data when examining the latter transcripts. However, the analysis was a 
cyclical process and the researchers went through the data a number of times swapping 
more useful themes for those deemed to be less significant (Smith, Jarman, and Osbom,
1999). Table 1 shows the list of superordinate themes generated by the data.
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Table 1, Superordinate themes
Superordinate themes Transcript instances Identifier1
Control “you didn’t even know [] 
what they were doing”
Jackie p4
Professional support “gave me no confidence” Mamey pg 4
Social support “better [J at figuring out what 
I needed at a particular time”
Claire p4
Emotional support “the knowledge and caring of 
our friends and family”
Paul p5
Isolation “not being able to 
communicate properly made 
me feel isolated”
Olga p3
Expectations “she told us one thing, and 
then a little later □ ruled over 
her decision”
Dave p2
Sources and application of 
knowledge
“she kind of knew all these 
terms and what you needed”
Paul p5
Some o f the details have been changed to preserve the anonymity o f the
participants.
Main Themes
The themes of social, emotional, and professional support were considered tQ be 
particularly relevant Revisiting the data ensured that there was a complete corpus of data 
on these three areas that could be intensively examined. Although the themes of “social” 
and “professional” support were believed to be central at the outset of the research, the 
theme of “emotional” support was identified purely through the analytic process.
Experience of Professional Support
The focus of this study was an exploration into the supports that first time parents 
received and the effect of these experiences upon them. Ten of the twelve participants 
(83%) cited a number of experiences when they felt that the support of professional staff 
involved in the birthing process was inadequate. For example,
It was a horrendous ordeal for me. The hospital hadn’t completed anything we 
had asked for. We wanted a water birth but they had too many people giving birth
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that night and they were short staffed. They induced me which I didn’t need but 
they said they wanted to huny everybody up (Mamey).
This statement is congruent with the observations made by Campero et al. (1998) that 
mothers who feel powerless during labour and childbirth experience great dissatisfaction 
with the hospital staff and are left feeling uncomfortable, passive, and dependant, This 
dissatisfaction may also be associated with higher levels of anxiety which can lead to 
adverse consequences and increased medical interventions (Lederman, 1978 ;cited in 
Campero et al,, 1998), This was evident in the case of Jackie as she explained:
The midwife who was with me never really helped to explain what was going on 
[] I didn’t really feel that I had anybody on my side other than Dave [] I was quite 
scared by this time j] cos what they wanted to do was try a ventouse on the 
operating table and then straight into an emergency caesarean (Jackie).
Many other explanations of experiences of the professional support in the hospital setting 
were also negative. For example:
I discharged myself as I just hated it in there (Mary),
It was kind of the midwives who were actually not that good (Stephen),
The midwife who had come in with us had disappeared off the face of the earth, 
so we had no one kind of explaining to us (Dave).
This quotation from Dave implies that he would have valued the support from 
professionals more had they kept him informed of the progress of the birthing process. 
This interpretation is comparable to the explanations by Callaghan and Morrissey (1993) 
who state that an integral component of support in health comes in the form of tangible or 
informational support. Similarly, Campero et al. (1998) assert that women who receive
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adequate information and encouragement experience a greater sense of control over their 
labour, which is a key component to a satisfactory birthing process.
The importance of control can be exemplified through a consideration of the temporal 
dimension of professional support. Having expressed how inadequate support from the 
professional staff was throughout her time in hospital, Mamey’s perception of 
professional support altered over the six-week postpartum period:
Initially the hospital were in control of the situation and we felt out of control. 
But later with the health visitor clinic you don’t have to go but can chose to if you 
wish (Mamey).
Only one couple reported a more positive experience at the hands of the professionals. 
Philip stated that:
Claire [partner] being a doctor [] wants someone who is not knowledgeable to lie 
to her about something. There was sort of slight of hand but Claire needed 
someone to tell her that everything was ok (Philip).
The difference between this story of relinquishing control to the working professionals 
can be compared to the other couples who felt less supported but attempted to gain some 
control and mastery over their situation. Unlike the other couples, Claire was a doctor 
and informed about the stages of the birthing process. Another factor that may have 
reduced anxiety was that she also worked in the hospital in which she gave birth and was 
familiar with the staff there. For example:
Claire was stitched up by the consultant, Heather, who she had worked under. 
The consultant stayed late specifically to do this, which was really sweet of her 
(Philip).
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This interpretation implies that although this couple had a different experience of 
professional support, this may have been achieved through a reciprocal relationship 
encompassing information, collaboration, influence and control.
Experience of Social Support
Throughout this analysis social support is conceptualised as that which is experienced 
with family and friends, but not professionals. All of the female participants (100%) 
reported that they valued having their partner there with them throughout the birthing 
process. This is clearly communicated in the following examples:
Stephen was really good and organised things (Mary)
I really needed him (Paul] there because it was a horrendous ordeal for me 
(Mamey).
Dave was very supportive both emotionally and practically (Jackie).
Research by Winter, Ferreira, and Bowers (1973) claims that the advantages which 
couples have over some other relationships is not that they work better together but have 
acquired shared understandings. This also appeared to be applicable to some of the 
couple’s family and friends as 75% of the couples extended their support system during 
the birth by allowing a friend or relative to accompany them. This was illustrated by 
Kyprianos who stated that:
Her mother was very supportive throughout the labour [] I think that was the most 
supportive feet (Kyprianos).
The remaining two couples expressed that they considered some family and friends to be 
of limited support during the actual birthing process. For example,
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My mum wanted to be there but I banned her (Claire).
Everyone was just sort of nagging. Tony just wanted it just us two at the birth. 
(Liz).
In tracking the temporal dimensions of the stories it became apparent that most of the 
respondents became closer to their social supports over the six weeks following the birth. 
One fundamental element of this support took the form of practical help and advice. 
Mamey expressed how she valued her mother’s input “by helping give him his first bath 
and holding him”. However, several of the participants stated that after their experiences 
in the hospital, any family support received had to be collaborative and non-blaming. 
Claire said:
She (friend) just listened [] and was very non-judgemental, which was great 
(Claire).
Experience of Emotional Support
Whereas professional support was conceptualised as the relationship with healthcare staff 
only and social support as the relationship with family and friends, emotional support 
encompassed the impact of the couples’ entire support network. Furthermore, there were 
some interesting changes in the participants’ reports of emotional support from birth to 
six weeks postpartum. Many of the participants’ dissatisfection with the professional 
staff resulted in them feeling out of control during the birthing process. Kitzinger (1990) 
has identified perceived control as central to the parents’ satisfaction and self esteem. 
Indeed it became evident that in the weeks following childbirth, with assistance from 
family and friends, the new parents regained more control in the parent/professional 
relationship which reduced feelings of emotional vulnerability.
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This shift can be exemplified by comparing how Paul experienced the supports at three 
different time points, during the birth, on leaving the hospital and a few weeks after 
returning home with his family:
They (professionals) had too many people on their books [] no friendship or 
closeness (Paul).
That was weird that they let us take the baby home....It was a bit scaiy and 
exciting (Paul).
Over time their (parents) advice faded into the background as we learned to cope 
on our own (Paul).
This transition was shared by a number of the couples and had a significant impact on 
their emotional states. To understand this shift it may be useful to consider the above 
stories in terms of attachment theory in which the professionals are the “stronger and 
wiser” (Holmes, 1997) “parent” figures. In his first statement, Paul could be said to have 
experienced a form of “avoidant parenting” (Holmes, 1997) in which the professional 
staff were brusque and functional in their handling of their “infants” (birthing parents). 
This would leave the non-attached parents in an anxious state, questioning their 
relationship with the “parent figure” and less likely to have confidence in their own 
coping mechanisms. This was reflected in Paul’s second statement, in that his feelings of 
being peripheral and superfluous in the hospital did not contribute to him feeling as if he 
was making a transition to the family home from a “secure base” (Ainsworth, 1982). In 
turn, Paul and his partner experienced a more secure and safe attachment with 
knowledgeable, informative family members. The third statement above illustrates how 
with the secure base in place, once the “danger had passed” the new parents managed to 
progress to a position where they had internalised their positive “parenting experiences”. 
Following this they could then move to a position of confidence where they could
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function as the newborn child’s parents and consequently provide the child with it’s own 
secure attachments.
The quality of the emotional support received by Tony and Liz was a little different to 
that of the other couples who experienced an insecure attachment. Liz explained how 
involved their parents wanted to be:
Tony’s (parents had) been phoning up all of the time. (My) Mum was phoning 
like three times a day (Liz).
However T ony stated that over the duration of the birth:
Liz’s dad was a complete mess, he was really, really horrendous, tears and 
eveiything. Everyone was going nuts, and my mum was going nuts (Tony).
The reaction of this couple to their parents could be framed as an “ambivalent 
attachment” (Bowlby, 1988). In child terms, Bowlby has describes this interaction as, 
when the parent intrudes on the child when they are playing happily and ignores them 
when they are clearly distressed. This process could be compared to the times when this 
couples’ parents are intrusive, using many telephone calls when the situation was “safe”. 
Conversely, when the birth became a distressing event, their parents went “nuts”, offering 
no emotional support, and Tony found himself trying to “contain” their anxieties.
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Overview
This study highlights the different support systems available to first time parents and how 
these supports may adjust over the first six weeks postpartum. While there is some 
overlap between these three identified support systems (professional, social, and 
emotional) this study began to identify when these different support systems were 
considered positive as well as their limitations.
The study indicates that first time parents value the medical knowledge of the 
professional staff However, as Kitzinger (1990) has stated childbirth is a stressful 
process due to the complex interaction between pain, immobilization, medical 
interventions and the failure of interpersonal relations with healthcare professionals. The 
failure of the professionals to conceptualise birth as a multidimensional event left the 
parents feeling powerless, depersonalised, and anxious. In the one case, where the 
birthing process was described as satisfactory, the mother to be was a doctor in the 
hospital in which she gave birth and her birthing partner was also a doctor. Therefore she 
had some knowledge, information and control over the birthing process, and some highly 
valued emotional support from the staff. These factors appear to have bridged the 
medical/psychosocial support systems resulting in a more satisfactory experience.
Drawing on attachment theory (Bowlby, 1988), this study illustrates how over the 
following six weeks postpartum the new parents experienced a transition. There was a 
shift from “non-attachment” with the professional “parent figures” to the appreciation of a 
new secure base offered by the practical and social support of friends and family. This 
growing closeness is described by McFadyen (1997) as an attempt to restore a sense of 
meaning and mastery in the face of the profound challenges to their assumptive world. 
The final phase of this birth to six-week transition saw the parents internalise these 
supports, which then placed them in a position where they could offer a secure base for 
their own child to begin to develop an attachment.
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Any conclusions drawn from this study remain tentative, as they may not be 
representative of the support systems that a majority of parents in Britain experience from 
childbirth to six weeks postpartum. Furthermore, the retrospective accounts of the 
parents described their support networks of up to five years after the initial birth. 
Although the researchers were more concerned with the stories rather than an “accurate 
account” of the events, it was recognised that this time span could have an impact on 
shaping the experience of meaning. Furthermore, the interview only encompassed one 
snap-shot of time in the whole process of conception, pregnancy and the transition to 
parenthood. These other factors would almost certainly have a bearing on parents’ 
reports of their experiences of support.
One other notable limitation is that six different researchers conducted an interview with 
each couple. Recognising the influence that interviewers have upon the content and 
process of the information elicited this may have resulted in a diversity of information 
which made comparability difficult to achieve. However, this process could also be 
described as reducing the effect of interviewer bias as the researchers would be operating 
in line with their different belief systems. Indeed, the results of the analysis may hold 
more credence as comparability was achieved and there was a sufficient corpus of data to 
support each of the major themes.
Finally, a more in depth investigation into the participants’ stories of support and what 
these experiences meant to them was beyond the scope of this research write up. Ideally, 
the richness of the data could have been reflected in further investigations of differences 
between the partner’s views of support, a closer analysis of which professionals/family 
and friends provided the greatest support, and how the values of these supports adjusted 
over time.
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Appendices
Appendix 1
A qualitative study on the relationship between social and professional support for first time parents:
From labour to 6 weeks postpartum.
Interview guide
1. Who was present:
a) At the birth
b) At the “going home” time
c) During the first six weeks of the child’s life
2. For times a), b) and c):
a) What type of support did you need most?
b) Who were the most important supports?
c) For each named person:
i. What did they do that was supportive?
ii. What was most helpful?
iii. What was least helpful?
iv. Who was supporting them?
V. How were they being supported?
vi. What was the hardest aspect of this time for you?
vii. What was the hardest aspect of this time for the person
supporting you?
3. How did the support you received change over time?
Appendix 2
A qualitative study on the relationship between social and professional support for first time parents:
From labour to 6 weeks postpartum.
Process of Analysis
An idiographic approach was adopted (Smith, Jarman, and Osboml999) in which one 
transcript was looked at in detail before analysing the others. Emerging themes were 
listed and connections between them identified. As some of the themes clustered together 
they formed superordinate concepts. After several readings of the first transcript new 
superordinate themes arose which assisted in grouping some of the other identified 
themes. There was great concern to ensure that each of these themes could be well 
illustrated with examples from the data. Having developed these superordinate themes 
for the first interview, the coding process was then repeated for each of the other 
interviews to see if the main themes were still applicable.
On completion of this process it was evident that some themes initially identified were 
not particularly relevant to the other transcripts, or needed to be re-categorised to 
encompass the new information. Once the main themes of professional, social and 
emotional support had been selected for more intensive analysis, the data was then re­
examined to ensure that there was sufficient data for a detailed examination.
The extracts from each transcript were then grouped according to the new numerical 
coding categories to produce collections of data relating to each concept. Below is a 
description of these categories and sub-categories:
Table 2. List of coding categories for the main themes of professional, social, and 
emotional support______________________________ ___________________
1.1 Types of professional support Professionals only
1.1.1 Directive
1.1.2 Collaborative
1.1.3 Not valued/incompetence
1.1.4 Valued/competent
1.1.5 Conflicting/confusing information
1.2 Types of social support Family and friends only
1.2.1 Directive
1.2.2 Collaborative
1.2.3 Not valued/absent
1.2.4 Valued
1.2.5 Power/powerlessness
1.3 Types of emotional support Professionals and/or family 
and friends
1.3.1 Trust and containment (or not)
1.3.2 Care/reassurance (or not)
1.3.3 Competence/incompetence
1.3.4 Collaboration/non-collaboration
1.3.5 Absent (valued or not)
A qualitative study on the relationship between soda! and professional support for first time parents:
From labonr to 6 weeks postpartum.
Finally, the analytic themes were translated into a narrative account in the write up. 
Although an emphasis was on the shared experiences of the participants, it was also 
useful to look at unique individual accounts of support networks. Having identified a 
number of main themes through an analysis of the data, these themes were then 
interpreted through an existing theoretical framework. For the purpose of this study, 
attachment theory was especially useful to provide an interpretation of the participants’ 
stories as it could be used to understand the meanings and development of support over a 
time continuum of six weeks.
UuM  Interview Transcript L . /  j
Six nfmtflis as a parent -  support coping and response.
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Interviewer: - (I)
Respondent: Mamey (M)
Did you say that you had your first child in hospital?
Yes.
And was your partner in the hospital with you?
Yes, Paul was there.
Was anyone else there around the time of birth?
My mother, Yvonne, and my brother in law, Mick.
Was anyone else there at all?
A few hours later, after birth there was the grandparents and some of my extended 
family.
So these people were all in the hospital around the same day of the birth?
Yes.
And you had a ?
Boy, called Dylan.
SO you and your partner were there and Mick and Yvonne were there too at the -j
time of the birth. Was thatnrfi-nlnrmfirl to tbosp. nfinnlf* thAi-A? /.ti   t  i t .  t t pre-planned t  have th se people t ere
Not really, it was a later decision. They decided to come to the hospital when they 
did.
Well, what did you think about this plan?
It was good. I was a bit disappointed that the grandparents were not there straight 
away as well.
Would that be Dylan’s grandparents?
Yes, Paul’s mum and dad. They came as quick as they could.
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I. Ok. Just for the record their names are... ?
M. Jenny and Tito.
I. I was wondering what it was like having those people around at the hospital. Did
you manage to talk to them when you were in hospital?
M. Yes, for the first six hours when I was in labour I was just sitting around in a chair
not doing very much and that helped while the time away. And then after that it 
started to get painful so I kicked everybody out. Then they had to sit and wait 
outside the room until the baby was bom and then they came in.
I. How soon after the birth did they come back in?
M. Ah, several hours later.
I. And where was Paul throughout all of this?
M. Most of the time he was with me. Now and then he would pop out to see Mick
and Yvonne to make sure they were alright and given them an update.
I. I see. So what was that like to have Paul disappearing off for periods of time
whilst this was all going on?
M. Wasn’t too bad I didn’t really mind because I knew he wouldn’t be long.
I. So it was quite reassuring to know that he was only going for a short period of
time.
M. Yes.
I. How supportive was Paul through the whole time?
M. I totally needed him there because it was a horrendous ordeal for me. The hospitc .1 4
hadn’t completed anything that we had asked for. We wanted a water birth but 
they had too many people giving birth that night and they were short staffed.
They induced me which I didn’t need but they said they wanted to hurry 
everybody4up. So it went against all our wishes. Also, when they induce you yo|u 
need to have an epidural and that didn’t work either, so through all the pain and 
the agony Paul was around to be able to assert my rights and I was confident that 
he was able to do that.
I see, and was there one particular person that he had to negotiate with?
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The midwife. And then the anaesthetist then didn’t turn up for about an hour and 
I was in agony.
So although Paul was very supportive, it sounds like you didn’t have that much 
confidence in the professional staff.
None at all.
Did things improve once the antitheists got there?
No, got worse. The midwife was trying to get the kid to come out as quick as it 
was gonna come because they wanted to go off duty. You felt rushed, unrelaxed, 
and unsupported. Then they said that this baby would not come out if they didn’t 
cut, I didn’t want that and they enforced their rights and did it.
Really? You already mentioned an epidural, did you have any other drugs at all?
i
Yes, everything.
So with all that, how easy or hard was it to know what was going on with these 
professionals.
I was aware what was going on but it was -  that’s why I needed Paul at my side. I 
got my point across, but I don’t think that they would have listened if he wasn’t 
there.
You have said how supportive it was for Paul to be there. How do you think Paul 
experienced the other professionals...
I think that he was alarmed as well. And he was disturbed because they hadn’t 
doftie what they said they would do and everything was done according to their 
plan and not our plan.
Sounds really frustrating after all the thought that you had put into it...
And also there are some criteria that you have to meet to have a water birth and x 
we met all of those criteria and they still wouldn’t let us have it.
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How about from the point of birth onwards, did things change then?
No. People contradict each other, they all give you advice because they all know 
best in their own way or in their own field or because they are older then you. SO 
everything conflicts and nothing makes sense and in the end you have to make 
your own mind up.
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The professionakwere contradicting each other were they?
Yes, in different methods of child care. One would say one thii9ng then the other 
would change it then another would say something completely different and you 
would be totally confused. This was over things like breast feeding and when you 
should or shouldn’t clean there eyes.
At what stage did this happen?
The day after he was bom. And that continued all the way through.
Just so I get the timing right; around the time of birth there was some differences 
between the professions about what they thought they would do and what you had 
previously agreed to do.
Yes.
Which sounds very unsupporting. And then the next day they were telling you 
how to care for the baby.
Yes, I wanted to breast feed but the baby wasn’t having it and he needed coaxing. 
But they were not able to coax it. So each person would tiy different things like 
holding your breast, putting the baby’s mouth to the breast, and really awful stuff 
not nice at all, totally undignified. And they were asserting their authority rather 
than act in a relaxed nature. Because he was so big they took him off to have a 
blood test and said that he had to have a bottle because he is too big and he needs 
food.
Right, a stressful time for you then.
Totally, and because it’s your first bom you try to do what is best by their 
information but it conflicts with each other so your left confused and struggling.
For mum, for you it must be difficult enough not to be able to bond with the child 
the way you had planned, what was it like for dad as well?
Same thing I think. The agony that I was feeling was passed on. He was 
concerned for me the baby, himself and how we were going to cope with it.
So lots of problems with the professionals, were there any professionals that were 
quite useful over the birth to six months period?
No. The community midwife was no good either, very bolshy and unreassuring. 
She gave me no confidence. She also took my stitches out which really hurt.
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I. So she doesn’t seem to have nurtured your confidence in caring for Dylan.
M. No, the people who gave me confidence were my mum and mother in law.
I. So in what ways were Yvonne and Jenny more supportive?
M. They said it doesn’t matter and were more relaxed in their approach and I suppose
we had more confidence in them because they were our parents. They were able 
to support us and our baby.
I. They have some experience of child birth themselves I imagine, how many
children did Yvonne have?
M. Three. Me, Jason and Darren who was older than Jason
I. You said was older?
M. He died.
I. Were there any particular things that your mum said which were helpful?
M. No not really, I think it was just the moral support. She said not to worry about
the breast feeding but to use the bottle and as long as he is comfortable and secure 
and happy on bottled milk then that is what is important really. And Jenny gave 
me some advice too.
I. Ah, so Yvonne and Jenny both helped reduce that anxiety around the actual
feeding of the child.
M. Yes. And also by helping give him the first bath and holding him and stuff.
I. Right, is it veiy difficult when you have never had a child before and there was
you and your partner then suddenly there is three of you in your house? Is it 
difficult to know hoWo do all of those basic caring duties?
M. Yes it is because everything is new and you don’t know if you will bum the baby 
or drop the baby. Your initial anxiety is that the baby is so fragile. You wonder 
how you can keep up the daily tasks with the added pressures of having a new 
baby.
I. So you’ve got the baby to look after which is all a new experience which your not
sure is right or not and then the rest of life goes on like all the washing and stuff. 
How did you manage all of that?
M. Well with support from parents, Paul and Mick.
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I. Did you and your partner Paul have different tasks?
M. Mine was just to rest to get over the birth. For the first week everything was new
and about 150 people came round and visited, I think. There was family, friends 
and friends of friends.
I. Was that a little draining having all of those visitors while you were trying to rest
up?
M. No, Paul controlled it. And Mick as well.
I. How did they do that?
M. They got people to come at a particular time.
I. Was that OK for you or did it feel like they were taking too much control?
M. No, it was good cause they needed a task too.
I. So, while you were resting up who did most of the looking after Dylan?
M. We all did. The grandparents, Mick and Paul and I  The firsffew weeks were
tough cause he had colic.
I. Right, where did you get any help or advice for colic from?
M. The health visitor.
I. Oh right, when did the H.V. begin to visit?
M. She visited before the baby was bom and 10 days after.
I. How useful was the H.V.?
M. She had her opinions. She was OK compared to the midwives. Just having one
person to talk to rather than many midwives made it easier,
I. So just having one voice was helpful.
M. Definitely, it made me more confident to try things.
I. I see, so when there were many professional opinions its sounds like it was 
difficult to know who to listen to but when you only had to hear just one H.V. ij: v^v
made it easier.
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You’ve told me how many family and friends became involved, especially after j ^  ~ 
you all got home from the hospital, were there too many voices then that were j
conflicting with each other? •
No. It worked well as the family know each other, know boundaries, are more 
laid back and supportive. Everybody had a vested interest in their grandson or 
nephew whereas with the midwives it’s different it’s “another” baby.
So for you were the best supports from the non-experts and the best supports from 
family.
Yes.
And where would Paul stand on that do you think ,what would he say?
He would agree with me. The family was supportive and the professionals 
confusing.
Over the whole span of time, from giving birth to six weeks later, what was the 
most difficult time for you?
The third day after giving birth.
Quite definite, what was it?
My breasts engorged as I couldn’t breast feed and I was in a lot of pain. My 
breasts were like the size of footballs.
You have very clear memories of that, no doubts about the worst part. And again, 
would Paul say that that was the worst part?
No! He liked that, he was OK with the breasts like footballs thing! {laughs}
What would you say his worst experience over this period was?
The time in the hospital I should think.
So it sounds, like family were supportive, some taking care of crowd control, 
some with the colic...
... .Some washing up, bottles, washing, they all had different tasks. Mum took 2 
weeks off work to help out, and all the other took turns coming in to help.
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I. Did Paul have to return to work?
M. After 2 weeks
I. Was that strange for you to have all of Paul’s support and then he was gone back
to work?
M. No. It was quite nice really. I could then be a bit more relaxed with the baby.
Roles changed a bit and I began to care for the baby in the night and took more 
responsibility for Dylan.
I. So it sounds like when Paul withdrew a bit you could get more involved.
M. Yes.
I. You appear to have got a lot of support which was useful, but what was the
hardest aspect of your partner supporting you over the initial 6 weeks. What was 
most difficult about his support for you.
M. Don’t think it was. We had some arguments out of tiredness.
I. Ok, was anything particularly hard for him?
M. Perhaps commitment. After you have the baby you think, wow I’ve got this baby
for the rest of my life. You’re concerns change to make sure it has the best on 
offer.
I. So did having your family around you help make that transition from being a
young couple to having this massive responsibility?
M. Totally. We would have felt veiy isolated if we were on our own, especially after
all the professional support that we didn’t get. Without the support around us we 
would have had too much to leam and do. Lots of my friends cried after they had 
a child but I didn’t do that because I felt so heavily supported.
I. Did some people get involved not just enough to lift the pressure but also made
you think that they’re interfering too much?
M. I though it might have done with our mothers but it didn’t because they knew
when to step back and go home.
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I. After the 10 day visit when did the H. V. call next?
After a while yo u  go to the clinic for weighing and stuff This happens most 
weeks.
Did they ask you to come this often?
No, I just wanted to know the baby is fine, 
was using this service quite reassuring?
Yes.
I see, so there appears to be a slight change in the way that initially your 
involvement with the professionals was difficult but as time went on and you grew 
in confidence then the professional support became quite useful.
Yes. I think that initially in the hospital they were in control of the situation and 
we felt out of control. But later with the H. V. clinic you don’t have- to go but can 
chose to if you wish.
So would you say that you prefer to know what you need and then go and get it 
rather than be told what you have to have?
Yes. A bit more control.
What do you think Paul’s impressions are of the changeover in your experiences 
of professional support?
He didn’t know much about it as he was at work and looking after the baby was 
then my main job. He was less aware of the changes with the professionals.
c<
fZGsJ'ofi-
) /V <c-U
fvu,s- H
• % ri-' i '  c ,
p-'/Cvs/
o c
A t /
J  ^
pi*
y
fooiJif
P<v-W- C
Co i,v* 
l e / f  f
\&.>j lA/x^
i «{?
j t p
%tvsi6»p^‘
^ A3 U.tf^  
f^vJvwU^
V^v(j>ri^
,f p'c^U
Interview Transcript 
as a parent -  support coping and response.
Interviewer: ^ ^ ( 1 )  
Respondent: Paul (P) ■
I
P.
I.
P.
I.
P.
I.
P.
I.
P.
You and your partner Mamey had your first child in hospital?
Yes. That was Dylan.
Who was there at the birth?
Myself, Mamey, her mother (Yvonne) and my brother (. v p
Which professionals were there for you in the hospital?
A midwife, and anaesthetist, half a dozen midwifes. It was annoying.
So many?
Yes that is why we had our next child at home. We had never met the midwife 
before Mamey was in labour, over the 12 hour labour they changed shift many 
times and we had to tolerate their agenda and there was little consideration for 
our wishes.
Have you got any examples of that?
It was our first child and we knew no better. And every so often a new midwife 
would come in and introduce herself as the new one. There was no chance to 
form a relationship with any of them. The one who actually delivered Dylan 
might have half smiled but there was nothing there, no meeting of personalities.
Was that the most difficult part of this process for you, not being able to bond 
with the midwives or was it something else?
Oh, it was certainly more than that. For instance they could not locate the 
anaesthetists, the did not answer his pager for over an hour...
How did this timing affect things?
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Very much, we wanted to have a birth without major drugs but it was thought best 
that we did. Then the guy could not be got hold of which was worrying at the 
time.
Sounds very worrying for you, how aware was Mamey of all this?
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Totally aware, probably more worried than me. I got very involved in ushering 
people along and co-ordinating them more than I usually would.
And was Mamey aware of what you were doing?
Yes and she trusted me to get things done. And I would have stopped at nothing 
to get them done.
Sounds very difficult. Was there anything about the professionals involvement 
that was more useful?
Their knowledge of the “operation” if you like. They were proficient in child 
birth. They appeared to be adequately skilled and in that field there was nothing 
for me to be worried about.
Does that include their knowledge and practice around the administration of 
medication?
Yes, I had to usher them along by stating how urgently Mamey needed painkillers 
but they seemed to know what they were doing.
Did Mamey have any reservations about their actual practice?
No, I don’t think so. Apart from the turnover of staff and not being able to locate 
the anaesthetists. They also ignored her wishes of a water birth, that was unfair. 
But if she was concerned about these things she would talk through me. The 
midwife would talk to Mamey a lot through the process but the feedback would 
come through me.
You sound very supportive throughout the birth, but were there any times over tfc 
process when Mamey would have found you less supportive or a bit of a 
nuisance?
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Oh certainly. There was times when she would be rude and brash to people. Shje 
ordered Mick and Yvonne out of the ward when birth was imminent.
Was that something that surprised you at the time?
Yes, in a funny way. I saw the humorous side but when things got serious there 
was great truth in her words. She knew I knew when things were serious and 
would get her point across.
Sounds like she got her point across to you clearly at these times.
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Yes.
How useful was it to have family members there at the hospital? Was it difficult 
at times to have the relatives there?
No, for me it was fine. We were in a strange situation and I was happy for some 
family support.
Did you ever feel caught in the middle of tending to Mamey’s needs and looking 
out for your family in the hospital?
No, I knew Mamey tmsted me to see to her wishes and the family there also 
respected that. I was just a mouthpiece for her when she needed it.
Over the duration of the labour did you stay with Mamey or were you also 
popping out to give the relatives and update?
Once things hotted up and the relatives were told to get out then I stayed with 
Mamey till the birth. But afterwards then I did see more of them.
Right, at what point did Yvonne and M££k come back into the room to see Mamey! 
and Dylan?
Uhm, as soon as birth was done and things tidied up. Some minutes after birth.
So there are five of the family now at the hospital, including baby Dylan. Did 
anybody else come to the hospital?
\ i
The next day more family and friends visited. My mother and father, friends, and; 
Mamey’s cousin.
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Did they all come at once?
They did. It was great though, I wish more people were there. 
Did it at any point seem too much after your long night? 
Nothing was too much, it was like a different world.
Would Mamey agree with that?
She certainly was pleased for everyone to be there.
How long was it before mum and Dylan returned home?
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They asked us if Mamey and Dylan wanted to stay in the first night to try and get 
the breast feeding right. She thought it best to stay in to get the help of the 
professionals, cause now we had friendly staff showing her how to feed. Again 
not one mentor, just several but the post birth nurses were much more friendly and 
helpful.
I see, and do you think that Mamey had the same experience around that?
Yes, I would say so.
What was it that was most helpful about these post birth nurses?
They were using all their experience to get the baby to feed which was really 
helpful.
How did the feeding go?
50% success. He did breast feed a bit which we though was very important. We 
got some of the breast milk down him with their help. But we gave up with the 
breast feeding a couple of weeks on.
Whose decision was it to give up?
Ah, all three of us. Including Dylan in that.
How about your family. Did they help at all with ideas around feeding?
Yes. My mother gave us her opinions, she had worked in a maternity unit in the 
past and had some advice.
Once you did return home was it just the 3 of you there or did others come 
around?
We went home on our own. That was weird that they let us take a baby home., 
was a bit scary and exciting but nothing would have stopped us taking on that 
adventure. We owned the right to do that.
Were there any nerves over what to do with a new baby once you got home?
I wouldn’t have known but I knew Mamey would know what to do and I knew 
that I would learn. I had to, he was my new son.
And who in the family was most helpful at this time?
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Both grandmothers were often round and were very hands on. Also my father was 
there. They all held the baby every evening in our house as Dylan had colic and 
cried a lot. So the 3 grandparents certainly.
How did you know what colic was?
I’d say Mamey already had a great interest in babies anyway so she kind of knew 
all these terms and what you needed to sort them out.
So one of the best supports that you had once you got home was Mamey’s own 
self-learning. fy)
pfc-oAo
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Oh yes, certainly. Also Mamey had a network of friends who has recently had 
babies too so she knew what they had gone through and how they had coped.
And were yours and Mamey’s friends around at all once you returned home?
It was largely the 3 grandparents, Mick and the rest of the people came to pay 
their respects frequently.
Was that manageable, considering that you may have been tired and had just go 
home, to have these people coming around?
I only appreciated their visits.
How were there visits organised?
People turned up and some were more arranged.
So, sounds like initially the professionals at the hospital were not as useful as they
R
A.
could have been.
Yes, poor bedside manner. They did become more useful later but still more 
functional than friendly. A bit more caring though than the midwives.
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So what is different about the support of the professionals compared to the suppjort 
of your family and friends?
The professionals in the hospital see several hundred babies and our family far 
less. So it was the sheer difference in numbers. The nurses see hundreds of 
babies and it showed.
So, if you were to rate which supports were the most useful what would you Sc
Certainly the knowledge and caring of our friends and family.
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I. And how long did you stay at home with mum and Dylan?
P. I only had a weeks paternity leave. Then I had a one line letter saying “your
paternity leave is over you are due back at work on Monday”.
I. Very sensitive.
P. Yes, no support from work.
I. What was that like for Mamey. You were so supportive and then you went to
work.
P. I think that she was empowered and she also knew she could get me by phone. It
was fine, we expected this to happen and she was the main one now.
I. How did you feel leaving the house and going back to work?
P. I would have liked a longer paternity leave just to enjoy it but she could cope well
on her own now.
I. Did she still have any professional help at this point?
P. The health visitor visited but not veiy regularly. The H.V. resigned after a month
and after our experience with many midwives this was not surprising to us. But 
we didn’t think this service was all that great.
I. So even now, when Mamey saw the H.V., after you had returned to work, you still
had reservations about how useful this was?
P. Totally, it all seemed part of the same unimpressive system.. They seemed like
they had too many people on their books and we were just another number. No 
friendships or closeness.
I. So from birth to 6 weeks there was no difference in the quality of support from the
professionals?
P. That’s right.
I. What was the hardest time over the first 6 weeks for you?
P. Just prior to birth and giving birth. Our wishes were not respected,
communication was poor, and there were many flaws in the system. It was out of
our hands.
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And for Mamey.
The same..
And once you got Dylan home, do you remember any feelings around the 
transition of moving from being a young couple to parents? I
I didn’t see it as daunting at all, it was a planned pregnancy and it was something I :
wanted to take on. - i
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answers come from? j
}/ ^
If Mamey didn’t know then grandparents. I f i ^ ^ y
Did grandparents ever give conflicting or unhelpful advice? j
No, I don’t think so. Over time their advice faded more into the background as we j
O'W '
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learned to cope on our own.. j
Appendix 3
A qualitative study on the relationship between social and professional support for first time parents:
From labour to 6 weeks postpartum.
Research Consent Form
As part of a research project, I would like to invite you to share with me some of your experiences and 
feelings around having a new bom baby. Some of the issues that are of particular interest are those of how 
parents respond to the birth of then* first child and the supports that they receive. It would also be 
interesting to begin to understand each partner’s thoughts and feelings about this time in their lives. To do 
this, I would like to complete a short interview (approx. 30 minutes) with each partner separately. 
Afterwards, if you wish, we can all meet up together to talk about the interview.
Care will be taken to ensure that you (or any person of organisation that you mention) can not be identified 
through the report. In making a transcription of die audio-tape, any names will be deleted or replaced by 
pseudonyms. After the transcription has been made, the audio-tape will be destroyed.
If there are any questions which you do not wish to answer feel free to say so. If there are any questions 
you would like to ask during the interview, please feel free to do so. You are free to withdraw from the 
study at any point without needing to justify your decision.
Please read the following. I f  you are in agreement, sign where indicated.
I confirm that I have read and understood the above information and agree that the piuposes o f this research 
and what my participation in it would entail, have been clearly explained to me in a manner that I 
understand. I therefore consent to be interviewed about my experiences and feelings about the birth of my 
firstborn child and die issues of support and coping in this context. I also consent to an audio-tape of this 
interview being made and to all parts o f the recording being transcribed for the purposes of this research.
Signed:.........................................................  Date:..................................
Please Print Name:.............................................................................................
Signed:.........................................................  Date:..................................
Please Print Name:.............................................................................................
On behalf of all those involved in this research, I undertake that confidentiality will be ensured in respect of 
the audio-tape and transcription of the same. I also undertake that any use of the audio-tape or transcribed 
material will be for the puiposes of research only. The confidentiality o f the above participant will be 
protected and they (or any person or organisation they mention) will not be identifiable to others (who are 
not already familiar with the circumstances described) in the research report.
Signed:......................................................... Date:..................................
Please Print Name:.............................................................................................
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Discourse analysis is a research methodology incorporated within the theoretical 
framework of social constructionism: Critically review the significance of discourse 
analysis and its application in the field of clinical research.
Smith (1996, pp. 265) asserts boldly that the “neglect of qualitative approaches within 
mainstream psychology has produced a distorted agenda as to what counts as legitimate 
inquiry and an impoverished map of psychological knowledge.” In order to redress this 
“imbalance”, the first section of this literature review will critically evaluate the 
underlying theoretical framework surrounding qualitative research methodology, before 
focussing in particular on discourse analysis. The underlying framework of discourse 
analysis is explored because epistemological and theoretical clarity are deemed to be vital 
to the understanding and interpretation of all research (Abraham and Hampson, 1996). 
With an understanding of this alternative epistemological paradigm, the usefulness, 
critiques, and application of discourse analysis to the areas of psychiatric medication, the 
construction of “mental illness”, “mental retardation”, and care in the community will be 
discussed through a review of the literature.
A shift in the theoretical frameworks of research: From traditional scientific research to
social constructionism
Philosophies central to traditional psychological research 
Modernism and psychological research
Modernism in Western culture is closely associated with advances in science and 
technology, which led human beings to begin to envision a mastery of the fundamental 
order of the universe (Kvale, 1992). It became apparent that all scientific endeavours 
could be unified under a single logic and that such rules of procedure could be adopted by 
any discipline in order to generate knowledge (Burr, 1995).
Gergen (1992) states that psychology became an enthusiastic and able participant in the 
“modernist romance”, and that there are four main presumptions that helped psychology
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associate itself with the modernist movement: A basic subject matter; Universal 
properties; Empirical method, and; Research as progressive. These are defined below.
1) A basic subject matter: This is the belief that there is a knowledgeable world that is 
constituted of subject matter. Some psychologists believe that this matter is in the mind 
(e.g. cognition, motivation, emotion) whereas others embrace the idea that the answers lie 
in observable behaviour (e.g. behaviourism).
2) Universal properties: In addition to the belief that there is a knowledgeable subject, 
modernist psychology also accepts that there are universal properties. These are universal 
principles and laws that may be discovered about the properties of the subject matter. 
Through the use of these universal principles the discipline attempts to develop 
empirically grounded theoretical networks to enable generalisations from the study of 
single instances to other instances across time, situation and persons.
3) Empirical method: Through a rational justification of logical empiricist philosophy, 
modernist psychology has attempted to determine truth through method. By way of 
empirical methods, modernist psychology seeks to establish obdurate truths about the 
nature of a subject. Furthermore, it is assumed that when properly deployed, modernist 
scientific methodology is not subject to the entry of ideological influence, or values into 
the research findings.
4) Research as progressive: Derivative of the preceding assumptions is the belief that 
empirical methods contribute to the progressive nature of research. This methodology 
pertains to move towards reliable, value-neutral truths in its discovery of the various 
elements of the objective world.
A critique o f traditional psychological research
A vast majority of psychological research is still conducted within a modernist framework 
(Gergen, 1992), as experimenters within this traditional scientific method attempt to 
screen out interpretation and to produce a clear and unmediated representation of the
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object of interest (Burr, 1995). However, by over valuing this single type of “objective” 
knowledge common to traditional scientific inquiry, some researchers have stated that 
psychological research has limited itself (Cronbach, 1975; Stanovich, 1989; Wachtel, 
1980). Indeed, psychological research has been described as being in “crisis” from the 
end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s (Parker, 1989) as an awareness 
developed of the impossibility of the assumption of the presence of universal truths. 
Indeed, Kuhn’s “The structure o f scientific revolutions” (1970) provided one of the most 
critical attacks on modernist thought. This criticism asserted that those facts, which 
appeared to be increments in knowledge, were no more than alterations in viewpoints. In 
other words, truth was beginning to be seen as matter of perspective. Therefore, what 
passes as knowledge within the sciences may be considered to be the result of social 
constructions within the culture of science (Latour and Woolgar, 1979).
Not until the early 1980s did the implications of such a critique of psychological 
methodology become broadly apparent. The writings of Habermas (1981) argued that 
scientists systematically transform questions of ideology into technical questions. 
Following this transformation, questions of ideology are suppressed. Consequently, 
technical solutions are received without question and these newfound “solutions” obscure 
the ideological positions of the scientists themselves. These ideas are significant as they 
illustrate that rational justification of science and a reliance on empirical methodology do 
not position the scientist above moral, ethical and ideological considerations (Gergen, 
1992).
Social constructionism: an alternative approach
Such critical perspectives of traditional psychology contributed to the emergence of social 
constructionism in psychology, which is usually dated from Gergen’s (1973) paper 
“Social psychology as history The term “social constructionism” is the theoretical 
orientation which subsumes alternative approaches, such as “discourse analysis”, “critical 
psychology”, “deconstruction” and “postmodernism” (Burr, 1995). Defining social 
constructionism is difficult considering that there is no single feature to identify a social
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constructionist position. However, Gergen (1985) has expressed that a social 
constructionist approach has one or more of the following key features:
1) It adopts a critical stance towards taken for granted knowledge and invites the 
individual to challenge knowledge based on positivism and empiricism familiar to 
traditional science. This perspective invites a critical approach to assumptions of how the 
world appears to be in terms of constructed categories that do not necessarily refer to 
“real” divisions.
2) The ways in which the world is interpreted, the categories and concepts adopted, are 
historically and culturally specific. Categories used to identify oneself and others is 
dependant on where and when in the world one lives. For example, up until 1987, people 
in Western civilisation who were homosexual were categorised by the DSM-IV 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994) as having a “mental illness”. This illustrates 
that all ways of understanding people are historically and culturally relative.
3) If knowledge of the world is not “real” and objective then where does it come ffom? 
The social constructionists believe that it is constructed between people. Hence, social 
interaction of all kinds, and particularly language, fabricates knowledge. Therefore, what 
is regarded as truth is not derived from objective observation but by social processes and 
interactions.
4) Each different construction of knowledge invites different action from human beings. 
For example, “drunks” were previously seen as responsible for their behaviour and a 
typical response was imprisonment. However, when the concept shifted from seeing 
alcoholism as a “crime” to seeing it as an “illness”, the social action became offering 
medical and psychological treatment. Hence, constructions of the world and its 
inhabitants sustain some patterns of social action and exclude others.
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The significance o f the researcher in social constructionist research 
As stated, the challenge of social constructionism to traditional understandings of science 
has emphasised that all knowledge is constructed within human relationships, social 
discourses, and cultural contexts (Kvale, 1992). This position disputes the presence of 
neutrality or objectivity in research, in favour of utilising an “interpretative study of a 
specified issue or problem in which the researcher is central to the sense that is made” 
(Banister, Butman, Parker, Taylor and Tindall, 1994, pp.2). This “interpretation” which 
provides a bridge between the researcher, the objects of study, and the researcher’s 
representations of the object of study is considered to be a process (Banister, et al., 1994). 
This process is ongoing as our relation to the world keeps changing. The qualitative 
researcher would follow the process and accept that there will always be a gap between 
the issues that they are attempting to understand and the researcher’s perception of the 
object of study (Burr, 1995).
Acknowledging the influence o f the researcher through reflexivity 
To appreciate the influence of the researcher in social constructionist research, the 
process of reflection is used. Reflexivity has been described as “the capacity of any 
system of signification to turn back upon itself, to make its own object by referring to 
itself’ (Ruby, 1982, pp. 2). The process involves the person making themselves the 
object of their own observation. Gergen (1992, pp.24) has stated, “critical self-reflection 
is essential for the postmodern scholar.”
The reflexive spiral is not a position adopted within quantitative research, where there is 
the assumption that the elimination of subjectivity leads to the production of a fully 
objective account (Banister, et al., 1994). However, in qualitative methods, reflexivity is 
used to conceptualise subjectivity as a resource, not a problem, which is acknowledged 
and used theoretically and pragmatically (Coyle, 1995). Hence, considering the “position 
of the researcher” through a reflexive analysis contributes to the understanding of the area 
of investigation, whereas ignoring that the activity of studying something will affect it, 
further compromises the positivist ideal of “objectivity” (Gergen, 1992).
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Deconstructionism in qualitative research
Whilst reflecting on texts (verbal pr written accounts), the researcher will take them apart 
or deconstruct them. Deconstruction is a method often used in qualitative research that 
further resists definitions and prescriptions, for it is looking for how a “problem” is 
constructed rather than attempting to claim what it really is (Derrida, 1983). When 
conducting research the researcher invariably relies upon the conventions of language that 
govern what can be communicated. Therefore, if language guides the formation of our 
accounts, it subsequently constructs an array of putative (considered to have existed) 
objects. One must accept that it is not possible to exit the language that constructs 
“reality”, so truth and accuracy are not a product of the real world, but a product of 
textual history (Gergen, 1992). With this in mind, one can begin to appreciate that 
language conventions are dependant on social processes, which will be influenced by 
various ideological biases. Following on from this it is apparent that all attempts of 
objective scientific writings and reports are essentially value-saturated phenomenon, 
which are products of social agreement (Ingleby, 2000).
Foucault (1979, 1980) extends this point by asserting that descriptive writing cannot be 
separated from issues of power. This observation is of huge consequence to those 
working in the field of psychology, as academic writing is perceived as a form of rhetoric, 
its effects are potentially persuasive and thus potentially powerful. The ways in which 
evidence is accumulated and used in the field must be reflected on and deconstructed, so 
as to identify the misuse of power and a transgression in the code of ethics in relation to 
client care.
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Discourse analysis
The inter-relationship between social constructionism, reflexivity. deconstructionism, and 
discourse analysis
Social constructionism is considered to be a loose collection of theoretical perspectives 
and discourse analysis is just one research methodology that fells within its rubric (Burr, 
1995). Nonetheless, some theorists have described discourse analysis as the research 
methodology that is most congruent with the principles of social constructionism (Parker, 
1992).
Discourse analysis is a research methodology that has developed from various domains 
including speech act theory, ethnomethodology, conversation analysis, and semiology 
(see Potter, 1996). It is a field of enquiry that is particularly reliant upon the postmodern 
movement and operates under the assumption that “meaning is not static and fixed but is 
fluid and provisional” (Coyle, 1995, pp. 244). Furthermore, language is not 
conceptualised as reflective of “reality” but rather as constitutive (having the power to 
enact) of experience (Potter and Wetherell, 1995). In other words, the linguistic 
categories that we use to describe “reality” bring into being the objects they describe, or 
put simply, language constructs reality (Parker, 1992). There is always a number of ways 
to describe something and our choice of words can be seen to form perceptions and 
experiences which creates different versions of events and reality (Willig, 1999). 
Therefore, discourse analysis is used to understand the ways in which “language 
constructs objects, subjects and experiences, including subjectivity and sense of self’ 
(Willig, 1999, pp.2). For an in depth description of rhetorical strategies and devices used 
within a text, Edwards and Potter’s (1992) Discursive Psychology is particularly useful as 
it provides a number of working examples.
An increasing number of psychologists are using discourse analysis (e.g. Potter and 
Wetherell, 1987; Edwards and Potter, 1992; Burman and Parker, 1993) as it allows the 
researcher to question concepts that are taken for granted in psychology. Such studies 
analyse the way in which particular categories are constructed and used and the
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consequence of this action. In addition, discourse analysis allows the researcher to reflect 
on the different subject positions that may facilitate or impede particular actions or 
experiences (Potter and Wetherell, 1995). For example, differences between the 
discourses of a psychiatrist and a patient could identify positions of power and how those 
are used, as the psychiatrist can prescribe or proscribe certain practices whilst the patient 
may passively grant the psychiatrist access to their body and mind. Deconstruction of 
these dominant psychological concepts and subject positions can demonstrate that things 
could be different and are not simply reflections of “reality” (Willig, 1999). Such 
deconstructions allows the opportunity for the researcher to reflect on the process of 
reification, in which human realities are reduced to the order of things (Ingleby, 2000), 
and to create a space for alternative approaches which may question the usefulness of 
existing doctrines of psychological “common sense”. The ultimate aim being to take a 
“critical, progressive and political stance to truth claims made by discourses which help 
maintain oppressive power relations, and to increase the ‘voice’ of marginalized 
discourses” (Burr, 1995, pp. 172).
Diversity of styles of discourse analysis
At this point it may be useful to briefly outline the four main styles of discourse analysis 
currently in use. As could be expected the different techniques do not fit neatly into 
categories, however there are some significant differences in style. The discursive 
psychology approach (see Edwards and Potter, 1992) has been likened to conversational 
analysis (see Wooffitt, 2001). That is, its central focus is on the discovery and 
explication of patterns of utterances, or it is used to make a microscopic, close-grained 
analysis of text. This is unlike the Foucauldian approach (see Parker, 1992; Willig, 
1999) which is more sociological and moves from a microscopic to a macroscopic 
position. This approach treats language as a screen on to which more traditional 
sociological issues can be inscribed, such as power, gender and status. A third technique 
is critical discourse analysis (see Fairclough, 2001). This method analyses text, 
interactions and other semiotic material, but begins with sociological opinions and works 
back to the text. It is critical in that it is committed to progressive social change. Finally,
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rhetorical analysis (see Billig, Condor, Edwards, Gane, Middleton, and Radley, 1988) is 
a form of analysis that incorporates and integrates several of the techniques from the other 
three models.
Critique of the analysis of discourse
Discourse analysts have long struggled with the criticism that discourse analysis is based 
on deconstructionist theoretical foundations, which challenges notions of “truth” and 
“reality” (see Burman and Parker, 1993). Therefore, if there was no “truth”, only 
competing discourses, then it would be contradictory to make truth judgements that, for 
example, a particular group are oppressed. The “discourse-reality” problem has caused 
much debate within the field of discourse analysis, as different people’s versions of this 
problem itself cannot be separated from political implications. For this reason, discourse 
analysts have been criticised for making the same mistakes as traditional psychologists, in 
representing their accounts as “truth” (Potter, Wetherell, Gill, and Edwards, 1990). 
Indeed, to remain true to the theoretical framework, it is essential that discourse analysis, 
which is itself just another body of theory and practice, continues to recognise that it is, 
after all, a social construction. A humility to the approach thus appears to be paramount 
to developing and maintaining its credibility considering the inevitable questions of how 
is this research evaluated and if it is not, then how is it judged as useful. These issues will 
be considered later in the literature review, when discourse analysis is applied to the field 
of clinical research.
An additional criticism made by Abrams and Hogg (1990) on the compatibility of 
discourse theory and research, is whether the political intentions of discourse analysts 
impede their qualifications to represent marginalized groups. They state that discourse 
analysis appears to appeal to those who hold left wing or liberal views and that there is no 
particular reason why right wing groups, such as the National Front, should not be given 
“voice”, just as much as black people, women and homosexuals.
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Discourse analysis and its application in the field of clinical research.
The second section of this evaluation moves from a review of the literature on the 
theoretical framework of discourse analysis to a review of the literature of its application. 
Although discourse analysis has become more popular as a psychological research 
method (Harper, 1999), there are still relatively few studies using this methodology in 
clinical research. However, considering limitations of space, a selection of studies has 
been chosen to illustrate the application and usefulness of discourse analysis across a 
range of clinical settings. These will be critically appraised. The literature review will 
focus on the following areas: Discourse analysis and psychiatric medication; discourse 
analysis and the construction of “mental illness”; discourse analysis and “mental 
retardation”; discourse analysis and care in the community.
Discourse analysis and psychiatric medication
To assist the reader in the credibility of the analysis, a shortened account of how Harper 
(1999, pp.l 33) used discourse analysis to deconstruct a professional’s views on a “mental 
health patient” is provided.
Transcript analysis — Medication and schizophrenia
Harper: Right, why don’t you feel, why do you feel the medication hasn’t affected
the beliefs?
Dr Lloyd: This is the interesting thing. I think because they’re <pause>they’re
deeply ingrained thought patterns <Harper: Right>. I don’t think you can 
any more just say they’re illness-based. Their origin is illness-based but 
they have had <pause> their existence and their entertainment and their 
reinforcement by repeated thinking has had positive effects for Alan for 
the reasons I gave earlier and therefore, even if the reason for the existence 
of the <pause> delusional beliefs is no longer there, assuming <Harper: 
Uh-huh> <pause> that the neuroleptic medication that affected the other 
things affects what lies at the bio-chemical core of those delusions 
<Harper: Uh-huh> They’re too important to leave. <Harper: Right, right>
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I mean that’s that’s one possible explanation <Harper: Uh-huh> I don’t 
think Alan doesn’t have schizophrenia apart from the delusions because 
he’s on neuroleptic medication. Enn it’s difficult to know now what’s 
long-standing ingrained personality patterns and what’s long-standing, 
ingrained, chronic, psychotic deficits and what is institutionalisation from 
being 25 years inside <Harper: Right> erm <we will never really know.
(Interview with Dr Lloyd' consultant psychiatrist)
Dr Lloyd is described by Harper as using a number of rhetorical strategies to suggest that 
medication has not affected Alan’s beliefs. This is partly achieved through a five part list 
as he details the presence of, a) “deeply ingrained thought patterns”, b) positive effects 
through the reinforcement of repeated thinking, c) “long-standing ingrained personality 
patterns”, d) “long-standing ingrained chronic psychotic deficits”, and e) 
“institutionalisation”. Listings of this kind have a number of uses in persuasive discourse 
(Edwards and Potter, 1992). The descriptions used are said to imply deficit and 
pathology in the patient which is a rhetoric often chosen by the “psy professions” 
(Gergen, 1990) which subsequently constructs the individual as pathological and 
deficient.
Furthermore, Harper interprets the use of eclectic listing (multifactorial talk) as a device 
to give the psychiatrist sufficient flexibility to fend off a variety of possible challenges. 
Dr Lloyd incorporates a range of theoretical frameworks including; biological, 
sociological, behavioural, cognitive, and personality psychiatry. One effect of this 
multifactorial approach is that if the biological model was challenged as ineffective, as 
medication was not successful with this individual, then other explanations could be 
incorporated to explain the presence of delusions. Harper also attends to ways in which 
multifactorial talk can be used to represent the various theories as relevant, but a fixed 
hierarchy is constructed in which biology and biological mechanisms are situated as the 
“core” constituents of schizophrenia. Although the shift from the failure of medication 
may appear as a progressive step, Harper notes that the oppositions of
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pathology/normality and individual/social remain unchallenged, so the pathological 
thought patterns are still located within the individual. Even when the social is 
recognised through the term “institutionalisation”, the concept remains individualistic 
contributing to the construction of the pathological individual.
Through a set of qualifications such as “I think”, “I don’t think”, “assuming”, “it’s 
difficult to know”, “we will never really know”, the psychiatrist introduces ambiguity and 
apprehension. This is a useful defence (Harper, 1999), for if counter-evidence or a 
challenge go against his judgement, Dr Lloyd has already attended to the fallibility of his 
tentative hypothesis allowing for the flexibility to change if required.
Finally, Harper refers to the use of a four-part list at the end of the extract, where Dr 
Lloyd mentions “long-standing, ingrained, chronic psychotic deficits”. This list is 
explained as serving the function of giving the symptoms agency. Furthermore, the use 
of the word “ingrained” is reiterated to repeat its effect implying that the symptoms are to 
be seen as permanent, and impervious to medication.
Reflecting on this study, Harper (1999) himself identified a number of potential 
criticisms. Indeed, a major controversial point is whether he needed to carry out this 
research at all or whether the implications he identified were just as accessible through an 
analysis of his own political position. In other words, he knew what the outcome would 
be before embarking on the interviews. This criticism is levelled at much discourse 
analysis as the process of questioning and the researcher’s political interests openly drive 
interpretation. Therefore, through these means the researcher (e.g. Harper) needs to be 
aware that analysts not only read but also produce the discourse (Burman and Parker, 
1993). Unfortunately, limitations of space in publications rarely allows for researchers to 
communicate how they managed to incorporate and interpret their own influence, leaving 
the author open to a host of criticisms (Harper, 1999).
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A further criticism that could be directed at Harper’s (1999) application of discourse 
analysis to the field of mental health is that unlike traditional psychological approaches it 
does not claim to discover anything. Butman and Parker (1993) consider this point and 
state that discourse analysis has sometimes been construed as “banal” in its efforts to 
avoid claiming to have found answers in mental health. They assert that the approach 
attempts to “elucidate interesting webs of meaning”, but it should not classify or 
categorise the seemingly obvious (Burman and Parker, 1993, pp. 163).
Finally, the Harper (1999) study is also open to accusations of “ontological 
gerrymandering”, as it asymmetrically focuses on the talk of professionals rather than 
balancing this out with the discourse of users. This use of a “singularising narrative” 
(Burr, 1995) however is not necessarily deemed as a study weakness within the social 
constructionist model. Indeed, following Derrida’s (1978) recommendations of rejecting 
binary oppositions, the unit of study is said to be both what is taken as well as what it 
appears to exclude (Burr, 1995). Therein, rather than approach different “systems” (i.e. 
psychiatrists or clients) as opposite sides of a dichotomy, they can be considered to be 
inseparable components, neither of which can make sense without the other (Burr, 1995).
Discourse analysis and the construction of “mental illness”
In an earlier study (The professional construction o f ‘paranoia * and the discursive use o f 
diagnostic criteria), Harper (1994) used discourse analysis to investigate how mental 
health professionals used rhetorical strategies to meet challenges that paranoid beliefs 
might be true. The limitation of space does not allow for a detailed explanation of this 
study, however a brief summary of one aspect of the study will permit some critical 
reflections. Harper (1994) critically explored the relationship between an empiricist 
account (focussing on recognised psychiatric symptoms) and a contingent account (the 
personal processes in making a clinical judgement), when a professional was making a 
diagnosis. In discussion, Harper states that the diagnosis of paranoia is constructed 
through a number of discursive practices. That is, the presence of contingent factors in 
the process of diagnosis suggests that this form of categorisation is not “factual”, but a
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construction. As the “paranoia” can no longer be perceived as “naively objective” (pp. 
140), Harper extends that it would be more useful to deconstruct this categorisation, 
creating a non-pathological understanding of the experiences and invoking a more 
systemic formulation.
Although Walkup (1994, pp. 148) “applauds” Harper’s research, a number of criticisms 
are expressed. Firstly, Walkup (1994) asserts that unlike Szasz (1973), Harper fails to 
clarify exactly where he stands on the position of anti-psychiatry. This is a valid point 
considering that discourse analysis requires the researcher to identify the reciprocal 
relationship the researcher and the interviewees have on each other. Walkup’s desire for 
Harper to openly state a polemic position on psychiatry raises another complex issue, for 
alongside the need for the researcher to be open about the influence of their position on 
the discourse, it is also important not to exclude other positions (Burr, 1995). If Harper 
categorised himself into one particular school of thought (i.e. anti-psychiatry), he would 
find himself in a position which would surely be untenable for a “deconstructionist 
researcher”. For, attempting to keep an “open mind” whilst producing and manipulating 
discourse “allows us the possibility of personal and social change through our capacity to 
identify, understand and resist the discourses that we are also subject to” (Burr, 1995, 
pp.153).
As outlined in the criticisms for the Harper (1999) study exploring the discourse of 
professionals, again there is some question over whether the author (Harper, 1994) could 
fail to find what he assumed was present (Walkup, 1994). This is an interesting criticism 
considering Harper (1994) makes a similar observation about the medical professional 
assessing for a mental disorder. Furthermore, if ideological and political interests guide 
the research without these being explicitly identified and interpreted, then this critical 
method of analysis could be accused of operating under similar constraints to those 
assigned to traditional psychological methods (Burnian and Parker, 1993).
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Finally, Walkup’s (1994, pp. 149) apparent frustration with the study results in the 
statement that the “article finds itself in a ‘tight spot’ for if we assume that any world of 
activity is socially constructed in much the same sense as the diagnostician’s, then 
nothing distinctive has been learned about diagnosis”. This opinion certainly seems to fit 
with Burman and Parker’s (1993) caution over interpreting discourse analytic studies 
findings as “banal”. A contentious point, and within the pluralistic model of social 
constructionism, the validity of this statement would have to be up to each individual 
researcher/clinician to determine. This pluralistic perspective could be accused of 
positioning researcher, professionals and clients in an unfamiliar and dangerous position. 
However, a mere awareness of the power of de/construction of “mental illness” appears to 
provoke a reflexive position on diagnosis that may otherwise have been ignored.
In another study, Lewis (1995) used a qualitative methodology incorporating grounded 
theory (see Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Henwood and Pidgeon, 1992) and discourse 
analysis techniques to look at different subjective experiences of “patients” (medically- 
diagnosed) and “non-patients” (self-diagnosed) who had depression. The author claims 
that the integration of discourse analysis and grounded theory was useful in identifying 
that depression has a “highly variable and subjective” (p.379) meaning to each individual. 
Lewis (1995) states that these techniques identified that diagnosis can serve to be both 
reassuring and pathologising.
At the expense of “ignoring” the outcome of the study, a closer look at the methodology 
provokes some interesting methodological questions, such as how was the analysis done? 
Lewis (1995) claims to have used an “integrative” approach of grounded theory and 
discourse analysis. The form of discourse analysis is described as an “interpretative 
discourse analysis technique[s]”and referenced to Henwood (1993). Although the 
theoretical framework of discourse analysis resists “how to do it “ rules (Burman and 
Parker, 1993), the examples of how this method was used appears to have little in 
common with dominant forms of discourse analysis outlined in the Diversity o f styles o f 
discourse analysis section of this literature review, and more with alternative qualitative
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methods such as grounded theory. Furthermore, the author did not differentiate between 
when the two approaches were being used, leaving the reader on an uneven 
epistemological footing with which to interpret the participant’s discursive repertoires. 
On the occasion where it appeared that discourse analysis was being used, the author then 
interpreted the speech in terms of attitudes and beliefs. This procedure could be 
conceptualised as incongruent with the theoretical framework, as unlike other qualitative 
positions, discourses are not a route to descriptions of “essentialist concepts” such as 
“opinions” and “beliefs” and cannot be taken as being manifestations of some inner 
condition such as temperament or personality (Burr, 1995).
In addition, no consideration was given to the reflexive subjective position of the 
interviewer in creating and interpreting the discursive repertoires. Failure to do so may 
have been a choice, as some have expressed concerns about the framework in that nothing 
can be interpreted if meanings only relate to each other and not to anything outside 
(Burman and Parker, 1993). In other words, the process of self-referentiality breeds 
solipsism (i.e. the view that the external world exists only as a product of one’s 
consciousness). However, Burman and Parker (1993) state that a measured amount of 
reflexivity is required for a more informative analysis. In the context of this literature 
review, the main point of interest to draw from the Lewis (1995) study is the necessity to 
remain within the methodological framework and epistemological paradigm in order to a 
produce clear and interpretable analysis.
The concept of self-efficacy has been used in clinical research to investigate its link with 
addictive behaviour (Stuart, Borland and McMurray 1994). An interesting paper by 
Hawkins (1995; Self efficacy: A cause o f debate) used discourse analysis to argue that 
“self-efficacy” is a useful concept when used as a descriptive metaphor, rather than as a 
“real” mental entity. In disputing Bandura’s (1995) claims that self-efficacy is a cause of 
behaviour, Hawkins (1995) concluded that by using discourse analysis the debate about 
the reality or non-reality of mental entities can be circumvented. This observation is 
echoed by Potter and Wetherell (1987, pp. 179) who state that, “much of our vocabulaiy
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of mentalistic terms has no “inner” referent at all; instead of being merely descriptions of 
mental states these words are themselves an autonomous part of particular social 
practices.”
Discourse analysis and “mental retardation”
Peter (2000) applied discourse analysis to the case file of an individual labelled as having 
mental retardation in order to explore the power dynamics behind services and to 
understand mental retardation. The study incorporated Foucault’s (1979) work on the 
mechanism of discourse in the process of social control. Firkins (1999) described this 
mechanism as the role of language in constructing an ideology that maintains power 
imbalances, ensuring that people with disabilities remain under the control of 
professionals.
The case study was of one male who lived in a group home with several other people who 
were also blind and labelled as having mental retardation (for details see Peter, 2000). 
Much of the data that was analysed came from the client’s case notes.
In line with Foucault’s (1979) assertion that a person’s identity is constructed out of 
culturally available discourses, Peter (2000) recognised that the client’s identity was 
constructed through discourse, as one of incompetent and dependant. For example, one 
entry into the case notes read: “This child’s mutism, his general reaction pattern today as 
well as that which has been noted at the Central School suggest gross mental retardation.” 
Constructions such as this when the boy was only 6 years old are believed by Peter (2000) 
to have been powerful enough to deny him any schooling for the first 15 years of his life. 
Although this discourse constructed him as “retarded”, in time this individual managed to 
make his abilities noticed, illustrating that his case file depicted a defective identity. 
Using scientific discourse and talk of objectivity, the professionals were in a powerful 
position in which they defined the client’s identity negatively (Peter, 200). Alternatively, 
Peter (2000) believes that a discourse from the client, in his own words about his very
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positive relationships and developmental milestones would challenge the deficit model 
ideology and be more helpful in casting his abilities in a more enabling light.
Discourse analysis and care in the community
Cowan (1999) used a discourse analytic approach (Edwards and Potter, 1992) to explore 
public opinion relating to the establishment of community mental health facilities. This 
was carried out, as Cowen (1999) believed that previous studies had failed to take account 
of the rhetorical richness and complexity of public expressions about the move towards 
community care. This is explained to have led to a marked discrepancy between 
empirical findings (Department of Health, 1993), which have reported optimism about the 
public accepting members of this client group into the community, and those at the 
forefront of service implementation.
The data comprised of written text, group discussions and individual interviews with 
community residents. The data was then analysed in two parts, the case against the 
community care project and then the case for the community project. An example of 
some text from the first part of the analysis may illustrate how the discourse analysis 
process was used.
A letter to the council opposing the new community facility, signed by 17 residents 
stated: “Several hundred children, mostly unaccompanied, pass this house at least twice a 
day. It is an unfortunate feet that the chronically mentally ill look different and behave 
both differently and unpredictably...”. This passage is said by Cowan (1999) to infer that 
the school children are potentially vulnerable to the risks posed by the “chronically and 
mentally ill” and by implication, the prospective members (residents) of the community 
care project. The use of the term “an unfortunate fact” is said to portray the factual 
acceptance of mentally ill people as having pre-existing features, a discursive strategy 
that is employed to avert any counter-criticisms of the resident’s prejudice.
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Cowan (1999) used discourse analysis to inform an understanding of a community 
problem. She pre-empts that critics within psychology may argue that the data may not 
represent the views of a wider population and can therefore not be generalised to the 
entire community. However, as argued by Widdicombe and Woffitt (1990), these 
objections are only relevant to studies concerned with quantification. The aim of 
Cowan’s (1999) analysis was to provide an in-depth understanding of the deployments by 
local residents when arguing for or against a particular community care project. Cowan 
(1999), nevertheless expects that the issues discussed in her paper would be transferable 
to other contexts. This particular assertion may be over optimistic and could be accused 
of attempting to make methodological leaps that are not grounded within the theoretical 
framework.
Tuffin and Danks (1999) carried out a similar study by investigating the discursive 
resources used by New Zealanders when talking about community care. As with the 
above study, the authors chose discourse analysis (Potter and Wetherell, 1987) to move 
“beyond attitudes”. Tuffin and Danks (1999) concluded that the main strength of this 
form of investigation was that through attending to the participant’s discursive 
repertoires, essential details were identified as to the positioning of the “mentally 
disordered”, as well as possibilities for change.
The application of discourse analysis to the field of psychology
Discourse analytic studies such as those outlined above have occasionally been accused 
of having little benefit to the field of mental health: Maingueneau (1999, pp. 176) 
paraphrases these critiques that perceive discourse analysis as “a trifling activity, which 
fluctuates between useless sophistication and confusion, mixing in an uncontrolled way 
linguistic analysis with second hand psychological or sociological views.”
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So is it useless or useful?
Willig (1999) recognises the “risks” in getting involved in formulating concrete proposals 
for psychological interventions. She states that this is why many discourse analysts avoid 
such “application”. A majority of those using discourse analysis employ it as a social 
critique, rather than to develop new, “better” interventions (Willig, 1999). In line with 
Foucault’s (1979,1980) argument, Wetherell and Potter (1992) assert that the exercise is 
not to undermine a “truth” and then replace it with a new “truth” but to examine the 
discursive processes which falsify or legitimise certain statements. Therefore, the 
relationship between discursive critique and social action is not addressed and claims are 
rarely made as to how an improved understanding can lead to change. Those who are 
highly sceptical of imparting explicit advice (Burman, Aitken, Alldred, Allwood, 
Billington, Goldberg, Gordo Lopez, Heenan, Marks and Warner, 1996) believe that a 
history of specific recommendations have contributed to the failings of the field of 
psychology and that just by challenging assumptions renders issues open to new 
possibilities. Harper (1999, pp. 140) has suggested that this is a position exclusive to 
academics, as “practitioners are not in a position to chose whether or not to intervene, 
they are already intervening; for them the choice is how to intervene”.
Harper (1999) appears to avoid counter-criticism by making a subtle shift in discourse to 
move from this concept of “application” to one of “usefulness”. This concept is 
considered in the context of postmodern notions of theory and practice (Hoshmand and 
Polkinghome, 1992), in which new “treatment technologies” are not developed, but a 
particular intervention results in a richer understanding and preferable outcomes. 
Following the deconstruction of a “mental health patient” detailed earlier, Harper (1999) 
states that he is not attempting to apply his findings but make suggestions consistent with 
the analysis. To do this he shifts from a micro-analysis of rhetorical strategies to a 
macro-analysis of political interests and the subsequent effects of these. Examples of the 
type of suggestions made are a shift in the balance of power so that professionals develop 
consultation and partnership with service users (Williams and Lindley, 1996), 
professionals become more informative about all the effects of medication, the
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development of more organizations to support the client, and a challenge to the binary 
concept of the client as “other” in the user/professional relationship (Thomas, 1997).
The first part of this literature review used selected literature to focus on the differences 
between traditional scientific approaches to research and the theoretical fiamework of 
social constructionism, which incorporates discourse analysis. Following this it has 
reviewed salient literature that has applied discourse analysis to psychiatric medication, 
the construction of “mental illness”, “mental retardation” and care in the community, and 
considered its potential to inform psychological and political practice. A number of 
epistemological, political and practical concerns have been identified and the 
complexities associated with the notion of application have been acknowledged. 
However, this review has indicated the role of discourse analysis in evaluating existing 
interventions. For example Harper (1994; 1999) was able to demonstrate that through 
applying discourse analysis to the field of mental health he was able to identify pertinent 
questions around the “creation” of mental illness and the subsequent treatment regimes. 
The study by Peter (2000) also served to identify how individuals could become victims 
of oppressive regimes that serve to label and further disable socially disempowered 
people.
The preceding discussions may well leave the reader in “two minds” as to the usefulness 
of employing discourse analysis as a research methodology. To deconstruct current 
practice without replacing it with an alternative tangible system may appear not to 
contribute to and progress the field of clinical psychology. Alternatively, if it is 
acknowledged that there are controversies, conflicts and questions within current practice, 
then to develop solutions without deconstructing them to their foundations, may itself be 
an “ineffective intervention”. Perhaps resistance to using discourse analysis is maintained 
not just as a result of its controversial theoretical framework but also because discourse 
analysts have perhaps applied their technique too vehemently to other research 
approaches in order to give their own marginalised group “voice”. It would be 
unfortunate if discourse analysis was deemed to be superfluous to research in clinical
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psychology just as it would be unhelpful for discourse analysts to discount the necessity 
of other research techniques.
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Abstract
This study is concerned with psychiatrist’s talk about interventions for attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). It examined how discourses of knowledge function in 
the construction and negotiation of approaches for intervention.
Ten child psychiatrists, seven males and three females, were recruited from one NHS 
Trust in England. Having obtained their informed consent each was interviewed using a 
semi-structured interview schedule focusing on aspects of diagnosis and intervention 
identified within the mainstream literature. The interviews were transcribed and analysed 
using Foucauldian discourse analysis.
Participants drew upon a range of discursive resources in constructing accounts of 
knowledge and negotiating subject positions. The empiricist (scientific) account was 
constructed as central in evaluating the effectiveness of interventions and addressing 
potential risks. However, the contingent (personal/professional) accounts of knowledge 
were also identified and highlighted a contrast with the empiricist account. A shift 
between these accounts of knowledge, and various subject positions, appeared to serve a 
number of functions including the maintenance of the professional legitimacy of 
psychiatric pmctice and the minimisation of risk. These findings were extended to 
consider the relationship between knowledge and power, and the implications for 
practice. It is proposed that over time, the dominance of the empiricist account of 
knowledge can be seen to marginalise the contingent account. The result is, stimulant 
medication is used more widely, which can leave other forms of intervention somewhat 
marginalised. The suggestion is, giving voice to subjugated forms of knowledge that 
challenge the prevailing inequalities of power could enable clinicians to re-evaluate 
interventions for children with ADHD.
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Chapter one - Introduction
Research introduction 
This study will explore the psychiatric constructions of knowledge in relation to 
therapeutic interventions for children diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity 
disorder (ADHD). It will then attend to the relationship between these constructions of 
knowledge and power. Finally, it will consider the implications for clinical practice. 
Discourse analysis is the method that will be used for this investigation, a research 
method that is part of the social constructionist epistemology. Firstly, this introduction 
will review the current research evidence and thinking in relation to attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder in children.
Attention deficit hyperactivity: the main issues 
Box I Reflexive boxes
Reflexive boxes shall be used to set aside text from the rest of the research so that side 
issues or reflexive elaborations can be considered (as recommended by Edwards and 
Potter, 1992).
Diagnosis and prevalence
ADHD is the most widely diagnosed and researched childhood disorder in the United 
States and Europe (Barkley, 1990). In the United States (U.S.), using the DSM-IV 
classification system (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) up to 50 % of referrals to 
child psychiatry clinics are for ADHD, where the prevalence is estimated between 3%- 
5% of school-aged children (Cantwell, 1996), with boys outnumbering girls by 3:1 
(Tannock, 1998). From 1990 to 1993, the number of yearly outpatient appointments 
escalated from 1.6 million to 4.2 million in the U.S. (Swanson, Lemer, Williams, 1995). 
In Europe, using the ICD-10 (World Health Organisation, 1990) classification system in 
which diagnostic criteria are more stringent, and the term hyperkinetic disorder is applied, 
prevalence rates of 1% are reported in school aged children (Taylor and Hemsley, 1995).
294
The construction o f knowledge:
A  discourse analysis o f psychiatrists' therapeutic repertoires fo r children with attention depot hyperactivity disorder
To diagnose ADHD, the core symptoms must be across two dimensions, 
hyperactivity/impulsivity and inattention. Using the DSM-IV classification (appendix 1) 
the presence of six of the listed symptoms in either of, or in both of these dimensions is 
considered to be consistent with a diagnosis of ADHD, whereas the ICD-10 classification 
(appendix 1) requires both significant inattention and hyperactivity to be observed. To 
diagnose ADHD the symptoms must be pervasive and persistent with time, develop 
before the age of six/seven, cause marked impairment and not be part of a developmental 
disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 1994; World Health Organisation, 1990).
The complex nature of ADHD has led to difficulties in diagnosis. Steifel’s (1997) article 
reviews the difficulties of diagnosing a heterogeneous disorder that is often comorbid 
with oppositional defiant disorder or conduct disorder (DSM-IV, American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994). In addition, Searight and McLaren (1998) discussed how social, 
cultural and economic factors have contributed to the increase in the diagnosis of ADHD.
ADHD is believed to be a life-long condition that places sufferers at risk of a range of 
problems including social isolation, school failure and psychological problems (Tannock,
1998). Those with ADHD have been described as anti-social, aggressive and 
disorganised (Tannock, 1998). Research has also indicated that children with ADHD are 
more likely to foil academically, although they generally score in the average to above 
average range on standardised ability tests (Hinshaw, 1994; Barkley, 1990). These 
children are also more liable to school exclusion for behavioural reasons (Hayden, 1997).
Causes of ADHD
Authorities on ADHD report that the precise causes of the disorder are unknown at this 
time (Cooper, 1999). Nonetheless, a significant amount of research has been directed at 
determining the causes of ADHD and the results have been delineated by Tannock (1998) 
into the following areas:
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Cognitive research
Cognitive research has focused primarily on impulsivity, or a dysfunctional response 
inhibition system. Research has indicated an extreme slowness of the inhibitory control 
system, in which the individual acts impulsively before the inhibitory system is folly 
activated (Tannock, 1998). An alternative model (Barkley, 1997) proposes that 
neurologically based difficulties of response inhibition cause executive functioning 
problems that are essential for effective self-regulation. The executive functions that are 
affected are working memory, internalised speech, motivational appraisal and behavioural 
synthesis.
Sonuga-Barke, Taylor, and Heptinstall (1992) also developed a cognitive theory that 
suggests that children with ADHD have difficulty in inhibiting responses. An interesting 
difference to other cognitive theories is that it considers difficulties that are situation 
specific, implying the important role of socialisation in the development of the 
difficulties.
Neurobiological research
Research on cognitive theories of ADHD is usually based on the assumption of 
neurological problems (Tannock, 1998). These assumptions are founded on a long 
research history, comparing similarities between symptoms of ADHD and those produced 
by frontal lobe damage (Hinshaw, 1994). In one neurological study, Rapport (1995) 
found that children with deficits in attention and learning in supportive environments may 
have lower levels of dopamine. Rapport describes this as a neurochemical difference 
from those children who have attention deficits and struggle to learn in less supportive 
environments, who are believed to have poorly regulated norepinephrine.
Alternatively, some studies have suggested that toxic damage to the brain causes ADHD- 
type symptoms (Barkley, 1997). These hypotheses typify the inconsistencies between 
studies about the biological nature of ADHD. The use of modem neuroimaging 
techniques, albeit limited, has also foiled to clarify the debates in this area (Tannock,
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1998). Although such techniques claim to identify common abnormalities that co-occur 
with ADHD, neuroimaging research has failed to show a direct link between neurological 
abnormalities and ADHD. With no evidence of brain damage, the characteristics of 
ADHD are believed to be the result of abnormal neurological development of unknown 
cause (Barkley, 1997). This has led researchers to look towards genetic factors.
Genetic research
There is some evidence of a genetic link in ADHD (Tannock, 1998). A number of studies 
have accumulated evidence through twin studies, however the long-standing arguments 
around the influences of environmental factors on child development still persist (Cooper,
1999). However, a little more credence has been given to genetic theories by molecular 
genetic research indicating an association between certain genes and ADHD symptoms 
(Thompson, 1993).
Biopsychosocial perspective
Most of the previous accounts of the causes of ADHD have been criticised for locating 
the disorder within the individual and failing to recognise the impact of social factors 
(Cooper, 1999). Slee (1995, pp. 74) states “locating the nature of disruption in the 
neurological infrastructure of the child is myopic and convenient”, and individualising a 
problem can lead to a serious misdiagnosis. A misdiagnosis could pathologise the 
individual whose behaviour was an appropriate reaction to unsympathetic or harmful 
environmental conditions.
A polemic stance has seen ADHD conceptualised as a purely biological or purely 
environmental set of problems. This has contributed little to the understanding of ADHD 
but is indicative of the “tribalism of competing disciplines and professions” (Cooper, 
1999, pp. 9). Furthermore, the way in which researchers have attempted to isolate single 
factors that determine ADHD has exacerbated the limitations of adopting polarised 
perspectives (Tannock, 1998).
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Interventions
Psychopharmacological interventions
Psychostimulant medications (stimulants) are used most commonly to treat ADHD. The 
three most frequently prescribed stimulants are methylphenidate (Ritalin), 
dextroamphetamine (Dexidrine) and pemoline (Volital) (Santosh and Taylor, 2000). 
Occasionally tricyclic antidepressants are given as an alternative, if the stimulants have 
no effect or if the child experiences an adverse reaction such as tics and anxiety 
symptoms (DuPaul and Stoner, 1994).
Effects o f medications
Stimulants are used to stimulate areas of the brain that are believed to regulate alertness 
and arousal (British Psychological Society [BPS] 1996). Although poorly understood, it 
is believed that the effects involve the stimulation of pre-synaptic inhibitory 
autoreceptors, causing reduced activity in dopaminergic and noradrenergic pathways 
(Solanto, 1998). The concurrent increase in intrasynaptic dopamine is believed to 
improve executive control processes, inhibitory control and working memory (Douglas, 
Barr, Amin, O’Neil, and Britton, 1988).
Much of the hypothesising about the neurological basis of stimulant action is based on “a 
string of elegantly designed experiments” on mice (Santosh and Taylor, 2000, pp. 29). 
These authors emphasise that the findings may not be replicable in children and state that 
in some trials the “mice in question seem to have had a different neurochemical milieu 
from that occurring naturally in children with ADHD”. Instead, they believe that “other 
animal models, such as the spontaneously hypertensive rat, may well be closer” (Santosh 
and Taylor, 2000, pp. 29).
Effectiveness o f stimulants in ADHD
ADHD has been treated with stimulant medications for over 50 years and the research is 
so well established that the short-term effect of methylphenidate is clearly understood 
(Santosh and Taylor, 2000). Scores of published studies have evaluated the efficacy of
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stimulant drugs, involving thousands of subjects (Wilens and Biederman, 1992). Also, 
for more than a decade several formal meta-analyses have been available (Kavale and 
Fomess, 1983) as well as a published “review of reviews” (Swanson, McBumett, Wigal, 
Pfiflher, Lemer, Williams, et al., 1993). These have contributed to a consensus about 
stimulant medication. The current consensus within the medical profession is that 
stimulant medication reduces the symptoms of ADHD in 75% of patients whilst 
maintaining a good safety record (Santosh and Taylor, 2000).
Stimulants have been found to improve the child’s classroom performance and on-task 
behaviour (Santosh and Taylor, 2000). Furthermore, parent-child interaction is said to 
improve when the child is on stimulants as compliance is increased. In social settings 
children taking stimulants are reported to experience fewer problems during game play, 
improved peer status, and increased attention (Whalen, Henker, Buhrmester, Hinshaw, 
Huber, and Laski, 1989).
Many professionals in the field of child mental health have recently celebrated the results 
of the Multimodal Treatment Study (MTA) of Children with ADHD trial, by the MTA 
Cooperative group (1999). The trials incorporated a detailed and intensive treatment 
regimen that was delivered consistently across different sites for many children (Taylor,
1999). The treatment regimes included medication only, psychological (behavioural 
modification) intervention only, combined medication and psychological intervention, 
and a community team approach. From these trials, Taylor (1999) concluded that the 
careftilly executed regimen of medication is superior to alternative treatments and nearly 
as effective as the combined treatment, which came out as the most effective. He adds 
that the superiority of medication management to behavioural treatment is robust and 
states that although combined treatments were the most effective, the extra benefits over 
medication alone were very small.
The MTA (1999) trials were conducted in the U.S. where practice is different from that in 
the U.K. (Taylor, 1999). Commercial information has indicated that in the U.S. the
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quantities of medication used annually and the numbers of prescriptions are 10 to 30 
times greater than in the U.K. (Taylor, 1999). However, the use of stimulant medication 
has received more formal recognition now in England and Wales in the form of the recent 
guidelines published by the National Institute of Clinical Excellence (NICE, 2000). Two 
of the recommendations are:
1 Methylphenidate should be used as part ofa comprehensive treatment programme 
for children with a diagnosis o f severe ADHD.
2 A comprehensive treatment programme should involve advice and support to 
 parents and teachers, and could, but does not need to, include specific
psychological treatment (such as behavioural therapy).
(NICE, 2000, pp. 1)
For those in the medical profession, these guidelines, alongside research findings, may be 
seen to promote the use of medical interventions for ADHD. However, to balance this 
review of treatment approaches, consideration should also be paid to the suggested 
limitations of the psychopharmacological approach.
Criticisms o f medical treatment regimes
The current use of stimulants sweeping the U.S. and Europe serves to ease parents’ 
anxieties, conflicts and exasperations around the difficulties associated with ADHD 
(Pozzi, 2000). Many clinicians are using a combination of pharmacological and 
psychological therapies in severe cases of childhood ADHD to ease family conflicts 
(Jackson and Williams, 1994). However, the real concern is the speed at which diagnoses 
are made and the extensive use of stimulants, whilst there is still a lack of knowledge 
about the diagnosis of ADHD (Taylor, 1994). Furthermore, although there are claims that 
the short term effects of medication are understood (Santosh and Taylor, 2000), the 
longer term effects are still undetermined (Breggin, 1998).
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Box 2 Use o f‘inverted commas’ and “speech marks”
This study will use inverted commas to draw attention to the constructed nature of 
‘things’ that are taken for granted. Speech marks are used to signify that text is taken 
directly from either published research or from participants’ own speech.
Santosh and Taylor (2000, pp. 29) asserted that although stimulants (e.g. 
methylphenidate) appear to “work”, the “mechanism by which stimulants act to reduce 
hyperactivity is not yet known in detail”. This statement about the ‘knowledge’ of the 
effects of stimulants appears to challenge Taylor’s (1999) statement that children’s 
mental health practice has evolved into an evidence based discipline. Indeed, not 
knowing how the stimulant medication works, but prescribing it nonetheless, could be 
interpreted as reversing the evidence/practice relationship, in which sound evidence is 
converted into ‘good’practice.
Searight and McLaren (1998, pp. 467) conceptualise ADHD as a “metaphoric expression 
of social anxieties” and believe that to “medicalise misbehaviour” and subsequently 
control it using drugs is not helpful to the child. Breggin (2000) shares this viewpoint and 
states that stimulant drugs are useful only to suppress behaviours that are unwanted in the 
classroom or in highly controlled family situations. Furthermore, as observed in animal 
studies (Breggin, 2000), the administration of stimulant drugs encourages perseveration 
or obsessive-compulsive behaviour and over-focussing. These behaviours may be less 
disruptive than typical ADHD behaviours, however they may still be adverse to the 
child’s mental health.
There are also concerns regarding the emotional and behavioural effects of stimulants. 
Methylphenidate is believed to be responsible for causing ‘cognitive toxicity’ in some 
children as they become compliant, withdrawn, isolated, and over-focussed (Swanson, 
Cantwell, Lemer, McBumett, Pfiffner, and Kotkin, 1992). Cramond (1994) found a 
correlation between descriptors for creativity and descriptors for ADHD, however when 
the children with ADHD were medicated their self-esteem lowered and their creative
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potential was suppressed. Further studies have indicated that children taking stimulants 
on a long-term treatment programme experienced reduced levels of self-esteem 
(McGuiness, 1989).
Although there are a huge number of empiricist accounts of the ‘effectiveness’ of 
stimulants on children with ADHD, ethical and sociological questions also need to be 
addressed before prescription (BPS, 1996). One ethical concern is that stimulant 
medications are listed in Schedule II of the Convention on Psychotropic Substances (Drug 
Enforcement Agency, 1995) alongside the banned drugs amphetamine and 
metamphetamine. This could be understood as a legitimate concern considering that in 
the U.S. 90% of those diagnosed with ADHD receive stimulant medication 
(amphetamine) to address their difficulties (BPS, 1996). Breggin (2000, pp. 17) has 
clearly expressed his concerns with the practice of “bathing a young child’s growing 
brain in toxic chemicals”. He speculates that there could be long term serious 
consequences for the individual considering that there is a 25-30% reduction in blood 
flow in the brain whilst taking regular doses of stimulants. However, long-term effects 
are simply not known as long-term trials do not exist (Santosh and Taylor, 2000).
The number of children given stimulants may be increasing as studies have indicated that 
any child, whether they have difficulties or not are likely to report improved 
concentration as a result of taking stimulants (Rapport, Buchsbaum, Zahn, Weingarten, 
Ludlow and Mikkelsen, 1978). Hence it is imperative not to assume that a ‘positive 
response’ to medication signifies the presence of ADHD (Santosh and Taylor, 2000). In 
fact it has been argued that since the effects of stimulants are not unique to children 
diagnosed with ADHD, then the ‘disorder’ can not be attributed to any specific brain 
abnormality, which for most prescribing clinicians is fundamental to their choice of 
intervention (DeGrandpre, 2000). If there were significant differences in the 
neurochemistry of a child with ADHD to a non-ADHD child, then it would be expected 
that the effects of medication would be different as the normal inhibitory functioning of 
their brains would then be overstimulated (DeGrandpre, 2000).
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Behavioural interventions
The BPS (1996, pp. 46) states “medication, although important, plays a facilitative rather 
than a primary role in long-term intervention”. However, the BPS (1996, pp. 50) also 
concedes “there does not seem to be a defined area of non-medical intervention specific 
to ADHD”. Goldman, Genel, Bezman, and Slantez (1998) perceive this as a problem, 
asserting that the effects of methylphenidate may obscure some of the clinical difficulties 
and will prevent the use and development of behavioural therapies.
Central to the development of behavioural therapy in ADHD is the functional assessment. 
This includes multiple assessment strategies in order to identify specific events that 
induce or sustain a particular behaviour (DuPaul and Ervin, 1996). Instead of 
pathologising the child, this process aims to investigate the function of the individual’s 
behaviour in relation to their environment (school, home, etc) and to develop strategies to 
minimise these difficulties (DuPaul, Eckert and McGoey, 1997).
The most effective behavioural strategies used with ADHD to date are believed to be 
positive reinforcement, response cost and behaviour reduction training (BPS, 1996). 
Social skills training is also reported to assist in reducing impulsivity and aggression 
(Kazdin, Sveldt-Dawson, French and Unis, 1987), in which the children are encouraged 
to focus on peer behaviour, problem solving, communication and self-assessment. These 
behavioural strategies are believed to be most beneficial when used in collaboration with 
the parents, as family factors can be associated with peer relationship difficulties, 
aggressive behaviour, and social withdrawal (Cantwell, 1997).
Cognitive Behavioural Interventions
There has been relatively little research on cognitive behavioural (CBT) interventions for 
ADHD (BPS, 1996). Useful strategies are believed to be self-monitoring, cognitive 
modelling, self-instructional training, self-control skills and interpersonal problem solving 
(Overmeyer and Taylor, 1999). Through such means children are helped to develop a
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“coping template” to interpret the world and thus develop more appropriate strategies 
(Cooper, 1999).
The success of the approach is dependent on many factors including the motivation and 
language capabilities of the child, age-appropriate materials, and the parents’ suitability to 
act as co-therapists (Overmeyer and Taylor, 1999). Although this intervention is often 
attractive to families the results of group studies have so far been disappointing with 
small effects (Gilltleman-Klein and Abikoff, 1989). However, large group community 
based parenting programmes effectively used CBT techniques to improve child 
management skills and disruptive behaviour (Cunningham, Bremner, and Byle, 1999). In 
the U.K., programmes such as these need to be targeted at families and children with 
ADHD (rather than oppositional disorder) in order to determine the potential 
effectiveness of CBT with this client group (Overmeyer and Taylor, 1999).
Although these interventions used a CBT approach it is interesting to see ADHD 
conceptualised as a systemic phenomenon and not located solely within the child. 
Indeed, the importance of a multi-dimensional approach in combining family therapy, 
individual therapy and medication management is believed by some to be the most 
supportive style of intervention (Cordell and Allen, 1997).
Multimodal Intervention
Current thinking around the use of Multimodal treatment is primarily based on the MTA 
(1999) trials discussed earlier. In addition to these results, clinicians have warned that 
medication should be used as a first line therapy only when the case of ADHD is 
particularly severe, and in mild cases the “most powerful treatment available” 
(stimulants) should only be used if behavioural interventions are not sufficient (Taylor, 
1999, pp.1097).
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Summary
This review has highlighted beliefs and controversies around the understanding of ADHD 
and interventions. Indeed, the different versions of knowledge around the cause include 
approaches that are cognitive, social, neurobiological, genetic and biopsychosocial.
Although many studies report the effectiveness of stimulant medication over other 
approaches, knowledge around the medical approach appears to be far from complete. 
Some studies have reported that stimulant medication is well established and understood. 
However this can be directly contrasted to the claims that there is still limited knowledge 
around what the medication does.
Some research trials have identified that medical interventions have often been found to 
be more effective than other approaches, including behavioural, cognitive behavioural, 
and systemic interventions. However, concerns around difficult diagnoses being made 
under time pressure, the lack of knowledge around the cause of ADHD, and ignorance 
about what the dmgs actually do may temper the enthusiasm to medicate. In addition, 
there are ethical concerns over the use of medication and the possible risks to the child’s 
physical and mental health.
Although ADHD has been the subject of a huge amount of research it is apparent that 
there are conflicting views on whether it is a discrete disorder, what causes it, how it is 
diagnosed, and how it should be treated. This review of the literature has identified how a 
number of different of versions of knowledge operate in relation to ADHD. However, 
how some of these versions attain priority over others in the clinical forum is currently 
difficult to determine.
Chapter two - Aims of this study
This introduction has put forward a version of events largely based on published research 
evidence and counter claims. This body of knowledge is central to an understanding of 
the developments and concerns in the field of ADHD. These resources were available to 
me throughout clinical training and I became particularly familiar with them over the
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course of the child and family core placement as well as a specialist child and family 
placement. Working alongside a number of experienced professionals in specialist 
ADHD clinics, it became apparent that there was some incongruity between the literature, 
how professionals spoke about interventions for ADHD, and actual clinical practice. For 
example, on a number of occasions professionals spoke about the use of psychological 
interventions and parents’ reluctance to give their children medication but then the child 
was still put on medication only.
Box 3 The objective/subjective position of researchers
Researchers within the traditional scientific paradigm construct themselves as having an 
objective relationship with their data in order to prevent bias from personal factors. 
However, within the social constructionist framework, ‘objectivity talk’ is seen as just 
another discourse through which a particular version of events is constructed in 
accordance with the assumptions that are embedded in the researcher’s perspective (Burr, 
1995). The task of the social constructionist researcher is then to acknowledge their own 
intrinsic involvement in the research process and to view research as a co-production 
between themselves and the participants. Following discussions with my research 
supervisors, I decided it was important to remain consistent within the epistemological 
framework and to, when necessary, write in the first person. Woods (1998, pp. 28) is 
sensitive to this kind of dilemma stating, “qualitative methods may be perceived as less 
‘scientific’”. He believes such methods “have tended to exercise the critical faculties of 
examiners most greatly” leading to the “most discussion and dissension among them”. It 
was thus hoped that transparency around the thinking throughout this piece of research 
would negate some of these potential difficulties.
This sense of confusion invoked in me gradually led to the formulation that there were a 
variety of constructions or representations around the interventions for ADHD. The 
outcome of these could have serious implications for the child’s mental and physical 
health. Within the medical culture it was evident that the scientific version of events was 
often considered to have greatest credence; however, at times, other accounts were
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noticeable. Those knowledges that are located lower down the hierarchy, those that have 
been disqualified as inaccurate, as beneath the required level of scientificity, are known as 
‘subjugated knowledges’ (Foucault, 1980).
The construction of knowledge/power
For Foucault, such knowledges that prevail within a culture at a particular time are 
intimately bound up with power (Burr, 1995). That is, a particular version of events 
(discourse) promotes some social practices whilst marginalizing alternative ways of 
acting. Indeed, ‘knowledge’ is the construction of a particular version of events that 
determines what one person is allowed to do to another (McHoul and Grace, 1993). 
When ‘knowledge’ is conceptualised in this way, it becomes evident that “meaning is not 
static and fixed but is fluid and provisional” (Coyle, 1995, pp. 244). Therefore the power 
to act in particular ways, to categorise something as a disorder, to control or be controlled 
is reliant upon the ‘knowledges’ that prevail within that culture or society (McHoul and 
Grace, 1993).
Scientific discourse can be interpreted as one form of ‘knowledge’ that exercises power 
through securing others within its bounds (McHoul and Grace, 1993). Foucault (1978) 
chose to analyse scientific discourse and the way that it is used in psychiatry, the field 
that he believed was one of the most complex as it attempted to apply science to humans. 
Foucault (1978, pp.25) indicated that these discourses are “practices linked to certain 
conditions, obedient to certain rules and susceptible to certain transformations”. He was 
interested in how the disciplines of the human sciences act as forms of social practice and 
have a wide-ranging effect on society. A detailed and current analysis of the relationship 
between discourse, knowledge, and social practices can be read in the literature review 
(Grixti, 2001). This review looked at discourse analysis and the construction of 
knowledge in relation to a range of clinical issues, including psychiatric medication 
(Harper, 1999), the construction o f ‘mental illness’ (Harper, 1994), ‘mental retardation’ 
(Peter, 2000), and care in the community (Cowan, 1999).
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McHoul and Grace (1993) ask whether individuals and populations should simply comply 
with these constructions of medicalised knowledge. They assert that dominating 
discourses, such as those that serve to promote medical knowledge, cany out the function 
of ‘normalisation5, attempting to manoeuvre people into ‘correct5 ways of thinking and 
behaving. The process can become so ‘normalised5 that ‘knowledges5 become ‘truths5 
until they “no longer have to pass through the consciousness of speaking subjects nor 
through the efficacity of thought55 (Foucault, 1978, pp. 22).
Discourse analysis and the construction of knowledge
This process has begun to be reversed as an increasing number of psychologists are using 
the qualitative, social constructionist methodology of discourse analysis to allow the 
researcher to question concepts that are taken for granted in society (for details of this 
approach see the literature review, Grixti, 2001). In using discourse analysis, language is 
not conceptualised as reflective of “reality55 but rather as constitutive of (having the power 
to enact) experience (Potter and Wetherell, 1995). In other words, the linguistic 
categories that we use to describe ‘reality5 bring into being the objects they describe, or 
put simply, language constructs reality (Parker, 1992). There is always a number of ways 
to describe something and our choice of words can be seen to form perceptions and 
experiences which create different versions of events and reality (Willig, 1999). 
Therefore, discourse analysis is used to understand the ways in which “language 
constructs objects, subjects (subject positions) and experiences, including subjectivity and 
sense of self5 (Willig, 1999, pp. 2).
This study applies discourse analysis to examine transcripts of interviews with 
psychiatrists working in specialist ADHD services talking about interventions. 
Psychiatrists were selected as the most appropriate participants for this analysis as they 
are central to the production of knowledge, especially in relation to ‘mental illness5 and 
intervention. Furthermore, the power that psychiatrists hold to construe the world in 
terms of those who are ‘mad5 and those who are ‘sane5 creates a power inequality 
between those who define and those who are defined (Burr, 1995). All the psychiatrists
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were selected from an NHS Trust in line with Foucault’s (1980, pp. 99) beliefs that the 
power struggles that should be unmasked are not the ‘totalising discourses’ (i.e. 
national/governmental discourses), but the ‘local’ power struggles that exist in institutions 
or at the micro level of society. He stated that the issues of interest are how the 
mechanisms of power have been invested, colonised and utilised resulting in the types of 
social domination that are readily identifiable.
There has not previously been a discursive analysis that has specifically aimed to identify 
the constructions of knowledge in relation to interventions for ADHD in children, and the 
rhetorical functions performed by knowledge talk. This study intends to fill this gap as 
well as to consider the relationship between constructions of knowledge and subject 
positions. The final aim is to examine the relationship between knowledge, subject 
positions and power.
Summary
There are a number of versions of knowledge concerning the interventions for children 
diagnosed with ADHD. As a result of the range of knowledges, at times there is some 
conflict between these versions. Some versions of knowledge gain dominance over 
others which shapes power relations and has implications for clinical practice. An 
investigation of the discourse, knowledge and power triad can be conducted using 
Foucauldian discourse analysis to examine how language constructs prevailing 
knowledges around interventions for ADHD.
In summary the aim was to address the following questions:
1) how do psychiatrists use discourse to construct accounts of knowledge in relation 
to interventions for ADHD?
2) what is the function of these constructions of knowledge?
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3) which positions are made available within their discourses?
Once these aims have been addressed, the following aims can also be taken up:
4) what is the relationship between discourse, the construction of knowledge and 
power?
5) how do the discursive constructions and subject positions open up or close down 
opportunities for practice?
6) what are the consequences of taking up particular subject positions for the 
psychiatrists’ subjective experience?
Chapter three - Method
Design
As discussed, the qualitative methodology of discourse analysis was used in this study.
Data were gathered using a semi-structured interview format as recommended by Willig
(2001).
Box 4 Reliability and validity in qualitative research
Reliability and validity can be a problematic concept for qualitative (including discourse 
analytic) research (Willig, 2001). However, the qualitative researcher can engage with 
concerns about reliability and validity in a number of ways:
1) Situating the sample (Elliot, Fisher and Rennie, 1999)
Information on each of the participants is presented to the reader. This allows the reader 
to make judgements on the interpretations made within the analysis.
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Box 4 Reliability and validity in qualitative research (cont)
2) Disclosure o f orientation (Stiles, 1993; Elliot, Fisher and Rennie, 1999)
This includes a disclosure of the researcher’s expectations of the study and personal 
speaking position. My speaking position was that of trainee clinical psychologist. Also, 
for some time I have been interested in the relationship between medication and the 
talking therapies for mental illness. My expectations for the outcome of the study were 
not clear, as I had not used discourse analysis previously. However, I expected the 
participants to invoke different accounts of knowledge to negotiate the complex issues 
associated with ADHD.
3) Description o f internal processes o f investigation (Stiles, 1993; Smith, 1996)
This consists of transparency in relation to the coding process and developing themes. A 
coded transcript (appendix 2) and an early analysis (appendix 3) are provided.
4) Providing credibility checks (Smith, 1996; Elliot, Fisher and Rennie, 1999)
All participants are offered the opportunity to check the credibility of the analysis. The 
research report (anonymised) was checked and commented on by all three research 
supervisors and the field supervisor. The focus was especially on the analysis section to 
work towards reliability regarding interpretations. For further credibility checks the 
analysis was also presented in a discourse analysis study group to get a set of 
interpretations from a range of discourse analysts. Finally, the analysis was presented to a 
Child and Adolescent Mental Health Team. Following this they formed a ‘reflecting 
team’ (Andersen, 1995) to check out the credibility of the work and to exercise criticism. 
This process was video taped for reference.
5) Presentation o f evidence (Smith, 1996)
Sufficient raw data (verbatim quotes) are placed in the text to enable the reader to 
understand the interpretations as they develop. One complete unmarked transcript is also 
submitted (appendix 4) as well as the coded transcript.
311
Box 4 Reliability and validity in qualitative research (cont)
6) Internal coherence (Smith, 1996)
This ensures that the study presents a consistent argument in the form of a clear and 
comprehensible narrative. This was achieved through consultation with the research 
supervisors, the field supervisor and a proofreader.
Participants1
As indicated by Turpin, Barley, Beail, Scaife, Slade, Smith and Walsh (1997), ten 
participants were considered to be a sufficient number. Each of the psychiatrists selected 
had at least three years and a maximum of twelve years experience of working in a 
specialist child ADHD clinic. Eight of the participants had consultant status and two 
were specialist psychiatric registrars (SPR). They worked across a total of seven different 
clinics. The sample comprised seven males and three females. Five participants were 
British and five were other nationalities.
Characteristics of participants 
Including all the details known about them facilitates understanding participant responses.
Dr DePaul
Age: 34 years
Sex: Male
Nationality: British
Spoken English: Good
Title: Specialist Psychiatric Registrar (SPR)
Experience of specialist ADHD clinic: 3.5 years
1 N.B.: Some o f the details have been changed, including all names, to preserve the anonymity o f 
the people involved as well as the health care setting.
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Other notes/observations:
Dr DePaul drew my attention to his extensive library in his office. He commented how 
ironic it was that his copy of the DSM-IV and ICD-10 were sandwiched between works 
by (‘anti-psychiatry’) writers such as Foucault, Sasz, and Goffinan. Prior to the study this 
SPR and I had met briefly on one occasion. Dr DePaul is at the end of training and about 
to become a consultant psychiatrist.
Dr Edmund
Age: 40 years
Sex: Male
Nationality: Chinese
Spoken English: Good
Title: Consultant Psychiatrist/Clinical Lecturer
Experience of specialist ADHD clinic: 5 years
Other notes/observations:
Dr Edmund and I were previously unacquainted.
Dr Godfrey
Age: 40 years
Sex: Female
Nationality: Iranian
Spoken English: Good
Title: Consultant Psychiatrist
Experience of specialist ADHD clinic: 3.5 years
Other notes/observations:
Dr Godfrey presented as particularly enthusiastic to share her knowledge on ADHD. We 
had not met prior to this study.
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Dr Gola
Age: 35 years
Sex: Male
Nationality: Jamaican
Spoken English: Good
Title: Consultant Psychiatrist
Experience of specialist ADHD clinic: 6 years
Other notes/observations:
Dr Gola and I were previously unacquainted.
Dr Julalab
Age: 43 years
Sex: Female
Nationality: Iranian
Spoken English: Good
Title: Consultant Psychiatrist
Experience of specialist ADHD clinic: 3 years
Other notes/observations:
Dr Julalab and I had met prior to the study to discuss the current thinking on treating 
ADHD, when she was very positive about both medical and psychosocial interventions 
for ADHD.
Dr Kelley
Age:
Sex:
Nationality: 
Spoken English: 
Title:
41 years 
Male 
British 
Good
Consultant Psychiatrist
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Experience of specialist ADHD clinic: 5 years
Other notes/observations:
Prior to the study I had met Dr Kelley on several occasions. He appeared enthusiastic 
about participating in this study.
Dr Pava
Age: 40 years
Sex: Male
Nationality: Indian
Spoken English: Good
Title: Consultant Psychiatrist
Experience of specialist ADHD clinic: 7 years
Other notes/observations:
Dr Pava and I met prior to the study to discuss the current developments and concerns 
around interventions for ADHD. He was noticeably respectful of psychology as an 
intervention but believed it to be sub-standard to medical approaches. Dr Pava described 
psychiatry as being at the “top of the field”, so other disciplines “downstream” would be 
affected by any changes in psychiatric practice.
Dr Rubin
Age:
Sex:
Nationality: 
Spoken English: 
Title:
56 years 
Male 
British 
Good
Consultant Psychiatrist
Experience of specialist ADHD clinic: 12 years
Other notes/observations:
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Dr Rubin was enthusiastic to share his knowledge with me concerning all aspects of 
ADHD. We had not met prior to the interview.
Dr Wayne
Age:
Sex:
Nationality: 
Spoken English: 
Title:
32 years 
Male 
British 
Good
Specialist Psychiatric Registrar (SPR)
Experience of specialist ADHD clinic: 5 years
Other notes/observations:
Dr Wayne has specialised in neurodevelopmental psychiatry. He is near to the end of his 
SPR status. We had not met prior to interview.
Dr Wolf
Age:
Sex:
Nationality: 
Spoken English: 
Title:
55 years 
Female 
British 
Good
Consultant Psychiatrist
Experience of specialist ADHD clinic: 9 years
Other notes/observations:
Dr Wolf and I had not met prior to the interview. This was my first of the interviews and 
Dr Wolf was noticeably patient as I was still developing my interview style.
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Procedure
Ethical Considerations
Ethical approval was obtained from two separate research committees, both within the 
same Trust, as well as the University committee (see appendix 5).
Box 5 Ethical reflections
My reflections on developing ethical issues and their influence on analysis can be found 
in appendix 6.
Piloting the interview schedule
The interview schedule was piloted on a paediatrician and a clinical psychologist who 
were not part of the study. The pilot could not include a psychiatrist as there was a 
problem with recruiting numbers. However, this was not considered to be a problem as 
the pilot fulfilled its goals in identifying the need for more clarity of expression, and a 
need to reduce the number of questions. The revised interview schedule was then piloted 
on the same clinical psychologist which enabled a comparison to the original interview 
schedule. Further minimal adjustments were made to the language used as well as the 
supplementary questions.
Piloting the interview was essential not just for developing clearly worded questions but 
also for developing an appropriate interviewing style. Thought was given to the impact 
that different interview styles could have on the participants’ responses.
Recruiting participants
A meeting was held with a consultant psychiatrist who was also a manager in the large 
NHS Trust. The inclusion criteria outlined to him were, psychiatrists with a minimum of 
three years experience of working in a specialist ADHD clinic, they had to be currently 
working in this setting, and to have a good command of the English language. He 
identified a number of potential participants in the Trust, their location and contact 
numbers.
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A letter was sent to a total of twenty-two psychiatrists, explaining the research and 
inviting them to be participants (appendix 7 - information letter). Of the twenty-two who 
were invited, ten opted into the study.
Box 6 Recruiting participants
Initially twelve psychiatrists were invited to participate in the study but only five 
responded affirmatively. Another meeting with the Trust manager generated a further 
ten names of which five more accepted. The eventual agreement of these ten participants 
to take part followed numerous contacts by telephone to arrange interview appointments 
that fitted in with their busy work schedules. Seven declined as they were excluded by 
pressures of time. The other five gave no reason.
Interviewing participants
In addition to the information letter, prior to interview a consent form (appendix 8) was 
presented to each participant summarising the purpose of the research outlined in the 
information letter. The consent form also addressed issues of confidentiality and 
anonymity. Participants were asked to give consent for the interview to be audio-taped 
with the understanding that the data would be held in accordance with the Data Protection 
Act (1998).
Each of the interviews was approximately forty-five minutes long and was conducted in 
an office in the participant’s work place.
The semi-structured interview schedule 
The interview (appendix 9) was designed to address the research questions that had 
emerged from my clinical experiences as well as the review of the literature. The semi- 
structured format was constructed to ensure comparability across interviews but also to 
allow topics of interest to be explored more fully as the respondents talked more freely 
about their beliefs and experiences. The interview schedule initially attended to the 
concepts of description, diagnosis and aetiology of ADHD, before moving onto
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intervention, risk and guidelines. This structure was chosen so that responses on 
intervention could be placed in the context of the preceding themes. The structure and 
rationale of the interview is presented below:
Interview schedule structure
Section one: Context Section (Approximately one third of the total interview).
To begin with, general questions and prompts were employed so that the participants 
could use their own choice of terms in order to describe ADHD. The aim was to create a 
common understanding of what was being discussed and to gently orient the participant 
to the area of interest. This was followed with an enquiry that was designed to establish 
how ADHD was diagnosed and conceptualised, and to begin to explore any differences 
between personal and professional opinion. This information could then be referred to 
throughout the interview. The final part of section one referred to causes of ADHD. This 
was an important area as it could be a necessary precursor to the selection of 
interventions.
Section two: Intervention (Approximately two thirds of the total interview).
The aim of this section was to elicit the knowledges surrounding interventions. This 
included the criteria they used to judge a particular intervention, their satisfaction or 
concerns with particular approaches, and their views about the effect that interventions 
have on the child, family, and professionals. This section also aimed to get the 
participant’s views on what the interventions actually targeted and their impact. Views of 
risk were also explored in this section as well as the impact of guidelines.
Analysis of data
Transcription
The interviews were audio-taped and transcribed by the author, following Potter and 
Wetherell’s (1987) guidelines. The transcription symbols as detailed by Atkinson and 
Heritage (1984) are in appendix 10. The time ratio of transcription to recorded interview 
was approximately 7:1, a total of 68 hours. The interviewees all declined the offer of
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checking the transcription for accuracy. The interviewer/researcher is referred to as 
‘Mark5, and to improve clarity there is a one-line gap to signify a change in speaker (i.e. 
between the interviewer and respondent).
Coding
Each transcript was read several times to facilitate familiarisation with the data. This 
immersion in the data served to identify recurring themes and limit the data to be included 
in the final analysis. A computer program (Kukartz, 1998; ‘WinMax’) for qualitative 
research was used throughout coding as the themes were generated, and to insert memos 
^appendix 2). The same extract was often included in more than one coded category so a 
cyclical process was adopted to code and recode different excerpts. The coding process 
was a necessary preliminary to the analysis itself and served to identify analytically 
interesting points of text that were relevant to the research aims (Henwood and Pidgeon, 
1992).
Foucauldian discourse analysis
The data were analysed using the Foucauldian version of discourse analysis as outlined 
by Willig (2001). Foucauldian discourse analysis is concerned with the interconnected 
triad of discourse, power and knowledge (Carabine, 2001). That is, certain dominant 
discourses privilege certain versions of knowledge which legitimate existing power 
relations and social structures. Foucauldian discourse analysis looks at how discourses 
are bound up with institutional practices that organise, regulate and administer social life.
The Foucauldian version of discourse analysis is concerned with the functions that are 
being fulfilled by the language used by the speaking subjects. However, it also asks 
questions about the relationship between the discourse and how subjects think, what they 
do, and the conditions within which such experiences take place (Willig, 2001).
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As Potter and Wetherell (1987) state there is no ‘right’ or mechanical process to follow in 
conducting discourse analysis. Nonetheless, the Foucauldian version as outlined by 
Willig (2001) is set out in six stages. These are as follows:
Stage 1: Discursive constructions
This stage is concerned with the discursive object, which in the case of this study is 
‘knowledge’ in relation to interventions for ADHD in children. This first stage involves 
identifying the discursive object (knowledge) within the texts.
Stage 2: Discourses
The second stage aims to locate the various discursive constructions of the object within 
wider discourses. In other words, the analysis then attends to the different ways that 
knowledge is constructed. Stages 1 and 2 are not presented explicitly in the analysis 
section as they are primarily concerned with the coding of themes that arise from the raw 
data (appendix 2).
Stage 3: Action orientation
This third stage of the analysis involves a close (micro-level) examination of the excerpts 
in which the different constructions o f‘knowledge’ are deployed. Attention will be given 
to the way rhetorical devices achieve this. There will also be an examination o f what is 
gained from constructing the object in this particular way, the function of this action, and 
how it relates to other constructions produced in the surrounding text. Focussing on the 
action orientation aims to give a clearer understanding of what the various constructions 
o f‘knowledge’ are capable of achieving within the text.
Stage 4: Positionings
The next stage is to take a look at the ‘subject positions’ that the discourses offer. 
Discourses do not just construct objects but also subjects, which makes positions 
available within the networks of meaning that speakers can take up as well as position 
others (see Davies and Harre, 1999).
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Stage 5: Practice
This stage looks at the relationship between discourse and practice. It makes use of a 
systematic exploration of the ways that discursive constructions and subject positions 
open up or close down opportunities for action, or the way that they limit what can be 
said and done. This process considers how certain practices become legitimate forms of 
behaviour within certain discourses. Through reciprocity, these practices reproduce the 
discourses that legitimate them.
Stage 6: Subjectivity
The final stage traces the consequences of taking up a particular subject position for the 
participant’s subjective experience. Having looked at what can be said and done from 
within different discourses in Stage 5, this final stage is “concerned with what can be felt, 
thought and experienced from within various subject positions” (Willig, 2001, pp. 111). 
Both stages 5 (practice) and 6 (subjectivity) are not explicitly developed until the 
discussion section as these areas of interest operate at a more macro-level (global) with 
the texts and therefore can be understood as more “speculative” (Willig, 2001).
Chapter four - Analysis
This section takes each selected exceipt that was identified from stage one and two of the 
analysis process and examines the ‘action orientation’. That is, the rhetorical devices 
which are deployed to construct different accounts of knowledge and the function of these 
discursive strategies. Next, where appropriate, subject positions will be analysed. The 
analysis addresses the research aims 1-3 identified earlier:
1) how do psychiatrists use discourse to construct accounts of knowledge in relation 
to interventions for ADHD?
2) what is the function of these constructions of knowledge?
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3) which positions are made available within their discourses?
The accounts of knowledge that became central to this analysis were; empiricist, 
contingent, moves between empiricist and contingent, and a temporal dimension.
The empiricist account 
Empiricism depends upon the collection and analysis of data in order to acquire 
knowledge (Willig, 2001). It is a scientific account in which the research results are often 
referred to as immutable facts and scientific givens (Harper, 1994). In this empiricist 
form of discourse, “data are depicted as ‘doing confirming’ and ‘concluding’ 
independently of the actions of the scientists” (Edwards and Potter, 1992, pp. 135).
The following excerpt followed on from an inquiry about which form of treatment Dr 
Wolf considered as the most effective for ADHD.
Excerpt 1 (Transcript 10 -  Dr Wolf)
319: But if we have made a clear diagnosis
320: of ADHD and we've done something about all of those other 
321: features then erm I would be looking to erm (.) a treatment 
322: particularly in ADHD erm my first line would be erm medic- 
323: medication.
324:
325: Mark: Would that be any particular medication?
326:
327: Dr Wolf: Stimulants (.) yes (.) the evidence is 
328: overwhelming that's it's erm useful.
329:
330: Mark: Can you say a bit more about that?
331:
332: Dr Wolf: Erm well (.) erm there are there are hundreds of
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333: reports that indicate that it's an effective treatment (.)
334: that stimulant medication is an effective treatment for ADHD 
335: it's (inaudible)
336:
337: Mark: Sorry I missed that.
338:
339: Dr Wolf: It improves inhibition time (.) and erm erm more
340: most recently there's been a study in the United States 
341: which has randomised children to various treatment groups 
342: and again the evidence is very clear that erm stimulant erm 
343: medication is erm erm erm very effective in the short term 
344: (.) the long term is more difficult the long term evidence 
345: is not so (.) is just not there to be compared with.
In excerpt 1, Dr Wolf uses an empiricist discourse to describe her preferred intervention 
for ADHD, as research outcomes are used to confirm the effectiveness of stimulant 
medication in the treatment of ADHD. The discursive ‘work’ of reinforcing the factuality 
of the empiricist version of events can be interpreted as being achieved through ‘explicit 
consensus and corroboration’ (Edwards and Potter, 1992). This rhetorical strategy 
‘brings forth’ other witnesses to strengthen a point and make it appear more factual. In 
this excerpt, Dr Wolf works to validate the treatment approach in stating, “there are 
hundreds of reports that indicate that it’s an effective treatment” (lines 332-333). This use 
of “hundreds” (fine 332) is an example of how ‘quantification’ (Potter, 1996) can be used 
to maximise a particular point. The sheer number of “reports” (line 333) can be seen to 
do the work of confirming the use of medication without any consideration of the actions 
of the researchers.
Her assertion that “the evidence is overwhelming that's it's erm usefiil” (lines 327-328) is 
as an ‘extreme case formulation’ (Pomerantz, 1986). An extreme case formulation is a 
descriptive practice that uses extreme points on relevant descriptive dimensions in order
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to justify a point. Dr Wolf makes her empiricist account more effective by drawing on 
the term “overwhelming” to warrant a stronger case for the use of stimulant medication. 
The plausibility of her constructions of effective intervention are then qualified by 
embedding it in a particular narrative sequence as she references a specific “study in the 
United States” (line 340). Dr Wolf could also be seen to demonstrate that she is familiar 
with the intricacies of this study as she uses a scientific discourse in stating that it 
“randomised children to various treatment groups”. The empiricist account is further 
strengthened as Dr Wolf continues to deploy extreme case formulations in asserting that 
the “evidence is very clear” (line 342) that stimulant medication is “very effective” (line 
343). Finally, lines 344-345 further assert the importance of an empiricist discourse, but 
constructs Dr Wolf as impartial enough to be able to express a critique. This can serve to 
support her position as any criticisms about ‘bias’ can be countered with this explicit 
acknowledgement of limitations of the “long term evidence” for the treatment of ADHD.
Positioning
‘Reflexive positioning’ is a term given to the discursive process by which one positions 
oneself (Davies and Harre, 1990). In this exceipt Dr Wolf adopts an empiricist position 
that serves to remove any personal or clinical views on the pharmaceutical intervention 
for ADHD. Her discourse positions her as an objective onlooker who has relied upon a 
wealth of empirical work (lines 341-345) to make an informed judgement about this 
medical intervention. Although Dr Wolf actively constructs her own position as an 
objective onlooker, the ‘impartiality’ of her account could be questioned. For example, in 
excerpt 1, she appears to attend to the reported advantages of using medication at the 
exclusion of reporting any of the disadvantages that may be associated with this form of 
intervention. Hence, medical interventions are constructed as favourable in the absence 
of any forms of knowledge to the contrary.
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To illustrate comparability between the psychiatrists, the following three examples have 
been selected.
Excerpt 2 ("Transcript 9 -  Dr Wayne)
297: if you read the MTA trial, the MTA trial is so powerful as 
298: it will never be surpassed in its size, quality erm 
299: thoroughness really but it addressed problems in a sort of 
300: gold standard way
In this excerpt, Dr Wayne explicitly names the research trial that he is referring to. In line 
297, he references his source of empirical information which serves to construct an 
objective and factual foundation from which he can frame his own accounts of treatment. 
The trial is described as “so powerful” (line 297), an extreme case formulation that could 
be described as making this version of events more effective by placing it favourably on 
the constructed continuum of relevant dimensions of judgement (Pomerantz, 1986). 
Next, a further extreme case formulation is then deployed in relation to time, stating, “it 
will never be surpassed” (line 298). This provides the professionals with the assurance 
that they have achieved the ultimate access to knowledge in this area, thus affording them 
the rights to practise accordingly. Dr Wayne goes on to say that it will never be surpassed 
“in its size, quality erm thoroughness” (line 298-299). This is a ‘three part list’, a 
rhetorical strategy that is often deployed to create a complete and convincing account by 
constructing a ‘stronger’ argument through listing examples (Jefferson, 1990). Finally, 
the validity of his empiricist account is further qualified by the assertion that “problems” 
(line 299) were addressed in a “gold standard way” (line 300). This figurative device 
(Hepburn, 2000) has much rhetorical force as the use of the word “gold” often has 
connotations with absolute excellence, as in ‘gold medal’ for example.
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Dr Kelley also uses the same study and the identical figure of speech to Dr Wayne when 
describing the interventions used in research trials, with the same rhetorical effect.
Excerpt 3 (Transcript 6 -  Dr Kellevl 
268: Dr Kelley: Erm (.) well in terms of the erm the MTA 
269: trials (.) the trials in the States (.) I think that's 
270: currently the gold standard in terms of treatment 
271: intervention. I think they've rigorously adapted a (.)
272: double blind crossover type erm methodology
The legitimacy of his empiricist account is qualified in stating, “they’ve rigorously 
adapted a (.) double blind crossover type erm methodology” (lines 271-272). This use of 
a scientific account may serve to give Dr Kelley access to the categoiy membership of 
science/research and thus strengthen the narrative of empiricist knowledge and 
epistemological rigour. The ‘facts’ appear to present themselves to the professionals who 
appear to have a passive role in interpreting them (Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984). The 
psychiatrists can then be seen to present the ‘facts’ in the same objective manner and 
construct them as a preferred form of knowledge. Excerpt 4 is another example of this 
process.
Excerpt 4 (Transcript 7 -  Dr Paval 
294: Dr Pava: I mean if one looks at research it is
295: probably the largest research area in child psychiatry is 
296: whether stimulants work in ADHD (.) in this point in time 
297: even the most rigorous critics of whether medication works 
298: have had to accept that stimulants do work in ADHD (.) the 
299: response rates are roughly between sixty-five to seventy-five so it would be 
300: around seventy that respond to stimulants, it's not that 
301: everyone responds to it but if you don't respond to one 
302: stimulant in an ideal dosage then another stimulant might
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303: still respond (.) so it's not just that if you try one 
304: stimulant and they haven't responded that means that they 
305: won't respond to another (.) so if you use all, two or three of 
306: the stimulants at different times you actually get a
307: response rate at about ninety to ninety-five percent that respond to medication 
308: (.) so the findings are robust
Explicit consensus and corroboration are used to warrant the merits of this treatment 
approach as it is described as “probably the largest research area in child psychiatry” (line 
295). For a further example (Dr Edmund, Transcript 2) see appendix 11. Dr Pava then 
supports this statement with, “even the most rigorous critics of whether medication works 
have had to accept that stimulants do work” (lines 297-298). The way in which Dr Pava 
explicitly recognises that there are “critics”, shows an awareness and consideration of 
competing discourses. This does the work of consolidating his position, for if the “most 
rigorous critics” have agreed, this implies that there is simply no case to answer. This 
account appears to silence any competing discourses under the weight of an empiricist 
account of knowledge.
Another rhetorical strategy used in this excerpt is one identified by Antaki and Wetherell 
(1999) and is named a ‘show concession’. This identifies a concession before reinforcing 
the initial belief to fortify the speaker’s position. Dr Pava makes a show of conceding by 
using a three part structure of proposition, concession and assertion. He proposes that 
“stimulants do work in ADHD” (line 298) and uses an empiricist account to warrant his 
statement in the form of ‘objective’ numerical data (lines 299-300). He then makes the 
concession, “it’s not that everyone responds to it” (lines 300-301), which allows him to 
reassert his proposition, “but if you don’t respond to one stimulant in an ideal dosage 
then another stimulant might still respond” (301-303). The power of this conversational 
structure is in its ability to use sequential development to dismiss any rival claims (Antaki 
and Wetherell, 1999). In the following lines Dr Pava then further consolidates the final 
part of the show concession, the ‘assertion’, by using an empiricist account to construct a
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continuum of effectiveness at which medication is described to have a “response rate at 
about ninety to ninety-five percent” (line 307), concluding, “so the findings are robust” 
(line 308).
Positioning
In addition to positioning oneself (‘reflexive positioning’), it is also necessary to consider 
how what one person says can position another. This process is named ‘interactive 
positioning’ (Davies and Haire, 1990). Both of these types of positioning can be applied 
to excerpt 4, but to do this, the question that preceded the excerpt is presented:
Excerpt 5 (Transcript 7 -  Dr Pava}
289: Mark: so (3) you sound pretty sure of the effects of
290: medication, especially with those at the more severe end of 
291: ADHD, I wonder how that knowledge came about, how we know 
292: this?
The interactional dynamic of questioner/respondent may well position the psychiatrist as 
the bearer of knowledge, or ‘expert’, whose role it is to give the ‘correct’ answers to the 
research questions. However, the term “you sound pretty sure” (line 289) could be seen 
as questioning the psychiatrist’s preceding response, as it is a colloquialism that can be 
perceived as challenging, as in “you sound pretty sure of yourself!”.
To ‘correct’ this connotation, and avoid closing down the discourse, I then ‘own’ the 
question by shifting to the first person (line 291), belbre a final orientation of a shared 
perception of knowledge by using the term “we” (line 291). This final shift increases the 
generality of the ‘knowledge narrative’ in order to pose a less confrontational question. 
Indeed, by explicitly invoking the discourse of “knowledge” (line 291), it becomes 
‘externalised’ (White and Epston, 1990) which serves to objectify it. This makes it more 
likely that the psychiatrist can talk about knowledge as separate to his own belief system 
as it has moved from the ‘personal’ to a ‘body of knowledge’. This appears to be the case
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as Dr Pava relies upon an empiricist account of the effects of medication. It is also 
noteworthy that he maintains the constructed position of a shared perception of 
knowledge when he states, “even the most rigorous critics of whether medication works 
have had to accept that stimulants do work in ADHD” (excerpt 4, line 297-298). This 
statement could be described as reconciling the differences between my questions about 
the treatment approach and Dr Pava’s defence of it. Or put simply, the challenging part 
of my question could have placed me in the membership category of “rigorous critics” 
(line 297), and that I, among others, should “accept” the evidence. This reconciliation 
could be seen to subjugate any competing discourses, attributing to the unification of 
knowledge and reinforcing the empiricist account.
It was noticeable that in this excerpt he did not speak of ‘children’ or ‘kids’, which he did 
on other occasions. These ‘absences and silences’ (Carabine, 2001) can be seen as a 
device to construct membership categories. Rather than saying that the child is expected 
to “use all, 2 or 3 of the stimulants” (lines 305-306), he substitutes this with a generalised 
second/third person narrative (“you”, “they”). This creates a membership category that 
constructs a more symmetrical power relation (Hepburn, 2000) between the psychiatrist 
and the child. This is achieved by excluding the ‘vulnerable’ child from the empiricist 
account of treatment approaches for ADHD, thus reducing the likelihood of the 
professional being positioned as ‘abuser’ from those critics who refer to the use of 
stimulants as the ‘medicalisation of misbehaviour’ (see McGuiness, 1999).
The contingent account - 1 
Making clinical decisions - Personal and professional accounts of knowledge 
The contingent account is different from the empiricist account in that it does not depend 
upon scientific ‘facts’ but on the individual’s personal and professional inclinations 
(Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984). Personal accounts of knowledge comprise individual beliefs 
that may or may not be fully compatible with the other systems of knowledge that they 
hold. Professional accounts of knowledge are beliefs that the clinician holds alongside 
their professional body concerning issues of practice.
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The contingent account is rhetorically organised and is embedded in discursive practices 
(Edwards and Potter, 1992). It incorporates the influences of institutional, economic, 
legal, and societal beliefs into the production of knowledge and the process of decision­
making.
In order to compare the empiricist and contingent accounts, excerpts from the same 
psychiatrists will be used in the following analysis.
Excerpt 6 (Transcript 7 -  Dr Pava)
The following excerpt was embedded in a discussion about the possible toxicity of 
stimulant medication.
767: Mark: And is there the scientific research on those who
768: have been on it [stimulants] for longer course, fifteen, eighteen years?
769:
770: Dr Pava: No I mean there's all all all that we have
771: is clinical experience and nothing nothing negative being 
772: reported in that erm so apart from that we can't state 
773: clearly (.) so that's why I'm saying that 5 years is what we 
774: do have for scientific, clear evidence which is more than we 
775: can say about the non pharmacological treatments (6).
The question (lines 767-768) invokes an empiricist account of knowledge by referring to 
“scientific research”. Dr Pava then explicitly presents an alternative account of 
knowledge in stating, “all all all that we have is clinical experience” (lines 770-771). 
This statement appears to question the validity of the professional contingent account of 
knowledge by minimising it by using the word “all”. However, doubts around the use of 
the contingent account are then immediately negated through the deployment of an 
extreme case formulation in that “nothing nothing negative being reported” (lines 771- 
772). The function of this pattern of discourse could be understood in terms of a show
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concession (Antaki and Wetherell, 1999). He initially states that clinical experience has 
not highlighted any risks of longer term use of medication, he then introduces a 
concession to challenge this initial belief in stating, “apart from that we can’t state 
clearly” (lines 772-773). Finally, he qualifies the concession and reasserts the superiority 
of psychiatric knowledge by re-invoking an empiricist account of the scientific evidence 
over the shorter time span of five years (lines 773-775). This shift from a professional 
contingent account is a defensive function deployed to ward off criticism of the longer- 
term use of medication with children with ADHD. Rather than invoking a discourse 
about possible limitations (‘absences and silences’, Carabine 2000), Dr Pava makes a 
claim for contingent knowledge before reverting the discussion back to an area that is less 
disputable, as it is supported with empirical evidence.
Positioning
Although Dr Pava had previously invoked the empiricist discourse in evaluating the risks 
associated with medication, the interviewer’s question also specifically attended to 
“scientific research” (line 767). In using this question, I positioned myself as prioritising 
the empiricist account of knowledge in the evaluation of risk which may have pre-empted 
an equally empiricist response. However, Dr Pava then invokes a discourse of contingent 
knowledge, clinical experience, but uses the collective term “we” (line 770) which may 
serve to construct a wider membership category thus conforming to the more empiricist 
ideal of ‘generalisability’ to support his claims. This discursive feature can be seen to 
maintain his position as a knowledgeable clinician, which is shared by his 
contemporaries. Dr Pava can then be seen to do some work to locate himself back onto 
‘safer’ ground by reverting back to an empiricist account and by comparing this 
knowledge against “non pharmacological treatments” (line 775). This comparison is 
another example of interactive positioning, in which Dr Pava constructs a continuum of 
professional accounts of knowledge, he then uses it to place psychiatry as superior to 
other non pharmacological treatment approaches. Considering Dr Pava was aware that I 
occupied the' role of trainee clinical psychologist, his direct comparison between
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knowledges could be seen as a discursive strategy in which the professional category of 
psychiatry, is positioned as more knowledgeable than psychology.
The following excerpt was selected as it invokes both personal and professional 
contingent factors in relation to the diagnosis and treatment of ADHD.
Excerpt 7 (Transcript 6 -  Dr Kellev)
80: Mark: Right Ok (.) Til cover a little bit more of the
81: treatment in a second. You have made a differentiation 
82: between behavioural disorders and ADHD and the use of having 
83: it as a distinct disorder (.) ADHD. In your view does that 
84: make it (.) would you classify it as a mental illness?
(lines 85-95 o f Dr Kelley’s response are omitted here to facilitate the focus)
96: Dr Kelley: I
97: think most of the hhh most of the energy around the 
98: recognition and treatment of ADHD has come from erm has come 
99: from the mental health erm sciences and profession (.) it 
100: hasn’t come from paediatrics (.) it hasn’t come from other 
101: other branches and professionals (.) so it's a disorder (.)
102: it's erm and I think that it has to be called a disorder 
103: because it's erm it's on a continuum and therefore erm (.)
104: it's difficult to say what is and what isn't a disorder as 
105: behaviour is on a continuum and clearly erm there's no sharp 
106: cut-offs between having a disorder and not having a disorder 
107: it's at best a clinical guess.
My question has invoked a dimension of classification that may have been too general for 
the psychiatrist to respond to in empiricist terms. However, Dr Kelley appears to bring 
forth an empiricist account in stating the “mental health erm sciences and profession” 
(line 99) are responsible for the development of an understanding of ADHD. Perhaps to
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consolidate an empiricist account, Dr Kelley then appears to allocate responsibility of 
these findings through eliminating “paediatrics” (line 100) and “other branches and 
professionals” (lines 100-101). Having determined that the knowledge is based within 
the membership category of “mental health sciences and profession” he then uses 
syllogistic reasoning to deduce, “so it’s a disorder” (line 102). However, the reliance on 
the deployment of a more logico-deductive discourse is soon abandoned as his discourse 
shifts to a more personal contingent account and he speaks in the first person saying “I 
think that it has to be called a disorder” (line 102). Finally, in line 107, Dr Kelley attends 
to a professional account of knowledge by concluding, “it’s at best a clinical guess” (line 
107). When comparing the use of the term “clinical guess” to the possible alternative of 
clinical certainty, it is apparent that Dr Kelley constructs the accuracy of the diagnosis as 
dependant on the judgement of the individual clinician. Adopting a more macroscopic 
view of this passage illustrates how Dr Kelley initially attempts to use a more empiricist 
account to categorise ADHD as a mental illness/disorder. However, as he then moves 
towards using a more contingent account he challenges this as he progressively moves 
from a position of certainty to conceptualising ADHD as professional guesswork (for 
another example of competing personal and professional accounts see appendix 11 -  Dr 
Gola).
Positioning
A comparison between how Dr Kelley positions himself in excerpt 3, transcript 6 
(empiricist account) and excerpt 7, transcript 6 (contingent account) illustrates how 
psychiatrists can orient themselves with different accounts of knowledge. Davies and 
Harre (1990) point out that this is not an unusual process as all people frequently 
experience multiple and contradictory positions. However, an awareness of the different 
ways that psychiatrists ‘do’ knowledge may be important when investigating treatment 
approaches for ADHD. For example, Dr Kelley’s contingent account of the disorder is 
described as, “at best a clinical guess” (line 107). However, he refers to the empirical 
treatment approaches as “gold standard” (excerpt, 3, line 270), having used a rigorous 
research methodology (lines 271-272). This highlights a possible incongruence in his
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accounts of knowledge as Dr Kelley’s ‘convincing’ empiricist account of treatment may 
appear to be less conclusive when it is positioned alongside the professional account of 
clinical guesswork in determining a diagnosis.
A third example of the use of a contingent account of clinical knowledge can be seen in 
the following excerpt:
Excerpt 8 ("Transcript 10 -  Dr Wolf)
149: (.) if you’re doing research I
150: think that you probably need to do to find erm a further 
151: instrument other than the ICD ten and DSM four because they 
152: don't erm provide a quantitative rating (.) they give you 
153: the areas and leave the judgement. So if you wish to do 
154: research you wish to use some other instrument otherwise 
155: what you do is to use the general guidance to come to a 
156: clinical decision. Vm interested in the clinical 
157: judgements for a particular division.
This response followed my questions around the sources of knowledge that were used to 
determine if a child had ADHD. Dr Wolf acknowledges how research requires explicit 
procedures to provide a “quantitative rating” (line 152) to determine classification. This 
is a form of knowledge that maximises the use of numerical data associated with an 
empiricist account, which in turn minimises the value of the more subjective personal 
“judgement” (line 153). Next, in line 154, she uses the word “otherwise” to distinguish 
between the necessity to use instruments for research and to use “general guidance to 
come to a clinical decision” (lines 1550-156). This shift in perspective moves from an 
empiricist account, where ADHD is marked out as a special phenomenon that is best 
quantified, to a contingent account where a clinician’s judgement is guided by “general” 
factors. Dr Wolf then identifies the difference in classifying ADHD for research and 
clinical purposes in stating, “I'm interested in the clinical judgements for a particular
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division” (line 156-157). This shift aligns her more closely with a contingent account as 
she states that her own personal interests lie in clinical judgements. This serves to 
minimise the amount of emphasis that she places on the construction of knowledge using 
more standardised, empirical methods.
Positioning
In her discourse, Dr Wolf constructs and occupies different subject positions. Referring 
to the use of stimulant medication in the empiricist account (excerpt 1; transcript 10) she 
states, “the evidence is overwhelming that’s it's erm useful” (lines 327-328). This use of 
convincing empiricist knowledge then appears to be somewhat undermined when she 
occupies a more contingent position asserting, “ I’m interested in the clinical judgements 
for a particular division” (lines 156-157). This can be understood as Dr Wolf shifting 
from a reliance on research and empiricist knowledge for the treatment of ADHD, 
although as a clinician she appears to construct a contingent account as most useful in 
determining the disorder.
The contingent account - II 
Social contingent account ffamilial)
The analysis has looked at personal and professional contingent accounts of knowledge 
and how they compare with empiricist accounts. The next section will extend this to 
social contingent factors, specifically the influence that the child’s family has on the 
psychiatrists’ decision making.
Excerpt 9 (Transcript 9 -  Dr Wavne)
398: There are
399: parents who will say Tm not going to give my kids the 
400: medication" same way as that as the asthmatic child's 
401: parents may choose not to give that child drugs (.) that 
402: happens all the time (.) so you have to be resourceful and 
403: you have to work around the people that you are working with
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404: (.) so there’s no point just knowing about one treatment 
405: modality (.) if the gold standard doesn't work then you go 
406: for the silver standard. So yes you have to be mindful.
Dr Wayne makes a comparison with asthma (lines 400-401), in which an alliance appears 
to be formed between the treatment of ADHD and physical illness, to warrant a stronger 
case for medicating. Dr Wayne then uses “all the time” (line 402) to convey the 
frequency with which parents refuse medication on behalf of their child, which he claims 
to meet through being “resourceful” (line 402). He then talks of the need to move from 
the “gold standard” (line 405), a figure of speech associated with excellence that he uses 
interchangeably with medication (transcript 9, line 315, “medication is the gold 
standard”). With the parents preventing the child from having access to the gold standard 
intervention then Dr Wayne talks of going for the “silver standard” (line 406). Here it is 
apparent that he has constructed a continuum of excellence in which medication is placed 
ahead of the non-pharmacological interventions.
Positioning
The way in which a professional moves to a social contingent (familial) repertoire where 
the families’ values are acknowledged can be seen as positioning the professional as a 
person, “who recognises the importance of social context whilst still asserting the 
empiricist repertoire” (Haiper, 1994, pp. 137). This use of two positions can be seen as 
serving both personal and interpersonal interests as the professionals can maintain a 
position of competence, which is paradoxically strengthened through acknowledging the 
social context (Harper, 1994). Dr Wayne recognises that some parents may have an 
alternative (contingent) account of preferable interventions, but he maintains that the 
empiricist account of knowledge is “gold standard”. This appears to construct the 
empiricist account as the ‘correct’ account of knowledge although he is prepared to “work 
around the people that you are working with” (line 403).
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Moving between empiricist and contingent accounts 
Discourses of risk in intervention: a cost/benefit approach 
The exceipts already analysed indicate that empiricist and contingent accounts of 
knowledge are not mutually exclusive, but are deployed interchangeably to perform 
particular rhetorical functions. A further reading of the texts highlighted the way in 
which the shift between these accounts of knowledge was evident when the interviewees 
were speaking about the costs/benefits of using medication to treat ADHD, especially in 
relation to “risk”.
To put this excerpt in context, it followed from a discussion about where ‘blame’ for a 
child’s behaviour is located. Dr Wolf had ^previously asserted that using stimulant 
medication as an intervention for ADHD may create a more blame free environment 
(transcript 10, lines 464-471) and parents can be made to feel less guilty (lines 475-476).
Excerpt 10 (Transcript 10 -  Dr Wolf)
479: Mark: I see. So do parents have a favourable reaction to=
480:
481: Dr Wolf: =No no I don’t think they do, I think that many
482: parents are obviously horrified at the idea of erm putting a 
483: child on drugs (.) as indeed I fm- everybody must be (.)
484: it's it's not something to be done lightly it's something 
485: you erm you think about veiy seriously but erm you then 
486: consider- that’s where one’s clinical judgement about 
487: functional impairment comes in (.) you ask yourself how 
488: significant is the problem erm how is difficult it is for 
489: this child to manage this family to manage, what's likely to 
490: happen, erm if you do nothing at all .hhh and and you share 
491: that judgement making with the parents erm 11 don’t think 
492: any of us would lightly say that we are just there to dish 
493: out pills (.) it’s very much a question of talking about
338
The construction o f knowledge:
A  discourse analysis ofpsychiatrists’ therapeutic repertoires fo r  children with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder
494: what are the precise aims (.) what we really want out of 
495: this and and and very often parents are erm persuaded erm no 
496: that’s not quite right I hope I don’t go round persuading 
497: parents (.) .hhhh parents are often happy to do something on 
498: a trial basis (.) so you tiy and set up a reasonable 
499: experiment of what we are going to measure, erm what would be 
500: our outcome, what are we hoping to change, how are we going 
501: to make a judgement about that (.) etc.
In this excerpt Dr Wolf invokes both a familial and a personal account of the reaction to 
stimulant medication. Her statement in lines 481-483 uses the extreme term “obviously” 
which can be seen to move her view beyond question from any competing discourses 
about how parents are “horrified at the idea of erm putting a child on drugs”. Dr Wolf 
then just stops short of directly aligning her own personal beliefs alongside that of the 
parents (“as indeed I I’m-”) and constructs a more generalised membership category of 
“everybody”. This progressive shift is an example of how different contingent accounts 
of the risks of medication are brought forth to move from a parental, to a personal, to a 
very general set of beliefs. A further contingent account is then invoked, a professional 
account, in which Dr Wolf refers to “one’s clinical judgement” (line 486). This 
professional account of knowledge appears to do the work of negating her initial 
personal/emotional reaction that she shared with parents. This account does the work of 
disconfirming the other accounts that constructed the use of medication as horrifying, and 
with the use of “clinical judgement” a cost/benefit approach is deployed to begin to 
redress the balance. Dr Wolf then uses a three part list (line 488-490) to build a more 
persuasive case in attending to the difficulties experienced by the child and family. This 
list is contrasted with one possible response of doing “nothing at all” (line 490), an 
extreme case formulation that serves to maximise the value of using this intervention, the 
alternative being to leave the family to suffer. Dr Wolf then reintroduces the parents’ role 
in decision making by stating, “you share that judgement making with the parents” (lines 
490-491), before saying how parents are “persuaded” (line 495) by the professional.
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Although Dr Wolf retracts this statement as it may have served to judge this process as 
manipulative, she then asserts that “ hhhh parents are often happy to do something on a 
trial basis” (lines 497-498). This is an interesting statement. In this excerpt she initially 
constructs parents as being horrified about putting their child on drugs. She then said that 
she shared this horror, as indeed “everybody” (line 483) must. However, a shift to a 
professional account then appeared to do the persuasive work of moving parents from 
“horrified” to “happy”. The move from a personal/parental account to a professional 
account is then completed as Dr Wolf finally invokes an empiricist account in lines 499- 
501. The reference to “a reasonable experiment” (line 498) can be seen to warrant the use 
of medication as the process is now constructed as scientific, which in turn may suggest 
that it is safe and objective. However, the adjective “reasonable” may serve to ‘soften’ 
any ‘horrifying’ connotations associated with experimenting on children. Following this, 
the “reasonable” nature of the experiment is further attended to by way of a four part list, 
in which “measure”, “outcome”, “change” and “judgement” (lines 499-500) are used to 
construct the process as almost mechanical in its objectivity and thoroughness.
Positioning
Dr Wolf speaks in the first person about her perceptions of parents’ horrified reactions 
and in doing so orients herself alongside their position. Furthermore, her choice of the 
words, “putting a child on drugs” is a discursive strategy that clearly constructs an 
asymmetry of power between the psychiatrist and the child. It places stimulant 
medication within a membership category of “drugs” which can have a number of 
negative and abusive connotations. Half way through explicitly aligning herself with 
parents’ beliefs Dr Wolf (line 483) moves from a first person position to a more 
generalised second person narrative (line 485). This shift in orientation moves her from a 
critical position shared by parents to a position o f‘insider’ as she then speaks in terms of 
“one’s clinical judgement” (line 486). Having reoriented herself as a clinician, she 
indirectly assumes a position of an advocate of medication. Dr Wolf then works to 
construct parents as “happy” (line 497) to be party to this approach. Next, she speaks of 
the decision-making process as reliant on empiricist means, although she maintains the
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alliance between herself and the parents by using “we” (line 499-501) numerous times. 
As this excerpt develops, Dr Wolf constructs a larger membership category in which she 
positions herself alongside the parents and their concerns over medication. This helps to 
position her as an empathic practitioner who would not use medication unless it was 
absolutely necessary. Hence, Dr Wolf has done the work that allows her to talk about the 
necessity of medication without the danger of being seen as ‘uncaring’ or ‘insensitive’ to 
the needs of the child and family.
A closer look at the texts indicated that there were numerous examples of a move 
between empiricist and contingent accounts from each psychiatrist. The following three 
excerpts have been selected as they draw on the discourses of three psychiatrists as yet 
unmentioned. These analyses will inform the reader of some of the different ways that 
such a shift is achieved, however the analyses will be more limited due to the restrictions 
of space.
To place excerpt 11 in context, it followed from an enquiry about the longer-term 
treatment effects of stimulant medication, to which Dr Julalab stated that such effects 
were unknown.
Excerpt 11 (Transcript 5 -  Dr Julalab)
353: Mark: I wonder if that causes concern for parents and
354: clinicians?
355
356: Dr Julalab: Well I guess that's something that applies to
357: lots of different medicines one gives (.) erm and that’s why 
358: lots of different medications that were thought to be safe 
359: at some stage were prescribed and were discontinued a little 
360: bit later and some of them were medicines that were used 
361: routinely in psychiatry or in medicine (3) erm so (5)
362: science is not perfect and that's something that we have to
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363: live with and I don't think that it just applies to 
364: methylphenidate (.) erm there are others (.) very serious 
365: medications that were taken (.) you know that ones that were 
366: taken during pregnancy and the children ended up having limb 
367: abnormalities and erm erm so yes medicine is full of risks 
368: but but but there are also lots of benefits so one has to 
369: look at the bright side (Smiles/Laughs).
Dr Julalab constructs a normalising account of the risks that are associated with 
prescribing medication. This is achieved by using the extreme case formulation “lots” 
(lines 357 and 358), which serves to place knowledge of the longer-term effects of 
stimulant medication in the company of other medical interventions. She states, “science 
is not perfect and that's something that we have to live with” (lines 362-363), which 
closes down the debate on its risks and it normalises the inadequacies of science. Dr 
Julalab then constructs a relational norm or continuum in which an extreme case 
formulation is given in terms of “veiy serious medications” (lines 364-365) which 
resulted in “limb abnormalities” (lines 366-367). Bringing attention to the incontestable 
severity of this practice and the clarity of evidence as to the costs of using such drugs in 
pregnancy may assist in the construction of Dr Julalab as a reflexive and critical 
practitioner. However, it is noticeable that she attends to the risks o f ‘other’ disorders at 
the expense of talking about the risks associated with treating ADHD. In addition, at the 
end of the excerpt Dr Julalab disclaims her concession that “medicine is full of risks” 
(line 367) by stating, “but but but there are also lots of benefits so one has to look at the 
bright side (Smiles/Laughs)” (lines 368-369). This illustrates a more personal account of 
knowledge in which the costs are unknown so they cannot be assessed, whereas the 
benefits are known and are therefore attended to. The phrase, “look at the bright side” in 
line 369, provides a vivid image of the aspects of knowledge that are attended to, the 
benefits, whilst there is a noticeable silence or absence about the contrasting ‘dark side’, 
or the risks of treating ADHD with stimulant medication. The presence of ‘humour’ at 
the end of this passage may serve a particular function. Gilbert and Mulkay (1984) have
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indicated that humour can be understood as signalling the juxtaposition of two opposing 
discourses. Here, for example, there may be a contradiction between a reliance on 
science and an empiricist account and personal and professional concerns over attending 
to the benefits at the expense of recognising the potential costs/risks.
Positioning
In this excerpt the style of the question uses ‘ignorance’, which positions me as a naive 
interviewer. This approach is believed to be beneficial in giving voice to otherwise 
implicit assumptions (Willig, 2001). Dr Julalab then takes on a similar position in her 
response. It begins with “Well I guess” (line 356), a term that also expresses uncertainty, 
or a decision that is based on insufficient information. In this position, Dr Julalab is able 
to delegate responsibility to an unnamed, generalised third party that use ‘risky’ 
medication in stating “medications that were thought to be safe at some stage” (lines 358- 
359). This positioning serves to construct her as a person who is an interested onlooker 
who has no part in the application of risky medications.
The next excerpt followed on from an enquiry about how much is known about the 
effects of using stimulant medication over the longer term.
Excerpt 12 (Transcript 8 -  Dr Rubin)
436: Dr Rubin: (3) We know (.) we know securely, in over two year
437: periods of time, longer than two year periods of time it's not 
438: experimental (.) it's naturalistic. But there has been a 
439: lot of been a lot of follow up of kids erm (.) here we have 
440: done follow up of kids who were undertaking treatment,
441: showed the disorder really is a risk (.) without therapy.
Dr Rubin can be seen to create a contrast between two systems of knowledge, 
“experimental” and “naturalistic” (line 438). Having experimental knowledge appears to 
warrant it as correct and beyond reproach as Dr Rubin states, “we know securely” (line
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436). The use of the term “naturalistic” implies that the other, more contingent system of 
knowledge is less controlled. However its use begins to be qualified in the lines 438-441. 
Dr Rubin relies upon the term “lot”, which is a form of quantification often deployed in 
empiricist accounts of knowledge, to warrant the validity of the knowledge from “follow 
up of kids”. The cost/benefit relationship is then deployed in line 441 as the ‘cost’ is 
aligned with those who are “without therapy” and the “disorder” is spoken about as the 
“risk”. This reconstruction of the disorder as the risk, rather than the use of stimulant 
medication can be seen as attending to the benefits of medication whereas there is a 
noticeable silence or absence about the potential costs.
Positioning
Dr Rubin positions himself in a different way to Dr Julalab (excerpt 11). His statement, 
“we know securely” (line 436) positions him as an insider when it comes to the 
acquisition of knowledge about the risks of medication. Furthermore, the certainty of his 
response can be contrasted with Dr Julalab’s as he adopts a position holding ‘definite’ 
knowledge. Dr Rubin’s certainty about the knowledge of the risks of medication and his 
position as ‘insider’ constructs him as a person who is in a position of power. This 
position becomes even more apparent as he constructs an asymmetrical category 
membership between his status and that of the clients in calling them “kids” (lines 439- 
440). Hence, Dr Rubin is positioned as a person who holds the knowledge which 
influences what forms of treatment can be prescribed to the less empowered children.
Excerpt 13 was selected for analysis as it proved to be an exception to the other 
transcripts as Dr DePaul attends to the gaps in the empiricist account.
Excerpt 13 (Transcript 1 -  Dr DePauD 
310: Mark: Right, so there isn’t data on the long term
311: effects?
312:
313: Dr DePaul: No but it is proposed that you just keep
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314: going for years and years. The MTA is you know an elegant 
315: trial it's 560 whatever, 570 kids over 6 centres, over 
316: randomised 4 different erm treatments (.) erm up to 14 months 
317: with follow up at 20 months. That's way way the biggest,
318: way the longest (.) up till then either medication or 
319: behaviour treatments have only ever been tried for up to 3 
320: months you know (.) and no-one ever goes on Ritalin for just 
321:3 months. So you know there's huge gaps in our 
322: understanding. We are giving you know stimulants, Class A,
323: Amphetamines are Class A drugs you know (.) these are not 
324: (.) we are not playing around with Smarties.
Dr DePaul could be seen to move between empiricist and contingent accounts as he 
attended to the ‘lack’ of knowledge of long term effects of stimulant medication. In lines 
313-314, he begins with a more contingent account of institutional expectations of 
practice but he quickly contrasts this with an empiricist account. Dr DePaul qualifies the 
use of the MTA trial in referring to it as “elegant” (line 314), thus constructing it as a 
desirable and well designed. The quantifiable qualities of the empirical trials are then 
reflected in his narrative as he refers to them as “way the biggest, way the longest” (lines 
317-318) which serve to maximise the knowledge derived fiom the trials. However, 
having attended to the benefits of this trial in terms of the longer term effects of 
treatment, Dr DePaul then uses the extreme case formulation, “huge gaps in our 
understanding” (lines 321-322). This descriptive work serves to minimise the presence of 
a comprehensive and persuasive empiricist account, even with such “elegant” research 
trials, and attends to the absences in empirical knowledge. The way Dr DePaul attends to 
the benefits of empirical knowledge, before explicitly identifying the risks, can be seen as 
an exception when compared to excerpts 11 and 12. Lines 323 and 324 maximise the 
attention to risk as he positions stimulant medication alongside “Class A drugs”, putting 
them in a category of other drugs which can be associated with high risk. His last
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statement (line 324) accentuates the potential costs of using stimulants as he makes an 
ironic comparison between Class A drugs and a ‘harmless’ children’s sweet.
Positioning
In this excerpt Dr DePaul is positioned somewhere between the two previous psychiatrists 
(excerpt 11 and 12). That is, he shares Dr Julalab’s construction of the practitioner as 
‘uncertain’ in stating, “there’s huge gaps in our understanding” (lines 321-322). 
However, rather than positioning himself outside the scope of responsibility, similar to 
the case with Dr Rubin, he positions himself as an ‘insider’ who is aware of the limits of 
knowledge. This positioning appears to put Dr DePaul in the potentially less comfortable 
position of a practitioner with limited knowledge about the risks of medication but one 
that is still prescribing.
Temporal constructs of knowledge 
Knowledge cannot simply be considered as a stable condition, but is subject to 
transformations and reorganisations (Foucault, 1970). Foucault looked at the historicity 
of the concepts developed at a particular period of cultural history. The final section of 
the analysis is also concerned with the way in which psychiatric discourses use the 
concept of ‘time’. It will analyse the interaction between these temporal influences and 
the psychiatrists’ constructions of knowledge.
The following excerpts were taken from questions about the effects of the recent NICE 
guidelines on interventions in ADHD.
Excerpt 14 (Transcript 1 -  Dr DePaul)
447: (.) but now you've got a very
448: (.) NICE guideline (.) in fact a big wave within psychiatry 
449: saying you know "we should be giving it more". So you know,
450: in terms of prescribing it's freeing you up, but in terms of 
451: whether you should, you know try psychosocial interventions
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452: first, that gets harder and harder to justify
Dr DePaul identifies that there has been a change in practice in stating, “but now” (line 
447). He refers to the MCE guidelines as a “big wave” (line 448) within psychiatry. 
This use of imagery creates the rhetorical effect of a widespread movement that may have 
such momentum that it is unstoppable, and it is thus unlikely to be guided by other more 
subtle movements. The use of reported speech (line 449) is a rhetorical function that can 
serve to distance the speaker from the reported speech act, as it serves to acknowledge 
that there are competing versions of a ‘preferred’ treatment approach. Dr DePaul is not 
constructed as an objector to pharmacological intervention, but as an impartial 
professional who has the capacity to step outside of the guidelines to make an 
independent and informed judgement. However, the use of “we” in this example places 
him in the same category as those others in the field of psychiatry. In line 447, the word 
“now” indicates that there is evidence of a change in this way of practising that suggests 
that current constructions of knowledge are undergoing change. A consideration of the 
costftenefit approach to this change is invoked as he states that the MCE construction of 
‘best practice’ acts as an ‘agent’ to free up the psychiatrist to prescribe (line 450), 
although he explicitly states that the cost might be a reduction in using alternative, 
“psychosocial interventions” (line 451). His statement that this is “harder and harder to 
justify” brings in a continuum of difficulty, which runs alongside a parallel continuum of 
time.
Positioning
In this excerpt, Dr DePaul reports how he has been positioned by the guidelines and the 
current climate in psychiatry. These two factors are said to free up the psychiatrist to 
prescribe, but the reverse argument that he puts forward is that psychosocial interventions 
are harder to justify. The way in which Dr DePaul is positioned as somewhat powerless 
over the interventions that can be used for ADHD, could be understood to remove 
responsibility for the way he currently ‘has’ to practice, whilst attending to other 
treatment approaches on offer.
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The impact of the temporal dimension on knowledge can also be found in the following 
exceipt.
Excerpt 15 (Transcript 3 -  Dr Godfrey)
572: (.) a few years on
573: we have referrals from the school and the teachers have 
574: learned to recognise ADHD (.) erm obviously because they 
575: have been educated over the years they are much better at 
576: picking it up (.)
As with excerpt 14, Dr Godfrey uses the word “now” (line 572) to indicate that the 
temporal dimension has affected the way in which practice is understood. She then uses 
an estimate to quantify the amount of time in years (line 572) to draw a favourable 
comparison to how “teachers have learned to recognise ADHD” (lines 573-574). This 
also gives ADHD a past, or the implication that it has always been there, just not 
recognised. This statement attends to the temporal dimension in constructing ADHD not 
just as a medical condition, but one that can now also be applied in the educational setting 
too. This could be conceptualised as normalising the ‘disorder’, in the way that people, as 
well as medical professionals, are manoeuvred into ‘correct’ ways of thinking and 
behaving. The process of normalisation, that appears to have become more apparent with 
time, can be seen to create a knowledge that gradually becomes accepted as a ‘truth’, 
which subsequently makes it more difficult to challenge. Dr Godfrey talks of the teachers 
being “educated over the years” (line 575) which is a statement that illustrates how over 
time the boundaries of the knowledge of the ‘disorder’ have blurred significantly. That is, 
there is a role reversal in that teachers are said to have learned to “recognise ADHD”, the 
role that was formerly associated with the psychiatrist, and the teachers are said to have 
been “educated”, which is the role that they used to occupy.
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Positioning
Dr Godfrey refers to teachers being “educated over the years” (line 575) to recognise 
ADHD. She does not explicitly say who has been positioned as educator, however 
ADHD was previously classified as a ‘mental illness’ and it is therefore possible to 
assume that psychiatrists as well as other mental health professionals would play a 
substantial part in this role. With more professionals recognising ADHD (including 
teachers) they could be said to occupy positions of greater power over those that they are 
observing. As Mendez (1988, pp. 144) states, only those people who are in the 
appropriate position of power in a particular social domain can “bring forth psychological 
problems” so that they are accepted.
Chapter five - Discussion and overview
This section will progress from making links between discourses, the constructions of 
knowledge and subject positions, to a consideration of how these influence practice and 
subjectivity (stages 5 and 6 of Foucauldian discourse analysis). This section addresses 
the research aims 4,5 and 6 identified earlier:
4) what is the relationship between discourse, the construction of knowledge and 
power?
5) how do the discursive constructions and subject positions open up or close down 
opportunities for practice?
6) what are the consequences of taking up particular subject positions for the 
psychiatrists’ subjective experience?
Power/resistance and the relationship with practice 
The empiricist account
The empiricist account of knowledge is regarded by Foucault (1977) to be one possible 
account of events, but one that has become accepted as the ‘truth’. He asserts that
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empiricism has an ideological function to produce knowledge that has direct power 
implications, as when one claims an alliance with the ‘truth’ then that is a power play. 
However, it was not his intention to explain why power takes place, as this would begin to 
attribute the devices of power to a singular ‘author’. Instead he was interested in the 
effects power exercises. It is therefore the task of the discourse analyst to “discover how 
these discourses or regimes of truth operated in relation to the dominant power structures 
of a given society” (McNay, 1994, pp.54).
This analysis of the psychiatrists’ empiricist accounts of knowledge indicated that a 
particular version of events was put forward which would have a direct impact on clinical 
practice. This account knowledge is used most often to pronounce the ‘truths’ about the 
human condition (McHoul and Grace, 1993). Using the empiricist account, stimulant 
medication was constructed as the most ‘effective’ intervention for ADHD. This account 
of knowledge will have the opposing effect on the other, alternative forms of knowledge 
identified. Foucault (1980) called these alternative knowledges ‘subjugated voices’, those 
that have been disqualified as inadequate or naive, and are often ranked beneath science. 
These ‘other’ forms of knowledge will be discussed later, but it is worth noting how the 
more dominant, ‘official’ knowledges work as instruments of ‘normalisation’. They 
attempt to manoeuvre populations into ways of thinking and acting (McHoul and Grace, 
1993). Foucault called this process a ‘power relation’, in that methods of power in their 
‘modem’ form have assumed responsibility for the categorisation of children with ADHD 
and determined the ways in which clinicians ‘should’ intervene.
The effects of power are not to be thought of as negative, but as producing ‘reality’ and 
rituals of ‘truth’. However, as the empiricist form of knowledge appears to be the most 
dominant in terms of interventions for ADHD, the other subjugated forms of knowledge 
therefore hold less power. It is through the reappearance of this occluded set of 
disqualified knowledges, beneath the required level of scientificity, that criticism 
performs its work (Foucault, 1990). This is where the discussion will now turn its 
attention.
350
The construction o f knowledge:
A  discourse analysis c f psychiatrists’ therapeutic repertoiresfor children with attention dtfich hyperactivity disorder
The contingent account
A comparison between these two ways that the psychiatrists ‘do’ knowledge highlighted 
incongruence between diagnosis and interventions for ADHD. An empiricist account was 
often used to construct a convincing and indisputable case for the use of medication to 
intervene with ADHD. However a more contingent account of the diagnosis of ADHD 
was often deployed. Indeed, it became evident that the difficulties around making a 
‘formal’ diagnosis often resulted in the psychiatrists using their clinical experience and 
judgement. The value of this form of knowledge was clearly questioned by Dr Kelley’s 
assertion (excerpt 7, transcript 10,) that diagnosis was “at best a clinical guess”. This 
conveyed a reluctance to rely upon clinical judgement. In addition, others expressed 
more of a dichotomy between the uses of empiricist knowledge. This took the form of 
reliance upon contingent forms of knowledge to make a clinical diagnosis, whereas a 
more empiricist approach to diagnosis was valued to conduct research trials. This 
observation assisted in the deconstruction of accounts of knowledge as it attends to other 
versions that may have been subjugated. At times the empiricist discourse was 
constructed as ‘less valued’ in ‘real’ clinical work and of more relevance to research, thus 
reconstructing the dominant discourse of empiricism as secondary to contingent accounts 
in clinical settings. Furthermore, the way that some of the psychiatrists constructed 
diagnosis as more of a clinical judgement, but then relied upon an empiricist account of 
knowledge concerning intervention may question the ‘validity’ of both research and 
practice. This could be explained at two levels. Firstly if research trials were conducted 
on clients whose diagnosis is not determined ‘empirically’ then the generalisability of the 
outcome of the results would be in question as the participants may not be a 
‘representative sample’. With the difficulties around diagnosis (Taylor, 1994) it could be 
argued that the positive therapeutic effects of medication from research trials must be 
interpreted with caution as the participants may have inaccurate diagnoses. Also, 
therapeutic effects of stimulant medication are not unique to children diagnosed with 
ADHD (Santosh and Taylor, 2000) so the results would appear to be positive whoever 
was a participant.
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Secondly, if research participants are diagnosed in a different way to clients in the clinical 
population, then results of the former group may not represent the latter. This ‘misfit’ 
would mean that the ‘knowledge base’ derived from the research trials would be of 
limited clinical value.
The social contingent account (familial) of knowledge was also identified in the analysis. 
In the example given (excerpt 9), the parents’ contribution to the selection of intervention 
is constructed as an account of knowledge that is less valuable than the empiricist 
account. The psychiatrist does not construct the parental account as a valuable form of 
knowledge, but as a difficult response that has to be worked around. In doing this, the 
social contingent account of knowledge (familial) is nothing more than one discourse that 
is secured within the bounds of a more dominant, scientific discourse. This subjugation 
of a familial discourse could be described as a ‘relation of power’ (Foucault, 1979). It 
serves to make a division between types of knowledges which positions one form of 
knowledge over another. Again, this is central to issues of practice as the parental 
account of knowledge is constructed as ‘inferior’, which could have serious implications 
considering the extent of knowledge that parents may have of their child. In addition, in 
the identifiable struggle for power of doctors over patients (Foucault, 1981), a more 
subjugated familial discourse may remain unheard. This is an issue that has been 
identified in the social constructionist thinking around both family therapy and 
psychoanalytic approaches (Lamer, 2000). In contrast with dominant professional 
hierarchies of knowledge, these therapists aim to suspend their own ‘expertise’ to 
empower the families and work with the families’ own belief systems.
The effects of moving between empiricist and contingent accounts 
The two accounts of knowledge appear to be positioned on a hierarchy o f‘truth’, which is 
dominated by the empiricist account. However, power and resistance always operate in 
tandem (Foucault, 1977). In this case, the resistance that comes in the form of the 
contingent account could dislodge the empiricist account from the position of ‘truth’. 
Foucault describes this implicit threat as creating the need for the ‘truthfulness’ of certain
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discourses to be re-affirmed constantly. This was evident in the section of the analysis 
that identified the movement between empiricist and contingent accounts ofknowledge in 
relation to risks. This will have an impact on what can be said and done in practice.
The analysis of excerpt 10 (transcript 10) is an illustration of how competing accounts of 
‘knowledge’ are deployed in the power/resistance relationship. In reference to the risks 
of stimulant medication Dr Wolf deploys both a social contingent (familial) and a 
personal account ofknowledge to talk about the ‘horror’ of putting a child on drugs. As 
indicated in the analysis, Dr Wolf then moves to a professional account to disconfirm the 
initial account of medication as horrifying. Finally, there is one final shift away from the 
initial account as she deploys an empiricist account to construct medical interventions as 
a reasonable scientific experiment. This shows how a movement between accounts of 
knowledge are important in suppressing other resistant accounts, which in turn re-affirm 
the dominance of medical intervention.
This movement between the two accounts of knowledge would have implications in 
relation to practice. Both personal and social contingent accounts ofknowledge, in terms 
of the risks of giving children medication for ADHD, become subjugated discourses as 
they are marginalised by the dominant empiricist account. This serves to legitimate this 
mode of intervention despite the acknowledgement of considerable concerns to the 
contrary. This is an important point in relation to practice when one considers the 
potential/hypothesised risks of medication outlined in the introduction (Swanson, 
Cantwell, Lemer, McBumett, Pfiflner, and Kotkin, 1992; Breggin, 2000).
Alternative movements between the two accounts of knowledge are also apparent in 
psychiatrists’ discourses about risk. In excerpt 13 (transcript 1) Dr DePaul talks explicitly 
about how in the absence of empirical evidence, institutional influence, which is another 
form of contingent account, continues to actively support the use of medical interventions 
for ADHD. This is another example of the way that competing discourses, or those that 
are resistant to treating ADHD with medication are ‘silenced’ to reaffirm this approach as
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the ‘best’. This is an interesting ‘power play’ as without the empiricist account of 
knowledge to promote the medical approach an alternative account is brought forth to 
achieve the same effect.
The empiricist account was often constructed as paramount to ‘accurate knowledge’ in 
the treatment of ADHD, but empirical information was not always available. What 
replaced these absences? Risk could have been attended to more directly, however this 
would have given voice to ‘resistant’, previously subjugated discourses. Instead, the 
absences were often used to reaffirm the medical approach to intervention. When 
absences in the empiricist account of the longer-term risks of medication were identified, 
personal and professional contingent factors were often deployed to attend to the benefits 
only. This could be seen as a process that maintains the dominant discourse around the 
use of medication, which will occlude other interventions, including clinical psychology. 
Hence, the discursive constructions of knowledge around intervention will limit the 
possibilities for action within clinical practice whilst securing psychiatric power over the 
‘disorder’.
In accordance with Foucault’s thinking, this discussion of the relationship between 
discourse, knowledge, and power, does not intend to identify the psychiatrists as 
professionals that are in a position to ‘create’ power. Power is not something that is 
wielded by a particular person or group but a ‘discursive relation’. Power is located 
outside of conscious or intentional decision, and is believed to install itself. Subjects act 
as a channel for the flow of power as it circulates, or functions in the form of a chain.
This explanation of power can be used to help interpret the psychiatrists’ movement 
between the empiricist and contingent accounts of knowledge. That is, rather than the 
psychiatrists being seen to create a discourse that promotes the use of medical 
interventions for ADHD, they can be understood as being vessels of power. This 
explanation may go some way in explaining why personal contingent factors, such as 
concerns over the risks of medication, became discourses that were subjugated by other
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accounts. As dominant accounts of knowledge are constructed regarding the most 
‘effective’ interventions for ADHD, psychiatric power is installed and maintained by way 
of a self-verifying process. Positions that are ‘resistant’ to the dominant discourse are 
then subjugated through power plays o f‘truth’. Through this process alternative accounts 
of intervention are constructed as ‘inferior’, resulting in approaches such as clinical 
psychology being marginalised. Professions outside of the chain of power would then 
experience difficulty in being heard in relation to intervention approaches.
Temporal dimension
Constructions ofknowledge are neither absolutely fixed nor open to the fleeting changes 
of the moment (McHoul and Grace, 1993). In feet, Foucault (1980) showed how ‘truths’ 
are subject to change and reorganisations through turning the focus onto the historical 
development of concepts of knowledge. Unfortunately, there is insufficient space to 
uncover the archaeology of ‘knowledge’ in this discussion. However, the ‘temporal 
constructs of knowledge’, identified in the analysis section begin to contribute to the 
understanding of the fragility of such concepts over a snapshot of time.
This analysis of the temporal constructs of knowledge indicated that intervention 
approaches in ADHD appear to be in a state of transformation as medication is being 
recommended as the treatment of choice. The psychiatrists constructed a graphic image 
of the way that the momentum is gathering behind this approach. Research, 
governmental guidelines (NICE), and psychiatric practice and opinion are vessels of 
power that are strengthening the dominant empiricist account and in turn, medical 
intervention. As indicated by Dr DePaul (excerpt 14, transcript 1), the impetus behind 
using medical interventions has reorganised the psychiatrist into a position where 
employing psychosocial interventions is “harder and harder to justify”. This clearly 
marginalises psychological intervention as well as alternative approaches. Considering 
the absences around the empiricist account of risks for this choice of intervention and the 
‘personal’ concerns of the psychiatrists that were identified, this movement in the field of 
ADHD appears to be surprising if not alarming. However, as discussed, the psychiatrists
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should not be viewed as being in a position of omnipotence, but as vessels through which 
power flows, often silencing resistant, contingent constructions ofknowledge.
Discourse positioning and subjectivity
This section explores the relationship between discourse, positioning and subjectivity. 
Such ‘speculation’ is an important part of Foucauldian discourse analysis and is perhaps 
more acceptable than in other social constructionist approaches such as the discursive 
psychology approach (see Edwards and Potter, 1992). Having considered how discourse 
affects practice, subjectivity is concerned with what can be thought, felt and experienced 
from within various subject positions.
For example, many of the psychiatrists were positioned as clinicians who operated within 
the ‘rules’ outlined by the empiricist account. Being positioned within a discourse of 
empiricism allowed the psychiatrists to attribute responsibility to science for their clinical 
reasoning. In addition, such positioning can be seen to reduce any dissonance concerning 
the choice of interventions as the empiricist account of knowledge is positioned as 
superior to a contingent account. Therefore, the psychiatrists may not only disclaim 
responsibility for medicating children diagnosed with ADHD, but may actually feel less 
guilt about it too.
This was certainly evident with Dr DePaul (excerpt 13). Initially, Dr DePaul adopted a 
‘neutral’ position of ‘interested onlooker’ that may have felt comfortable as he was 
‘removed’ from a position of responsibility. He then repositioned himself as ‘insider’, a 
practitioner who is aware of the limits to knowledge around the medical approach to 
ADHD. This could be seen to evoke feelings of discomfort as he acknowledged absences 
in the empiricist account ofknowledge. However, in excerpt 14, Dr DePaul goes on to 
take up a position of powerlessness because, as time progresses, he ‘has’ to practice in the 
way that is ‘dictated’ to him. These positional moves may invoke feelings of helplessness 
in the psychiatrist as he feels that he must practise in a way that he is not comfortable
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with. In addition, despite his acknowledgements of discomfort, the removal of 
responsibility may leave him feeling less guilty about prescribing medical interventions.
By way of scientific data and ‘facts’, the empiricist account may also make available the 
position of ‘expert’ for the psychiatrist. This ‘expert’ position might serve to meet 
personal and professional needs, which will impact on perceptions of self-esteem. In 
reciprocal fashion, this positive self-evaluation will continue to contribute to the 
dominance of some versions ofknowledge over others.
Analytic reflections
Adopting a relativist approach makes it veiy difficult to justify one particular reading of a 
text as ‘better’ than others when using discourse analysis (Burr, 1995). It is important not 
to ‘close off the text to alternative readings, but to acknowledge that these research 
findings are open to other interpretations that are potentially, equally valid (Burman and 
Parker, 1993). To facilitate the evaluation of validity and reliability, specific measures 
were taken in this study (see method, reflexive box 4).
Part of the reflexive process central to discourse analysis is the researcher’s contribution 
to the study. This has been addressed throughout by considering my clinical experiences, 
positioning, and ethical reflections. Hopefully, offering explicit accounts of the text and 
clear interpretations has complemented this. However restrictions of space have limited 
the extent to which my own role in the research could be reflected upon. Otherwise, it 
would have been interesting to bring into the analysis pertinent ideological issues. For 
example, the method of discourse analysis is a social constructionist approach that moves 
away from traditional empiricist values. This shift in epistemology is mirrored in this 
study as empiricist accounts ofknowledge were deconstructed in what could be perceived 
as a ‘critical’ act. It could be argued that the epistemological framework could have 
predicted some of the results before the study was undertaken. However, it is unlikely 
that the different versions ofknowledge, their function and their implications for practice 
could have been predicted at the outset of the study.
357
The construction o f knowledge:
A  discourse analysis o f psychiatrists* therapeutic repertoires fo r  children with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder
To be able to use discourse analysis depends on the understanding of a difficult 
theoretical framework (Parker and Burnian, 1993). However, unlike analyses in 
traditional psychology, it cannot pretend to ‘discover’ things in the same ‘exciting’ way. 
This is partly because of the need to remain epistemologically consistent, which means 
accepting that there are no ‘truths’ only different versions. Researchers from other 
disciplines may criticise this approach in limiting the scope for new ‘discoveries’.
Furthermore, discourse analysis resists explicit ‘how to do it’ rules, leaving the approach 
open to the interpretation, but also to criticism. The absence of rules certainly had an 
impact on me throughout the research process. Managing the movement between more 
traditional mainstream ideas about what research is whilst attempting to remain within a 
social constructionist framework was an immensely consuming process. Also the move 
from a micro (analysis) to a macro (discussion) level examination of the discourses was a 
difficult transition to make, but a necessary one to understand implications for practice. 
Nonetheless, the further the interpretations are from the data at a micro level, the more 
open they are to criticisms around validity and reliability.
Finally, to ensure that this piece of research is more than an academic exercise, and so 
that it can begin to influential, it needs to be disseminated. The unmasking of subjugated 
and marginalised discourses needs to be extended beyond this analysis and actually 
applied to this completed study. There is often some resistance to publish qualitative 
research in mainstream psychology journals (Turpin, et al., 1997), however these are the 
forums where it will have the most impact upon clinical thinking and practice.
A further recommendation would be to apply the same research methodology to 
psychologists’ accounts of interventions for ADHD. This could explore whether there are 
alternative constructions of knowledge and whether this group of professionals are 
organised in the same way in relation to power.
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Chapter six - Conclusion
Using discourse analysis two accounts of knowledge were identified in relation to 
interventions for ADHD. The empiricist account was used to construct stimulant 
medication as the most ‘effective’ form of intervention. This appeared to be the most 
dominant, ‘official’ form ofknowledge. The second account ofknowledge, one that had 
previously been occluded was the contingent account.
Despite a reliance on an empiricist account for intervention, discourses of diagnosis were 
more reliant on contingent accounts. This highlighted an interesting ‘conflict’ between 
the two discourses. This raised questions about the ‘construction’ of the disorder, and in 
turn the ‘validity’ of the empirical accounts of interventions, and whether the research 
findings are applicable to clinical practice. By identifying this more marginalised account 
ofknowledge, the power of the dominant empiricist account began to be resisted.
Discourses of risk moved between the empiricist and contingent accounts ofknowledge. 
The psychiatrists invoked an empiricist account to counter the risk effects of medication. 
In the absence of empirical information a contingent account was then brought forth to 
achieve the same effect. This was another way that a dominant discourse, that of the 
positive effects of medical intervention, was attended to as the negative effects were 
minimised. This maintains the power of psychiatric intervention and further marginalises 
alternative approaches.
Psychiatrists’ movement between the two accounts ofknowledge was discussed in terms 
of them being the ‘vehicles’ rather than the ‘creators’ of power. This can go some way 
towards explaining the way that empiricist and even professional accounts ofknowledge, 
subjugated personal contingent concerns. Furthermore, psychiatrists can be seen as a link 
in the ‘chain of power’ as the dominant discourses of intervention for ADHD are 
maintained through research and governmental guidelines, as well as through psychiatric 
practice and opinion.
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Finally, the effects of these two accounts ofknowledge were considered in a temporal 
dimension. This indicated that the momentum behind medical interventions is increasing 
with time. The consequence of the strengthening of this dominant discourse is that 
alternative approaches to intervention are becoming harder and harder to justify. The way 
that the medical approach is dominating the field positioned some of the psychiatrists as 
powerless over how they practise. Nonetheless, as the responsibility over practise is 
assumed by higher professional bodies, the individual practitioner’s concerns are 
somewhat alleviated. This further subjugates personal contingent accounts thus feeding 
back into the self-verifying cycle of power.
It should be pointed out that discourse, knowledge and power do not create an 
impenetrable web that cannot be challenged and ‘developed’. Indeed, from this study it is 
evident that by giving voice to marginalised discourses, other versions of events begin to 
challenge the existing ones. However, it is worth noting at this point that Foucault 
cautioned against looking into the future and postulating which versions of events would 
be ‘better’ for society. He resisted making any universal political or moral judgements, as 
he was aware that what appeared to be change for the better often turned out to have 
undesirable consequences. Foucault’s main focus was to understand the ways that we 
understand ourselves so that we can begin to question their legitimacy and challenge 
them. In doing so, previously marginalised knowledges will be given voice and 
empowered. In keeping with Foucault’s ideas I would also resist the temptation to project 
these research findings into the fixture and make explicit recommendations about what 
‘should’ be the ‘correct’ version of events.
This study has ‘unmasked’ some of the knowledges that influence the choice of 
intervention for ADHD and the knowledges that create ‘reality’. More importantly, this 
study has endeavoured to give voice to those marginalised forms of knowledge whose 
resistance challenges prevailing inequalities of power.
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Appendix 2
Coded transcript
1:
2: Transcript 7
3:
4: Consultant Psychiatrist: Dr. Pava (Male)
5:
6 :
7:
8: Mark: So if I start with some quite general questions
9: around ADHD/hyperkinetic disorder just so we can establish a 
10: common understanding before going into some more detail 
11: about treatment. So could you tell me how you would 
12: describe ADHD or hyperkinetic disorder?
13:
—>BEGIN: Diagnosis. Empirical 
14: Dr Pava: Hyperkinetic disorder would be erm a child of
15: less than 7 having symptoms of hyperactivity, impulsivity,
16: inattention with or without oppositionality erm happening at 
17: both at home and at school erm but having an impairment as a 
—>MEMO: memo8
Definite terms used "HK would be”. The existence o f the "disorder" is unquestioned and 
the criteria clearly demarcated. Knowledge o f the constructs o f this disorder are used to 
bring it forth into existence and objectify.
18: result. That would probably be what was the official 
19: definition. And the ADHD definition is a more loose 
20: definition of that there, it can be happening only at home 
21: or at school a erm milder form of erm the character of the 
22: disorder.
->END: Diagnosis. Empirical 
23:
24: Mark: In your practice do you use one or the other or
25: both definitions?
26:
->BEGIN: Diagnosis. Empirical 
27: Dr Pava: I tend to use the diagnosis of the ICD-10
28: which is the hyperkinetic disorder but erm have used the 
29: term of ADHD in children who don't fulfil the criteria for 
30: ICD (.) but erm I think that the kind of cases that come to 
->MEMO: memo9
Empiricism still used but the suggestion o f different contexts meaning likelihood o f  
different diagnoses shows how the professionals have used administrative influences in a 
manner conducive to that culture to divide and treat these children.
31: the clinic where I work, I think do meet the criteria for 
32: hyperkinetic disorder, by the time they've reached me (.) so,
33: probably, in another setting I might have used the context of 
34: ADHD because kids don't meet the criteria of hyperkinetic 
35: but not in this clinic so much.
—>END: Diagnosis. Empirical 
36:
—>MEMO: memo 10
Mark warrants the constructed continuum o f problems.
—>BEGIN: Diagnosis. Empirical 
37: Mark: And this is the more severe end?
—>END: Diagnosis. Empirical 
38:
39: Dr Pava: Yes that's right.
40:
41: Mark: And so you mentioned the 3 main symptoms (.) I'm
42: just wondering how you judge thresholds when you are making 
43: a diagnosis.
44:
—>BEGIN: Diagnosis. Empirical 
45: Dr Pava: The basic idea is to have a look at whether
46: the inattention in keeping with whatever the age of the 
—>MEMO: memol 1
Social norms are used here to judge pathology by comparing the child (him) to his peers 
by age and mental ability. Pava may fend off criticism by then talking about a 
comparison across all domains is used to ensure that the child exceeds all social norms in 
all settings. This still suggests that it is a socially defined construct which may have be 
applied i f  behaviour is considered as socially acceptable (Harper 1994 pg 137).
47: child is (.) not only his chronological but his mental 
48: functioning. And whether it is in keeping with the context,
49: so it is not just to be taken as erm being overactive 
50: compared to his peers, compared to what you'd expect of his 
51: age range you know in the family, put together, so that 
52: would be the same in all of the domains of the symptoms (.)
53: erm and so, by necessity, most erm diagnostic processes for 
54: ADHD would include at least some understanding of what the 
55: cognitive level of functioning for the child is because you 
56: need to have that on board because the child could be 20 and 
57: functioning as a 5 year old and obviously the activity 
58: levels of a 5 and 10 year old are different so you need to 
59: take that on board.
—>END: Diagnosis. Empirical 
60:
61: Mark: Right, so you'd measure cognitive functioning as
62: well would you?
63:
64: Dr Pava: Yes as a part of the system the procedure
65: that would be done.
66:
67: Mark: And how do you measure that?
68:
-->BEGIN: Positioning psychology.Psychology as rescuer 
69: Dr Pava: Well yes I mean I the clinic we have the
—>MEMO: memo 12
Psychology positioned as assisting the psychiatrists in making a differential diagnosis. 
"Luxury" may also suggest that the psychologist is an appendage rather than a necessity 
in this arena colonised by medical practice. The collective term of "we" is used when 
talking about diagnosis which positions the 2 disciplines shoulder to shoulder - is this 
maintained in treatment bit?
70: luxury of having psychologists in the team so we do use the 
71: WISC and so on (.) most kids do get tested intellectually 
—>END: Positioning psychology.Psychology as rescuer 
72: and if we do find that there is no specific problem with 
73: intellectual functioning then we do go ahead and do further 
74: testing to make sure that they don't have any specific 
75: reading disability, or spelling or whatever (.) so it would 
76: be making sure that the construct of dyslexia doesn't exist 
—>MEMO: memo 13
A constructed quantity o f sufficient intellectual functioning.
—>BEGIN: Diagnosis. Empirical 
77: (.) so you can have normal intelligence and have problems in 
-->END: Diagnosis. Empirical 
78: reading and spelling or writing and that could be what's 
79: really the problem in a school context and leading to 
-->BEGIN: Diagnosis. Empirical 
80: behaviours which could be misinterpreted as ADHD. So that's 
81: part and parcel of what I think an ideal assessment would 
—>MEMO: memo 14
Part and parcel means an essential ingredient. His choice o f words position his clinic as 
"expert" and conclusive in it's judgements. Unlike others, he does an expert diagnosis in 
"every case" (EXTREME CASE FORMULATION - clear cut and non-negotiable).
82: include but it depends (.) I'm sure that not every clinic 
83: would have the luxury of being able to do it, but that would 
84: be what I would want to do in every case.
->END: Diagnosis. Empirical 
85:
86: Mark: Even with the luxury of being able to do a wider
87: assessment is it difficult to isolate ADHD from other 
88: comorbid factors?
89:
~>MEMO: memo 15
DISCLAIMER - concedes difficulty then uses empirical criteria to validate diagnostic 
accuracy.
—>BEGIN: Diagnosis. Contingent 
90: Dr Pava: Yes to some extent but usually if you've got
—>END: Diagnosis. Contingent 
—>BEGIN: Diagnosis. Empirical 
91: a child who has symptoms present before the age of 7, so 
92: we are talking about quite an early onset, and you are sure 
93: that a disorder like anxiety or depression isn't actually 
94: being able to explain the symptoms better than a label of 
95: ADHD then yes, you would go for the other label but 
96: otherwise I think that if you have someone got symptoms of 
97: all the domains to not have another disorder that could 
98: explain it better, whether it's depression, anxiety, or 
-->MEMO: memo 17
Introduces other psychiatric constructs and uses an elimination process to accept or 
reject the ADHD diagnosis. Being "sure" something else isn't present makes him sure 
that another "label" is appropriate. RHETORIC OF ARGUMENTATION (Edwards and 
Potter) - By an impersonal operation o f logic - process o f elimination. I f  A = B then C.
99: whatever or intellectual disability (inaudible) but apart 
—>END: Diagnosis. Empirical 
100: from that if you are fairly sure that everything is fine and 
101: the child still exhibits these symptoms in the context of 
102: both home and at school (.) erm then sometimes they show it 
103: only in the clinic.
104:
105: Mark: Okay, with someone who is showing fairly pure
106: symptoms of ADHD across different setting, quite pervasive,
107:1 wonder if that is considered as a mental illness or not?
108:
109:
-->BEGIN: Diagnosis. Mixture 
110: Dr Pava: Yes I think it is, I personally think that it
111: is a mental disorder just like anything else. It would be 
112: wrong to assume that it is wrong to assume that it's just a 
113: thing that doesn't have a basis for it (.) it could be (.)
114: part of the problem is that many people refuse to give the 
115: label or don't want to label the child because they think 
—>MEMO: memo 18
This whole passage is full o f interesting rhetorical strategies. He goes from a personal 
opinion that it "is" a mental illness to an objective account o f it being "wrong" to not 
recognise it, to extreme lay terms around "lumping symptoms" together to fend off 
criticisms o f a non empirical procedure, to forming an alliance with the non-psychiatric 
and medically accepted diabetes (with envy at the simplicity o f their diagnosis) E.C.F - 
The absence o f a "very specific" test could be interpreted as a weakness in diagnosis in
empirical terms but he defends the absence o f this by saying that the failure to test other 
psychiatric problems is a marker o f comparability justifying this procedure. Brings an
open question into the more secure arena o f medical model.
116: it’s just a badly behaved child or a child who has got some 
117: symptoms and we are wanting to lump them into a diagnosis 
118: but I think it's more than that, I think that these kids 
119: really do have a problem and need to be treated for it just 
120: as much as a child with diabetes. No-one asks the questions 
121: then just because you've got a test that shows you that 
122: blood sugars are high that's why it suddenly came to be seen 
123: as a disorder, whereas in ADHD because we do not have any 
124: specific test for it (.) erm very unlikely to develop a test 
125: that is very specific for ADHD erm but that's the same for 
126: most psychiatric problems, there is no diagnostic test for 
127: almost any psychiatric disorder.
—>END: Diagnosis. Mixture 
128:
129: Mark: I suppose I'm thinking that with something like
—>MEMO: memo 16
Mark has introduced his own beliefs which may be contrary to those held by the 
interviewee.
—>BEGIN: Diagnosis. Empirical 
130: diabetes that is very much located within the individual,
—>END: Diagnosis. Empirical 
131: where with ADHD there seems to be (.)
132:
133: Dr Pava: (.) well I think that that's the problem,
134: people presume that diabetes is located within the 
135: individual actually even with a disorder that is an 
~>MEMO: memo 19
Substitutes the illness again to find a suitable comparison in which a 3 part list can be 
achieved. PSEUDO EMPIRICISM: Other illness/treatments brought in to place ADHD 
into a membership category.
-->BEGIN: Diagnosis. Empirical 
136: infection (.) forget diabetes but even tuberculosis which is 
137: clearly an infection (.) even there you have all 3 
138: components you have a biological component, a psychological 
139: component, and a social component. For example if you've 
—>END: Diagnosis. Empirical 
140: got tuberculosis you can end up having (.) the biological 
141: thing would be the bacteria, and the psychological would be 
142: the coping mechanism and how he copes with stress and that,
143: and if the immune system (.) if you are stressed the 
—>MEMO: memo21
Shifts in knowledge - The psychiatrist chooses not to discuss his reasons why ADHD is a 
mental illness but actually attempts to argue his point by moving out o f the field o f mental 
illness and into the field o f medical illness. He then applies his medical understanding 
(empirical) to mental illness which bases his arguments on a very different diagnosis.
144: immunity will be worse and you have a higher chance of 
145: developing illness with tuberculosis, and then of course 
146: there's the social thing in that if you are in an 
147: overcrowded situation where someone else had tuberculosis 
148: it's because of the overcrowding that you are being exposed 
—>BEGIN: Diagnosis. Mixture 
149: in the first place (.) so you've got, even in a very very 
150: medical model of illness you have all 3 components so I 
—>MEMO: memo20
He sets up a continuum o f a "very very" medical model and asserts that he recognises the 
extreme (ECF). He then wards off criticism o f a medical model by placing his ideas at a 
milder end o f it. Moves from empirical to personal opinion which strengthens 
empirical opinion as balanced (Harper 1994 - p i  37).
151: don't see why you can't use the same understanding for a 
152: disorder like ADHD (.) but it has all 3 components I think.
—>END: Diagnosis. Mixture 
153:
154: Mark: And which of those is the major factor in the
155: cause of ADHD?
156:
157: Dr Pava: I mean I think that's going to be a very erm
158: difficult one to erm answer (.) because I don't think that 
—>BEGIN: Diagnosis. Empirical 
159: ADHD is a unitary or a homogenous group, I think it has 
160: subsets in that (.) erm having different roots into the 
—>MEMO: memo22
He acknowledges how he cannot answer the question, speaks o f the higher potential for a 
biological cause, then acknowledges the importance o f social interactions, almost "rules 
out" the uniform statement, andfinally despite having poor evidence o f one cause states 
that on top o f little evidence he thinks it is biological. SHOW CONCESSION - i) 
potential to be biological (ii) challenges own statement (iii) qualifies and reasserts initial 
belief. This process strengthens own position.
161: common syndrome (.) presentation. I think that the 
—>END: Diagnosis. Empirical 
162: hyperkinetic disorder, the more severe one that we see, the 
163: ones we make diagnosis of, I think that has a higher 
164: potential to have a biological (.) route erm and even then 
165: would have psychological, social erm you know interactions 
166: with that (.) so I think that would be more in that group 
—>BEGIN: Diagnosis. Empirical 
167: where it was to (.) someone there who's having erm a less
168: severe form of ADHD and if it is only in the context of home 
169: and not elsewhere then that situation may be due to the fact 
-->END: Diagnosis. Empirical 
170: of parenting or interactions (.) might play more of a role 
-->BEGIN: Diagnosis. Contingent 
171: in that particular subset of kids so I don't think that we 
172: can rule out and say (.) give a uniform statement saying 
173: that it is more biological than (.) but I do think that it 
174: has biological underpinnings erm.
-->END: Diagnosis. Contingent 
175:
176: Mark: And those biological or neurological factors would
177: they be a predisposition of ADHD or might the social 
178: environment actually shape the neurological functioning?
179:
-->BEGIN: Diagnosis. Empirical 
180: Dr Pava: It it you can have both erm I mean it's a
181: fallacy to believe that genetics doesn't play a role in the 
182: environment because we know that it does and parents of 
183: children with ADHD at least 1 in 4 to 1 in six who have 
184: diagnosed ADHD themselves, if you've got a parent with 
—>END: Diagnosis. Empirical 
185: undiagnosed ADHD then they're going to be inconsistent in 
186: parenting (.) they're going to find it more difficult to 
187: control their temper and erm so on and so forth. So you're 
188: going to have an environment that is not ideal for the child 
189: anyway but why that environment came about is probably the 
->BEGIN: Diagnosis. Contingent 
190: biology of the parent so as to whether it is environment or 
—>MEMO: memo23
This suggest that it is down to personal view. He moved from being definite about 
biology to accepting that it is personal view 
191: biology I think is a moot question, I think that there is a 
192: contribution of both erm it just depends on how one views it 
193: and what particular child is in front (.) and it is almost 
—>END: Diagnosis. Contingent 
194: impossible, I think, to look at a child and say that there is 
195: this much biology in this child and this much hyperactivity 
196: in this child I think that there would be an interplay 
197: between multiple factors.
198:
199: Mark: That's interesting that you were saying about it
200: depends how one views what determines cause and erm 
201: thinking about the genetic lineage, through erm families, I 
202: suppose that someone from a more psychodynamic background
203: may say that it is to do with more intergenerational 
204: patterns erm and psychosocial factors rather than it 
205: necessarily being biological.
206:
207: Dr Pava: Well I think that erm I'm not of the opinion
208: that you can explain habitability of the (.) because ADHD,
—>BEGIN: Diagnosis. Empirical
209: the genetics of ADHD is one of the most highly heritable erm 
210: that we have got in psychiatric disorders, apart from autism 
211: ADHD is the next highest heritable condition that we have 
->END: Diagnosis. Empirical
212: (.) and in terms of the intergenerational hypothesis from a 
213: psychodynamic view I don't think that that would stand the 
214: test in terms of the 80% that we are talking about (.) and I 
215: suppose that the other thing is that in terms of the 
216: psychodynamic view of ADHD, we really do not have much to 
217: suggest that that's a causal link (.) it modifies I think in 
218: terms of what the outcome would be but I don't think that 
219: it's the causal link to producing the disorder.
220:
221: Mark: Right, I see yes. Okay now if we could move on to
222: treatment from there, it seems like a good place to do that,
223:1 wonder which forms of treatment you would advocate for 
224: this disorder?
225:
-->BEGIN: Intervention. Empirical
226: Dr Pava: Well I think that the whole support from (3)
227: erm research is for medication (.) that's stimulants in 
228: treating ADHD erm especially if it is hyperkinetic disorder 
—>END: Intervention. Empirical
229: then I think we should go with medication as treatment for a 
—>BEGIN: Positioning psychology.Psychology as abuser 
230: child with hyperkinetic disorder diagnosed and not waste 
—>MEMO: memo24
Following difficulties o f diagnosis, he states that treatment is certain once diagnosed. 
This suggests the partly contingent process o f diagnosis is then formalised and the 
treatment response automatic.
231: time using non-pharmacological treatment with that 
232: particular sub-group of kids (.) not if you are talking 
—>END: Positioning psychology.Psychology as abuser 
->BEGIN: Intervention. Empirical
233: about a less severe erm group or a child who is pre-school 
—>MEMO: memo25
These criteria fit in with the administration o f the culture ofprofessionals. Logical steps 
proposed (RHETORIC OF ARGUMENTATION?)
234: and having symptoms (.) then in that particular group I 
235: would probably go for behavioural intervention first and add 
236: medication if it doesn't erm if it is insufficient. I think 
—>END: Intervention. Empirical 
237: social skills training will have to be used as part and 
238: parcel with most kids erm irrespective of whether you use 
239: medication or not (.) so and if you've got symptoms of only 
240: at school and not at home then I would still think that 
241: medication has a role but in terms of education and looking 
242: at if they have specific spelling or reading or learning 
243: difficulty that is actually hampering their attentional 
244: process that would have to be tackled specifically (.) and 
—>BEGIN: Intervention.Mixture
245: similarly, if it is home specific and not happening at school 
->MEMO: memo26
Is this more about the child fitting with the way professionals have carved up treatment 
approaches - but he acknowledges the child as central.
246: then in that context again looking at parenting and working 
247: around that as well so it would have to be viewed in the 
248: context of what's the particular profile of the child.
—>END: Intervention.Mixture 
249:
250: Mark: That's interesting, so if it was either one or the
251: other, home specific or school specific, there is still a 
252: case for using medication even though the child shows that 
253: in other environments they don't show these symptoms?
254:
—>BEGIN: Intervention. Empirical 
255: Dr Pava: Yes because the thing is that erm from
256: research and everything, if you look at them in great detail 
257: it is to do with differing different thresholds for 
258: reporting(.) a to whether the child has symptoms what 
—>END: Intervention. Empirical 
—>BEGIN: Intervention. Contingent 
259: setting or not, for example, if you look at the Asian sub- 
260: population in boys parents would report less hyperactive 
261: behaviour (3) even though it's the same amount of 
-->MEMO: memo27 
social/cultural contingent factors 
262: hyperactivity because the threshold is higher in certain 
263: erm (.) situations but if you got a class where most of them 
264: are disruptive then a child with ADHD could still be 
265: considered in the context of an EBD school, to be okay. So a 
—>END: Intervention.Contingent 
266: teacher's rating of the hyperactivity of that child would
—>BEGIN: Intervention. Empirical 
267: not be the true representation of the accuracy levels of 
—>END: Intervention. Empirical 
268: that child (.) so you have to take that in context (.) so 
—>BEGIN: Intervention.Mixture
269: erm do we take home specific and school specific? It's a 
270: reported measure of a parent and teacher and when you go to 
~>MEMO: memo28
Considering the talk on Asian cultures the psychiatrist may be saying that the 
professional culture has superiority in identifying symptoms/what is socially acceptable. 
Ties in with Harper 1994 - flexibility o f criteria - moving between emp/cont accounts. 
271: greater detail to see if the child actually exhibits other 
272: symptoms of ADHD in the other settings, they really do. It 
—>END: Intervention.Mixture
273: is very rare to find a child who has no symptoms in the 
274: other settings. So that's partly the reason why I think (.)
275: erm it's just thresholds and manifestations they're more in 
276: one setting and of course a lot when you are talking about 
277: symptoms being less in schools it is in the context of the 
278: child having already been treated with medication. The 
279: teachers have a better chance to see a child who is better 
280: behaved and able to concentrate more because the medication 
281: is in the system and he is in school and he comes out and 
282: goes home but that time the medication is run out of his 
283: system and the report from the parent is definitely going to 
284: be by definition different from that of the school (.) and 
285: that shouldn't be viewed as being home specific and a 
286: problem at home (.) it's partly because the medication that 
287: we use is run out.
288:
289: Mark: so (3) you sound pretty sure of the effects of
290: medication, especially with those at the more severe end of 
291: ADHD, I wonder how that knowledge came about, how we know 
292: this?
293:
—>BEGIN: Intervention. Empirical 
294: Dr Pava: I mean if one looks at research it is
295: probably the largest research area in child psychiatry is 
296: whether stimulants work in ADHD (.) in this point in time 
—>END: Intervention. Empirical 
-->MEMO: memo29
Empirical proof o f medication working. Doing unquestionable knowledge/practice. 
—>BEGIN: Intervention. Empirical
297: even the most rigorous critics of whether medication works 
298: have had to accept that stimulants do work in ADHD (.) the
299: response rates are roughly between 65-75 so it would be 
300: around 70% that respond to stimulants, it's not that 
—>END: Intervention. Empirical 
301: everyone responds to it but if you don't respond to one 
302: stimulant in an ideal dosage then another stimulant might 
303: still respond (.) so it's not just that if you try one 
304: stimulant and they haven't responded that means that they 
—>BEGIN: Intervention. Empirical 
305: won't respond to another (.) so if you use all, 2 or 3 of 
306: the stimulants at different times you actually get a 
307: response rate at about 90 to 95 % that respond to medication 
308: (.) so the findings are robust and we are we are talking 
—>END: Intervention. Empirical
309: about short term response and that is the other thing with 
310: stimulants, they are usually methylphenidate, you see a 
311: response within 30 minutes so you don't need to wait for 
—>MEMO: memo30
Moved from the strong evidence argument to a clinical one to bring in parents and 
teachers as witnesses.
-->BEGIN: Intervention.Contingent 
312: days to see change (.) you just give the medication in doses 
313: and usually you give the parents or teachers a ring to find 
—>BEGIN: Positioning psychiatry.Psychiatry as rescuer 
314: out what happened and the child is so different (.) so it's 
315: that dramatic.
—>END: Intervention.Contingent 
-->END: Positioning psychiatry.Psychiatry as rescuer 
316:
317:
318:
319:
320:
321:
322:
323:
324:
325:
326:
327:
328:
329:
330:
331:
332:
333:
Mark: Right. With such a high response rate of 90-95 %
0
Dr Pava: When you use different types of stimulant.
The average would be around 70 so you've got around 30% who 
don't respond and then you use a different stimulant and of 
that 30% you would improve it of another about 20%.
Mark: So it has a high impact on these children with
ADHD. Does it also have a significant impact, this drug, on 
children who haven't got ADHD?
Dr Pava: Yes medication in terms of stimulants would
have an improved attention span for those who would have 
inattention due to other reasons too. For example if you 
have a child who has got erm head injury having inattention, 
medication would help you with that condition so it's not
—>BEGIN: Diagnosis. Mixture 
334: that (.) response to medication is by no means a 
—>MEMO: memo31 
A criticism o f the practice-theory linkI 
335: diagnostic tool at all for ADHD (.) it's not.
—>END: Diagnosis. Mixture 
336:
337: Mark: I was wondering that (.) how if ADHD is so
338: effective with (.) sorry if medication is so effective 
339: children with ADHD and it is also effective on children 
340: without ADHD, what does the drug actually do to the child? 
341:
—>BEGIN: Intervention.Mixture
342: Dr Pava: I mean in terms of what medication does there
343: are lots neurochemical things that it does but erm one of 
—>END: Intervention.Mixture 
~>BEGIN: Intervention. Empirical
344: the things that recently has been erm reported about is what 
345: happens to children with ADHD, their brains is that normal 
346: development (.) if you look at normal brain development in 
347: children between the ages of 4 and 22, erm normal 
348: development and then look at what happens in ADHD there are 
349: significant differences in how the brain develops and erm 
350: for a start children with ADHD have a smaller brain there 
351: are parts of the brain where there are differences of up to 
352: 14 to 16% in size for example the cerebellum is smaller by 
353: 14 to 15% compared to a normal child, in ADHD. SO what's 
~>END: Intervention. Empirical 
354: been done is they've looked at erm erm brain size of 
355: children who have been treated with medication and those who 
356: haven't' and what's been shown clearly that instead of 
357: medication having a negative impact on the brain 
358: development. In fact those who have been treated with 
359: medication actually the brain develops more like a normal 
360: brain compared with the ones who haven't been given 
361: medication (.) so that's part of the reason why I think that 
362: medication really does have a robust erm and a role to play 
363: in treating the disorder.
364:
365: Mark: Right I see.
366:
—>BEGIN: Intervention.Mixture 
367: Dr Pava: So I'm not saying that erm medication is
-->MEMO: memo32 
Disclaimer - is medication everything?
368: entirely (.) the answer to everything but I think that it 
369: does have a significant role to play and also ADHD is one of 
—>END: Intervention.Mixture
370: the few conditions which has erm low response rate to 
371: placebo so compared to a lot of other disorders, for example 
372: depression where you have quite high rates of placebo 
373: response, you give them a non-active drug and they respond,
-->BEGIN: Intervention.Mixture
374: 25 to 20 % respond but with ADHD you have a very low placebo 
-->MEMO: memo33
Introducing other disorders to justify treatment. Also to fill the gaps o f non-knowledge to 
maintain superiority.
375: response (.) so it can't be because of it is a pill it has 
376: to be something that the pill does.
—>END: Intervention.Mixture 
377:
378: Mark: Was the pill designed specifically to target ADHD?
379:
-->BEGIN: Intervention.Mixture
380: Dr Pava: In terms of erm...no. Stimulants were not 
381: designed for ADHD it was actually produced in the past for 
382: medical purposes (.) it was being used for narcolepsy (.) so 
383: that was what it's original use of stimulants were erm but 
384: that doesn't mean much because there are lots of medication 
—>MEMO: memo34
This knowledge is identified to be non-specific but then it is fiercely guarded by bringing 
in other treatment approaches as a point o f reference. So this maintains the legitimacy 
but only against other psychiatric practices - are such discourses that "work" beyond 
question?
385: and I think the most recent one is Ibuprofen, which is just a 
386: painkiller, which has been proven to have an immediate effect 
387: on Alzheimer's but that doesn't mean anything in terms of 
388: whether the drug was first discovered or used for one 
389: disorder and whether it has any implications in terms of 
390: whether it produces effects you know on another.
-->END: Intervention.Mixture 
391:
392: Mark: Right, there seems to be a difference there to me
393: in that although a lot of the evidence around how effective 
—>BEGiN: Intervention.Mixture 
394: it is, is in, and is looked at in a very scientific 
395: framework whereas the actual development of the drug was not 
396: as scientific as the current trials=
->END: Intervention.Mixture 
397:
398: Dr Pava: =1 mean the development of the drug anyway
399: anyway has got nothing to do with the disorder because it 
400: was not (.) the disorder didn’t exist at that time when the 
401: drug was there. The diagnosis of ADHD came much later it is 
402: only a diagnosis that has come in the late (inaudible) and 
403: it is in the 80s that the diagnosis came into being.
404: Stimulants have been there since the 50s.
405:
—>BEGIN: Intervention.Mixture
406: Mark: So the diagnosis almost fits onto the drug, rather
407: than the other way round?
-->END: Intervention.Mixture 
408:
~>BEGIN: Intervention.Mixture 
409: Dr Pava: No no no I don't think that's right at all
410: that that's wrong to believe that drugs are made with a 
411: purpose for a particular disorder all the time (.) you have 
—>END: Intervention.Mixture
412: drugs that are made for something else which they then find 
—>BEGIN: Intervention.Mixture
413: also works for a typical thing (.) like now there's Viagra 
414: which was designed for impotence and and and is an 
415: aphrodisiac for some but now you realise that it actually 
—>MEMO: memo35
Bringing in another disorder/treatment to validate this one. He states that drugs and 
diagnosis are independent completely. This discourse attempts to maintain an empirical 
knowledge base and the power o f psychiatry even though it appears to undermine the 
theory-practice link.
416: works for diabetic neuropathy (.) but nothing to do with how 
417: it was produced so I don't think that drug development and 
418: whether the diagnosis already exists or not (.) erm I don't 
419: think that it needs to follow from one to the other at all.
420: They are independent completely.
~>END: Intervention.Mixture 
421:
422: Mark: And if they are independent processes does that
423: question the typical theory to practice link, is practice 
424: creating the theory?
425:
426: Dr Pava: No I don't think that either basically
427: because erm in terms of the availability of the drug (.)
428: (.) this is a drug that is already available in the market 
429: for treating a particular condition ok (.) and this 
-->MEMO: memo36
Mendez - bringing forth a pathology. Pava chooses not to say "when we created it" 
objectify the disorder.
—>BEGIN: Diagnosis. Empirical 
~>BEGIN: Intervention. Empirical 
430: condition of ADHD when it came into being it was purely 
~>END: Diagnosis. Empirical 
—>END: Intervention. Empirical 
431: about how and why and what the neurochemical basis was and 
432: what is the dopamine hypothesis for ADHD (.) and what the 
433: hypothesis was that there is no dopamine in the brain in 
434: certain parts of the brain (.) and that was how they looked 
435: for a drug that would create dopamine and what was available 
—>BEGIN: Intervention.Contingent 
436: was stimulants and that's how methylphenidate was used so I 
437: don't really think that using a drug that was there before,
438: after a disorder necessarily has any links at all. We need 
—>END: Intervention.Contingent
439: to have a theory to first try why you want to use the drug,
~>BEGIN: Intervention.Mixture
440: it's just the dame with Viagra or erm whatever, it's the 
441: reason why you end up using it in a very different condition 
—>MEMO: memo37 
Pseudo-empirical 
442: like that (.) you know it's got nothing to do with thing, it 
443: is because they knew that this particular drug increased 
444: blood flow where there were restrictions and low blood flow.
-->END: Intervention.Mixture
445: So the neuropathy would mean that there was restricted blood 
446: flow and that's how the hypothesis of using that in another 
—>BEGIN: Intervention.Mixture
447: condition is the same thing in ADHD. So I don't think that 
448: necessarily makes it less scientific, or less biological, or 
449: less of a disorder as such (.) it's interesting that it 
—>MEMO: memo38
Not a matter that is worthy o f thought. Close down debate. Not attend to this as it 
criticises theory practise doctrine. Silences and absences.
450: happens at different times erm but apart from that I don't 
451: give it much thought.
~>END: Intervention.Mixture 
452:
453: Mark: When we were talking earlier you mentioned how
454: there may be some psychodynamic explanations for some of 
455: this but you were saying that there was not much convincing 
456: research in about them. I wonder if with the amount of 
457: convincing research that you have mentioned around the use
458: of methylphenidate, whether that has suppressed other 
459: medical and non medical areas which may produce less 
460: controversial ways of treating ADHD=
461:
->BEGIN: Intervention. Empirical 
462: Dr Pava: =No I don't think (.) I think it's because
463: the the the (.) if you look at the evidence base for non- 
464: pharmacological treatment we have very little to suggest 
465: that anything works erm to the extent of medication. Now 
466: even in the larger a study of the MTA trials which is new it 
467: shows that psychological interventions work but much less 
—>BEGIN: Intervention.Contingent
468: than medication. Erm so if you’re looking at it from a cost 
—>END: Intervention. Empirical 
469: effective perspective (.) the cost effective view of 
470: psychological intervention erm in a child with ADHD (.) then 
—>MEMO: memo39
Psychology not cost effective - this is contingent discourse that used in addition to avert 
this treatment approach.
471: if you are talking about the core symptoms of ADHD,
472: inattention, hyperactivity and impulsivity, then the answer 
473: is no, it is not cost effective to use psychological 
474: interventions with this particular group when you can use 
475: medication and get much better responses, ok. And in terms 
—>END: Intervention.Contingent 
476: of research, which is not a question of suppressing or 
477: anything, people are working on non-pharmacological 
478: interventions that were lower and have done for a long time 
—>BEGIN: Intervention. Empirical 
479: and erm erm (4) it's only the fact that nothing seems to 
—>MEMO: memo40
Psychology as hopeless for ADHD. But it is not as simple as what works but also within 
the economic constraints that dictate successful interventions.
480: work that prevented it from becoming mainstream practice 
481: rather than it being the other way round. Because even now,
—>END: Intervention. Empirical 
—>BEGIN: Intervention. Empirical
482: lately people have gone back to looking at Pavlovian methods 
-->MEMO: memo41
Psychology has been misled for 100 years and is put back in it's place.
483: of trying to work with kids with ADHD because nothing else 
484: seems to be really having the same kind of effect so now 
—>END: Intervention. Empirical
485: they are having erm all these meters and so on to detect 
486: movement and so on and the hand gets a set of vibrations
487: when they are moving too much (.) so they get a feedback 
488: that should decrease their movement and so on. And that 
489: sort of treatment are now being tried (.) so it is not that 
~>BEGIN: Intervention.Mixture
490: it is not (.) and when you look at the expense (.) how 
491: expensive the trials are for non pharmacological and 
—>MEMO: memo42
Knowledge is only determined within economic terms - so drugs superior. Wouldn’t use 
psychology even if  it did work due to expense - this is excellent example o f subjugating a 
discourse.
492: pharmacological trials the non pharmacological ones are much 
493: much more expensive (.) and in fact the MTA trials did use 
494: millions to do psychological interventions. The reality is 
—>END: Intervention.Mixture
495: that by assuming that psychological interventions from the 
496: MTA trial work, erm it doesn't mean that what we do as a 
497: psychological intervention in day to day practice is going to 
498: have any kind of effect to the same size to that which is 
499: shown in the trial because we would not be able to do that 
—>BEGIN: Intervention.Mixture 
500: kind of thing (.) in that trial they had school 
501: interventions, social skills groups, holiday camps, training 
502: for 27 weeks, groups being run for everyone, and everything 
503: (.) and that kind of a package will not be done by anyone in 
504: our setting wither here or in America (.) and it is when you 
~>MEMO: memo43
EXF and FIGURATION and 5 part lists used here to show that the best that psychology 
can offer is clearly no comparison
505: use that kind of a Rolls Royce kind of treatment that you've 
506: got a response which is roughly maybe 60% of what the drug 
507: medication., medication did when done properly, when the 
508: medication is used properly (.) so if that is what it takes 
509: for a response of 60% then I would argue that we shouldn't 
510: be wasting those kind of resources for a (.) at least with 
511: the core features of ADHD. I still think that behavioural 
—>END: Intervention.Mixture 
512: interventions, and I make it very clear that I'm not talking 
513: about psychodynamic interventions, as I don't think that 
514: psychodynamic interventions have much of a role in ADHD, but 
->BEGIN: Intervention.Contingent 
515:1 think that behavioural interventions, cognitive 
->MEMO: memo44 
Psychology positioned outside o f ADHD.
516: behavioural interventions or pure behavioural strategies I 
517: think has a significant role (.) parenting and so on (.)
518: has a role especially in dealing with non ADHD symptoms that 
519: co-exist with ADHD. For example peer interactions,
—>END: Intervention.Contingent 
520: oppositional behaviour, aggression, social skills, constant 
521: quarrels between mother and child, those kind of things (.)
522:1 think those areas so respond to some extent to medication 
523: as well but if you're focussing your treatment on those non 
524: ADHD, core ADHD symptoms then I think these kind of 
525: behavioural strategies, social skills and so on have a 
~>MEMO: memo45 
Subject is decided and somewhat closed 
—>BEGIN: Intervention.Contingent 
526: significant role to play in those symptoms. I'm making it 
527: very clear as to where one would like to target.
—>END: Intervention.Contingent 
528:
529: Mark: I see. So do you think that there might come a
530: time where some psychological, be it behavioural or CBT,
531: interventions do target the actual core symptoms of ADHD? 
532:
—>BEGIN: Intervention. Empirical 
533: Dr Pava: I think that with the current knowledge at
534: the moment I don't think that we have evidence to suggest 
535: that we would be able to target erm the core features but I 
~>END: Intervention. Empirical 
536: think that it has a significant role in the peripheral 
537: features which I think the peripheral features are the ones 
538: which actually (.) to a large extent determine the negative 
539: outcome (.) as well (.) in the long term (.) so if a if a 
540: child has got ADHD living in a family where the parents are 
541: very hostile to the child and doesn't really praise him or 
542: anything positive happening (.) and that child also has 
543: oppositional behaviour that child is probably going to end 
544: up having conduct disorder (.) as he grows up so I think 
545: you know that if we had an intervention to decrease their 
546: expressed emotions between the mother and the child to 
547: increase positive interactions we might be able to change 
548: the negative outcome (.) and I'm not sure that just giving 
549: medication would suffice in that particular group of 
~>BEGIN: Intervention.Contingent 
550: children (.) so I wouldn't say that psychological 
551: interventions have no role at all but if you're talking 
—>END: Intervention.Contingent 
552: about core features of ADHD (.) inattention, hyperactivity 
553: and impulsivity for those features I think that it is going
554: to take some more time, maybe years to come if there’s a 
-->MEMO: memo47
Contrary to the psychiatric practice-theory model o f treatment?
—>BEGIN: Intervention.Mixture 
555: better (3) you know theoretical framework in which they are 
—>BEGIN: Intervention.Contingent 
556: going to develop further treatments (.) maybe but I'm 
~>END: Intervention.Mixture 
557: sceptical about it as we have already had 25 years of it (.)
558: people have come and gone with their different theories and 
559: different dimensions and we haven't really been able to 
—>MEMO: memo46
Recognition and evidence for disbelieving in psychology 
560: address the core features as yet and that's the reason why 
561: I'm sceptical (.) not that I think that it's impossible, it's 
562: just that the time span that it has happened over.
—>END: Intervention.Contingent 
563:
564: Mark: When you look at effectiveness with a child you
565: use certain questionnaires and observations and the parents 
566: are asked their opinions, and the teachers are asked their 
567: opinion and the child is asked their opinion as well.
568:
569: Dr Pava: Yes we use standardised measures which have
570: been used for years in the Western countries and the 
571: developing world.
572:
573: Mark: Right, and they are all self report are they?
574:
575: Dr Pava: Erm in terms of the child yes it's self
576: report, in terms of the parents yes they would, we also have 
577: erm standardised interviews that is a semi structured 
578: interview and you go through he whole process of trying to 
579: make a diagnosis of ADHD (.) what are the domains and get 
580: information to reach a diagnosis of ADHD. SO it is there 
—>BEGIN: Intervention.Mixture 
581: but erm erm I mean at the moment I don't think that's too 
582: much of an issue in terms of how we get the information 
->MEMO: memo48
Using empirical methods but recognising the culture differences. Which culture makes 
the final decision o f whether the treatment is effective?
583: because information between teachers and parents are 
584: different (.) they are not identical and the correlation 
585: between the two is not very high (.) that's because you're 
586: talking about (.) the norms are different in different
587: settings.
—>END: Intervention.Mixture 
588:
589: Mark: And the child (.) I wonder what the child's
590: experiences of treatment are.
591:
—>BEGIN: Intervention.Contingent 
592: Dr Pava: The child erm (3) amazingly a lot of children
-->MEMO: memo49 
ECF
593: who have taken medication and have shown response want to 
594: continue with it (.) it becomes a difficulty when they are 
—>END: Intervention.Contingent 
595: actually having to (.) start getting bullied in secondary 
596: school and so on when they have to go out of the class and 
597: get their medication from the headmaster or teacher (.) so 
598: they are open to ridicule and stuff (.) so that's when 
599: things start getting (.) difficult (.) and of course during 
600: adolescence when you are trying to establish independence 
601: and so you don't want any thing (.) you don't want to take 
602: anything (.) you naturally want to become an independent 
603: person (.) so that's when you start having problems with 
604: medication. The few kids who do develop side effects (.)
605: they would find it difficult to (.) they would want to not 
606: have medication but might be in a position to reason that if 
607: they didn't take medication then they might end up getting 
608: excluded from school or would lag behind and they would end 
609: up taking the decision to take it (4) but parents and 
610: societal values also play a big role because in this country 
611: medication is not the first option (.) most parents need 
612: convincing that their child needs medication (.) unlike in 
613: America where, I think, you need more convincing of parents 
614: that psychological interventions need to be used rather than 
615: medication (.) so different societies have different values.
616:
617: Mark: Do you think that the English culture will become
618: more like America where drugs are more acceptable?
619:
620: Dr Pava: I think I think erm (3) in terms of
621: medication and so on there has been a dramatic change in 
622: practice over the last three to four years where we have 
623: started to prescribe much more than we ever did before (.)
624: but I still don’t think that it would reach the proportion 
~>BEGIN: Intervention.Contingent 
—>BEGIN: Positioning psychiatry.Psychiatry as rescuer
~>BEGIN: Positioning psychology.Psychology as abuser 
625: that it is currently in the U.S. (.) I think the U.S. has to 
626: become a little less erm you know easy with the 
627: prescriptions erm while I think the U.K have to be a little 
628: more liberal in prescribing more often (.) and I think that 
629: the middle ground needs to be reached at some point in time 
630: erm (.) psychological interventions I think erm is going to 
631: be the same. I think that we need to use a little less of 
632: psychological interventions while they need to use a little 
633: bit more psychological interventions (.) the reason why I 
634: say that we need to use less psychological interventions is 
~>MEMO: memo50
A continuum is constructed in which drugs can then be looked at as needing to be 
increased to get a balance. Psychology is imbalanced and needs reducing. Subtle shift 
from psychology as useful to useless. In that he wants "middle ground" (reasonable) to 
"little less psychology" (more direct) to "less" to "wasting time".
635: because of the fact that currently more clinics, not here,
636: more clinics do use psychological interventions as their 
637: first line and when they fail with psychological 
638: interventions only then do they consider medication and I 
639: don't think that that's correct because of the fact that not 
640: only are you wasting that much time but very often it is not 
641: audited (.) so you continue to go on with psychological 
642: treatment, maybe family therapy, or whatever for 2 years 
643: before you consider the diagnosis of ADHD and you treat that 
644: with stimulants (.) and I think that 2 years is a long time 
645: for a child who's developing to have missed out on all the 
646: opportunities that might have been available if he had been 
647: diagnosed and treated with medication.
~>END: Intervention.Contingent 
—>END: Positioning psychiatry.Psychiatry as rescuer 
-->END: Positioning psychology.Psychology as abuser 
648:
649: Mark: So first line should be medication instead of
650: psychological?
651:
652: Dr Pava: Yes in the severe end of the condition but as
653:1 said in the hyperkinetic group because that's what the 
654: research evidence shows that not only does it respond to 
655: medication but it specifically tends to respond less well to 
656: non-pharmacological treatment (.) so that's where I think we 
657: can be more clear in saying that if you have got severe end,
—>BEGIN: Intervention.Mixture 
658: if you have got hyperkinetic disorder go for medication (.)
659: don't waste time on psychological intervention (.) when they
660: are better (.) maybe at that point in time if you've got the 
—>MEMO: memo51
Psychology as a "luxury" - this implies that it is not o f  use to child andfamily 
661: luxury of being able to offer something more, go ahead (.)
662: but it doesn't seem to add much erm but in the less severe 
—>MEMO: memo52
Child's needs first? Or other economic/professional factors?
663: ones erm you have to make a decision based on (.) what the 
664: needs of the child are.
~>END: Intervention.Mixture 
665:
666: Mark: You erm (.) earlier you touched on the issues that
667: as children turn to adolescents the medication may not agree 
668: with their system and I wondered what your thoughts are 
669: around the risks of using medication/methylphenidate with 
670: children with ADHD.
671:
672: Dr Pava: What sorts of risks are you taking about?
673:
674: Ark: Any risks to health.
675:
676: Dr Pava: Oh yeah, in terms of side effects (.) there
677: are side effects with medication including methylphenidate 
678: there are side effects and erm in terms of side effects you 
679: have children who might find it difficult to fall asleep if 
680: you give them medication after 4pm you might have kids who 
681: lose their appetite and lose weight or erm in terms of 
682: growth curves slight differences are occurring as a result 
683: of that (.) a few kids will develop things like dysphoria,
684: feeling low, initially when you start medication (.) until 
—>BEGIN: Intervention.Contingent 
685: erm they get used to it but there are there are strategies 
—>MEMO: memo53 
Risks identified and the DISCLAIMER 
686: available to deal with all these side effects but sometimes 
687: these side effects are significantly and severely reduced on 
688: the medication (.) and can consider other alternatives.
—>END: Intervention. Contingent 
689:
690: Mark: Other alternative interventions?
691:
692: Dr Pava: Interventions in terms of medication and non
693: pharmacological depending on what is most appropriate for 
694: that particular child.
695:
696: Mark: So you mentioned sleeping, appetite, and mood can
697: sometimes be detected quite early on, perhaps not 
698: trajectory, growth curve that might=
699:
700: Dr Pava: =that takes a little while. What we do is as
701: a result of that we end up monitoring the growth erm during 
702: the follow up so when they come every 3 months at least you 
703: take their height, weight, it's charted and if they go off 
704: the chart what they expected to do, cause you have to draw a 
705: curve for each person (.) that you predict, and if they go 
706: off the curve then you know that you need to be worried 
707: about it (.) and you take appropriate action and probably 
708: stop the medication and change the medication or change erm 
709: look at what's happening in terms of the (.) erm do they 
710: need drug holidays you know take them off the medication 
711: during weekends or (.) there are lots of different erm types 
712: of interventions you can do (.) but it's not erm it's not 
713: the same strategy for everyone.
714:
715: Mark: You mentioned that methylphenidate is often quite
716: a long course of treatment and I wondered what the longer 
717: term effects or risks are?
718:
~>BEGIN: Intervention.Mixture 
719: Dr Pava: Yes I (.) in terms of long term effects of
720: methylphenidate we don't have very many studies (.) we have 
721: 5 year follow ups done which say that there isn't much side 
—>MEMO: memo54 
Absence and presence o f knowledge.
722: effects I mean erm erm negative consequences in the long 
723: term (.) if anything it shows positive consequences 
724: especially drug abuse (.) when clearly those who have been 
~>END: Intervention.Mixture 
725: treated with methylphenidate erm end up abusing drugs and 
726: alcohol much less than kids with ADHD who have not been 
727: given methylphenidate. So that's a clear positive effect 
728: rather than being a negative one (.) and of course there's a 
729: study I mentioned little while ago (.) erm about erm brain 
~>MEMO: memo55
Attends to the positive aspects only. More power to psychiatry but child's risk 
overlooked. Silences.
730: development using neuroimaging (.) now we know that when you 
731: actually give medication the brain seems to be developing 
732: more like a normal brain (.) as opposed to those kids who 
733: have not received medication (.) I think that's the most
734: important erm to date to suggest that maybe it's not always 
735: negative effects that we are looking for.
736:
737: Mark: So there's some evidence of the positive effects
738: of the drug on the brain. I also read something quite 
739: recently about saying that it could have a toxic effect as 
740: well on the brain.
741:
742: Dr Pava: I I I  hadn't read that literature (.) the
743: ones that I mentioned about toxic effects is is to do with 
744: erm in terms of long term effects (.) in terms of brain 
~>BEGIN: Intervention. Empirical 
745: development and so on and you put all the literature 
746: together and look at number in terms of evaluated scientific 
747: method of looking at it we haven't got any evidence to 
748: suggest that it has a toxic effect on the brain and yet now 
—>MEMO: memo56
Put all beliefs aside and prioritise the empirical discourse. Function - strengthens it and 
subjugates others.
749: you have different people that have different theories about 
750: it and erm in the non peer review journals or the lay press 
751: you will have people hyping the issues of effect erm but if 
752: you look at it from a scientific perspective irrespective of 
753: your views on whether you like medication or not and look at 
754: it just from the scientific content of it (.) then I don't 
—>END: Intervention. Empirical 
755: think that we have very much to suggest that there's a toxic 
756: effect erm (.) I'm not saying that they may not find some 
757: negative effects in the future but it is definitely not 
758: something that we have found. And the other thing to 
759: remember that people have been using stimulants for ADHD fro 
760: the last 18 20 years anyway (.) and lots of them have been 
761: on medication for a long time (.) and I said 5 years because 
762: that's what the research which has been done retrospectively 
—>BEGIN: Intervention.Contingent 
763: and so on (.) but that doesn't mean that clinical experience 
—>MEMO: memo58
Contingent factors actually prioritised here. Where evidence exists then it is relied upon 
to support practice. However, contingent factors are then prioritised to achieve the same 
function when empirical evidence is absent. This opens up a debate on the sources o f 
knowledge.
764: shows that there have been people who have been on 
765: medication for years, 15 years and have had no problems.
-->END: Intervention.Contingent 
766:
767: Mark: And is there the scientific research on those who
768: have been on it for longer course, 15 18 years?
769:
~>BEGIN: Intervention.Mixture 
770: Dr Pava: No I mean there's all all all that we have
771: is clinical experience and nothing nothing negative being 
—>MEMO: memo57
Contingent factors used to illustrate success o f drugs. Then empirical discourse used to 
fend o ff challenges o f other approaches.
772: reported in that erm so apart from that we can't state 
773: clearly (.) so that's why I'm saying that 5 years is what we 
774: do have for scientific, clear evidence which is less than we 
775: can say about the non pharmacological treatments (6).
—>END: Intervention.Mixture 
776:
777: Mark: Okay. Just a moment ago you were saying (.) you
778: compared practice between the U.S. with practice in the U.K.
779: (.) and perhaps the changes that need to happen and that 
780: brings me to the recent NICE guidelines that have come out 
781: around treating ADHD, I wonder what your thoughts on these 
782: NICE guidelines are. Whether you find that they are helpful 
783: or restricting?
784:
—>BEGIN: Intervention.Mixture 
785: Dr Pava: I think that they are helpful but erm with
786: the new knowledge of what the research shows I think it 
787: should should be (4) erm because the NICE guidelines talk 
788: about treatment for hyperkinetic disorder they don't talk 
789: about sub-syndrome hyperkinetic disorder (.) for those who 
~>MEMO: memo5 9
His talk promotes the use o f empiricism to use medication with kids who fulfil his criteria. 
He then uses contingent factors in saying that those who don't fill criteria (clinical 
judgement) should have medications too. This is the supported through a return to 
empiricism and evidence.
790: don't meet the criteria for hyperkinetic disorder (.) that 
791: seems to have been just left out of the NICE guidelines (.)
792: erm the less severe ones and I think now evidence shows that 
793: even those kids respond to medication (.) and I think that 
794: is a necessary thing that needs to be changed in the NICE 
795: guidelines so it would be (.) rather than it being erm (3) I 
796: think that it's too strict what's being prescribed (.) I 
797: think we should be a little more open to prescribing 
798: medication to kids who do not fulfil all of the criteria as 
799: well (.) because evidence shows that they respond.
—>END: Intervention.Mixture
800:
801: Mark: So the NICE guidelines should advocate using
802: medication more with all children with hyperkinetic 
803: disorder?
804:
805:
806: Dr Pava: I mean hyperkinetic disorder yes, erm and erm
807:1 think what it needs to advocate is that erm even if they 
808: don't fill all of the criteria for hyperkinetic disorder, if 
809: they have impairment and they have a syndrome as such erm 
810: medication is not too bad (.) I think it needs to be 
811: included (.) in this country I think it's too restricted and 
->MEMO: memo60
Shifting the constraints o f criteria to give psychiatry access to all children with ADHD. 
From empirical evidence to personal opinion based in fact.
812: it's (.) to talk about the non hyperkinetic kids which has 
813: been shown in the MTA study only 145 of them had 
814: hyperkinetic disorder erm compared to 579 who had ADHD then 
815: you've got only one fourth of the population that we have got 
816: some guidelines for the rest, three quarters don't so that's 
817: the reason why I think we need to have it.
818:
819: Mark: And as a clinician do you find that as guidelines
820: become tighter (.) do you find that your practice becomes a 
821: bit restricted and you lose some of your own autonomy and 
822: clinical judgement or not?
823:
824: Dr Pava: Erm (3) no not really I think I welcome the
825: NICE guidelines because at least (.) because what the NICE 
826: guidelines suggest what we have been doing for a long time 
827: erm just erm beyond that all the NICE guidelines give you is 
828: the minimum good practice (.) it doesn't give you the 
—>MEMO: memo61
Maximum good practice interpreted as giving drugs more, not less.
829: maximum good practice. All that it suggests is the basic 
830: minimum that you have to do (3) so anything more than that 
831: is welcome but that's for practice in the rest of the 
832: country where a lot of them don't even follow the minimum 
S33: and it's for that that NICE came out with the guidelines (.)
'34: so I have no problems with erm with erm following it anyway.
35:
’.6 :
7: 1 
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Appendix 3
An early analysis
Developing key themes
The following excerpt followed on from an enquiry about the role of research in 
interpreting and developing treatment approaches.
Transcript 7 -  Dr Pava
494: The reality is
495: that by assuming that psychological interventions from the
496: MTA trial work, erm it doesn't mean that what we do as a
497: psychological intervention in day to day practice is going to
498: have any kind of effect to the same size to that which is
499: shown in the trial because we would not be able to do that
500: kind of thing (.) in that trial they had school
501: interventions, social skills groups, holiday camps, training
502: for twenty seven weeks, groups being run for everyone, and everything
503: (.) and that kind of a package will not be done by anyone in
504: our setting whether here or in America (.) and it is when you
505: use that kind of a Rolls Royce kind of treatment that you've
506: got a response which is roughly maybe sixty percent of what the drug
507: medication (.) medication did when done properly, when the
508: medication is used properly (.) so if that is what it takes
509: for a response of sixty percent then I would argue that we shouldn't
510: be wasting those kind of resources for a (.) at least with
511: the core features of ADHD.
Throughout this excerpt, Dr Pava uses both empiricist and contingent accounts of 
knowledge. Empiricism depends upon the collection and analysis of data in order to 
acquire knowledge (Willig, 2001), this is a scientific account in which the research results 
are often referred to as immutable facts and scientific givens (Harper, 1994). In this 
empiricist form of discourse, “data are depicted as ‘doing confirming’ and ‘concluding’ 
independently of the actions of the scientists” (Edwards and Potter, 1992, pp. 135).
Dr Pava makes use of an empiricist account in stating, “assuming that psychological 
interventions from the MTA (Multimodal Treatment Study) trial work” (lines 495-496), 
thus constructing ‘truth’ as dependent on scientific methods (McHoul and Grace, 1993). 
Dr Pava’s statement “assumes” that psychological interventions may be judged by 
science to “work”, however, he then makes a shift from an empiricist to a contingent 
account to disclaim the possible benefits of this intervention.
The contingent account acknowledges personal and professional inclinations of the 
individual as well as the influence of social, political and economic factors (Gilbert and 
Mulkay, 1984). Dr Pava uses a 5 part list (Edwards and Potter, 1992), a rhetorical 
strategy which is often used to construct a persuasive account by using a number of
examples to support a claim. The use of this list (lines 500-502) serves to construct the 
psychological interventions used in the trials as exceptionally comprehensive. Having 
created a convincing account of the thoroughness of this approach, the psychological 
approach can then be brought into question as he invokes an economic discourse (line 
510) to imply that this intervention is a misallocation of resources. He further qualifies 
his viewpoint by using a figurative device (Hepburn, 2000), one that is commonly used in 
language to make a point more persuasive by adding rhetorical force. Dr Pava achieves 
this by referring to “a Rolls Royce kind of treatment” (line 505) to hold it up as the best 
thing on offer, and perhaps one that could not be reasonably expected from an NHS 
service.
Other contingent factors are introduced as he makes a cultural comparison, which he 
believes is consistent, in stating, “that kind of a package will not be done by anyone in 
our setting whether here or in America” (lines 503-504). This comparison with America, 
where the research trials that he is referring to were held, can be interpreted as conveying 
an ‘explicit consensus’(Edwards and Potter, 1992), in that other witnesses are ‘brought 
forth’ to strengthen a point and warrant factuality.
Subsequently, Dr Pava reverts back to an empiricist account, asserting that with the 
psychological treatment package “you’ve got a response which is roughly maybe sixty 
percent of what the drug medication (.) medication did when done properly ” (lines 505- 
508). This contribution combines personal guesswork, “roughly maybe” (line 506), with 
the more empirical research statistics comparing the two approaches, which can be seen 
as creating the existence of a ‘correct’ way to intervene. His representation of ‘correct 
knowledge’ is then consolidated by asserting,” we shouldn’t be wasting those kind of 
resources for a (.) at least with the core features of ADHD” (lines 509-511), a declaration 
that would be difficult to challenge in the context of his cumulative argument.
The analysis of this excerpt identifies various discursive constructions. The functions of 
these discourses could be seen as ‘normalising’, in attempting to categorise different 
treatment approaches as ‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’, calling upon science, culture, clinical 
practice and resources to promote a version of the ‘truth’. This process will be explored 
further throughout the analysis. Note how this excerpt is an example of how a variety of 
discursive constructions constitute knowledge.
Appendix 4
Unmarked transcript
1:
2: Transcript 2
3:
4: Consultant Psychiatrist: Dr. Kelley (Male)
5:
6 :
7:
8: Mark: If I start off with some quite general questions
9: (.) just to get a common understanding could you tell me how 
10: you would describe ADHD?
11:
12: Dr Kelley: Ok well I (cough) see it as a disorder of
13: hyperactivity (.) erm impulsivity and inattention erm (.) I 
14: see it as a clinical disorder and all of these behaviours 
15: are on a continuum of a a wider population (.) I think there 
16: is a small group of children that happen to have a disorder 
17: in these three areas to a clinically significant degree 
18: which has an an impact on their lives as individuals and an 
19: impact on their family's lives and on their attainment at 
20: school and on their later lives as well (.) so (3) I think 
21: it is a (.) ADHD or hyperkinetic disorder is is erm (.) a 
22: valid well a valid diagnostic concept or construct. It has 
23: proven it's validity over time.
24:
25: Mark: So so with those (.) the three core areas that you
26: were sayingQ of hyperactivity(.) impulsivity and
27: inattention (.) and you explained them being on a
28: continuum(.) I just wondered where the thresholds would be
29: on a continuumQ what makes ADHD and what is sub-threshold?
30:
31: Dr Kelley: Hmm I think erm I think I think the threshold
32: question is very interesting and erm it's key but I think 
33: it's quite easy to recognise the hardcore ADHD cases of erm 
34: erm (.) to most observers actually (.) erm there is a good 
35: inter-rater reliability for hardcore cases of hyperkinetic 
36: disorder and cases within ADHD but I think the harder 
37: clinical task is actually to separate out erm perhaps those 
38: cases which are less prominent symptomatology but still have 
39: the disorder and to separate them out with background 
40: generalised conduct disorder and family disruption and other 
41: school factors and community factors which are, if you like,
42: providing some background noise which is quite difficult to 
43: separate out ADHD erm (3) from all all those attending
44: factors so it's erm I think clinically one(.) one tries to 
45: erm ultimately there's no absolute scientific way of doing 
46: thisQ one tries to separate out erm the ADHD factors from 
47: all of the other factors and tries to tries to decide erm 
48: we would try to decide whether erm there is a treatability 
49: factorQ is there something that we can, by treating(.) can 
50: improve the erm general situation for a young person erm (.)
51: and (4) that's one of the one of the tasks for the 
52: clinician.
53:
54: Mark: So with (.) erm you have set out that there is
55: ADHD and there is lots of other perhaps comorbidities in 
56: other areas that might influence that so with treatability 
57: are you looking to treat ADHD or is it more of a general 
58: behavioural disorder?
59:
60: Dr Kelley: Well I I I  thinks it's it's more of a
61: behavioural disorder but (.) erm (4) what has been 
62: impressive I think ,over time, I think our ideas of ADHD are 
63: gradually evolving and erm (.) certainly see that in (.)
64: practice of child and adolescent psychiatrists (.) which is
65: the group I belong to (.) erm there is increasing
66: recognition of the value of the identification of ADHD as
67: opposed to (.) and and to separate out that particular
68: constellation of erm symptoms which constitute the disorder,
69: separate them out from other erm similar erm (.) and often 
70: co-existing things like conduct disorder or erm specific 
71: learning difficulties or erm other issues of comorbidity (.)
72: cause there is proven treatabilityQ I think (.) if you
73: take the larger American studiesQ the MTA study etc is
74: very impressive data,that there is treatability when you
75: identify these young people erm with ADHD and when you treat
76: them you do actually produce positive treatment effects
77: which have, certainly have, a medium term impact and hopefully
78: over timeQ a long long term impact.
79:
80: Mark: Right Ok (.) I'll cover a little bit more of the
81: treatment in a second. You have made a differentiation 
82: between behavioural disorders and ADHD and the use of having 
83: it as a distinct disorder (.) ADHD. In your view does that 
84: make it (.) would you classify it as a mental illness?
85:
86: Dr Kelley: I don't see it as a mental illness erm 11
87: think it's hhhhh is it a mental dis (.) I mean it's a 
88: disorder, whether you could I mean it's classified, as I
89: suppose, as a mental disorder but erm I think even having the
90: word erm "mental" erm is probably unfortunate (.) I think
91: that it erm sends the wrong erm perhaps the wrong message
92: (.) ADHD (.) ADHD is a behavioural disorder (.) I think it
93: has erm it has an organic basis and erm it can it can
94: certainly send the wrong message to the childQ family and
95: educators as classifying it as a mental disorder. That is
96: where it's that is where it's classified at the moment and I
97: think most of the hhh most of the energy around the
98: recognition and treatment of ADHD has come from erm has come
99: from the mental health erm sciences and profession (.) it
100: hasn't come from paediatrics (.) it hasn't come from other
101: other branches and professionals^) so it's a disorder(.)
102: it's erm and I think that it has to be called a disorder 
103: because it's erm it's on a continuum and therefore erm (.)
104: it's difficult to say what is and what isn't a disorder, as 
105: behaviour is on a continuum and clearly erm there's no sharp 
106: cut-offs between having a disorder and not having a disorder 
107: it's at best a clinical guess.
108:
109: Mark: So with that continuum (.) and saying that "at
110: it's best it's a clinical guess"(.) I wonder what other 
111: factors influence that clinical decision now (.) erm it 
112: seems that prevalence of ADHD has gone up and if it is 
113: biologically based you imagine that it has perhaps been 
114: around for some time and what has changed to make that 
115: "clinical guess" more prevalentQ that ADHD is more 
116: prevalent in children?
117:
118: Dr Kelley: Erm (4) I mean, that's a very good question
119: because erm (7) I think there are (.) if we look at the wide 
120: (.) if we look at the social situation(.) I think that 
121: there are erm (.) there are reasons why erm particularly for 
122: young boys (.) there are reasons why it is more difficult 
123: for them perhaps in this generation than in any previous 
124: generation(.) those boys would (.) erm have a disorder of 
125: this kind erm (.) I think this is to do with the nature of 
126: of of a schools (.) the nature of (.) erm the nature of 
127: housing (.) the nature of city life etc (.) and it's much 
128: more pressure on young (.) younger children to be(.) to 
129: conform physicallyQ to do with structure^) because of the 
130: concerns about their safety in the streets for instance 
131: they're much more likely to be contained at home erm (.)
132: Because many more children (.) I think are given the 
133: opportunity of education (.) and for longer perhaps than
134: ever before I think that a lot of children who would 
135: previously have dropped out earlier erm in education have 
136: gone on as they are expected to stay in school until a noble 
137: age and are expected to conform to a structure (inaudible). 
138: And then there are factors (.) there are social factors that 
139: in the community (.) everyone is in agreement that 
140: communities are less cohesive than they used to be.
141:
142: Mark: So with those factors of school and family (.)
143: psychosocial and environmental factors (.) what I still 
144: don't see is how that fits with ADHD still having a 
145: biological determinant.
146:
147: Dr Kelley: Well (.) I think the (.) well again that's an
148: interesting question because erm I think that it has been 
149: demonstrated that between cultures erm erm for instance an a 
150: culture like Chinese or Japanese culture which is actually 
151: much more conformist than our own (.) I think (.) if you 
152: look at (.) they will come up with similar rates of ADHD to 
153: erm to the Western culture (.) but it's interesting that if 
154: you compare the two you will find that the children who are 
155: rated as ADHD in Japan are actually (.) probably show less 
156: symptoms or signs of the disorder than children who are 
157: rated to be in the United States (.) so (.) that would 
158: suggest that there are cultural factors that contribute to 
159: (.) erm (.) the expression of the behaviour erm (.) to go 
160: back to(.) to go back to your(.) if you remind me again of 
161: your question (laughs).
162:
163: Mark: Yeah (.) cause (.) cause you were talking about
164: the erm social and environmental precipitators for ADHD and 
165: previously you were talking about having a biological 
166: determinant (.) I was wondering how the two fitted together. 
167:
168: Dr Kelley: Well (.) 111 think that it's it's about the
169: expression but one may have a biological erm (4) erm maybe a
170: genetic coding or whatever erm a phenotype which lends
171: itself to the expression of a particular behaviour (.) but
172: one still needs a set of circumstances to allow that
173: behaviour to be erm to be expressed (.) for instance a child
174: who has erm a phenotype which erm would have a tendency
175: towards ADHD (.) if that child is given is given (.) very
176: erm positive teaching experience (.) a very good
177: environment^) given lots of one to one(.) supportQ etc(.)
178: it is possible that it will not result in an expression of
179: the behaviour (.) erm because the environment is protecting 
180: (.) or if the child is given lots of opportunities for erm 
181: physical recreation or exploration for lots of other 
182: compensatory behaviours then again it is possible that the 
183: behaviour will never express itself. But if you create an 
184: unfavourable environment (.) you erm you erm expect children 
185: to perform in a way that there constitution is maladapted to 
186: do(.) then you will see much more expression of this erm 
187: troublesome behaviour. Erm (4) erm (3) I mean hhhh I mean 
188: at the edges it's a fascinating topic because one would also 
189: look at the impact of stimulation of erm stimulation 
190: (inaudible) (.) and the attention span is something that is 
191: dropping in general in children over time. So could (.)
192: could it be the case that children are hyper-stimulated and 
193: erm does that have an impact on them?
194:
195: Mark: It seems like again (.) there are a lot of
196: environmental effects on people's concentration and 
197: attention erm (.) and you have explained how that effects 
198: peopleQ but what leads us to believe that there is a 
199: biological determinant.) where does that come from?
200:
201: Dr Kelley: I think that the (.) I mean this is not an
202: area of expertise but I think that the genetic erm the 
203: evidence of a genetic basis of ADHD is very robust (.) it's 
204: not absolutely robust but it's fairly robust and I think 
205: that's been that's been establishes in many different 
206: studies that that there is loading within families erm that 
207: the the usual erm usual ways of establishing genetic erm 
208: linkage is through adoption studies etc (.) looking at erm 
209: mono-zygotic (.) dyzygotic twins etc (.) and I think all of 
210: those have established that there is a genetic loading 
211: involved in the erm (.) genesis of ADHD. Erm (4) and then 
212: the the different erm (.) again whether (.) I don't think 
213: that there (.) although there are references to the 
214: chromosomal erm factors (.) which may be important (.) I 
215: don't think that the there is a single gene that is erm 
216: basically linked to ADHD erm but there are (.) in particular 
217: families and particular small groups there are sometimes 
218: clearly identifiable factors that would carry on on on 
219: chromosomes.
220:
221: Mark: And how would these be recognised (.) by what
222: means?
223:
224: Dr Kelley: Erm (.) well again (.) I'd say my (.) it's
225: not my area of expertise but I think it's it's about erm (4) 
226: it's about looking at particular groups (.) whether there is 
227: strong clustering I think and if there are genetic 
228: similarities between the erm individual with ADHD and 
229: mapping out a particular loci which may be erm (.) you 
230: know(.) contribute to the ADHD gene. Like all complex 
231: behaviours erm there are multiple genes supposed to be 
232: involved erm and this interaction is (inaudible).
233:
234: Mark: So initially perhaps it's an interaction of a
235: number of different (.) a number of different genes (.)
236: perhaps more so than an interaction of different
237: environmental influences. One predisposes the other? Is
238: that right?
239:
240: Dr Kelley: I I would think that you need a genetic
241: predisposition. I think to develop ADHD erm you need a 
242: genetic predisposition. Then you need an(.) not necessarily 
243: an unfavourable environment but certainly it helps to have 
244: an unfavourable environment (3) So that if erm (.) It very 
245: much depends I think on the extent of the (.) the extent of 
246: the disorder I think that there are some young people who 
247: (.) have (.) erm a core genetic difficulty which erm 
248: produces the expression of behaviour (.) but that is despite 
249: having a favourable environment, without having siblings 
250: with any evidence of the disorder, despite having parents 
251: who appear to be very competent, despite having positive 
252: schooling experiences (.) etc (.) these young people go on 
253: to express ADHD type behaviour. It all has (.) it's erm 
254: persuaded me that that that there is a genetic loading there 
255: (.) that's producing the behaviour. But in other cases erm 
256: it's not so (.) it's not so clear that there are (.) with 
257: all the background noise it's very hard to segregate out all 
258: the different factors (.) all the effects of families,
259: social factors, deprivation, failing schools, erm it's much 
260: less clear in those cases (.) to be able to say "this is 
261: ADHD".
262:
263: Mark: Right (.) with such a complex picture around
264: diagnosis (.) I will move on to treatment now (.) but 
265: following what you said (.) with such a complex picture (.) 
266: how are the best treatment strategies determined?
267:
268: Dr Kelley: Erm (.) well in terms of the erm the MTA
269: trials (.) the trials in the States (.) I think that's 
270: currently the gold standard in terms of treatment 
271: intervention. I think they've rigorously adapted a (.)
272: double blind crossover type erm methodology and erm they 
273: have used (.) erm to the best of my knowledge (.) they used 
274: erm psychopharmacology(.) erm they've used erm a 
275: behaviouralQ a behavioural social skills module(.) erm (.) 
276: and and maybe the social skills module was separate from the 
277: erm from the behavioural approach but certainly they have 
278: looked at all the possible combinations of those three three 
279: treatment types (.) and erm what's (2) what's persuasive is 
280: that is the importance of a of of medication again(.) but it 
281: was seen as an either or thing, historically, that one would 
282: either use(.) one might use medication or might use a (.)
283: behavioural intervention^) I think there's less evidence 
284: now that a behavioural intervention erm is likely to be 
285: successful in the absence of psychopharmacological support 
286: (.) particularly in those cases which are more severe erm so 
287:1 think there's less enthusiasm amongst child and adolescent 
288: psychiatrists for waiting erm a length of time before 
289: actually erm before actually administering (.) using 
290: medication erm.
291:
292: Mark: So, in that trial (.) well, in those trials,the
293: medication came out as the most effective?
294:
295: Dr Kelley: Yes, but it was erm but it (.) but if one had
296: to choose (.) if one only had resource for one single 
297: treatment erm I think that medication would be the treatment 
298: of choice (3) but it (.) anyway it's never that simple 
299: because to give medication effectively you do need to 
300: introduce behavioural concepts (.) you do need to(.) it's 
301: very difficult to give pure medication without actually 
302: giving some behavioural support for instance (.) erm But if 
303: if 111 think that it's a syllogistic situationQ I think 
304: that if you've got medication plus behavioural support erm 
305: then you you maximise the opportunity for the family and for 
306: that person (.) you push the likelihood of successful 
307: intervention upwards statistically.
308:
309: Mark: So you have said that if you had one option it
310: would be medication and then to be backed up with 
311: behavioural support (.) you said was important. I'm 
312: wondering about erm (.) I'm thinking about how much really. 
313: With the medication I imagine that there is a certain dosage
314: that is used (.) but with behavioural support (.) I'm not 
315: sure how that's quantified, if it is, to make the 
316: comparison.
317:
318: Dr Kelley: (6) Well the (.) in terms of dosage (3)
319: within the UK for instance there's a recommendation in the 
320: BNF of 60mgs as the upper (.) the upper limit of erm (.)
321: upper dosage limit (.) I think that maybe (.) in cases it's 
322: exceeded, depending on the erm individual situation (.) but 
323: most people have 60mg (inaudible) methylphenidate. But in 
324: practice I think what happens is (.) I think people think 
325: about the dosage in terms of mg per Kg and erm (3) it varies 
326: erm quite significantly I think between countries (.)
327: certainly I know that in the US sometimes they give up to 
328: 2mg per Kg particularly in the centres where they treat 
329: large numbers of young people. Most clinicians here would 
330: be more conservative (.) I myself am not terribly happy to 
331: give more than 1 to 1.5 mg per Kg.
332:
333: Mark: And when comparisons are made between the doses
334: (.) the correct dose to use of methylphenidate(.) I wonder 
335: how that's compared with the correct dose to use of 
336: psychological interventions that you mentioned.
337:
338: Dr Kelley: Well I think one of the (.) one of the 
339: difficulties that people in an ordinary CAMHS service is 
340: facing that is very real is that erm is that in terms of 
341: cost there's absolutely no comparison between the cost of 
342: psychopharmacology which is just tiny in comparison to the 
343: cost of a behavioural (.) proper behavioural intervention 
344: erm (.) I think that (3) as I as I understand it (.) and in 
345: the MTA trials the the the behavioural interventions that 
346: were employed (.) I haven't I haven't read the trials 
347: recently so I can't be specific but these were not erm not 
348: skimpy behavioural interventions (.) they were very 
349: significant behavioural interventions, for a significant 
350: amount of time and trained therapists, that had specific 
351: training I think in dealing with ADHD(.) these were not erm 
352: these were not gauche therapists(.) they had a significant 
353: amount of time to deal with the problem in practiceQ in in 
354: real life CAMHS it's erm A) it's unusual to fmd(.) to find 
355: therapists that are actually very familiar with behaviour 
356: modification (.) in ADHD and B) it's unusual that they would 
357: have the amount of time to do(.) the large amount of time to 
358: devote to a single case. So what tends to happen is that
359: erm families are offered some kind of modified behavioural 
360: approach (.) not a(.) probably not erm the sort of 
361: behavioural support that they would (.) be offered if they 
362: went into the research kind of programme.
363:
364: Mark: With such an agreement about the most effective
365: treatment being methylphenidate (.) and sub-standard 
366: behavioural interventions being offered (.) I suppose my 
367: concern is that all this kind of agreement (.) this 
368: universal perception of what works serves to reinforce 
369: what's already in practice erm rather than develop other 
370: areas of intervention?
371:
372: Dr Kelley: Probably (Laughs) (10).
373:
374: Mark: It seems that the momentum (.) through trials and
375: erm also with cost implications, more and more momentum is 
376: building up behind this particular intervention(.) at the 
377: risk of excluding other ways of treatment which might be 
378: less controversial than using methylphenidate with young 
379: children.
380:
381: Dr Kelley: Erm (8) I'm sure (.) I'm sure that's right
382: erm I think erm in my own practice in the area of 
383: methylphenidate has changed (.) I erm had a erm I would 
385: had the first couple of years to a progress to the idea of 
386: methyl (.) of using methylphenidate and it's interesting 
387: (.) it's interesting that people have (.) that people have 
388: moved quite a distance in such a short period of time.
389: Certainly the older consultant (.) child psychiatrists that 
390:1 (.) that I erm (.) trained with (.) some of whom retired 
391: recently (.) it was only in their last five years of 
392: practice that we actually (.) actually used methylphenidate 
393: at all (.) historically although it's been around quite a 
394: long period of time erm (5) So practice (.) practice is 
395: changing and I think it's erm absolutely erm you know I 
396: think that if a child and adolescent psychiatrist takes a 
397: position that mental failure is not indicated at all(.) ever 
398: for ADHD (.) hyperkinetic disorder(.) it's it's now out on a 
399: limb erm they can they can defend their position 
400: philosophically but I think they can't defend it erm in (.)
401: scientifically I think (.) erm there is such a weight of 
402: evidence they would find it very difficult (.) that's 
403: that's in generalQ I think in specific cases (.) of course 
404: one should always look at the specific case (.) erm it is a
405: fact that (.) erm in research in general psychological 
406: treatments (.) in research into psychopharmacological 
407: treatments (.) there is much more money behind research into 
408: psychopharmacological treatmentsQ there's much more 
409: research dollars available for that sort of thing. That's 
410: unquestionably the case (.) but what's erm what's erm 
411: interesting about methylphenidate is that's it's not 
412: particularly (.) I don't understand it to be a huge erm cash 
413: cow for for the companies that produce it. It's been around 
414: for such a very long time erm I don't understand it as such 
415: a money-spinner as say SSRIs are. And that I think reduces 
416: the ethical blurring (.) the ethical blurring I think 
417: around methylphenidate.
418:
419: Mark: But it has cost implications for the actual
420: service?
421:
422: Dr Kelley: Oh absolutely. Huge cost implications when
423: compared to behavioural interventions. Massive cost 
424: implications. Erm and it has cost implications around 
425: training as well because as I experienced myself doing the 
426: CBT course (.) people think they know what CBT is but 
427: actually don't know what it is very often, so a large number 
428: of people are doing behavioural modification that actually 
429: don't have the training and skills to do it properly in the 
430: dosage that may be required to produce an effect. And that 
431: absolutely has cost implications.
432:
433: Mark: I suppose that through people not being well
434: enough trained to work psychologically (.) as you were 
435: saying there with ADHD (.) the implications are that it 
436: probably adds more momentum to the need to use 
437: methylphenidate rather than other interventions.
438:
439: Dr Kelley: I think that there are other factors as well
440: (.) 111 think (4) as well as there being intra-clinic 
441: limitations I think there are also limitations (.) and 
442: methylphenidate is often used, I think, because there doesn't 
443: seem to be any other changeable factor that one can work 
444: with. The young person may be in a sink school (.) with erm 
445: (5) maybe a dysfunctional situation at home erm and there 
446: doesn't seem to be other workable factors (.) if one uses 
447: methylphenidate perhaps in those cases when erm (5) the 
448: alternatives are not pursuable. I think that's the 
449: unfortunate (.) that's that's the unfortunate reality with
450: the use of psychopharmacology (.) it's not just ADHD that is 
451: getting exposure to the psychopharmacological culture (.)
452: it's a depressive disorders and erm (6) and it's it's erm 
453: (6) it's to do with treatability (.) and dealing with social 
454: adversity and (.) (fade out).
455:
456: Mark: If the child was in a socially adverse environment
457: (.) such as a sink school or an erm dysfunctional family (.)
458: erm some people who have voiced opinions against using 
459: methylphenidate (.) rather than be used to help the child's 
460: inattentionQ impulsivity and hyperactivityQ it is used 
461: to pacify the adults in these settings.
462:
463: Dr Kelley: Erm .hhhhh I think that's a possibility. Erm
464: (10) It's (.) unquestionably that's reality. It's a reality 
465: because if you look at certain communities in the United 
466: States for instance (.) you see that in the more (.) in some 
467: communities particularly in the more socially disadvantaged 
468: communities in the States up to 10% of the children are 
469: taking methylphenidate (.) so there has to be some erm some 
470: element of social prescribing, I think, going on. I think in 
471: erm (4) in a situation here, when a clinician sees a child 
472: with ADHD behaviour (.) who is erm who is experiencing some 
473: very negative feedback from erm parents and the school erm 
474: (4) with no opportunity, I think, to affect any other change,
475: then the clinician may prescribe something to erm (3) to try 
476: (.) to try to erm (5) set up a more positive cycle a more 
477: positive chain of events So I think that erm I think that 
478: it's absolutely okay to prescribe in a social context and 
479: erm very often that social context is improved.
480:
481: Mark: And you've got the individual and you've got the
482: social context (.) and I suppose when your looking at 
483: effectiveness erm you use your clinical judgements as well 
484: as looking at the system. I wonder if the children 
485: themselves are included in the measures of effectiveness (.)
486: what they perceive as effective?
487:
488: Dr Kelley: Hhhh erm Yup erm I think you you you always
489: seek the child's opinion about erm about the use of 
490: medication erm or the experience of taking the medication 
491: erm their views about taking medication. I think it is true 
492: than only in older childhood that you're beginning to get 
493: sophisticated responses about that (.) whereas from ages six 
494: to eight or six to nine you get (.) you certainly get
495: opinions about whether the child wants to be on medication 
496: but you're not likely to get clear feedback as to the 
497: actual effect of the stimulants on them (9) It's always 
498: salutary to erm and a lot of kids are surprised by giving 
499: positive feedback because most children don't like taking 
500: medication erm and most children given the choice between 
501: taking medication and not taking it(.) they would choose not 
502: to take it. Erm it's also quite salutary when you get 
503: quality feedback (.) when the child says "I want to take 
504: this". Because they are aware of the positive knock on 
505: effects in school (.) you know when they get good feedback 
506: from teachers or when they get less negative feedback from 
507: parents. And erm (4) so, certainly, we use feed (.) (.) we do 
508: use feedback erm I think, practically speaking, as well when 
509: children (.) in our culture when children get to a certain 
510: age(.) around about twelveQ practically it becomes 
511: impossible to get them to comply erm with with erm a 
512: medication that they don't want to take(.) actively do not 
513: want to take medication they won't and they will find ways 
514: covertly and overtly not to. So it's interesting.
515:
516: Mark: You say that when they get older they can make a
517: bit more of a erm perhaps informed choice (.) perhaps not 
518: (.) which they can't do when they're younger. And I 
519: wondered (.) a part of the information around that choice 
520: might be not just the effect that the drug is having there 
521: and then but perhaps the longer term effects. Stimulants 
522: are often said to be a longer term treatment (.) what are 
523: the longer term effects of taking methylphenidate?
524:
525: Dr Kelley: Erm hhh (10) I think what (.) well (5) there
526: aren't to my knowledge long term studies on the efficacy of 
527: treatment of ADHD erm (5) certainly (4) large scale studies 
528: of of of significant value (.) I can't think of any offhand 
529: (.) a follow up of childhood into adulthood erm of treated 
530: versus non-treated ADHD (.) I don't think such studies exist 
531: (.) if they do I would be very (Laughs) very glad to read 
532: them. Erm I think medium term studies exist (.) these would 
533: be two to five years sort of time scale (.) those sort of 
534: studies compare the erm treatment intervention. But again 
535: most (.) the problem with psychopharmacological studies is 
536: that (6) with a preponderance of studies actually is that 
537: they are quite short term (.) in terms of weeks and small 
538: numbers in months rather than very long term studies in 
539: terms of erm treatment. Erm although it's the case that
540: ADHD erm you start off treatment and erm you have a starting 
541: point and you do not have a clear end point in sight and 
542: there is a general belief amongst psychiatrists that every 
543: year there should be a new evaluation about a decision (.)
544: at least every year there should be a drug free period where 
545: one can monitor the impact (.) in the school environment 
546: where the effects of the behaviour are most important. And 
547:1 think that it's most important clinicians do that. Erm in 
548: my experience children and young people do not comply for 
549: very large numbers of years anyway erm and I think it's very 
550: difficult to get anyone erm to comply to long standing 
551: medication over the years. I think I'm right in saying that 
552: in Massachusetts erm one of the great American researchers 
553: who wrote the manuals on ADHD treatment (.) I think even his 
554: people (.) with all the enthusiasm they have for ADHD 
555: treatment would (.) I think that most people stay the 
556: distance for three to three and a half years. These are 
557: highly motivated (.) selected people etc (.) etc and the 
558: medication was not maintained over a number of years. So I 
559: (.) when people ask me you know(.) "does this mean he has 
560: to be on it for life" or whatever, I usually say well I'm not 
561: thinking as far ahead as that(.) I want to see what the 
562: impact is going to be over the next six months or a year and 
563:1 want you to tell me whether this has made a qualitative 
564: change or not.
565:
566: Mark: You were saying that that there doesn't seem to be
567: any evidence in about the impact of medication over an 
568: extended period of time (.) are parents also picking up on 
569: this (.) are they asking you what effects of the medication 
570: will be on their child?
571:
572: Dr Kelley: I think they're more concerned about if the
573: young person would be on medication for (.) for life(.)
574: you're consigning this young person to take a pill for life.
575: That's what the concerns are (.) they don't actually ask too 
576: many questions about "will there be long term side effects 
577: as a result of this erm medication".
578:
579: Mark: Do you have personal concerns about (.) that there
580: maybe?
581:
582: Dr Kelley: Erm (.) well I'm not overly concerned about
583: methylphenidate as a medication I have to say (.) it's it's 
584:1 think it's a relatively clean medication which is probably
585: the most researched paediatric medication (3) erm very large 
586: studies with methylphenidate (.) it's been around for thirty 
587: or forty years but I think it's a very clean erm (4)
588: medication and we can be (.) I think that we can assure 
589: parents that it's not likely to have erm very serious health 
590: implications for (.) for their child. There are concerns in 
591: adolescence of erm (.) this is after all an amphetamine 
592: derivative (.) there are concerns about generalising to 
593: substance abuse from the use of methylphenidate. I think 
594: those concerns are more historical than present (.) I don't 
595: think that there's erm (5) I don't think that erm there is 
596: real active concern there (.) there are always concerns 
597: about the use of other medications or substances in 
598: conjunction with methylphenidate which is potentially 
599: hazardous. Erm but but (6) but the one issue that comes up 
600: for me erm time and time again is about growth and 
601: development. And methylphenidate needs to be monitored 
602: quite closely (.) that's usually the reason for stopping 
603: methylphenidate (.) around the danger of growth trajectory 
604: (.) particularly weight. That's the one that effects me (.)
605: effects me most. I know other clinicians who have had 
606: experience with methylphenidate have had children with 
607: psychotic episodes but it's not something that I have 
608: experienced.
609:
610: Mark: You were saying that It's an amphetamine
611: derivative (.) I'm wondering how using stimulants with 
612: perhaps overstimulated(.) or hyperactive children could 
613: work(.) as it seems to have the opposite effect in adults.
614:
615: Dr Kelley: Yeah (.) I mean yeah it's paradoxical you
616: have erm one wouldn't expect erm an amphetamine derivative 
617: to have erm a different effect in erm anyone (.) but it 
618: does seem to have a paradoxical effect with children. One 
619: would expect an amphetamine derivative to have a (.) well 
620: you would expect it to increase levels of activity, but this 
621: doesn't happen, it is a paradoxical effect. And I haven't 
622: read anything which appears to be a conclusive as to why 
623: that is.
624:
625: Mark: I suppose with the current way of thinking (.) at
626: some point from childhood to adulthood there is quite a 
627: drastic change for the effects to be reversed (.) to go from 
628: being a sedatory effect to a stimulant effect. Do you know 
629: what might explain that?
630:
631: Dr Kelley: I think at all ages (.) erm (.) I think if
632: you or I took erm methylphenidate it would erm (.) although 
633:1 haven't tested this (Smiles) I think that it would improve 
634: (.) it would improve erm (3) concentration. Some people erm 
635: some people erm use methylphenidate when they are coming up 
636: to major examinations whatever (.) But I have never read a 
637: satisfactory explanation for (.) why. And it certainly (.)
638: it certainly has much less of an impact on erm (.) ADHD 
639: itself changes in younger children and adolescent ADHD does 
640: not present in the same way as a child with ADHD so there is 
641: much more (.) their restlessness is much more subjective.
642: They they they may display some restlessness but certainly 
643: not anything to the degree of a child with ADHD and their 
644: impulsivity will be more contained but they can still have 
645: quite a degree of distractibility. Erm and erm again (.)
646: there are biological reasons for this.
647:
648: Mark: It seems that although methylphenidate has been
649: used specifically with ADHD (.) from what you have described 
650: it also has a more generic effect on both adolescents and 
651: adults if taken in small doses. So is (.) is it a kind of 
652: drug that has been used as a catchall drug(.) is it being 
653: used very generically or is it being used specifically for 
654: symptoms which are exclusive to ADHD?
655:
656: Dr Kelley: Hhh (12) I think it's been used very
657: generically but it's it's erm (.) ADHD is not erm (.) is not 
658: a disorder that you can identify with erm precision. Erm 
659: we're reliant (.) there's no test you can do to identify it 
660: (.) we're reliant on information from schools and from 
661: parents very often and also from observation erm which (.)
662: and that information can be flawed (.) parents can give 
663: their perception and the children can be scapegoated etc.
664: Erm and we're talking about a range of behaviours which erm 
665: are very general (.) one overlaps with another (.) these erm 
666: symptoms in the complex disorder (.) so erm I don't think 
667: it's been used (Laughs) as a social control agent I think 
668: that we are trying to use a specific (.) for you know people 
669: who have clearly identified problems in the area of 
670: overactivity (.) inattention(.) impulsivity. And (4) anyway 
671: it is true that erm they (.) may (.) not (.) have (.) ADHD 
672: (.) it is true that simply giving methylphenidate may 
674: ADHD (.) erm as I think test results have demonstrated with 
675: people with Conduct Disorder erm (13). Erm I still think
676: that the balance of evidence is still in favour of using 
677: using methylphenidate in selected people (.) using using it 
678: as opposed to not using it(.) but trying to use it as 
679: selectively as possibleQ and when one has exhausted all 
680: the other possible areas of opportunity.
681:
682:
683: 1
684:
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02 August 2001 University Registry 
of Surrey
Guildford
Mr Mark Grixti 
Flat 4
23 Lower Rock Gardens
Surrey GU2 7XH, UK 
Telephone
+44 (0)1483 300800 
Facsimile
+44(0)1483 873811
BRIGHTON
East Sussex BN2 IPG
Dear Mr Grixti
The construction of effective interventions for children with attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder: A reflection on psychiatrists’ discursive explications of 
therapeutic repertoires (ACE/2001/52/Psvchl
I am writing to inform you that the Advisory Committee on Ethics has considered the 
above protocol (and the subsequent information supplied) and has approved it on the 
understanding that the Ethical Guidelines for Teaching and Research are observed and 
the following condition is met:-
• That the Information Sheet for Volunteers and the Consent Form are presented in a 
more ‘professional’ manner with regards to their layout on the University’s headed 
paper.
For your information, and future reference, the Guidelines can be downloaded from the 
Committee’s website at http://www.surrev.ac.uk./Surrev/ACE/.
This letter of approval relates only to the study specified in your research protocol 
(ACE/2001/52/Psych). The Committee should be notified of any changes to the 
proposal, any adverse reactions, and if the study is terminated earlier than expected, 
with reasons.
Contd .
I should be grateful if you would confirm in writing your acceptance of the condition 
above, forwarding the amended documents for the Committee’s records.
Date of approval by the Advisory Committee on Ethics:
Date of expiry of approval by the Advisory Committee on Ethics:
Please inform me when the research has been completed.
Yours sincerely
Catherine Ashbee (Mrs)
Secretary, University Advisory Committee on Ethics
02 August 2001 
01 August 2006
ETHICAL COMMITTEE (RESEARCH)
26 October 2001 B f  f Q j  £001
Re: A reflexive investigation into the effectiveness of treatment for attention
deficit hyperactivity disorder <
The Ethical Committee (Research) considered and approved the above study at its meeting on 
19- October 2001. The committee stressed the need to be particularly vigilant about 
confidentiality in this staff-subject project.
Initial approval is given for one year. This will be extended automatically only on 
completion of annual progress reports on the study when requested by the EC(R). Please 
note that as Principal Investigator you are responsible for ensuring these reports are sent to 
us.
Please note that projects which have not commenced within two years of original approval 
must be re-submitted to the EC(R).
Any serious advefs  ^events which occur in connection with this study should be reported to 
the Committee using the attached form.
Please quote Study No. in all future correspondence.
Yours sincerely,
ftnonjrvu/eJ {tor c
25 June 2001
Mark Grixti
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
Dept of Clinical Psychology 
Surrey University 
Guildford 
GU2 5XH
4 Dear Mr Grixti
Re A reflexive investigation into the effectiveness of treatment of attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder
Thank you for your letter dated 10.5.01 regarding the above research proposal. If there is no 
patient involvement, this does not require approval by a Research Ethics Committee.
Yours sincerely
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Ethical reflections
Ethical concerns
I have outlined my ‘ethical reflections’ here as they progressively became more important 
to the analysis of the texts. Having not used discourse analysis before, I had awareness 
but not experience of the impact of doing it on my own ethical position.
Discourse analysis is sometimes described as a ‘critical’ methodology (Parker, 1992) and 
my understanding of this became clearer as the coding process developed. I began to feel 
some discomfort at making interpretations based on the psychiatrists’ discourse, as it 
often felt over critical. I had respect for the psychiatrists and was grateful for them taking 
time out of their busy schedules to help me complete my research interviews. To make 
critical interpretations certainly raised some ethical concerns for me.
Reflections guide interpretations
Having identified this discomfort, I wondered how I could use these ‘ethical reflections’ 
to help inform my interpretations and improve the analysis. This is a process Potter and 
Wetherell (1995) have also identified.
Central to social constructionism is the emphasis on knowledge being a version of events 
(Burr, 1995). The version of events put forward by the psychiatrists was developed from 
their training, clinical practice, and belief system. Thinking about this from their 
perspective, rather than a psychological position, helped me to get a better insight into 
their role in the discourse, knowledge, power triad. To do this study properly, it felt 
important to stay within a Foucauldian approach, without taking too much of an ‘anti 
psychiatry’ position. This was easier to do by applying the idea that some forms of 
practice are not better or worse than others, only different versions. Furthermore, 
Foucault was reluctant to denigrate one clinical approach in favour of others as this 
process has been taken before, often with regrettable results.
These reflections reduced my ethical concerns and helped me to focus on the analysis. It 
also contributed to my understanding of Foucault’s idea that power is not owned by 
people, but people act as vessels for the power. Having ‘externalised’ power in this way, 
I could begin to develop a different relationship with the psychiatrists’ moves between the 
empiricist and contingent accounts of knowledge. I moved from seeing these shifts as a 
conscious, controlled process, to a function that maintained power by silencing resistant 
discourses. This helped me to empathise with the way that the psychiatrists were 
organised by power. This was evident when the empiricist account silenced their 
personal or even professional accounts of the risks of stimulant medication.
Working with power
Having externalised ‘power’ and analysing the way it functions I was also interested in its 
relationship with my subject position. There was clearly a power differential between me 
and the psychiatrists. I only have ‘trainee’ status, I am younger than the participants, and 
have less clinical experience. The psychiatrists often had consultant status and all were
well respected in specialist ADHD clinics. So what does this mean for this piece of 
research?
I could have chosen to use a less critical research method and left the psychiatrists in the 
position of experts and used another form of analysis on their texts. This other form, such 
as IP A, could have looked at interesting themes that developed from their responses. But 
would this have achieved the aims set out? It is unlikely, as a more deconstructionist 
approach is required to ‘unmask’ the power that flows through discourse and versions of 
knowledge.
I came to the realisation that investigating power is a powerful process and it organised 
me into a position where I questioned the ethics of my research. It would have been 
easier not to use such a critical approach and work with these difficult dynamics. 
However, if I had not asked the questions I did and analysed them using discourse 
analysis, I would have felt that I was ‘colluding’ with the power plays that I set out to 
‘unmask’. Being a trainee I may not have had the ‘right’ to deconstruct the ‘experts’ 
discourses on ADHD. Perhaps I am one of the ‘resistant’ discourses that would remain 
subjugated employing more traditional research methods. What are the wider 
implications of this?
Considering my subject position and ‘trainee’ status left me feeling low on the ‘hierarchy 
of power’ what implications would this have in clinical practice? Clients and families 
may experience an even bigger power differential between themselves and the 
psychiatrists. If this is the case it is unlikely that they will get the opportunity to have 
their concerns heard. This will further exacerbate the marginalising of alternative 
discourses. This realisation was encouraging when addressing my ethical concerns. In 
fact, as I reflected more and more on these concerns I began to question whether it would 
be ‘unethical’ not to explore the relationship between discourse, knowledge and power in 
relation to ADHD.
As I developed a better understanding of my ethical concerns, I felt more confident in 
doing this research. Furthermore, looking at how I was organised by my ethical concerns 
assisted in the analysis and discussion. Guiding these reflections and maintaining my 
motivation for this study was further developed through support and enthusiasm from my 
supervisors as well as other professionals working with children and families.
Using a ‘critical’ research method
As discourse analysis is sometimes described as a ‘critical’ approach, it could be argued 
that the participants should be informed of the research method that will be used. In this 
study, although the participants were told that I was using a more social constructionist 
qualitative research methodology, I did not explicitly state that it was discourse analysis. 
Parker and Burman (1993, p. 35) state that “it is simply not possible to tell the subjects 
everything which they could be told about the study” as it might “alter those critical 
aspects of their behaviour which are of interest to the researcher”. Nonetheless, no 
intention was made to deceive any of the participants and my aim to examine the
knowledges around the interventions for ADHD was made explicit on the Information 
Letter distributed prior to the study. Also, the Research Consent form invited the 
participants to refuse to answer any questions, or withdraw from the interview at any time 
if they wished. They were also invited to read an analysis of their transcript to begin to 
make a comparison between our interpretations of the text. All of these measures were 
carried out with respect to the confidentiality of each of the participants. However, 
although these measures were taken to address some potentially difficult ethical issues, 
now that I have a better understanding of the social constructionist epistemological 
position, if I was to repeat the study I would identify the selected research method at the 
outset. This disclosure would serve to minimise any imbalances of power between the 
researcher and participants.
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University School of
of Surrey Human
Surrey GU2 7XH, UK 
Telephone
+44 (0)1483 300800 
Facsimile
+44 (0)1483 300803
Information sheet for volunteers 
Effective interventions for children with ADHD: A psychiatric perspective
Dcdr Dr ^
I am writing to you to introduce myself in the hope that I can meet with you to pursue my research interests 
for my thesis. I am currently in the final year o f my PsychD in clinical psychology at Surrey University. I 
have also recently completed my child and family placement at the ’
Whilst working in the: NHS Trust, I became aware o f the impact o f Attention
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) on such a large number o f children, their families, and their 
schooling. My understanding o f these difficulties was further informed through attending lectures, debates, 
and discussions provided within die locality.
Psychiatrists are well informed about ADHD and there is a sound evidence base. However, research has 
identified some gaps in the knowledge o f die effects of stimulants on children. Furthermore, although 
recommendations have suggested that an improvement in psychological therapies may be beneficial to help 
meet these children’s needs, it is not clear what drives decisions to provide this type of intervention.
The potential developments in the field o f ADHD could well be modelled on the improvement o f 
interventions and knowledge bases for the depressive disorders. Indeed, the effectiveness o f treatment for 
depression was progressed through an improved medical understanding, alongside the development of 
psychological approaches for the emotional disorders.
With this in mind, the aim o f my research is to investigate psychiatrists’ perspectives on the 
advantages/limitations o f medical interventions for children with ADHD. I would also be interested to hear 
your thoughts on the advantages/limitations o f forms o f psychological intervention for this client group, as 
well as how a cross-disciplinary approach could be o f maximum benefit
Please could you let me know if  you if you are willing to share your thoughts and knowledge on ADHD. If 
you are, this would involve a 50-minute interview (please complete and return the attached form 
overleaf). The interview will be conducted at a venue that is convenient for you. I hope to complete the 
interviews between **** and * * * * . Your confidentiality will be protected and you (or any person or 
organisation mentioned) will not be identifiable to others. The interview will be audio-taped which 
following transcription will be destroyed. All data will be respected in accordance with the Data Protection 
Act (1998).
This research is conducted in collaboration with Dr Nan Holmes (Chartered Clinical Psychologist, 
University o f Surrey) and Ms _  ,, Consultant Clinical Psychologist (.
NHS Trust). In the interest o f dissemination o f information, I intend to present the findings back to the 
Trust as well as to write a paper. I would also be pleased to feedback the findings to the participants 
individually if  so desired.
f  Thank you in anticipation.
Mark Grixti
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
University o f Surrey
Please delete as appropriate and return (S AE) to Mark Grixti, Department o f Clinical Psychology, Surrey 
University, Guildford, GU2 5XH. Alternatively, please contact Mark on 07900 275077 or e-mail 
mark.grixti@totalise.co.uk
I would/would not be willing to be interviewed for this piece o f research on ADHD.
-If die answer to the above is affirmative then please state a preferred date(s) that you would like to be 
interviewed..........................................................
-Preferred venue for the interview......................................
Contact telephone number:.................................................
E-mail:...................................................................................
Signed:..................................................... .............................
Print:......................................................................................
If for arty reason you prefer not to be contacted again by me, please indicate this on the form before 
returning it.
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University 
of Surrey
Guildford
Surrey GU2 7XH, UK 
Telephone
+44 (0)1483 300800 
Facsimile
+44 (0)1483 300803
School of
Human
Sciences
Research Consent Form
A reflexive investigation into the effectiveness of treatment forattention deficit hyperactivity disorder
I am conducting a piece of research as a  part of my PsychD course in clinical psychology. I would like to 
invite you to share with me some of your thoughts, experiences and feelings around the effectiveness of 
treatment for attention deficit hyperactivity disorder in children. Some of the issues that are of particular 
interest are; what are the most effective interventions, with whom are they most effective, the areas which 
need to be further understood to improve effectiveness and the role of psychological therapies in treatment. 
To do this, I would like to complete a  short interview with you for approximately 50 minutes. The interview 
would be audio-taped.
Care will be taken to ensure that you (or any parson or organisation that you mention) can not be identified through the 
report In making a transcription of the audio-tape^  any names will be deleted or replaced by pseudonyms. After the 
transcription has been made a copy will be sent to you for verification purposes (unless you specify otherwise) and then 
the audio-tape will be destroyed.
If there are any questions that you do not wish to answer fed free to say so. If there are any questions you would like to 
ask during the interview, please fed free to do so. Your participation is entirely voluntary. You are free to withdraw 
from the study at any point without needing to justify your decision.
Please read thefollowing. If you are in agreement, sign where indicated.
I confirm that I have read and understood the above information and agree that the purposes of this research and what 
my participation in it would entail, have been clearly explained to me in a manner that I understand I therefore consent 
to be interviewed about my thoughts, feelings and experiences concerning the treatment of attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder. I also consent to an audio-tape of this interview being made and to all parts of the recording 
bdng transcribed for the purposes of this research. I understand that all personal data will be held and processed in 
accordance with the Data Protection Act (1998). I agree that I will not seek to restrict the use of the results of the study 
on the understanding that my confidentiality is preserved
*
Participant’s Signature
Signed:......................................................................    Date:..................................
Please Print Name:.................................................. ................................................................
The confidentiality of the above participant will be protected and they (or any person or organisation they mention) will 
not be identifiable to others. Use of the audio-tape or transcribed material will be for the purposes of research only. 
Confidentiality will be ensured in respect of the audiotape and transcription in accordance with the Data Protection Act 
(1998).
Researcher’s Signature
Signed:..........................................................................  Date:......................................
Please Print Name:
Witness’ Signature
Signed.............................
Please Pript iYqu*?,,...
Date.
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Interview Schedule
1. Context Section
Descriptions
Just so we can get a common understanding, could you tell me how you would 
describe “ADHD”?
- Core symptoms
- Thresholds for “abnormal”
- Is it a mental illness?
Diagnosis
How do you make your diagnosis of ADHD?
- Which classification system (differences in these)
- Comorbidities
- Pressures from profession/parents to diagnose which go against own beliefs?
- Any personal reservations/concerns around diagnosis?
Causes
What would you say the cause(s) of ADHD are?
- Biological or Psychological or genetic? (How do we know this?)
- Where is ADHD located? \In child or elsewhere?
- Explore neurological/environmental relationship.
- If biological why are numbers rising? (what has changed -  professionals or children?)
2. Intervention section
Intervention
Which forms of intervention would you advocate for ADHD?
- What for whom?
- How is this known?
- Explore theory/practice links and clinical experience.
- Specificity of interventions?
- Personal/professional opinions?
- If one intervention is so effective is it necessary to develop other approaches?
- Who measures effectiveness? (child?)
- In a typical case, what would the child’s perception of effectiveness be?
- I f  answer is to concentrate and comply -  Is drug used to “pacify adults”?
What does the drug actually do to treat ADHD?
- Did theory come before the practice? (post hoc)
- Explore temporal dimension of treatment development -  “a pill for every ill or an ill 
every pill”.
How do you decide which children would benefit from which treatment when you 
are considering which intervention to recommend?
-Referral decisions
Does the preferred intervention work with all children with ADHD?
-The effects of it with non-ADHD children?
Explore the risks associated with medical interventions.
- Long/short-term effects? Risks?
- How is this known?
- Personal/professional opinions?
What is the effect of current guidelines on determining treatment approaches?
-Restrict or empower the psychiatrist? (NICE)
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Transcription Symbols
(.) pause in talk less than 2 seconds
(5) 5 second gap
.hh speaker’s in breath
hh speaker’s out breath
= no gap between speakers/overlapping talk
break off a sentence abruptly 
but emphasis
(but) inaudible or doubt about its accuracy
(laughing) classificatoiy information
practice extension of preceding vowel sound
(( )) a description of a non- verbal activity
**** Detail anonymised
Use commas and full-stops as required to improve clarity of read.
Appendix II
An empiricist account
This response was to a question about the confidence of using stimulant medication.
Transcript 2 - Dr Edmund 
344: because it has been around for about 50, 60 years erm and it 
345: is probably one of the best research drugs around in 
346: psychiatry erm (7) erm you know, it is much better researched 
347: than any other intervention in psychiatry (.) there are most 
348: things published with methylphenidate than most of these 
349: psychological treatments (.) psychiatric treatments in 
~>MEMO: memo65 
350: general (.) psychiatric or psychological treatments. I am
In Dr Edmund’s (transcript 2) empiricist account he uses a similar rhetorical device to Dr 
Pava (Excerpt 3, transcript 7) of explicit consensus. Dr Edmund invokes the factor of 
time in supporting the use of stimulants in stating, “because it has been around for about 
fifty, sixty years erm and it is probably one of the best research drugs around in 
psychiatry” (lines 344-346).
Dr Edmund could be seen to further qualify this statement by introducing psychological 
interventions as a comparative measure of empirical inferiority by asserting, “there are 
most things published with methylphenidate than most of these psychological treatments” 
(lines 347-349). A more micro level consideration of this statement could be used to 
consider how Dr Edmund uses the word “most” ( lines 347-348) to construct a continuum 
of empirical evidence in which he places methylphenidate at what appears to be the 
favourable end. This use of “most” is another example of an extreme case formulation, 
which can be understood as warranting a stronger case for medicating over psychological 
treatments. This statement exemplifies the way in which “data are depicted as ‘doing 
confirming’ and ‘concluding’ independently of the actions of the scientists” (Edwards and 
Potter, 1992, pp. 135). Moreover, the outcome data of treatment trials could be 
perceived as secondary, as they are not even referred to. Instead, the quantity of “things 
published” (line 348) alone are used here to warrant a particular treatment approach.
Positioning
Dr Edmund’s response followed the question:
340: Mark: I wonder how confident people are about using
341: methylphenidate with ADHD?
In this case the question is constructed in a simpler way than in the Dr Pava example 
(transcript 7; lines 289-292). The question is softened using “I wonder” (line 340) in 
which the subject position of an unknowing agent is occupied. In turn, the respondent is 
positioned as the informant who would be expected to supply answers to the questions. 
However, it should be acknowledged that the creation of such positions is not linear but 
the result of a cumulation of fragments from an ongoing narrative (Davies and Harre,
1990). Indeed, the positions may be influenced by known roles, as Dr Edmund was 
aware that I was also a trainee clinical psychologist. This knowledge may contribute to 
the specific speech conventions such as, researcher-participant, student-teacher, 
psychologist-psychiatrist.
A personal/professional contingent account
This was the response to the Dr Gola being asked which treatment approaches he 
preferred.
Transcript 4 - Dr Gola
289: Dr Gola: I think I would probably (.) if it's not too
290: severe to try to try the psychological and behavioural 
291: methods first. Erm but I must say (.) and I don't know why 
292:1 have got to this point (.) although I do that (.) I have 
293: found out that even when I do that I end up having to 
294: prescribe medication eventually. And sometimes I question 
295: whether that is an appropriate way of doing it (.)
This question appears to have invoked some level of uncertainty for Dr Gola. He begins 
with two comments that indicate this in line 289, with “I think” and “I would probably”. 
He then constructs a continuum of severity and classifies psychological and behavioural 
methods of intervention as worth trying with the milder end of the disorder (line 289- 
290). So far he appears to be using a personal contingent account as he conveys a more 
personal preference for intervention with less severe children. However, from line 291, 
this personal contingent account appears to be resisted by another discourse. Dr Gola 
seems to recognise this subtle shift in stating “I don’t know why I have got to this point” 
(lines 291-292). He then disclaims the approach that he initially supported by saying that 
“I end up having to prescribe medication eventually” (lines 293-294). It could be the 
dominance of a professional contingent account that moved him to this position. The 
words “having to” indicate that he is a clinician who is ‘forced’ to prescribe medication. 
However, the personal contingent account reappears as he expresses with the comment 
“And sometimes I question whether this is an appropriate way of doing it” (lines 294- 
295).
Positioning
The shift between personal and professional accounts serves the function of constructing 
Dr Gola as a thoughtful practitioner with reservations around the use of medication. He is 
then positioned as ‘helpless’ as he is ‘forced’ to prescribe mediation despite his 
reservations. Having removed responsibility for this action, he then objectifies 
prescribing by questioning it appropriateness. This puts him in a position where it would 
be difficult to challenge his choice of intervention.
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